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Date: 3/20/23

TO: Attn: Brandon Hunzicker

FROM: Leshuh Griffin

Company: WEC, Election Commission

Company: 414-239-2112

Name: WEC (formal reply)

Name:

Fax: 1-608-267-0500

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Comments: Please find my Formal Appeal response due today. I also am sending an audio as evidence via e-mail.

Audio being sent via e-mail

LeshuhG

Formal appeal + exhibits attached

VERIFIED SWORN APPEAL RESPONSE

(Exhibits attached/audio sent via attached e-mail)

I, FORMALLY file this verified appeal response to the respondents' answer to my verified appeal filed before the Wisconsin Election Commission regarding the filing officer's decision on January 9, 2023 to not place my name on the ballot for Municipal Judge, Branch 3 election. This response is made to the Wisconsin Election Commission through this submission of sworn written statements. To the extent as applicable by law, I, being the appellant, herein referenced as 'the appellant' requests that the administrative body take any and all judicial notice and judicial cognizance of all federal and state law as cited infra. My signature below verifies and affirms, under oath, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY the following **facts** that are **true** and **correct** to the best of my personal knowledge, recollection and belief as it relates;

The respondents' failed to refute *each* verified statement of law and fact in the appellant's verified appeal filed before the Wisconsin Election Commission. At no time did the respondents' put on record their jurisdiction and venue relating to the appellant's ballot placement recommendation nor refute that they *were without* jurisdiction on January 9, 2023 as detailed in the verified appeal. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required are deemed admitted when not denied in the responsive pleadings. **See Wis. Stats. 802.02(4). See also Schlieper v DNR, 188, Wis. 2d 318, 525 N.W. 2d;** 'arguments not refuted are to be deemed admitted.'

The appellant's formal verified appeal clearly states the 'issues' in the appeal and it is not as 'suggested' by counsel for the respondents'. The appellant formally refutes the respondents' answer in its entirety and objects to the unapproved minute documents that are not a correct nor

accurate depiction of events that have occurred. The appellant had included an actual true unedited audio (via an attached e-mail) of the January 9, 2023, hearing of Chavez v Griffin, Griffin v Chavez, which is prima facie evidence that the respondents' have filed their answer in bad faith, with inaccuracies and false statements before the Wisconsin Election Commission.

The respondents filed a perjury riddled legally insufficient purported verified response with reckless disregard for the truth and have attempted to 'cherry pick' what they choose to respond to in the appellant's verified appeal. The appellant will address the totality of their response and will began with the 'purported' 'elephant in the room'; the non election related concocted baseless unconstitutional denial of the appellant's right to have her name placed on the ballot, pursuant to clearly established law.

The qualifications of public office as proscribed by state Constitution as well as the State legislation cannot be added to or impaired by the respondents. The respondents were without statutory authority to enlarge the State of Wisconsin's ballot placement qualifications. **See State ex rel. Knowlton v Williams, 5 Wis 308, Sate ex rel Wood v Baker, 38 Wis 71.** A statutory 'scheme' that denies a candidate a place on the ballot is unconstitutional. **See Williams v Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23.** Federal law renders it a crime for ***any*** person to "knowingly and willfully ***deprive, defraud, or attempt to deprive or defraud*** the residents of a State of a **fair and impartially** conducted election process by **procurement,** casting, or tabulations that are known by the person to be *materially* false, fictitious or fraudulent. **See 52 U.S.C.§ 20511(2). (Emphasis Added).**

Wis. Stats. 8.30 is titled 'candidates ineligible for '*ballot placement*' . Stat.8.30(c) states that 'candidates, if elected, could not **"qualify"** for the office sought within time allowed **'by**

law' *for* "**qualification"** because of age, residence, or other impediment. **Reading is fundamental.** The ***law*** in the State of Wisconsin, for ***qualification(and limited described impediments)*** **for office** are clearly established. The respondents do *not* have statutory authority to heightened nor add to the ***qualifications*** ***(nor impediments)*** for public office, clearly established ***'by law'*** for ***qualification*** for public office.

The qualification requirements for an **elected public office** in the city of Milwaukee are outlined in the Wisconsin Constitution, Wisconsin state legislation as well as the Wisconsin Election Commission's issued 'declaration of candidacy' form. ***The State of Wisconsin's Constitution as well as the state legislature pursuant to law, defines only one 'other' qualification requirement' besides 'residence' and 'age' to be eligible for public office; that a candidate not have a felony conviction.*** Further, Wisconsin state legislature mandates pursuant to ***law***; Wis. Stats. 8.35(1) 'any person who files nomination papers and qualifies…the name of the person ***shall*** appear on the ballot **except** in the case of death of the person.

According to the 'unapproved minutes' attached in the respondents' answer , the respondents' voted' on January 9, 2023 [*without prior public notice* in a 'closed door' proceeding] to 'remove' the appellant's name from the ballot because 'Commissioner Martin *motioned* in the 'closed door proceeding' to remove Ms. Griffin from the ballot 'based' '*upon*' 'evidence' that Ms. Griffin would not be able to 'meet' the 'qualifications' 'to hold office' by May 1, 2023 if elected…' For the record, the May 1, 2023 date cited by the respondents is an unlawfully promulgated unconstitutional rule making [non]authority of the respondents in violation of chapter 227 of Wisconsin states as it relates to administrative law cited nowhere else in clearly established '***law***'. Timeframes for 'grant of licensing' is not an election related ballot

placement matter, and the respondents are not authorized by law to perform inquiry into the subject matter. **See Lovell v Griffin, 303 US 444**

Commissioner Martin motion in itself is prima facie evidence that '*removal* from ballot' means that the appellant name was on the ballot, as such it cannot be deemed that the filing officer 'refused' to place the candidate's name on the ballot', as stated in Wis. Stats. 8.30. The removal is clear indication of the decision made by the filing officer as told to the appellant, that the appellant was certified for ballot placement stood, until the self imposed impermissible motion made in a closed door preceding that violated public notice laws and the Due Process Clause of the United Sates constitution.

There was no prior challenge to the ballot placement other than by an agency's self-imposed motion, which is constitutionally impermissible as an administrative agency does not have authority to initiate proceedings on its own motion. **See Public Utilities Com. V Pollak, 343 US 451. (Emphasis Added).** Clearly established law by way of the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin Constitution as well as the Wisconsin legislature does *not* allow for the respondents to sua sponte add to the qualifications for public office already prescribed under cleanly established ***law***. This is a 'society' of '***laws***'. The ***laws*** of a state are to be found in its statutory and constitutional enactments. The Wisconsin Election Commission's administration website indicates that 'among many other roles; 'the agency ***ensures compliance*** with federal and state ***election laws***.'

The respondents' essentially have unlawfully promulgated a new unpromulgated purported election 'law', in violation of the administrative procedure act, and having unlawfully created this new unpromulgated purported election 'law' applicable only to the appellant ; that

being that the appellant has to first join a membership dues union in order to exercise the right to run for an **elected** (not appointed) **public** office and the right to hold public office if it is the will of the qualified electors.

The respondents are essentially imposing onto the appellant a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution., which is constitutionally impermissible. **See Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 113.** Turning a liberty into a privilege, 'licensing' it, and attaching a fee is unconstitutional. **See Murdock v Penn, 319 U.S. 105.** The ***law*** of the state *must be applied equally to all persons within the state's jurisdiction* in order to meet the 'equal protections' of the United States Constitution requirements, which is the supreme law of the land, applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, which mandates 'no state shall 'make' or "***enforce***" *any* law **{including unpromulgated municipalities internal charter policies}**which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life liberty or property, without 'due process' of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the ***equal protections*** of the law***s***. Furthermore, 'if' a ***law*** destroys a *constitutional right*, it is to that extent, void. **See State ex rel. Lafollette v Kholer, 200 Wis. 2d 561.**

The ***'public notice'*** by the respondents to all candidates running for an elected public office regarding 'Certification by Election Commission' states in no uncertain terms; "if your nomination papers are complete (there are a sufficient number of valid signatures) and all other filing requirements have been met, your nomination papers will be certified as sufficient by the Election Commission and your name will appear on the ballot."

The filing officer by way of written correspondence stated to the appellant that she had a sufficient number of valid signatures and 'all other filing requirements had been met, and that her name would be placed on the ballot. A candidate's name cannot be removed from ballot once the candidate qualifies for nomination, the respondents' as trained election officials are aware of this mandatory law. The respondents have a mandatory duty owed to the appellant to place her name on the ballot.

The respondents' have purposely failed to follow their own election laws and purposely created a 'separate and unequal' set of NON existence non promulgated election laws only applicable to the appellant with the purpose of discriminatory intent and minority vote dilution. This conduct has and continues to violate the appellant's equal protection and due process rights and the will and intent of the voters. The respondents cannot satisfy their burden by piling on 'inferences upon inferences'. There is no legal justification for any of the discriminatory acts and omissions of the respondents' against the appellant and the qualified electors whom nominated the appellant to have her name placed on the ballot for the election for Milwaukee Municpal Judge Branch 3. The express will of the voters cannot be rejected. **See Roth v LaFarge Sch, Dist Bd of Canvassers, 268 Wis 2d 335, 674 NW2d 553.**

The protections of the Due Process Clause extend to public servants. **See Wieman v Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183.** A statutory 'scheme' that denies a candidate a place on the ballot is unconstitutional. **See Williams v Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23.** It is the will of the people and not the personal preferences of those clothed under 'color of law' as to who their elected public representatives should be. **See Cousins v Wigoda, 419 US 477**. The respondents' are unlawfully interfering with the appellant's constitutional right to work for public service as a public servant.

