




State of Wisconsin Government Accountability Board



2014 Voting Equipment Audit Report

March 2015



**Wisconsin Government Accountability
Board**

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Introduction

Wis. Stat. § 7.08(6) is the state embodiment of § 301(a)(5) of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Wis. Stat. § 7.08(6), requires the Government Accountability Board (G.A.B.) to audit each voting system that is used in this state following each General Election:

(6) Enforcement of federal voting system standards. Following each general election, audit the performance of each voting system used in this state to determine the error rate of the system in counting ballots that are validly cast by electors. If the error rate exceeds the rate permitted under standards of the federal election commission in effect on October 29, 2002, the board shall take remedial action and order remedial action to be taken by affected counties and municipalities to ensure compliance with the standards. ¹ Each county and municipality shall comply with any order received under this subsection.

This law was passed in 2005 and became effective January 1, 2006. Following the November 2006 general election, the first post-election audit was conducted in the State of Wisconsin. Wisconsin has required a “complete, permanent paper record showing all votes cast by each elector, that is verifiable by the elector, by either visual or nonvisual means as appropriate, before the elector leaves the voting area” since April 2004. Wis. Stat. § 5.91(18).

The State of Wisconsin specifically distinguishes the post-election audit requirement as separate from the required pre-election tests of electronic voting systems. The pre-election test of electronic voting system, defined by §5.84, Wisconsin Statutes, uses a pre-determined set of ballots to ensure that the voting system is properly programmed prior to Election Day. The post-election audit, on the other hand, is designed to assess how the electronic voting system performed on Election Day using the actual votes cast by electors.

The Wisconsin Government Accountability Board established detailed procedures for meeting the post-election audit requirement. Post-Election Audits fulfill many goals including:

- Creating an appropriate level of public confidence in the results of an election;
- Deterring fraud against the voting system;
- Detecting and providing information about large-scale, systemic errors;
- Providing feedback that will allow jurisdictions to improve voting technology and election administration in future years;

¹ The current federal standard is 1 in 500,000 ballots. Accordingly, auditing teams must reconcile the Voter Verified Paper Record with ballots or records tabulated and recorded by equipment and eliminate any potential non-tabulation related sources of error including printer malfunctions, voter generated ballot marking errors, poll worker errors, or chief inspector errors.

- Providing additional incentives and benchmarks for elections staff to reach higher standards of accuracy; and
- Confirming, to a high level of confidence, that a complete manual recount would not change the outcome of the race.

The effectiveness of the audit is enhanced by several features, including:

- Use of a completely transparent and random selection process for choosing reporting units to be audited;
- Conducting audits for state and local offices;
- Ensuring a minimum number of reporting units for each model of equipment is represented in the audited reporting units;
- Use of counting methods that include overvotes, undervotes, blank ballots, and spoiled ballots; and
- Auditing of all ballots tabulated on Election Day including absentee ballots.

Since 2006, the G.A.B. has conducted audits on voting equipment within the state. With the 2006 report, the audit verified that the machine tallying functions on all electronic voting equipment models tabulated correctly. The report also indicated that there were no identifiable bugs, errors, or failures of the direct recording electronic (DRE) equipment used in the 2006 general election.

In 2008, Board staff reformed the audit program given the unsustainably high costs both in terms of personnel and financial expenses. The Board staff began asking municipal clerks to conduct audits at the municipal and county level, and mail audit materials to the Board offices for staff to complete, instead of staff completing the audits onsite. In 2010, the Board continued requiring municipalities to conduct audits at the municipal level with assistance from G.A.B. staff. Municipal and county officials have performed the majority of voting equipment audits following the canvass process. In spite of the considerable demands on their time, most of Wisconsin's clerks in audited jurisdictions have diligently completed the voting equipment audits, providing staff with considerable evidence of the accuracy of the voting equipment used within the state.

In 2012, Board staff reformed the audit program to begin auditing double the amount of reporting units from previous audits. This meant auditing over one hundred (100) reporting units. Municipalities continued to be required to perform voting equipment audits at the municipal level, with assistance from G.A.B. staff. In 2014, the G.A.B. implemented procedures and reporting unit numbers similar to those used in the 2012. Municipalities were again required to perform audits at the municipal level. Many municipalities worked with their respective county clerks to conduct the required voting equipment audits. G.A.B. staff assisted municipalities with planning, and auditing procedures, review of initial audit results, ideas and methods for resolving

potential discrepancies, and in limited circumstances conducting a third count of the ballots to verify the voting equipment results report against the hand count audits.

