NOTICE OF OPEN AND CLOSED MEETING

Wisconsin Elections Commission

Regular Meeting

Thursday, May 7, 2026

OPEN AND CLOSED SESSION AGENDA

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O. Closed Session

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2. Approval of Previous Meeting Minutes
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4. Requests for Advisory Opinions

P. Adjourn

Wisconsin Elections Commission
Quarterly Meeting
Wisconsin Capitol Building, Room 412E
Madison, Wisconsin
10:00 a.m. March 25, 2026

Open Session Minutes

Present: Commissioner Marge Bostelmann, Commissioner Ann Jacobs, Commissioner Don M. Millis, Commissioner Carrie Riepl, Commissioner Robert Spindell Jr., and Commissioner Mark Thomsen, all in person.

Staff present: Ahna Barreau, Sharrie Hauge, Brandon Hunzicker, Robert Kehoe, Anna Langdon, Emilee Miklas, Angela Sharpe, Riley Willman, Jim Witecha, and Meagan Wolfe, all in person.

A. Call to Order

Commission Chair Jacobs called the meeting to order at 10:00 a.m. and called the roll. All Commissioners were present.

B. Administrator's Report of Appropriate Meeting Notice

Administrator Meagan Wolfe informed the Commission that the meeting was noticed in accordance with Wisconsin's open meetings laws.

C. Public Comment

Chair Jacobs stated that each speaker would have three minutes to provide comments.

Ann Chartier

Ann Chartier appeared via Zoom and requested that the Commission provide greater support to municipalities that must comply with Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.

Kole Torres

Kole Torres appeared via Zoom and requested that the Commission provide greater support to municipalities that must comply with Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.

Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Spindell followed up with comments and questions.

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Ms. Torres shared her negative experience serving as an election observer in the Village of Sharon.

Jay Schroeder

Jay Schroeder asked two questions regarding compatibility for state constitutional office and whether a study existed regarding how each state maintains their voter rolls.

Chair Jacobs answered his questions.

Debra Cronmiller

Debra Cronmiller appeared in person representing the League of Women Voters Wisconsin. She praised the Commission's work running its polling place accessibility review program and requested that the Commission provide greater support to municipalities that must comply with Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.

Commissioner Spindell and Commissioner Thomsen followed up with comments.

Eloisa Gomez

Eloisa Gomez appeared in person and requested that the Commission provide greater support to municipalities that must comply with Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.

Chair Jacobs followed up with comments.

D. Approval of Previous Meeting Minutes

a. February 24, 2026

MOTION: To approve the February 24, 2026, open meeting minutes.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Riepl.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

E. Discussion and Potential Action Relating to *Nancy Kormanik v. Wisconsin Elections Commission* Post-Litigation Guidance

Chief Legal Counsel Jim Witecha gave a brief overview of past developments and Commission actions regarding *Kormanik v. Wisconsin Elections Commission* and noted that the judge in the case had asked the parties for a status conference.

Discussion.

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The Commission agreed to postpone discussion of the agenda item until after the status conference, and changed the start time of its April 22, 2026, meeting to 8:30 a.m. to accommodate discussion then.

F. Discussion and Possible Action on Manual Revisions Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 7.08(3)(c)

Staff Attorney Angela Sharpe provided an overview of the Commission's materials regarding manual revisions. She acknowledged receipt of feedback from Commissioner Riepl and Chair Jacobs and noted that some of the questions before the Commission were carryovers from the previous meeting.

Attorney Sharpe solicited answers to the questions starting on page 2 of the Commission's manuals materials:

Question 1: The legality of "ballot selfies" in Wisconsin is an unsettled legal question. On one hand, statute prohibits voters from intentionally showing their marked ballots to other people. On the other hand, other courts in other states have held similar statutes to be an unconstitutional encroachment on voters' First Amendment rights. Staff are not proposing the Commission answer the legal question, but rather, seek the Commission's input on including both sides of this context for this issue in the manual.

Discussion.