The protections of the Due Process Clause extend to public servants. **See Wieman v Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183.**

The diluting of Black voting strength has occurred and has been done by an orchestrated scheme of the respondents' and this scheme has had a serious irreparable injury to the public as well as the appellant in whom the public has consistently chosen to be their choice of representative. **Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)** prohibits *any* "standard that results in a denial or abridgment of an election right. A section 2 violation is established if "a process leading to nomination or election" in the jurisdiction "are not equally open to participation by members of a 'minority' group' in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. **See § 10301(b).**

What the City of Milwaukee voters are being subjected to has not been subjected to citizens of the state of Wisconsin as a whole, and the audio provided to the Wisconsin Election Commission of the January 9, 2023 hearing clearing has the voice of Claire Woodall-Vogg acknowledges that the heightened standard the appellant is being subjected to is not a criteria for every city election in the state of Wisconsin under the same situated circumstances. The acknowledgement is prima faice evidence of a section 2 voters right violation as detailed supra. **Title 52 10102** related to voting; mandates 'no person acting under the color of law shall apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standard, practice, or procedure of other similar political subdivision within the state.

Wisconsin Constitution, article VII, section 24(1), requirement that 'an attorney license to practice law in the state 'is a prerequisite for courts 'of record' only. The City of Milwaukee,

the legislature, the State of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Appellate Court as well as the Wisconsin Supreme Court have known for decades that a municipal judge is *not* required to be an attorney, a fact the City of Milwaukee litigated and referenced and is only subjecting the appellant to such heightened, arbitrary nonpromulgated discriminatory act under the guise of an 'election law, because of race, gender and status.

The City of Milwaukee's own city attorney noted in litigation that 'a judge of municipal court need not be a lawyer.' **See Milwaukee v Wroten, 160 Wis.2d 207, 466 N.W.2d 861.** The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in **Wroten**, noted that 'municipal judges need not be lawyers' as well, and stated that the issue of municipal judges not being attorneys was in fact, 'a trivial' issue 'irrelevant to the municipal court's power'. **See Milwaukee v Wroten, 160 Wis.2d 207, 466 N.W.2d 861.** The United States Supreme Court ruled in **Shuttlesworth v City of Birminghamn, 394 U.S. 150,** licensing laws must be balanced with Firs Amendment protections, 'unconstitutional restraints by virtue of licenses can be ignored by citizens, and citizens cannot be penalized for excursing the right to ignore such unlawful restraints.

The Milwaukee based minority voting group is a sufficiently large group, geographically compacted to constitute a majority in a single member district. The members within this group have been and are politically cohesive in their support of the appellant Ieshuh Griffin as their choice for candidate representation and have made their choice sufficiently and unequivocally clear. The respondents have impermissibly abridged representative and voting rights in violation of Article I section 2 of the Constitution of the United States which violates the First Amendment Right to political association.

The respondents' by way of corruption and dishonest services and violations of clearly established federal and state law in a concerted effort to impeded on the will of the voters and as such has caused irreparable injury to the appellant and the will of the voters who were, are and have tried to conduct business and engage in lawful interstate commerce.

The Fourteenth Amendment commands that 'no state shall make or "enforce" any law which shall 'abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 'Enjoyment upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances of the privilege of pursuing a calling or trade…is an essential part of the rights of liberty, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. **See Powel v Pennsylvania, 127 US 678.** The respondents essentially have unlawfully promulgated a new election rule, applicable only to the appellant that the appellant has to first join a membership dues union in order to exercise the right to run for and hold public service; essentially imposing a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution., which is constitutionally impermissible. **See Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 113.** Turning a liberty into a privilege, 'licensing' it, and attaching a fee is unconstitutional. **See Murdock v Penn, 319 U.S. 105.**

In **Butcher v Crescent City Co, 111 US 746**, the United States Supreme Court held that 'monopolies violate common law because 'they destroy the freedom of trade, discourage labor and industry…and are void because they interfere with the liberty of the individual to pursue a lawful trade or employment. The voting rights act was created by Congress to prevent 'discriminatory practices by states against minorities. Section 2 is violated where 'the political process leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a relevant group, in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to

participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. **See Section2 (b). See also Shaw v Reno, 113 S.Ct. 2816.**

The January 9, 2023 hearing was nothing short of an unauthorized disciplinary proceeding unpromulgated by law and in violation of due process of law, notice and open records meeting laws. The respondents unlawfully acted as 'an examining board', unlawfully treating an election candidate as an applicant of a licensure, establishing heightened qualifications for licensure, and unlawfully determined that the appellant was 'unqualified' on the basis of no 'known' legal election ballot placement duty bestowed upon any other election candidate similarly in the State of Wisconsin.

These acts of the respondents are arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and unlawful. Government cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. **See Dent v West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114.** Licenses must not be 'contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official." **See Shuttlesworth v Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147.** The respondents unconstitutionally and impermissibly acted as 'expert' witnesses regarding the practice of law, licensing and what constitutes criteria as an attorney. In **Daubert v Merrill Dow, 509 US 579;** federal courts noted that the admissibility of 'an expert's' testimony is based on the qualifications of the expert. None of the respondents were qualified to act as 'witnesses and doing so was in clear violation of the administrative rule making authority as no such 'rule' allowing such was promulgated prior to what purported to be their testimony in the subject matter. Core zones of 'authority' are to be strictly guarded by each branch of government. **See Barland v Eau Claire City, 216 Wis. 2d 560.**

Only the Wisconsin Supreme Court and Congress are "exclusively" vested with the 'power' to 'determine' what 'constitutes' the practice of law. **See Dinger, 14 Wis.2d 202**. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in several cases have 'authorized "laypersons" and/or 'unlicensed attorneys' and/or "nonattorneys" to engage in 'conditional' practicing of law. **(Emphasis Added). See State ex rel Bar v Keller, 21 Wis. 2d 100, 123 N.W. 2d 905. See also Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 202. The United States Supreme Court in Sperry, 373 US 399** as well as **Johnson v Avery, 393 US 483**, noted that 'nonlawyer' participation in various legal practices and forums is 'protected' in the exercise of federal constitutional rights.

Furthermore, **Wis. Stats. § 757.30** makes clear, a person 'may' "engage" in the practice of law in as well as *out* of the court. The 'practice' of law is *not* confined to a courtroom. The **Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 35555(b)** authorizes all agencies to 'permit' nonlawyer participation in proceedings. Wisconsin legislation as well as the Wisconsin Supreme Court notes by clearly established law; "every person who shall appear as an 'agent', 'representative' or 'attorney' for or on behalf of 'any' other person, or 'any' firm, 'association' or 'corporation, in 'any' 'action' or 'proceeding before a court of record, commissioner, or judicial tribunal of the United States, or of 'any' state, or shall 'otherwise' ***"shall" be "deemed" to be 'practicing' law***.

As provided in the audio of the January 9, 2023, hearing the appellant, repeatedly stated that she was 'an attorney' and at no time did the appellant deny or allege that she would not qualify to meet the purported language of the charter IF need be. That being said there was no evidence presented to the contrary that the appellant was not in substantial compliance of all mandates relating to ballot placement and eligibility of office, as defined by **clearly established law**; formal, informal or otherwise.

Only, the Wisconsin legislature, the United States Congress and the Wisconsin Supreme Court can 'define' in 'Wisconsin' the "qualifications" of a person and to 'regulate' the 'practice of law', in a 'common sense' way, not in any way that was demonstrated by Woodall-Vogg, MEC and the BOEC's, which was nothing short of a desperate attempt to hamper and burden such interest with 'impractical technical unlawful nonpromulgated restraints in order to disenfranchise minatory voters will and intent. Claire –Woodall Vogg, the Milwaukee Election Commission, as well as the Board of Election Commission, were not competent to make such declarations, considerations and/or lawful determinations.

The respondents' acted outside the scope of their sworn duties and acted in violation of administrative rule making as well as in violation of Due Process of law, when they purported to give legal advice as to what constitutes 'a license', 'practicing law', 'an attorney' and 'prerequisites'. Claire –Woodall Vogg, the Milwaukee Election Commission, as well as the Board of Election Commission unlawfully gave what constitutes as 'legal advice' and 'personal opinions' as to the 'legal rights' of candidates Chavez and Griffin to accomplish a 'goal' in which they had no administrative rule making authority to do. State 'election laws' enacted to 'regulate' elections must meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The respondents' engaged in an invalid exercise of administrative rule making power, exceeding the bounds of 'correct' interpretation and acts constituted an usurpation of the inherent power of the supreme court of Wisconsin and United States Congress in 'determination' of what is 'the practice of law', 'establishing the qualifications of persons entitled to engage in such practice' and authority to 'grant and/or deny licenses to persons whom may qualify in such practice.

The United States Supreme Court, the United States Constitution, as well as the Wisconsin Constitution are all in sync with the main objective of election laws are designed to give 'effect' to the 'will of the electors'. **(Emphasis Added).** A statutory 'scheme' that denies a candidate a place on the ballot is unconstitutional. **See Williams v Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23.** The respondents are denying the appellant equal protection of the laws by unlawfully refusing to bring the appellant's name on the ballot. **(Id at 24).** In 74 Op. Att'y Gen. 234, 237 (1985) the State Attorney General published '...civil rights statutes are considered to be remedial in nature and are to be construed liberally in favor of coverage to effectuate the constitutional mandate *against* discrimination.