The audits reveal matters for future consideration by the Legislature, the Board, the County and Municipal Clerks, as well as concerned citizens. As noted in the Board's previous audits, the voting equipment used within the state, while accurate, is aging and beginning to show signs of wear that many municipalities will need to address. The audit also underscored the necessity of educating voters on the voting process as well as the continued need to have technology in place that makes the voting experience easily understandable and accessible by all voters.

Overview of Audit Procedures

The Government Accountability Board randomly selects a pre-determined number of reporting units across Wisconsin to target for municipal audits, including a minimum of five (5) reporting units for each voting system used in Wisconsin. The audits are conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth below. Both the municipal and county clerk of reporting units selected for audit are notified of the selection. If fewer than five (5) reporting units for any voting system are selected through the random selection process, then additional reporting units are randomly selected for the voting system until five reporting units per voting system have been selected. Any reporting unit selected for audit that is subject to a recount is replaced by another reporting unit selected at random by the G.A.B. For good cause, the G.A.B. may identify other reporting units to be audited.

Pre-Audit Preparations

The audit shall be open to the public. Members of the public may not interfere with the conduct of the audit. The time and location of the audit must be posted at least 48 hours prior to the audit. Audits may commence as soon as notification is provided by the G.A.B. The audit must be conducted no later than two (2) weeks after the Government Accountability Board certifies the election results.

Upon notification by the Government Accountability Board that the municipality shall conduct an audit of a selected reporting unit, the municipal clerk shall make arrangements with the county clerk and the county board of canvassers to preserve and retain the election materials including voter lists, the Inspectors' Statement (GAB-104), Tally Sheets (GAB-105), reports printed or generated by the voting system, ballots and any other required materials that will be used during the audit. All materials subject to audit must be retained in a secure location by either the municipal or county clerk.

Upon agreement of the municipality and county, the county clerk or county board of canvassers may perform the audit of the selected reporting unit(s) in lieu of the municipality. In this instance, the county would be entitled to any reimbursement provided by the Government Accountability Board.

General Procedures

1. The municipality shall acknowledge receipt of their selection for the post-election voting system audit and confirm with the G.A.B. the following information for each reporting unit selected:
 - a. Voting System Type
 - b. Voting Equipment Model
 - c. Touch Screen Voting Equipment Model
2. Four (4) contests shall be audited, including the top contest on the ballot (Governor). The other selected audit contests were: Attorney General, State Treasurer, Sheriff.

3. The clerk shall publicly post notice of the time and location for the voting system audit at least 48 hours prior to the scheduled audit.
4. A minimum of two individuals shall participate in the audit. Votes shall be tallied by hand for the contests included in the audit. For some voting systems, this will require counting the votes listed on the voter-verified paper audit trail generated by the voting system on Election Day. At least two auditors shall each determine an independent total for each contest. These totals shall then be compared to each other. If the auditors' totals agree, the totals are then compared to the results generated by the voting system and any discrepancies are recorded.
5. If any offices contain an overvote, no vote is counted for that office, and is considered an undervote.
6. Auditors should only count votes as the equipment would have counted them. Because the purpose of the audit is to evaluate the performance of the voting equipment in accurately tabulating ballots, auditors do not attempt to assess voter intent for a ballot that is not marked according to the ballot instructions. In some cases, it may not be clear exactly how the ballot would have been counted by the voting equipment. Auditors should document in the minutes any ballots where it is unclear how the voting system would count the ballot. The auditors should include in the minutes how they counted the ballot as well as all reasonable alternatives on how the machine may have counted the ballot.

Example: Ballot 93, voter marked both Jane Doe and John Smith and attempted to erase the mark for John Smith. We counted it as a vote for Jane Doe, but the machine may have read this as an overvote in this contest. This may result in our tally having one more vote for Jane Doe and one less undervote in this contest.

It may be possible that the auditors' totals do not match the voting equipment results report, but as long as any difference in the totals can be reasonably explained by reference to specific ballots, this is not considered to be an error with the voting system.