Furthermore, in **Volume 61, of the Opinions of the State Attorney General**, the attorney general noted that "municipal clerks may not discriminate with 'directed special questions' not asked of all others [in like circumstances]. The respondents actions are invidiously discriminatory are in direct conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Constitution, and the Wisconsin Constitution, specifically section 1, article 1.

In **Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533,** the United States Supreme Court declared that 'the basic principle of equality among voters within a state and the fundamental principle of representative government is one of 'equal' representation. Public elections are not for sale and are not to be privatized, they are of the for the people, of the people, by the people, and 'answerable' to the people. (Emphasis Added). In **Black, v State, 113 Wis. 205**, the high court held that 'equality' is a substantial component within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 'Fencing out' from the election franchise a sector of the population because the way they vote is constitutionally impermissible. **See Schneider v State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147.**

SCR 40.02 are 'general qualifications' regarding practice of law in the state by "order" of the supreme court. Practicing law in the state by 'order' of the supreme court however is not the only legal and/or lawful way to be "licensed" to 'practice law' in the state of Wisconsin. **SCR 23.02(2)** specifically and unequivocally lists a plethora of 'exceptions' and 'exclusions' to the 'license requirement' as a prerequisite to practicing law, and use of such title. Requirements that candidate Griffin, meets and/or exceeds. **SCR 23.02** 'highlights' exceptions to 'unauthorized practice of law' to 'municipal officers', employees and consultants. (Emphasis Added). The appellant and the will of the voters simply put are being subjected to disparate, discriminatory treatment.

'Licensing' and 'license' pursuant to federal law is a 'broad' term. It is defined among other things as 'permission', 'granting', certifying, 'permitting' as well as 'approving'. The issuance of a license or certificate which is a prerequisite to engaging in certain employment may not be conditioned upon waiver of a person statutory or constitutional due process right, any such condition is void. "Licensing' falls within the general due process requirements of notice, and opportunity to be heard, as such the Board of Election Commissioner's was without territorial jurisdiction and venue to decide a 'licensing' related matter, nor is there legislature granted authority for either Milwaukee Election Commission or the Board to consider such matter as a ballot access prerequisite for a candidate.

An agency by law, must give an applicant for any license an opportunity to demonstrate compliance, or an opportunity to achieve compliance. **See Central National Bank v United States Dept. of Treasury, 912 F2d 897 (7th cir).** Chapter 227.01(6) defines 'licensing' as an agency process relating to the grant, denial, renewal revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal or amendment of a 'license'. An existing 'license' does not expire until the

application for a 'new' or 'renewal' of a license has been acted on in its 'finality' by the agency applied for, and "if" the application is denied or the terms of the 'new' license are 'limited', until the last day for seeking review of the agency's decision or a 'later' date fixed by order of the reviewing "court". **See Wis. Stats. 227.51(2)**

Such policy violates 'political equality' in violation of both the State and Federal Constitution guarantees under the 'Equal Rights as well as the Equal Protection Clauses', constituting an unconstitutional impairment of said rights secured. When an election process reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness, there is a due process violation. **See Reynolds, 377 US 561.** The electors are being injured in the free exercise of a right or privilege secured by the laws and Constitution of the United States. The failure to put the will of the electors first, foremost and at front is violate the Fourteenth Amendment. **See Anderson, 417 US 226. See also Reynolds, 377 US 555.** The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects the right to vote from conduct by state officials which seriously undermines the fundamental fairness of the electoral process. Voters have a right to cast a ballot in an election free from taint of intimidation and fraud. **See Burson v Freeman, 504 US 211 (1992).** The right of the electors is a constitutional right not a mere privilege. **See State ex rel, Melms v Young, 172 Wis 197.**

Equal enforcement of election laws is necessary to preserve our most basic and fundamental rights. The requirement of equal treatment is just as necessary, in exercising fundamental rights as established. Treating voters as well as candidates differently violates the Equal protection Clause of the United States. The right to vote extends to all phases of the voting process. Federal law prohibits two or more persons from conspiring to 'inure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State...in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege

secured to such person by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The United States Supreme Court has made clear the right to vote is among the rights protected by the United States Constitution, as well as **18 USC section 241.**

The respondents are using a municipality's unpromulgated internal administrative policy to impair and infringe on voters rights. Federal and state law preempts the municipality's unpromulgated internal administrative policy. The particular municipality has a promulgated ordinance under 109-1 'equal rights' in which it acknowledges the mandates of **Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. sections 3601, 24 C.F.R. sections 111. 42 USC 2000a,** Wis stats as well as state and federal law. The municipality has a mandatory obligation to adhere to equal rights and federal and state law as it relates. Discrimination is prohibited under all fractions of state, federal as well as local law.

The municipalities' internal unpromulgated administrative policy is in direct violation of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity promulgates rules. Pursuant to federal law as well as the mandates of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, A Black African American female candidate is entitled to the same ***opportunities*** as provided of the same and/or similarly situated circumstances 51% of White males currently sitting as elected ***nonlawyer*** municipal judges across the state of Wisconsin,. **See Wait v Pierce, 191 Wis. 202.**

The racial gap in Milwaukee is the largest of any metropolitan are in the country, twice the national gap. The policy is a violation of federal law and creates a 'cause of action' under section 2 of the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution as it is conspiratorial and creates a racially discriminatory invasion of the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness that is entitled to White citizens. The municipality policy violates Wis. Stat. 755, territorial

jurisdiction, yet no White male nonlawyer municipal judge, sitting, past or present has been 'disqualified' pursuant to the mandates of this municipality's internal administrative policy regarding 'municipal judges'. Local rules cannot trump governing stator provisions. **See Hefty v Strickhouse, 2008 WI 96.**

The charter's internal policy is an unconstitutional impermissible infringement on the right to political association, political ideas and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause as it is discriminatory based on a suspect classification not found in state law or the state's constitution; causing a substantial burden on 'disfavored' political persons. The unpromulgated municipal charter is not a law but an 'internal' policy in *conflict* with *'statewide uniformity'* directed at its 'state officers', being erroneously subjected to as 'public officers'. In **74 Op. Atty Gen. 234, 237 (1985)** the State Attorney General published that '…an 'attorney' is an officer of the court but is '*not*' a 'public officer'. 'Policy' is the outline of what an organization 'principles in achieving a goal'. 'Laws' are 'standards', principles, and procedures that must be followed in a civilized society.

A local internal administration policy for a municipality's officers is neither an election related rule promulgated by law nor is said policy in conformity with clearly established state and federal law. Both the Board and the Milwaukee Election Commission's reference to and use of a nongovernmental union's website for 'license' verification', reference to a print out non certified paper for a 'synopsis' of SCR rules and a copy of a nonpromulgated 'synopsis' of a municipality's internal policy constituted an agency's unlawful unconstitutional revised interpretation of unpromulgated administrative rule making. These invalid actions exceeded the bounds of 'correct' interpretation.

The agencies 'rule' making was not preceded by notice and public hearing as required in sts. 227.17 and 227.18; nor was the agencies' 'rule' filed under Wis. Stat. Chapter 227.20. The unconstitutional self-imposed memo guide is not an election law, it imposes no duty and creates no office, it bestows no power or authority of obligation onto any candidates for ballot access. No rule making can abrogate rights secured by the United States Constitution. **See Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436.**

The respondents' have been and are intentionally failing to follow its own laws and procedures including legislation in regards to Wisconsin residence contractual obligations, duties and responsibilities. In addition to direct evidence of discrimination, racial "prejudice or stereotype" may be proven through circumstantial evidence. **See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252, 266.** The respondents' had a mandatory obligation to rely on the sworn statement of the appellant as well as the appellant's Declaration of Candidacy. An affidavit uncontested and unrefutted must stand as prima facie evidence. **See United States v Kis, 658 F. 2d (7th cir).** Wis. Stats section 2.05(5) MANDATES that; "***Where any required*** item of information on a nomination paper is incomplete, the filing officer shall accept the information as complete if there has been ***substantial compliance*** with the law." "Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decision maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached."

MEC is engaging in a public harm by failing to carry out its duty owed to the electors and myself as a candidate as proscribed by law. The 'self-imposed' guidance memos of the MEC & BOEC were and are inadmissible and invalid as they have not been promulgated as rules as

mandated under Chapter 227 of the Wisconsin Statutes. **Quoting Luther v Borden, 48 US 1,** "...governments have no power to delegate what is not delegated to them...."Martin, Ruiz-Cruz and Haag have a responsibility to adhere to all State as well as federal laws as it relates to the subject matter.

Further, Martin, Ruiz-Cruz and Haag have a unique duty to function and operate in accordance with the laws and authority delegated to it and cannot go any further than what is delegated to it. Duties imposed on city board election commissioners and manner performance thereof, being particularly stated by law, such provisions must be followed or acts of board are invalid. **See State ex rel. Mayer v Schuffenhauer**. An act done in violation of mandatory provisions of election statute is void. **See Gradinjan v Boho, 29 Wis 2d 674.**

The interpretation of use of a nongovernmental union's website for 'license' verification', reference to a print out non certified paper for a 'synopsis' of SCR rules and a copy of a nonpromulgated 'synopsis' of a municipality's internal policy pursuant to an administrative charter is inconsistent with state and federal election laws including rule making authority in violation of the State Administrative Procedure Act. Furthermore, it is in direct violation of the federal law; specifically Title VI as it 'excludes' from 'participation as well as 'denies' the benefits and subjects a disproportionate group to discrimination as the municipality receives election related federal funding. Further, it is a direct violation of section 2 of the Voting rights Act of 1965, **42 USC sec 1973.**

The United States mandate in **North v Russell, 427 U.S. 328; the 14th** Amendment allows 'a nonlawyer' judicial officer the due process right to preside over defendants' as long as the defendants have 'appellate' rights. The United States Department of Justice have repeatedly sued 'state bars' over unconstitutional monopolies of an attempt to control the legal field in

violation of the 'Anti-Trust Laws'. **See 496 US 356.** On audio, Claire Woodall-Vogg admits that a license to practice law is nota statewide requirement for municipal judges. Ballot access is recognized as an importance aspect of voting rights. The primary focus is on the voters rights. **See 103 S.Ct.1564. Wis. Stats. 8.35(1)** 'any person who files nomination papers and qualifies to appear on the ballot may not decline nomination. The name of the person ***shall*** appear on the ballot except in the case of death of the person.

The use of a municipality's internal nonpromulgated policy in an attempt to removal candidate Griffin's rightful name placed on the ballot is nothing short of an arbitrary and irrational classification scheme in an attempt to disenfranchise minority voters will to elect a representative of their choosing. Any order or ordinance of a political subdivision must be consistent with and not more restrictive than state law. The state alone has the sole authority to 'control' and 'regulate'. Municipalities have no inherent right to self government; it is merely a 'department' of the state. **See Van Gilder v Madison, 222 Wis. 58.**

Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause applies to state specification of qualifications for elective and appointed offices. All persons have a 'federal constitutional right to be considered for public service without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualification. The state may not deny to some a privilege that is extended to others similarly situated.

The MEC and BOARD engaged in serious departures from the mandates of Due Process and the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause and were without personal and/or subject matter jurisdiction over the candidate and the non election law related issue cited by Phil Chavez as well as are without territorial jurisdiction over myself as a candidate as it relates to the non election related issue. Mandatory conditions precedent was not met. The MEC and BOARD have failed to put forth proof of proper and lawful jurisdiction to restrain me of the liberty and right to have

my name placed on the ballot after complete and full compliance with all mandatory prerequisites as established by law.

The judgment, decision and/or orders of the Board of Milwaukee Election Commissioners are void ab intio. Both the Milwaukee Election Commission and The Board of Elections lacked stator power to consider a non ballot/non election related matter. Administrative powers are not freely and readily implied, 'any' reasonable doubt as to the existence of an implied power in an agency is to be resolved 'against' the agency. **See Kimberly-Clarke Corp. v Public Service Comm'n, 110 Wis.2d 455.**

An administrative agency may not make a procedural rule which the legislature may not make, nor may an agency operate to deny due process of law. The jurisdictional defects are fatal, as the Board lacked personal, subject matter jurisdiction as well as improper venue on January 9, 2023. Rendition of a judgment without jurisdiction is a usurpation of power. A judgment without subject matter jurisdiction is void. **See Fauntleroy v Lum, 210 US 52.** A judgment without jurisdiction is also a violation of due process. **See Hess v Pawloski, 274 US 352.**A void judgment is a nullity and cannot create a right or an obligation, it is worthless and does not create an obligation nor right, it is not binding on anyone. **Kett v Community Credit Plan, Inc., 222 Wis.2d 117, 586 N.W.2d 68.** Jurisdiction cannot be presumed simply by the exercise of jurisdiction. The Board cannot confer jurisdiction where it does not exist nor did the Board have the discretion to ignore the lack of jurisdiction.

The actions and decision and orders to deny myself the rightful earned ballot placement by way of the will of the people cannot stand as a matter of law. The state and federal constitutions provide 'identical' procedural due process and equal protection safeguards. **See**

County of Kenosha v C&S Management, Inc, 223 Wis.2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236. Wisconsin Constitution, Section 22 guarantees the 'maintain of free government', which can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance...and virtue to 'fundamental principles'.

The actions of both the Milwaukee Election Commission as well as the Board of Election Commissioners were arbitrary, capricious and not in accordance with the Wisconsin statutes. Wisconsin Election rules were not properly applied.

The legality and validity of the actions of the decisonmakers are void ab intio. The unlawful decision was not based on facts, legal mandates of due process were ignored and the findings were conclusionary in nature, a there is no state or federal law supporting the acts of the agencies; MEC and BOEC.

Neither the filing officer, the Milwaukee Election Commission nor the Board of Election Commissioners ever afforded myself as a candidate a written explanation, nor written notice of the reasons nor findings of facts and conclusions of law as it relates to the unlawful and unconstitutional removal of my name from the rightful earned ballot placement by way of the will of the people. Due process commands a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. The filing officer purposely and intentionally concealed relevant facts and circumstances on January 9, 2023. Not only was Vogg the 'filing officer for the complaint, she was the investigator, 'expert witness' and 'advocate, also personally participating in the closed door decision making and acted as an advocate for the complainant Chavez. Due process as such, was violated.

An administrative agency does not have authority to initiate proceedings on its own motion. **See Public Utilities Com. V Pollak, 343 US 451.** The candidate was not provided

notice as it relates to the true 'nature' of the hearing, nor the fact and laws in which jurisdiction was under for the hearing to be held.

The filing officer did not comply with the mandatory obligation of notice to the appellant, there is no record, nor indication nor does the audio provided any evidence of a prior decision by Vogg as it relates to the 'denial of ballot placement' of the appellant had this been a formal decision of Vogg, for the record it was not. Nor, as heard in the audio provided as evidence did the filing officer provide the appellant of adequate notice of the true nature of the hearing so that an adequate response could be prepares.

The appellant had no knowledge of the memo guides used, nor the 'outside' of the record purported evidence used by Vogg; all which violates due process. The respondents did not comply with 19.84(2) public notice as to ballot placement issues regarding the appellant being 'intended for consideration at any contemplated closed session'. The appellant was not apprised of such information, nor was there an express prior notice afforded to the appellant that action would be taken regarding removal from ballot placement; in violation of public notice laws as well as in violation of procedural due process mandates.

As heard in the audio, the chief presiding officer asks the nature of the closed session meeting, she did not state nor imply that she denied the appellant ballot placement, as such the Board was without jurisdiction to take up a matter of ballot removal of the appellant as it was to expressedly announce to be taken up by the chief presiding officer, which is mandatory under Wis .Stats 19.85(1) as well as Wis. Stats 19.851(1)(2). The Board further was without statutory jurisdiction to investigate and/or make a decision regarding 'licensing' as Wis .Stats 19.85(1) (b) 'considering licensing or discipline a person must be given actual notice containing a stamen regarding the right to an evidentiary hearing.

No such prerequisite occurred as it relates. Further, the audio, has a recording of the African American male board member conceding that they had already 'looked up' the appellant. The timeline of the 'closed door convening' of such meeting regarding Candidate Griffin and the subsequent closed door meeting on January 9, 2023, violated Wis .Stats 19.85(12), mandates as well as violating procedural due process.

The attorney has made nothing more than conclusionary legal allegations. There are no federal laws, statutes, rules nor regulations to consider unverified and undocumented conclusionary arguments and opinions as facts. **See North Carolina v Rice, 404 US 244.** The city attorney cannot 'testify', statements of counsel in the response are not 'facts' before the court. **See United States v Loveable, 431 US 783.**

The city attorney's affirmation is nothing more than speculation, unsupported by evidence. The law does not recognize attorney review and or self applied determination of pro se pleadings. **See University; 531 US 356 (2001).** The boilerplate bald assertions of speculation and conjecture by the attorney and the affiant submitted to the court in bad faith are insufficient; Hearsay, personal opinions, speculation, and conclusionary statements are not sufficient.

The appellant is *not* ineligible for ballot placement. The appellant has met all conditions precedent. The Milwaukee Election Commission is a municipal corporation located within the State of Wisconsin, within the United States of North America, specifically the City of Milwaukee that has a responsibility to adhere to all State as well as federal laws as it relates to the subject matter. Further, it has a unique duty to function and operate in *accordance* with the laws and authority delegated to it and cannot go any further than what is delegated to it. The Milwaukee Election Commission has engaged in myriads of non delegable laws, engage in a 'dramatic shift' from the mandates of the United States Constitution, Wisconsin Constitution and

the Wisconsin legislative laws and is departing from familiar and long accepted constraints on the exercise of power.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that 'municipalities are "established by law to assist in the civil government of the state...and are creatures of the state." The Milwaukee Board of Election Commissioners as well as the Milwaukee Election Commission are local 'agencies' within' the State of Wisconsin's government. Wisconsin Stats. 227.01(1) states an 'agency' means a department (including a 'board') [in] the state government. Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "in" as 'among'; not necessarily 'belonging to'. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition defines 'in' as 'existence', 'inclusion'. As such, both the Milwaukee Election Commission and Board of Election Commissioners acted outside the scope of the statutory confinements of an agency's administrative procedure and review as defined under Chapter 227. The purported 'memo' 'guides' used by both agencies on January 9, 2023, were invalid and did not have the 'effect' of an election related 'law'. Agencies are subject to 'rule-making' procedures in making discretionary choices, even if those choices are based on opinions of another entity describing what law mandates. **See 68 Atty Gen 363.**

There was no rule promulgated for the ballot access election related law use of neither 'SCR' policies regarding admission to proactive law nor a Municipality internal policy regarding licenses to practice law. Both memo guides are in direct conflict with State and Federal election laws. No agency may promulgate a rule that conflicts with state law. Wisconsin Stats. 227.10(c) mandates that 'each person affected by a rule is 'entitled' to the same benefits and is 'subject' to the same obligations as any other person under the 'same' or 'similar' circumstances.