Recommended Audit Procedures

Set-Up

1. Count out ballots into sets of 100.
2. Label stacks-each ballot will have a unique number (1-100, 101-200, 201-300, etc.)

Note: Two people review each ballot. Auditors should rotate the stacks between them – i.e. Person A works on Stack 1-100 while Person B works on Stack 101-200, etc...then they switch. Person A and Person B will each individually go through all the ballots. Keeping the stacks in order allows the auditors to narrow down discrepancies between them instead of recounting all ballots over and over again.

Each Auditor Individually

1. Tally votes in groups of 20 – the goal is to be able to narrow discrepancies between individual tallies down to the smaller groups of 20.
2. Keep separated in subgroups of 20 while tallying – it is helpful to keep the group of 100 in one stack but to alternate the directions of the subgroups of 20.
3. Add subtotals after 100 ballots are complete.
4. Add subtotals together; confirm total is 100.
5. Repeat 1-4 in sets of 100 until all ballots are counted.

Auditors Jointly

1. Compare individual tallies for each contest audited.
 - a. Circle any discrepancies between the two tallies.
 - b. If tallies do not match, recount the sub-group of 20 to determine which tally is correct. You should use a new tally sheet labeled “Recount [insert Stack Number/Subgroup]”.
2. After any discrepancies are reconciled, add the stack totals together to determine the total vote in each contest audited.
3. Compare to electronic voting machine (EVM) total.
 - a. If the totals match, note that they match on the reporting form.
 - b. If the hand tally and voting equipment tally does not match for a contest, the auditors review the minutes for ballots that were ambiguously marked that could explain the discrepancy. If the discrepancy can be reasonably explained by specific reference to these ballots, record that explanation on the reporting form.
 - c. If the minutes do not provide a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy, calculate the error rate and note the actual difference in votes and the error rate on the reporting form.

Post-Audit Procedures

Each municipality conducting an audit must submit the designated reporting forms and supporting documents from the audit, including tally sheets, to the Government Accountability Board (G.A.B.) to indicate the audit was completed and describe any discrepancies found.

The G.A.B. staff may, at its sole discretion, request that the municipality submit all audit materials, including the source documents (ballots, poll lists, etc.) to the G.A.B. for further review. In such a case, the G.A.B. will reimburse the municipality for the associated postage/shipping costs.

In the event that a discrepancy between the machine tally and the paper record tally cannot be reasonably explained, the G.A.B. will request that the voting equipment manufacturer investigate and explain the reasons for any differences between the machine tally and the paper record tally. Should the vendor fail to provide a sufficient written explanation, including recommendations for preventing future occurrences, within 30 days of notification, the G.A.B. will suspend approval of the affected voting system in Wisconsin. This suspension will be implemented immediately, pending an appeal by the vendor to the Board, which must be filed within 30 days.

Based upon the results of the audit, the Government Accountability Board may, at its sole discretion, choose to re-test the voting system per GAB Chapter 7. Such a test would be a condition of continuing approval of said voting system.

Municipal Reimbursement

The Government Accountability Board will reimburse up to \$300 per reporting unit for the costs associated with conducting each audit to those municipalities with reporting units identified for audit. Municipalities will be reimbursed (up to \$300 per reporting unit) for actual costs incurred. Appropriate documentation detailing actual costs incurred by the party conducting the audit is required for municipalities or counties to receive this reimbursement. The Government Accountability Board will not reimburse personnel costs at a rate exceeding \$10 per hour. As of February 23, 2015, the G.A.B. has reimbursed municipalities and counties a total of \$13,804.25 for the 2014 voting equipment audit.

Voting Equipment Descriptions

Touch Screen Voting Equipment

Sequoia Edge

The Board approved Sequoia's AVC-Edge with VeriVote Printer DRE system, version 5.024 on March 22, 2006. This system was approved under National Association of State Election Directors (NASSED) system ID # N-1-07-22-22-002. Most municipalities that use the AVC-Edge utilize it to meet accessibility requirements and use another system, usually traditional paper or optical scan, to fulfill the majority of voting needs.

ES&S iVotronic

The Board approved ES&S's iVotronic DRE with Real Time Audit Log, version 9.1.4.0 on April 26, 2006. This system was approved under NASSED # N-2-02-22-22-005. Most municipalities that use the iVotronic utilize it to meet accessibility requirements and use another system, usually traditional paper or optical scan, to fulfill the majority of their voting needs.