The burden of proof was on the complainant, whom filed the complaint. The filing officers had mandatory obligations to fulfill the mandates of the statute. The filing officer

decides the challenge before the candidate certification deadline using the evidence provided by the two parties. The filing officer issues a decision regarding the outcome of the complaint, as it is to be served as a record on appeal. The filing officer, Claire Woodall-Vogg did not issue a decision affirming the complaint, but issued a written decision via email confirmation to the appellant before the deadline certification, that all conditions precedent were met, and that she would be recommending ballot placement. No other decision to the contrary was put in writing or noticed to the appellant. The audio is void of any reference from the filing officer that the appellant was not recommended for ballot placement, nor was there any open record discussion that the appellant was not recommended or being considered for non recommendation for ballot placement.

The appellant is in full compliance with all known election related legal duties, for ballot placement. The respondents' actions are simply'retaliation' against the appellant for 'exercising' a constitutional right. It is not a promulgated rule of the State of Wisconsin election laws to allow the respondents' to act as Board of Licensing Examiners regarding a non election related issue. The charter cited by the respondents is an unpromulgated guide memo, an internal unpromulgated municipality's administrative policy for its 'officers'. The MEC as well as the BOEC are acting outside the 'guardrails' of the state and federal constitution as well as state legislation. An 'unconstitutional' 'rule', policy and/or law cannot operate to supersede any existing law.

'Judges' are not to 'act' as 'attorneys', in 'any' manner. **See Wis. Stats. Section 757. 22** 'Any' includes 'portraying one as such'. Chavez 'acts' as an attorney by purporting to be a member of the state bar union, as an 'attorney' in good standing. The void judgment imposed by the BOEC is premised on a legally incorrect finding and also premised on a heightened legal

standard, which substantially prejudices the rights of the voters as well as the appellant; it is manifestly oppressive to the voters.

The Board of Election Commissioners did not have proper personal, nor subject matter jurisdiction nor venue. The actions of both the Milwaukee Election Commissioner as well as the Board of Election Commissioners actions were arbitrary, capricious and not in accordance with law, nor sound judgment. A statutory scheme that absolutely denies a candidate a place on the ballot is unconstitutional. **See Williams v Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23.** There is no state compelling interest in violating the mandates of both the state and federal constitution.

Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 'no person' shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Emphasis on 'no person'. The respondents use of a municipality's internal unpromulgated policy for its 'officers' is not fair 'on its face, is done with 'evil intent' and a 'wicked eye', as to by practice make an unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights. It is a denial of equal opportunity and is within the prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution.

The Board of Election Commissioner as well as the Milwaukee Election Commission was required to state specific 'findings of fact' and 'conclusions of law' in the manner required of state agencies. **See Edmonds v Board of Fire & Police Commrs, 66 Wis. 2d 337, 224 N.W. 2d. 575.** The findings of the Board of Election Commissioners failed to specify what wrong acts that the appellant as a candidate was purported to have engaged in or specifically what acts constituted 'removal' from the mandates of ballot placement in compliance with clearly established law. Both agencies violated procedural due process as the scope of the January 9,

2023 hearing exceeded notice; parties have a right to be appraised of issues to insure the right to be heard. **See Bracegirdle v Board of Nursing, 159 Wis 2d 402, 464 N.W. 2d 111.**

The appellant to date has not recovered nor has the respondents given the appellant a written determination nor what grounds the actions were taken on. Every decision when made, signed and filed shall be served forthwith by personal delivery of mailing a copy to each party to the proceedings or to the party's attorney of record. See Wis. Stats.§ 227.48. Serving of a decision is complete on the date of mailing. **See In re Proposed Incorporation of Pewaukee, 72 Wis. 2d 593, 241 N.W. 2d 603.**

The appellant is entitled to equal rights, equal opportunity & equal protections under the laws of the United States Constitution as well as the State of Wisconsin Constitution. The appellant is in substantial compliance with all election related ballot placement, and eligibility for public office prerequisites as defined by clearly established law. The appellant has met and exceeded all conditions precedent to have her named placed on the ballot. The filing officer's inaction and decision on January 9, 2023 to not place my name on the ballot for Municipal Judge, Brach 3 election and inaction is not in conformity with clearly established law as detailed supra. The appellant provided the respondents with an affidavit under penalty of perjury that she qualified and met all conditions precedent relating to qualifications and eligibility for Municipal Judge, Branch 3. The affidavit is entitled to the presumption of validity.

As evidence in the audio of the January 9, 2023 hearing held by the respondents there had not been provided to the appellant or any evidence set forth on record in compliance with clearly established law, including procedural Due Process that demonstrate 'a failure to comply with statutory or other legal requirements' to be placed on the ballot for Municipal Judge, Branch 3.

On January 5, 2023 at 3:08 p.m. Claire Woodall-Vogg, acting in the capacity of an Milwaukee Election Commission employee, notified the appellant via e-mail that the appellant's nomination papers were 'deemed' sufficient also stating that the appellant had 'completed' ***all*** other filing requirements and the appellant's name would in fact be placed on the ballot.

As the audio clearly shows; Claire Woodall-Vogg, acting in the capacity of an Milwaukee Election Commission employee after receiving complaints and responses from both myself and Phil Chavez did NOT make, nor issue any decision to the contrary of 'recommending the appellant for ballot placement' nor was there any 'public notice' of such decision made or given to the public or appellant.

On the bottom of page 1, top of page 2 of the respondents' perjury riddled legally insufficient purported verified response with reckless disregard for the truth the respondents' counsel conceded that the '**sole**'' basis for the 'challenge' is that 'Griffin is not currently ***licensed*** to practice law in the State of Wisconsin as 'required' by '§ 3-34-2-b, of the Milwaukee City Charter..Chavez further argued Griffin was 'therefore 'ineligible' for ballot placement as a result of Wis. Stats. 8.30.

The WEC can clearly see that the challenge (**see exhibits attached**) does not in any way state what is now alleged in the respondent's perjury riddled legally insufficient purported verified response with reckless disregard for the truth. The complaint, as attached in the appellant's formal appeal sates that Chavez 'allege' that Ieshuh Griffin, respondent is not a member of the state bar of Wisconsin, and thus is not an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Wisconsin, which would make Ieshuh Griffin, the respondent ineligible for the position

of City of Milwaukee Municipal Judge as cited in the city charter. Counsel for the respondent is doing nothing short 'lying' to the WEC.

The challenge is as it stands, and it falls exactly where it stands. The challenge failed to meet its burden of proof, in its entirety. 1) The appellant does not have to be a member of the State Bar of Wisconsin to be 'an attorney' 2) The prerequisites to obtaining a 'license' to practice law in Wisconsin IF it were to be an 'election related ballot placement' prerequisite were, have been and already are met and exceeded by the appellant as the audio of the appellant's affirmation under oath confirmed 3) The municipality's unpromulgated charter is preempted by state and federal law, and is void on its face as detailed herein the verified reply 'under oath'. 4) State law as well as the State of Wisconsin Constitution has not ever indicated nor inferred that a qualification for Municipal state judgeship public office was, is or has been conditioned on obtaining any form of license.

Contrary to the boiler plate conclusions of the respondents' counsel, on page 4 of the perjury riddled legally insufficient purported verified response with reckless disregard for the truth stating that the filing officer's determination of validity has no relevant to the 'issue at hand', the appeal is in fact centered around the actions and inactions of the filing officer on January 9, 2023. Over 1,500 qualified electors 'requested that the appellant's name be placed on the ballot, as the appellant is their choice; i.e. 'the will of the voters'. The filing officer intentionally 'suppressed a certificate of nomination' 'which had been duly filed'. It is unlawful for an election official to willfully neglect or refuses to perform an official duty, in fact it is considered 'election fraud'. **See Wis. Stats. 12.13(2).**

Furthermore, contrary to the boiler plate conclusions of the respondents'' counsel, on page 4 of the perjury riddled legally insufficient purported verified response that the 'WEC is not competent to rule about the 'City's authority' to 'establish' such a requirement is far from the truth. Further, it is a mockery of law that the respondents on the same page then boldly state that 'the Wisconsin Supreme Court is the arbiter of who may practice law', yet the respondents' as evidenced n the audio provided usurped such authority unconstitutionally, which by clearly established law invalidates and voids the January 9, 2023 hearing as they did not have lawful authority to act as 'arbiters of who may practice law'.

Municipal ordinances adopted under state authority constitute state action within the Fourteenth Amendment. **See Lovell v City of Griffin, 303 US 450**. If the Wisconsin Election Commission 'accepted' the unpromulgated charter as an 'election ballot prerequisite law', the WEC would be under a mandatory duty to disqualify and remove all state wide sitting and running 'nonlawyer municipal judges, as a judge does not have discretion to act a 'trespasser of the law'. 'Municipal judges, pursuant to clearly established state law, have 'statewide' 'territorial jurisdiction, inclusive of the City of Milwaukee. The unpromulgated municipality internal charter/policy makes no exception; as such the 51% of nonlawyer White male municipal judges across the state would then be 'in clear absence of all jurisdictions'. If a judge lacks jurisdiction, than a judge lacks all jurisdiction, whether or not the subject matter is properly before him. **See Kulko v Superior Court, 436 US 84.**

Page 5, of the perjury riddled legally insufficient purported verified response is nothing short of speculation, conjecture and opinions of counsel that are not to be considered by law as law. The appellant has challenged the challenge of candidate Chavez, the actions of the filing officer on January 9, 2023, the actions of the Board, the jurisdiction, the venue, and refutes the

filed response in its entirety. The real issues are as stated in the complaint, and as contested, and refuted within the verified reply before the WEC now. The counsel for the respondents'' in conclusion asks the WEC to dismiss the appellant's 'complaint' in its entirety, yet what is before the WEC is not a 'complaint', it is an 'appeal'. A 'verified' appeal. A 'complaint' is a written document regarding the quality of service, or lack thereof, which may or may not include the behavior of others as it relates.

An 'appeal' is an 'institute of legal proceedings' to review the lawfulness of actions taking and if such actions are consistent with clearly established law or are in violation of clearly established law and to impose corrective measures upon finding such violation; it provides for further appellate relief if need be and the respondents are to answer in accordance to law, and truthfully. The WEC is without jurisdiction, respectfully speaking to dismiss something that is not before it, the pleading filed with the WEC is not a 'complaint', as such the conclusion of the respondent is void ab intio.

The appellant has met all conditions precedent in the verified appeal, and verified appeal's reply. The same cannot be stated for the respondents as their pleading is nothing more than a perjury riddled legally insufficient purported verified response, failing to refute arguments as such by clearly established law, the appellant's verified appeal has been 'admitted to ' by the respondents'.

The actions of the respondents on January 9, 2023 is, taken against the appellant is an unconstitutional 'bill of attainder' and is in direct violation of the separation of power clause. The fact that the 'punishment' is 'civil' makes it no less unlawful as if it was 'criminal'. **See United States v Lovett, 328 US 316.** The clause prohibits all legislative acts 'no matter what

form' that apply either to named individuals or to an easy ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a 'judicial trial' are 'bills of attainder' prohibited by the Constitution of the United States. Article I section 3, cl 9 of the United States Constitution 'forbids' the 'enactment' of 'any' bill of attainder or ex post facto law.

The actions of the respondents' further are in direct violation of the federal Hatch Act, as the respondents, while acting in their official capacities, unlawfully added heighted 'political' activity to a 'nonpartisan' election. The filing officer unequivocally expressed 'political support' for candidate Chavez, in the capacity of an unpromulgated 'expert witness' 'investigator' and 'advocate' for 'union bar' members. The filing officer, unlawfully promulgated a 'guide memo' as an 'election related rule', giving no notice of the memo to the appellant. The memo was 'outside the scope' of evidence as it was not attached in any complaint nor response to a complaint, but was unlawfully promulgated by the filing officer without public notice.

The filing officer used 'the state bar of Wisconsin' as the 'legislative authority' to decide 'ballot placement' on January 9, 2023, and on that date alone, as prior to that, the filing officer had not 'refused to place the appellant's name on the ballot.' The filing officer further subjected the appellant to a heighted standard of proof that candidate Chavez was not subjected to in any capacity, though running for the same elected positions thee appellant.

The appellant was denied by the respondents the right to a full, fair and impartial formal 'adjudicatory hearing'. An agency must initiate an 'adjudicatory' hearing when one is required by law. Wisconsin law mandates a person is entitled to such hearing if a 'substantial' interest of the person is 'injured' by the agency's action and there are disputed facts. **See Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 375 N.W.**

2d 648. The adjudicatory hearing embodies due process principles of fundamental fairness and opportunity to be heard, confront witness, obtain evidence as well as cross examine witnesses. **See Matthew v Eldridge, 424 US 319.**

A 'licensing hearing' is a 'protected property' interest as a license can be denied, withdrawn or revoked, as such before any is commenced,, proper notice and due process must be fully accorded when a person is directly deprived, or is to be deprived of such. The 'denial' of the 'right to apply' in itself is an unlawful deprivation under the Due Process Clause of the United States. A formal hearing in line with due process must occur before such deprivations are acted upon by the government. An administrative order is void if a hearing is denied or if the hearing which was given was inadequate and/or manifestly unfair. **See American Power Co v SEC, 329 US 90.**

The City of Milwaukee cannot interfere with a person's 'right' to work. A municipality has no authority to unlawfully 'convert' an 'elective' public officer into an 'appointed' public officer, nor does a municipality have power to 'authorize' its officers to 'perform' an illegal act, as such it lacks the power to 'ratify' such an act. The city's municipality charter requiring 'licensing' as a prerequisite to one of its "officers" must be required under the 'equal pains and penalties clause' to 'all' of its "officers"; inclusive of alderpersons, and mayors, municipal clerks, board members and so forth. **(Emphasis Added).**

The ***law*** of a state is to be found in its statutory and constitutional enactments. The ***law*** of the state *must be applied equally to all persons within the state's jurisdiction* in order to meet the 'equal protections' of the United States Constitution requirements, which is the supreme law of the land, applicable to the states. No municipality can convert a common right, a constitutional

right into a government privilege. 'One who is prosecuted for disobeying a license ordinance which is 'void on its face' may contest the validity without having first sought the license. **See Lovell v Griffin, 303 US 452.**

A municipality has no legislative power to abridge constitutional rights. A 'license' only applicable to a certain demographic area and not applicable to the citizens similarly situated throughout the state as a whole is unconstitutional. It is a hostile misuse to trample on guaranteed constitutional rights to 'life, liberty and the 'pursuit' of happiness. **See Grosjean v American Press Co, Inc, 297 US 233.**

Discrimination against Milwaukee minority voters is a historic 'City of Milwaukee' political problem. requiring a political solution, yet to be resolved. The respondents are enacting an unlawful nonelection related 'segregation clause' that does nothing more than suppresses and dilute the minority vote, with a discriminatory purpose, unconstitutional in all aspects. This self imposed nonpromulgated standard, practice and pursue, is an unnecessary heavy burden on the minority vote, a 'protected class' having 'less opportunity' as other citizens 'statewide' whom are 'similarly situated'.

From state legislation to 'strict scrutiny' the actions of the respondents against the appellant and the will of the voters is patently unconstitutional. The appellant requests that the WEC order the respondents' to comply with clearly established law, and the mandatory duties imposed upon the municipal court and correct the unlawful and wrongful removal of the appellant's name from the ballot that was rightfully earned and adhere to the will of the voters, placing the name of the appellant 'back' on the ballot, as the vote was to 'remove' the appellant's

name from the ballot. The appellant has met all conditions precedent as defined by clearly established law to have her named place on the ballot and is entitled to such.

Conclusion

The appellant requests that the respondents' perjury riddled legally insufficient purported verified response with reckless disregard for the truth be quashed and the Wisconsin Election Commission order that the respondents place the appellant's name back onto the ballot forthwith, as it is an earned right of the appellant and the will of the voters by way of over 1,500 sufficiently valid nomination signatures. It is the will of the voters that must be the starting point and the ending point of all election related laws.

Being first duly sworn under oath, my signature below verifies and affirms, under oath, UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY the above statements are **facts** that are **true** and **correct** to the best of my personal knowledge, recollection and belief.

Signed before a notary this 20th **--------- day of February 2023**

Teshuh Griffin

Appellant/Candidate

ABDALLAH SARSOUR NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF WISCONSIN

10/23/2024

Notary

Exhibits Attached

1. **Audio of the Jan. 9, 2023 (sent via e-mailed attachment)**
2. **Wisconsin Election Commission information that clearly indicates the 'challenge to nominations' are 'decided' by the 'filing officer'**
3. **Filing officer's 'written decision' for appellant's ballot placement/filing officer's confirming appellant had 'completed all other filing requirements'**
4. **Filing officer's public notice, with no public notice nor indication that the appellant was not recommended for ballot placement, only reciting unpromulgated memos as guides in violation of administrative procedures.**
5. **Candidate Qualifications for office as publically noticed**
6. **The ONLY publically noticed impediment to the qualification for eligibility for public office/publically noticed ballot procedure**
7. **Only publically notice municipality ordinance that is a 'ballot' placement status prerequisite, emphasis on BALLOT**
8. **Wisconsin Election Commission's notice regarding the ONLY publically noticed impediment to the qualification/eligibility for public office**
9. **City of Milwaukee's PUBLICALLY noticed qualifications for public office including the ONLY publically noticed impediment to the qualification/eligibility for public office**
10. **Challenge to appellant doe NOT state as alleged by the counsel for the respondent**
11. **SCR 23.02 EXCEPTIONS & EXCLUSIONS to a 'license to practice law in the State of Wisconsin**

Ex. 2

What happens when a challenge is filed?