AccuVote TSX

The Board first approved Diebold's AccuVote TSX DRE Touch Screen and AccuView Printer Module, version 4.6.3 on March 22, 2006. This system was approved under NASSED # N-1-06-22-22-001. Most municipalities that use the AccuVote TSX utilize it to meet accessibility requirements and use another system, usually traditional paper or optical scan, to fulfill the majority of their voting needs.

Populex

Populex Digital Paper Ballot Voting System, version was approved by the State Elections Board at the May 17, 2006 meeting.

Optical Scan Tabulators

ES&S M100/ES&S M550

System assigned NASSED # N-2-02-22-22-005. This equipment was approved by the Elections Board April 26, 2006.

ES&S DS200

DS200 digital scanner, version 1.6.1.0, was approved by the Board on August 28, 2012. Version 2.12.00 was approved by the Board on September 4, 2014.

Optech Insight

Formerly a Sequoia Product that has been acquired by Dominion Voting, the Optech Insight optical scan ballot reader, version APXK2.10/HPX K1.42 was assigned NASED system ID # N-1-07-22-22-002. The State Elections Board approved this equipment on March 22, 2006.

Optech Eagle

The Optech IIP Eagle originally made by Business Records Corporation and later (as a result of merger and an antitrust decision), by both Sequoia Voting Systems and by Election Systems and Software. The Optech Eagle is the longest running voting system currently in use, and in some municipalities, the Eagle has been in use for approximately twenty years.

Diebold/Premier-AccuVote-OS

This was formerly a Diebold Elections System Product that has been acquired by Dominion Voting. The AccuVote-OS (model D) Optical Scan, version 1.96.6, was approved by the State Elections Board along with a series of security recommendations, at the March 22, 2006 meeting. The system was assigned NASED system ID # N-1-06-22-22-001.

2014 Voting Equipment Audit Summary

After the 2014 General Election, G.A.B. staff selected a total of 104 reporting units across Wisconsin to conduct the 2014 post-election voting equipment audit. The municipalities selected to conduct a post-election audit include five reporting units for each piece of touch screen and optical scan voting equipment approved for use in Wisconsin. If fewer than five reporting units for any voting system were selected through the random selection process, then additional reporting units were selected by voting system until five reporting units per voting system were selected. The municipalities selected for the audit and the types of voting equipment used by each municipality are listed in Appendix A.

There were two exceptions to the “five reporting unit” rule related to touch screen voting equipment. The Populex equipment is used by only two municipalities, encompassing three wards, and therefore those reporting units are included in every voting equipment audit. In addition, G.A.B. records used for the random draw of reporting units incorrectly stated that the Village of Menomonee Falls used the iVotronic. The City of Adams was also removed as an audit municipality because G.A.B. staff records incorrectly listed the voting equipment used by the City of Adams.² Upon receipt of the correct information G.A.B. staff concluded there were sufficient municipalities conducting voting equipment audits for the voting equipment used in the City of Adams. As a result, 103 reporting units conducted voting equipment audits. The municipal and county clerks were notified of the municipality’s selection to complete a voting equipment audit for one or more of the municipality’s reporting units.

These tables reflect the number of reporting units audited for each type of voting equipment.³

Touch Screen Voting Equipment	Reporting Units Audited
Sequoia Edge	46
AccuVote-TSX	18
iVotronic	3
Populex	2

Optical Scan Voting Equipment	Reporting Units Audited
Sequoia Insight	11
ES&S M100	6
Optech Eagle	31
AccuVote-OS	17
ES&S DS200	13

² Information for voting equipment used by each municipality is available on the G.A.B. website, and is what is used when conducting the random drawing for the voting equipment audit. The information contained in the document titled “Wisconsin Voting Equipment Spreadsheet 11.19.14” was gathered from surveys submitted or information obtained from municipal and county clerks.

³ Numbers in each table do not add up to the total number of reporting units audited because some reporting units use only (1) touch screen voting equipment or (2) optical scan voting equipment and the AutoMARK ballot marking device.