The filing officer notifies the candidate whose papers or eligibility are being challenged and arranges for a copy of the challenge to be provided within 24 hours of the challenge being filed.
A verified or sworn response to the challenge must be filed by the candidate to the filing officer within 3 calendar days[1] of the challenge being filed. A verified or sworn response must be notarized or otherwise sworn before an official authorized to administer oaths in accordance with Wis. Stat. §887.01.
The filing officer decides the challenge* before the candidate certification deadline using the evidence provided by the two parties.
The filing officer issues a decision regarding the outcome of the complaint. This decision will serve as record for any potential appeals, along with any other materials submitted as part of the challenge process.

**Municipal and county filing officers may reach out to Wisconsin Elections Commission for guidance regarding a challenge. However, Commission staff will not make the determination on behalf of or with the filing officer because an appeal of the decision would be reviewed by the Commission.*

What if the challenger or the candidate does not agree with the decision from the filing officer?

The challenger or candidate may file an appeal of the filing officer's decision. If the filing officer is at the municipal or county level, the appeal would be made to the Wisconsin Elections Commission through the submission of a written, sworn statement or the EL 1100 Elections Complaint Form. For more information about filing the appeal, see Wis. Stat. § 5.06 which provides guidelines about complaints and which the Commission is required to use during the appeals process as well. The appeal must be filed no later than 10 days after the party knew, or should have known, about the violation of law or abuse of discretion by the filing officer. Wis. Stat. §5.06(3). For complaints about ballot access decisions it is recommended that any such complaints be filed immediately, so that the appeal may be heard prior to ballot printing and distribution deadlines.

If the filing officer is Wisconsin Elections Commission, the challenger or candidate may choose to file an appeal with the circuit court for the county where the official conducts business or the complainant resides. Any such appeal must be filed no later than 30 days after the decision order is issued by WEC. Wis. Stat. §5.06(8).

What if my question wasn't answered here?

More information regarding challenges to nomination papers can be found in the following locations:
Elections Administrative Code 2.07: "Challenges to nomination papers"
Wisconsin Elections Commission "Challenger Procedures Memo" and "Challenged Candidate Memo", published on the WEC website (elections.wi.gov) for each election and typically found with the candidate nomination tracking reports.
Chapter 8 of the Wisconsin State Statutes prescribes the ballot access filing requirements for candidates for each office and type of election.

Speak to an Elections Administration Specialist by calling Wisconsin Elections Commission at 608-261-2028 or by emailing elections@wi.gov.

[1] If the deadline falls on a Sunday, the response may be filed the next day. (*See* Wis. Stat. §990.001(4)(b))

Ex 3

Woodall-Vogg, Claire

From: Woodall-Vogg, Claire
Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2023 4:39 PM
To: eyeforjustice@yahoo.com
Cc: Zuniga, Jonatan
Subject: RE: Nomination Signatures Validated

Hi Ms. Griffin,

No one has challenged you. I had learned of a requirement that is specific to Milwaukee and wanted to bring it to your attention. You are in full compliance and will be recommended for ballot placement at this point in time.

The draw for the order of candidates appearing on the ballot has been scheduled for Monday, January 9, 2023 at 5:00PM (taking place directly after the Board of Commissioners reviews and rules on any challenges). The meeting location is Room 501 of City Hall and the agenda will be posted on the homepage of the Election Commission, Milwaukee.gov/election.

Sincerely,

Claire Woodall-Vogg

From: eyeforjustice@yahoo.com <eyeforjustice@yahoo.com>
Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2023 4:36 PM
To: Woodall-Vogg, Claire <cwooda@milwaukee.gov>
Subject: Re: Nomination Signatures Validated

I also would like to add for the record I am in FULL compliance with the law as it relates, again please inform me if and who challenged me. I would like a copy of their verified complaint so that I may respond accordingly.-Ieshuh Griffin

On Thursday, January 5, 2023 at 03:08:44 PM CST, Woodall-Vogg, Claire <cwooda@milwaukee.gov> wrote:

Dear Ms. Griffin,

The Election Commission has completed the review process for individuals who registered as candidates and filed nomination papers to qualify for the Spring Election to be held on April 4, 2023. This process included a review of the nomination papers to verify the necessary number of valid signatures were secured and that all documents, as required by Wisconsin §8.10 (5), have been filed with the appropriate filing agent.

This email is to formally notify you that your nomination papers have been reviewed and deemed sufficient. Of the 1,709 signatures submitted, the Election Commission has validated 1,555 signatures. You have completed all other filing requirements.

City of Milwaukee | **ELECTION** COMMISSION

Ex. 4

January 9, 2023

TO: Milwaukee Election Commissioners

FROM: Claire Woodall-Vogg, Executive Director

RE: Chavez vs. Griffin & Griffin vs. Chavez

1. Phil Chavez filed a verified complaint on Friday, January 6, alleging that if Ms. Griffin were to be elected to the office of Municipal Judge Branch 3, she would not be able to qualify for the office sought within the time allowed by law because of "other impediment." Chavez referred to City of Milwaukee Charter, 3-34-2(b) which states that a Municipal Court Judge shall be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Wisconsin. Chavez alleges that Ms. Griffin is not currently a licensed an attorney, nor will she become one within the time allowed by law to take office.
2. Wis. State Statute 8.30 outlines situations where a Candidate may be ineligible for ballot placement:

   (1) "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the official or agency with whom declarations of candidate are required to be filed may refuse to place the candidate's name on the ballot if any of the following apply:

   ...

   (c) The candidate, if elected, could not qualify for the office sought within the time allowed by law for qualification because of age, residence, or other impediment."
3. Ieshuh Griffin filed a complaint on Friday, January 6, alleging that Phil Chavez is not a licensed attorney because any license would need to be issued by the Wisconsin Department of Safety and Professional Services.
4. Supreme Court Rule 40.02 lays out qualifications generally to be admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin:

   SCR 40.02 Qualifications generally.
   A person who meets all of the following qualifications shall be admitted to practice law in this state by order of the supreme court:
   (1) Has attained the age of majority under the law of this state.
   (2) Satisfies the legal competence requirements by diploma privilege (SCR 40.03), bar examination (SCR 40.04 or SCR 40.055) or proof of practice elsewhere (SCR 40.05).211
   (3) Satisfies the character and fitness requirements set forth in SCR 40.06.
   (4) (a) Takes the oath or affirmation prescribed in SCR 40.15 in open court before the supreme court or a justice thereof.

Ex 4a

(b) For individuals unable to appear at an in-person court ceremony and upon receipt of notification from the Board that an applicant has been certified for admission, a qualified applicant may request to take the oath or affirmation prescribed in SCR 40.15 remotely via audio-visual communications technology before the Wisconsin Supreme Court or a justice thereof. Qualified individuals may also request that they be permitted to take the oath or affirmation prescribed in SCR 40.15 before a member of the highest court of another jurisdiction or a person authorized by that jurisdiction to administer the attorney's oath for bar admission there or before a judge of the U.S. District Court or Court of Appeals or a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Any such requests shall be sent to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
(5) Subscribes the roll of attorneys maintained by the clerk of the supreme court or has his or her name entered thereon by the clerk.

5. Furthermore, Supreme Court Rule 10.01 states, "There shall be an association to be known as the "state bar of Wisconsin" composed of persons licensed to practice law in this state, and membership in the association shall be a condition precedent to the right to practice law in Wisconsin.
6. Because both candidates have raised concerns related to the other's qualifications, I have completed my due diligence to confirm who is a licensed attorney within the State of Wisconsin.
7. Per the State Bar of Wisconsin, Phil Chavez is a licensed attorney in good standing.
8. Per the State Bar of Wisconsin, there is no record of Ieshuh Griffin being a licensed attorney.

- Per "license bureau" No license on file 4 Phil Chavez
- State Bar is a UNION not a license bureau

Respectfully submitted,
Claire Woodall-Vogg
Executive Director

She purposely stated GENERAL requests.

CANDIDATES

Summary

All candidates must meet certain qualification requirements and must also complete and file proper ballot access documents in order to gain a spot on the ballot. Municipal clerks serve as the filing officer for municipal offices. Therefore, the municipal clerk should keep detailed records of candidate filings and correspondence. Municipal offices are nonpartisan and are up for election on the first Tuesday in April. If a primary is required, the primary is held on the third Tuesday in February preceding the spring election.

Qualifications for Office

All candidates must meet the residency requirements established for the office to which he or she is seeking election.

1. City Offices:	A qualified elector* of the city and residing in city at the time of election. Wis. Stat. § 62.09(2)(a).
2. Aldermanic Offices:	A qualified elector* of the city and aldermanic district and residing in the district at the time of election. Wis. Stat. § 61.09(2)(a).
3. Village Offices:	A qualified elector* of the village and residing in village at the time of election. Wis. Stat. § 61.19.
4. Town Offices:	A qualified elector* of the town at the time of taking office, except an assessor who is appointed under Wis. Stats. §§ 60.307, 60.30(2).
5. School Offices	A qualified elector* of the school district at the time of filing a Declaration of Candidacy (EL-162). If representing an apportioned area, also a resident of that area at the time of taking office. Wis. Stat. § 120.06(2), (6)(b) 2.

*A qualified elector is defined in Wis. Stat. § 6.02, as a U.S. citizen, 18 years of age or older, who has resided in the election district for at least 28 consecutive

Exhibit 6

days before an election at which he or she offers to vote and who is not disqualified by virtue of one or more of the impediments described in Wis. Stat. § 6.03.