The 103 reporting units represent 79 municipalities throughout the state. Ten municipalities did not inform G.A.B. staff of the date and time of their scheduled audit prior to their occurrence as requested by audit procedures. No municipality completed a voting equipment audit during a municipal canvassing period. Twenty-five municipalities completed their initial audits prior to the certification of the election by the Board on December 1, 2014, as permitted by the Board's motion on October 28, 2014. One municipality did not complete their initial audit by the December 15, 2014 deadline. All municipalities submitted their initial audit materials before the end of 2014.

As of February 23, 2015 two reporting unit audits have not been closed out. The two reporting units are aware of the issues concerning their audit and are working on reconciling remaining discrepancies. Approximately 15 of the municipalities did not need to complete additional verification (conduct a second audit) after the initial audit.

Touchscreen Voting Equipment Audit Results Summary

All voting equipment audits of touch screen (Direct Recording Electronic or DRE) voting equipment were completed by municipal or county clerks, except for one, which was completed by Board staff due to a unique set of circumstances which applied to the municipality. The audit reports indicate the voting equipment tallying function on all audited touch screen devices tabulated correctly, with no identifiable bugs, errors, or failures occurring between the individual cast vote record and the total tabulated vote record. The only noted issue arose with the procedure for auditing the touch screen voting equipment paper audit trail. In one municipality the auditors incorrectly cut the tape when separating individual votes, which caused two voided ballot notices to be attributable to four individual ballot entries. However, the four ballot entries could be identified and the numbers reconciled when applying the two voided entries to two of the four individual ballots.

Optical Scan Voting Equipment Results Summary

All voting equipment audits of optical scan equipment were completed by municipal or county clerks. G.A.B. staff had to perform additional hand counts for three municipalities, in a total of three reporting units, to reconcile audit results. The individual audits indicate the optical scan voting equipment performed correctly and as expected. Minor discrepancies were reconciled (with a reasonable degree of certainty) between the audit hand counts and the voting equipment results report from election night.

Optical scan voting equipment has specifications for which type of ballot marking devices are to be used in order for voting marks to be detectable by the equipment. In instances where voters used improper marking devices (e.g. absentee voter used a pen, when the equipment required the mark to be made with a carbon-based marking device (pencil)), or marked ballots incorrectly (e.g. the voter only partially filled in the oval or arrow on the ballot), the equipment would most likely not count these ballots. In rare instances, the equipment performed better than expected and was able to read ballots, despite voter errors. Some audit teams would count improper ballots based on voter intent. In others, municipalities initially did not count ballots marked

improperly. Municipalities narrowed down vote totals to a reasonable range of ballots responsible for the vote discrepancies to the degree possible, in each circumstance.

Municipalities were able to identify ballots that were likely responsible for the discrepancy in vote totals to a reasonable degree of certainty. The initial difference in totals were attributable to voter error and not machine inaccuracy. Questionable voter errors that teams identified as being “not readable” to a reasonable degree of certainty were in the range of one to ten ballots. The reports indicated that there were no identifiable bugs, errors, or failures of the optical scan voting equipment used in the 2014 general election.

Many of the initial errors in the voting equipment audits occurred because voter intent was taken into account when hand counting ballots. In addition, clerks were unaware that the hand count audit must be done with no human error on the part of the auditors in order to reconcile the audit with the election night voting equipment results. In each circumstance the auditors’ additional verification located a potential problem ballot or clarified that the vote totals were correct and the swapped votes were human error. In very limited situations some optical scan equipment would jam, requiring ballots to be fed through the equipment for a second time. Jams occur because the ballot bin is full, or due to the condition of the ballot or the age of the machine.

Two reporting units are unable to be reconciled due to human error either on election night or between election night and the date of the voting equipment audit. One municipality’s audit could not be officially reconciled because one ballot was misplaced between being cast on election night and the voting equipment audit. The city clerk discussed the matter with elections inspectors, double-checked the optical scan voting equipment, reviewed the inspector’s statement, and conducted a second audit to try to locate the error. The voting equipment audit results are correct, with the exception of one missing vote in each contest.

Another municipality had an “un-processable error” on a ballot, for which the machine did not tabulate votes for any particular candidate. However, that un-processable error ballot was not marked, recorded, or made apparent so that it could be discounted when conducting the voting equipment audit. Therefore, the municipality’s audit has one additional vote in each contest. ES&S was contacted to inquire as to the meaning of the “un-processable error” status code. ES&S indicated this error is used when a ballot is overridden and the machine is unable to read the ballot as a ballot. The machine may not have been able to read a ballot because the timing marks were wet or crinkled, or the motor operated incorrectly causing the image scanner to not recognize what it was reading. Normally these ballots are striped with a red mark and placed in the center bin. However, given that this type of error occurs infrequently the ink may not have been installed or maintained by the municipality, which caused no distinguishing mark on the ballot. Additionally, election inspectors could have either remade the ballot or could have provided the voter with the opportunity to spoil the ballot and vote a re-issued ballot.

Conclusion/Recommendations

Both the touch screen voting equipment and optical scan voting equipment used and audited for the 2014 general election tabulated as expected and according to vendor specifications.

The recent Legislative Audit Bureau stated that previous voting equipment audits were not completed in a timely manner, mainly referring to the 2008 and 2010 voting equipment audits. While there were several reasons for those delays, this audit was completed less than four months from the date of the 2014 General Election. Board staff appreciates the diligent work of local election officials which made it possible to complete the 2014 voting equipment audit in a timely manner.

Based upon feedback from some clerks, Board staff believes that the audit instructions can be improved to make them more understandable to clerks who may not conduct them frequently, describe likely problems auditors may encounter during the audit, and emphasize that auditors are free to and encouraged to contact the G.A.B. in the event that a discrepancy is found that they cannot account for. Additional language concerning the reason for the voting equipment audit and the need for it to be free of auditor human error could increase understanding on the part of clerks and auditors. Previous audit reports have recommended the use of webinars to assist clerks in conducting a voting equipment audit correctly, and pursuing that approach remains a goal of Board staff to provide clerks and auditors with visual and/or additional training on the purpose and procedures for conducting a voting equipment audit. Lastly, Board staff will work with municipal and county clerks to continually update and ensure the accuracy of G.A.B. records concerning the equipment used by each municipality.

Appendix A

Table 1. Table of 2014 Municipalities Audited

Municipality	Reporting Unit	County	Optical Scan Voting Equipment	Touch Screen Voting Equipment
CITY OF BURLINGTON - MAIN - 52206	CITY OF BURLINGTON WARDS 5 - 8	RACINE	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
CITY OF CHETEK - 03211	CITY OF CHETEK WARDS 1 - 4	BARRON	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF CHIPPEWA FALLS - 09211	CITY OF CHIPPEWA FALLS WARD 5	CHIPPEWA	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE - ALT - 09221	CITY OF EAU CLAIRE WARD 41	CHIPPEWA	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE - MAIN - 18221	CITY OF EAU CLAIRE WARD 17	EAU CLAIRE	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE - MAIN - 18221	CITY OF EAU CLAIRE WARD 27	EAU CLAIRE	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF EAU CLAIRE - MAIN - 18221	CITY OF EAU CLAIRE WARD 9	EAU CLAIRE	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF GREEN BAY - 05231	CITY OF GREEN BAY WARD 10	BROWN	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
CITY OF GREEN BAY - 05231	CITY OF GREEN BAY WARD 45	BROWN	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
CITY OF GREENFIELD - 41236	CITY OF GREENFIELD WARD 15	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF HURLEY - 26236	CITY OF HURLEY WARD 2	IRON	None	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF JANESVILLE - 54241	CITY OF JANESVILLE WARD 28	ROCK	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF KENOSHA - 30241	CITY OF KENOSHA WARD23	KENOSHA	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
CITY OF KENOSHA - 30241	CITY OF KENOSHA WARD87	KENOSHA	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
CITY OF MADISON - 13251	CITY OF MADISON Ward 119	DANE	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MADISON - 13251	CITY OF MADISON Ward 31	DANE	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MADISON - 13251	CITY OF MADISON Ward 35	DANE	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MADISON - 13251	CITY OF MADISON Ward 55	DANE	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MADISON - 13251	CITY OF MADISON Ward 60	DANE	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 041	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 113	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 146	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 153	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 172	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 202	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 283	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 305	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF MILWAUKEE - MAIN - 41251	CITY OF MILWAUKEE WARD 313	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF OCONOMOWOC - 68265	CITY OF OCONOMOWOC Wards 1-3	WAUKESHA	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
CITY OF OCONTO - 43265	CITY OF OCONTO WARDS 1-7	OCONTO	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF OSHKOSH - 71266	CITY OF OSHKOSH Ward 17	WINNEBAGO	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
CITY OF OSHKOSH - 71266	CITY OF OSHKOSH Ward 19	WINNEBAGO	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
CITY OF OSHKOSH - 71266	CITY OF OSHKOSH Ward 26	WINNEBAGO	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
CITY OF PRAIRIE DU CHIEN - 12271	CITY OF PRAIRIE DU CHIEN Ward 1	CRAWFORD	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge

CITY OF RACINE - 52276	CITY OF RACINE WARD 21	RACINE	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF RHINELANDER - 44276	CITY OF RHINELANDER Ward 10	ONEIDA	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF VERONA - 13286	CITY OF VERONA WARDS 6-9	DANE	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
CITY OF WAUKESHA - 68291	CITY OF WAUKESHA Ward 14	WAUKESHA	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF WAUKESHA - 68291	CITY OF WAUKESHA Ward 25	WAUKESHA	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF WAUKESHA - 68291	CITY OF WAUKESHA Ward 35	WAUKESHA	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
CITY OF WEST ALLIS - 41292	CITY OF WEST ALLIS Ward 1	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF WEST ALLIS - 41292	CITY OF WEST ALLIS Ward 12	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF WEST ALLIS - 41292	CITY OF WEST ALLIS Ward 15	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF WEST ALLIS - 41292	CITY OF WEST ALLIS Ward 22	MILWAUKEE	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
CITY OF WHITEWATER - ALT - 28292	CITY OF WHITEWATER Wards 10-11	JEFFERSON	ES&S DS200	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF ALVIN - 21002	TOWN OF ALVIN Ward 1	FOREST	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
TOWN OF ANDERSON - 26002	TOWN OF ANDERSON ward 1	IRON	None	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
TOWN OF BEAVER - 10002	TOWN OF BEAVER WARD 1	CLARK	ES&S M100	ES&S iVotronic
TOWN OF BROOKLYN - 24004	TOWN OF BROOKLYN Wards 1 - 3	GREEN LAKE	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF BURLINGTON - 52002	TOWN OF BURLINGTON WARD 11	RACINE	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF CAMPBELL - 32008	TOWN OF CAMPBELL Wards 1 - 6	LA CROSSE	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
TOWN OF CLYMAN - 14012	TOWN OF CLYMAN WARD 1	DODGE	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF CRESCENT - 44004	TOWN OF CRESCENT Wards 1 - 3	ONEIDA	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF DAY - 37016	TOWN OF DAY Wards 1 & 2	MARATHON	ES&S M100	ES&S Automark
TOWN OF DEKORRA - 11010	TOWN OF DEKORRA Wards 1 - 3	COLUMBIA	ES&S M100	ES&S Automark
TOWN OF FAIRBANKS - 59014	TOWN OF FAIRBANKS WARD 1	SHAWANO	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF FERN - 19008	TOWN OF FERN WARD 1	FLORENCE	None	Populex-Populex 2.3
TOWN OF FOSTER - 10012	TOWN OF FOSTER WARD 1	CLARK	None-We Use Paper Ballots	ES&S iVotronic
TOWN OF FOX LAKE - 14018	TOWN OF FOX LAKE WARDS 1-4	DODGE	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF GARDEN VALLEY - 27020	TOWN OF GARDEN VALLEY WARD 1	JACKSON	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF GERMANTOWN - 29012	TOWN OF GERMANTOWN WARDS 1 & 3	JUNEAU	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF GRANT - 17010	TOWN OF GRANT WARDS 1-2	DUNN	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF GULL LAKE - 66024	TOWN OF GULL LAKE Ward 1	WASHBURN	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Populex-Populex 2.3
TOWN OF HARRISON - 35010	TOWN OF HARRISON Ward 1-3	LINCOLN	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
TOWN OF HARRISON - 69014	TOWN OF HARRISON Ward 1	WAUPACA	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF HARTFORD - 67012	TOWN OF HARTFORD WARDS 1-5	WASHINGTON	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF HAY RIVER - 17012	TOWN OF HAY RIVER WARDS 1 & 2	DUNN	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF HERMAN - 59024	TOWN OF HERMAN WARD 1 - 2	SHAWANO	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
TOWN OF HOLWAY - 61022	TOWN OF HOLWAY Ward 1	TAYLOR	None-We Use Paper Ballots	ES&S iVotronic
TOWN OF HUBBARD - 55020	TOWN OF HUBBARD WARD 1	RUSK	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
TOWN OF LEBANON - 14026	TOWN OF LEBANON WARDS 1-2	DODGE	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF LEROY - 14028	TOWN OF LEROY WARDS 1-2	DODGE	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX

TOWN OF LIMA - 60008	TOWN OF LIMA Wards 1 - 4	SHEBOYGAN	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF LINCOLN - 64014	TOWN OF LINCOLN Wards 1-5	VILAS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF LOMIRA - 14030	TOWN OF LOMIRA WARDS 1-2	DODGE	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF MANCHESTER - 27032	TOWN OF MANCHESTER WARD 1	JACKSON	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF MELROSE - 27034	TOWN OF MELROSE WARD 1	JACKSON	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF MENASHA - 71008	TOWN OF MENASHA Wards 3, 5, 6	WINNEBAGO	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF MILLSTON - 27036	TOWN OF MILLSTON WARD 1	JACKSON	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF NORRIE - 37060	TOWN OF NORRIE Ward 1	MARATHON	ES&S M100	ES&S Automark
TOWN OF PRAIRIE DU CHIEN - 12014	TOWN OF PRAIRIE DU CHIEN WARD 1-2	CRAWFORD	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF RIPON - 20034	TOWN OF RIPON Wards 1-2	FOND DU LAC	Optech- Eagle	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF SAUKVILLE - 46014	TOWN OF SAUKVILLE WARDS 1-3	OZAUKEE	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF SCHLEY - 35022	TOWN OF SCHLEY WARDS 1-2	LINCOLN	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
TOWN OF SEVASTOPOL - 15022	TOWN OF SEVASTOPOL WARDS 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5	DOOR	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
TOWN OF SMELSER - 22054	TOWN OF SMELSER WARDS 1 & 2	GRANT	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF SPENCER - 37074	TOWN OF SPENCER Wards 1 & 2	MARATHON	ES&S M100	ES&S Automark
TOWN OF SUMMIT - 34028	TOWN OF SUMMIT Ward 1	LANGLADE	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF WELLS - 42046	TOWN OF WELLS WARD 1	MONROE	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF WHITETOWN - 63042	TOWN OF WHITETOWN WARD 1	VERNON	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
TOWN OF WILLARD - 55046	TOWN OF WILLARD WARD 1	RUSK	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
TOWN OF WILTON - 42048	TOWN OF WILTON WARDS 1 - 5	MONROE	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
TOWN OF WINGVILLE - 22062	TOWN OF WINGVILLE WARD 1	GRANT	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
VILLAGE OF ADELL - 60101	VILLAGE OF ADELL Ward 1	SHEBOYGAN	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
VILLAGE OF BELLEVUE - 05106	VILLAGE OF BELLEVUE Wards 7-10	BROWN	ES&S DS200	ES&S Automark
VILLAGE OF CEDAR GROVE - 60112	VILLAGE OF CEDAR GROVE Wards 1 - 3	SHEBOYGAN	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
VILLAGE OF HARTLAND - 68136	VILLAGE OF HARTLAND WARDS 1-6	WAUKESHA	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Sequoia Insight	Dominion (Sequoia) – AVC Edge
VILLAGE OF KEWASKUM - MAIN - 67142	VILLAGE OF KEWASKUM WARDS 1 - 5	WASHINGTON	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX
VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS - 68151	VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS WARD 3	WAUKESHA	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS - 68151	VILLAGE OF MENOMONEE FALLS WARD 7	WAUKESHA	Optech- Eagle	ES&S Automark
VILLAGE OF POTOSI - 22172	VILLAGE OF POTOSI WARD 1	GRANT	None-We Use Paper Ballots	Dominion (Sequoia)/Command Central-Edge
VILLAGE OF ROTHSCHILD - 37176	VILLAGE OF ROTHSCHILD WARD 3 & 4	MARATHON	ES&S M100	ES&S Automark
VILLAGE OF SLINGER - 67181	VILLAGE OF SLINGER WARDS 1-8	WASHINGTON	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote-OS	Dominion (Premier)-Accuvote TSX