Note: No person may hold any state or local elected office in Wisconsin if the person has been convicted of a felony in any court in the United States unless the person has been pardoned of the conviction. Additionally, no person may have his or her name placed on the ballot for any state or local elective office in Wisconsin if the person has been convicted of a felony in any court in the United States unless the person has been pardoned of the conviction (Wis. Const. Art. XIII, § 3(3)). Any person who falsely signs this statement could be convicted of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(3)(a), (am). (no other disqualifications)

Ballot Access Procedure

All candidates, regardless of office sought, must complete ballot access documents. Most candidates are nominated for office through the filing of nomination papers. However, some towns and villages use the caucus procedure to nominate candidates for town or village office. All candidates, regardless of the nomination procedure used, must file two documents:

1. Campaign Finance Registration Statement (CF-1). Wis. Stat. § 11.0102(1).
2. Declaration of Candidacy (EL-162). Wis. Stat. § 8.21, Art. XIII, Sec. 3, Wis. Const.

only authority given to refuse placement

If a candidate fails to file one or both of these forms with the municipal clerk by the deadline for filing nomination papers or by 5:00 p.m. on the fifth day after a candidate receives notification of nomination at a caucus, the clerk cannot place the candidate's name on the ballot. Wis. Stat. § 8.05 (l)(j). If the fifth day falls on a Sunday or holiday, the deadline is extended to the next business day. Municipal judge candidates also need to submit a *Statement of Economic Interests* to the Wisconsin Ethics Commission in order to meet ballot access requirements. Ballot Access Checklists (ELIS-6, ELIS-7, ELIS-8) for municipal candidates indicate this requirement and the appropriate filing deadline. Forms and instructions are available from the Wisconsin Ethics Commission's website (http://ethics.wi.gov) or by contacting the Wisconsin Ethics Commission at (608) 266-8123.

Exhibit 1

ordinance created by law

Additionally, some municipalities may have an ethics ordinance under Wis. Stat. § 19.59(3)(b), requiring a *Statement of Economic Interests* to be filed with the local filing officer in order to achieve ballot status. If you are unsure whether your municipality has an ethics statement requirement, you should check with your municipal attorney. If the statement is not filed by the deadline, the candidate's name will not appear on the ballot.

Clerks should make "candidate packets" available for all prospective municipal candidates. All ballot access forms and checklists are available on the respective Wisconsin Elections Commission and Wisconsin Ethics Commission websites. Candidate packets should include the following forms:

1. Campaign Finance Registration Statement (CF-1).
2. Declaration of Candidacy (EL-162).
3. Nomination Paper for Nonpartisan Office (EL-169), if required.
4. Appropriate Ballot Access and Campaign Finance Checklists (ELIS-6, ELIS-7, ELIS-8).

Wis. Stats. §§ 8.1, 8.21.

Campaign Finance Registration Statement (CF-1)

For information about the Campaign Finance Registration Statement, please contact the Wisconsin Ethics Commission.

Declaration of Candidacy (EL-162)

The Declaration of Candidacy (EL-162) may be filed at any time, but not later than the deadline for filing nomination papers or not later than 5:00 p.m. on the fifth day after receipt of notification of nomination at a caucus. A person who has been convicted of a felony cannot run for or hold public office unless he or she has been pardoned of the offense. The Declaration of Candidacy (EL-162) contains a certification that the candidate meets this requirement. Wis. Stat. § 8.21.

NOTE: School District Candidates use the EL-162sd.

Exhibit D

Wisconsin Elections Commission

212 East Washington Avenue | Third Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

MEMORANDUM

TO Wisconsin County Clerks and the Milwaukee County Elections Commission
Wisconsin Municipal Clerks and the Milwaukee City Election Commission

FROM: Elections Commission Staff

DATE: September 13, 2019

SUBJECT: Effect of Constitutional Amendment Barring Convicted Felons from Running for or Holding Elective Office in Wisconsin

In November 1996, the electors of the State of Wisconsin ratified a constitutional amendment which bars any person, who has been convicted of a felony for which they have not been pardoned, or who has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving a violation of public trust for which they have not been pardoned, from holding a state or local office. As a result of the adoption of this constitutional amendment, which took effect on November 5, 1996, local election officials may need to address a number of questions relating to convicted felons who seek to run for office or who are elected to office.

The constitutional amendment deals with two different types of crimes. The first involves felony convictions. Any person convicted of a felony in any federal or state court in the United States is barred from running for state or local office in Wisconsin, unless that person has been pardoned.

The second involves misdemeanor convictions involving a violation of public trust. The term, "misdemeanor involving a violation of public trust," has not been defined by state law. Filing officers do not have to worry about individuals convicted of that category of crime until the term has been defined. At the present time, there is no such thing as a misdemeanor involving a violation of public trust.

The Declaration of Candidacy form (EL-162) reflects this constitutional change. Any person seeking to be a candidate for state or local office must file a Declaration of Candidacy. That declaration contains a sworn statement that the person has not been convicted of any felony for which they have not been pardoned, or any misdemeanor involving a violation of public trust for which they have not been pardoned. Any person who falsely signs this statement could be convicted of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(3)(a), (am). If a person seeking to become a candidate advises you that they have been convicted of a felony, your best approach is to advise

Exhibit 9

Qualifications

The requirements to run for an elected office in the City of Milwaukee are outlined in the Declaration of Candidacy form. The body of the oath lists the requirements including:

1. A minimum of 18 years of age.
2. U.S. citizenship
3. Residency: The residency requirement is specific to the position. If it is a citywide office that the candidate is seeking, the residency must be within the city limits. If it is the Aldermanic position, then the candidate must have residency within the Aldermanic District by the date he or she takes office.
4. Not have been convicted of a felony in any court in the United States for which the candidate has not been pardoned.



This website was created to assist citizens who are considering a bid for elected office. This cursory review does not replace the candidate's responsibility to review Chapters 5-12 of the State Statutes governing the election process.

10

State of Wisconsin
Before the Elections Commission

The Complaint of Phil Chavez, 3401 S Delaware Ave, Milwaukee, WI 53207, Complainant
against
Ieshuh Griffin, 2722A N Richards St, Milwaukee, WI 53212, Respondent

COMPLAINT

This complaint is under the City of Milwaukee Charter, 3-34-2.MUNICIPAL JUDGE (b) ELIGIBILITY: A Municipal Court Judge shall be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Wisconsin
AND;
Wisconsin State Statutes 8.30 Candidates ineligible for ballot placement.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the official or agency with whom declarations of candidacy are required to be filed may refuse to place the candidate's name on the ballot if any of the following apply:

(c) The candidate, if elected, could not qualify for the office sought within the time allowed by law for qualification because of age, residence, or other impediment.

I, Phil Chavez, Complainant, allege that Ieshuh Griffin, Respondent, is not a member of the State Bar of Wisconsin and thus is not an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Wisconsin which would make Ieshuh Griffin, Respondent, ineligible for the position of City of Milwaukee Municipal Court Judge as cited above in the City of Milwaukee Charter Paragraph 3-34-2.(b). It follows that Ieshuh Griffin, Respondent, if elected, could not qualify for the office sought due to this impediment and as a result is ineligible for ballot placement for City of Milwaukee Municipal Court Judge, Branch 3 for the April 4, 2023 Spring Election as cited above in Wisconsin State Statutes 8.30(1)(c).

Date: January 6th, 2023

P. Chavez

I, Phil Chavez, being first duly sworn on oath state that I personally read the above complaint, and that the above allegations are true based on my personal knowledge and, as to those stated on information and belief, I believe them to be true.

P. Chavez

STATE OF WISCONSIN)
) ss.
County of MILWAUKEE)
Sworn to before me this day of January 6, 2023.

Deborah L Craig

My commission expires 3/23/23, or is permanent.
Notary Public or _____

DEBORAH L CRAIG
Notary Public
State of Wisconsin

proceeding in which legal pleadings are filed or a record is established as the basis for judicial review.

(4) Negotiation of legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of another entity or person(s).

(5) Any other activity determined to be the practice of law by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

SCR 23.02 License required to practice law; use of titles.

(1) RIGHT OF A PERSON TO PRACTICE LAW IN WISCONSIN.◆ A person who is duly licensed to practice law in this state by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and who is an active member of the State Bar of Wisconsin may practice law in Wisconsin.◆ No person may engage in the practice of law in Wisconsin, or attempt to do so, or make a representation that he or she is authorized to do so, unless the person is currently licensed to practice law in Wisconsin by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and is an active member of the State Bar of Wisconsin.

(2) EXCEPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS.◆ A license to practice law and active membership in the State Bar of Wisconsin are not required for a person engaged in any of the following activities in Wisconsin, regardless of whether these activities constitute the practice of law:

(a) Practicing law pursuant to SCR 10.03(4) by a non-resident counsel or registered in-house counsel.

(b) Serving as a courthouse facilitator pursuant to court rule.

(c) Appearing in a representative capacity before an administrative tribunal or agency to the extent permitted by such tribunal or agency.

COMMENT

A nonlawyer who is an employee, member, or officer of an entity or organization may represent such entity, organization or any corporate affiliate before an administrative tribunal or agency of the State of Wisconsin.

(d) Serving in a neutral capacity as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator, or facilitator.

(e) Participation in labor negotiations, arbitrations or conciliations arising under collective bargaining rights or agreements.