MOTION: In the proposed revisions for Question 1, replace "Taking a photograph of a marked ballot for personal use is likely permitted, but if a voter posts that photo on social media, shares it with someone else, or livestreams their voting choices, they can run the risk of 'showing his or her marked ballot to any person,' which is prohibited," with the following language:

> "Taking a photo of a marked ballot for personal use is not prohibited. Posting that photo on social media, sharing it with someone else, or livestreaming voting choices is prohibited by state law."

Add the following footnote to this language:

> "Under certain circumstances, this prohibition may not be enforceable."

Moved by Commissioner Millis. Seconded by Commissioner Thomsen.

Discussion.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	No
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 5-1.

Question 2: Not a change, but staff are seeking the Commission's input on including a new section focused on special types of federal observers who operate under slightly different laws than Wisconsin's observer laws. These federal observers include congressional observers under the COCOA Act (who appeared in the 2024 General) as well as U.S. DOJ federal election monitors, which are becoming more common.

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Discussion.

The Commission agreed to include this content in the manual.

Question 3: Electioneering and unauthorized election-related material are unequivocally prohibited in voting areas, as well as within 100 feet of the entrance to the polling place. But staff have fielded questions in recent years about mixed use buildings where voters must pass through a hallway (or several) to get to the voting area. Staff believe the prohibitions against campaigning and election material should equally apply to these reasonable paths (though not the whole building), and seek the Commission's consideration and approval of this interpretation.

Discussion.

MOTION: Adopt the redlines on page 4.

Moved by Commissioner Millis. Seconded by Commissioner Bostelmann.

Discussion.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	No
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 5-1.

Question 4: The Commission has existing guidance on weapons in the polling place, but not in the Election Day manual. Staff propose adding a brief section that provides initial guidance on this topic, with a link to where users can find additional detail.

Discussion.

The Commission agreed to include this content in the manual.

Attorney Sharpe provided an overview of the new chapters before the Commission.

Discussion.

Chair Jacobs directed staff to rework the Counting Votes & Write-In Scenarios chapter:

- Divide the write-in scenarios by situation: 1-candidate races, 2-candidate races, etc.
- Make "Determining Voter Intent" into its own chapter
  - Add specific examples of defective ballots

MOTION: The Wisconsin Elections Commission ("the Commission") has reviewed the recommended manual revisions presented in these materials and accepts the recommendations consistent with discussion during the meeting.

- The Commission directs staff to make the following specific revisions:
  - Replace "Taking a photograph of a marked ballot for personal use is likely permitted, but if a voter posts that photo on social media, shares it with someone else, or livestreams their

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voting choices, they can run the risk of 'showing his or her marked ballot to any person,' which is prohibited," with the following language:

"Taking a photo of a marked ballot for personal use is not prohibited. Posting that photo on social media, sharing it with someone else, or livestreaming voting choices is prohibited by state law."

Add the following footnote to this language:

"Under certain circumstances, this prohibition may not be enforceable."

- In the "Counting Votes & Write-In Scenarios" chapter, divide the write-in scenarios by situation: 1-candidate races, 2-candidate races, etc.
- In the "Counting Votes & Write-In Scenarios" chapter, make "Determining Voter Intent" into its own chapter
  - Add specific examples of defective ballots

- Staff are also directed to update any formatting, numbering, scrivener's errors, or hyperlinks necessary to finalize these chapters and forms.
- Finally, staff are directed to implement the edits consistent with the outcomes of the Questions presented in this memo, along with any revisions in response to Commissioner comments, and finalize the substance of the revised drafts with Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Millis.

Moved by Commissioner Millis. Seconded by Commissioner Bostelmann.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

G. Discussion and Approval of Clear Ballot Group ClearVote 2.5

Elections Specialist Cody Davies appeared and presented a summary of the report recommending approval of Clear Ballot Group ClearVote 2.5.

Discussion.

MOTION: The Wisconsin Elections Commission adopts the staff's recommendations for approval of the Clear Ballot Group, Inc. ClearVote 2.5 electronic voting in compliance with US EAC certificate CBG-CV-25, including the conditions described above.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Riepl.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

H. Discussion and Action on Accessibility Review Plan

Riley Willman presented a summary of the Commission's accessibility review plan.

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MOTION: The Commission approves the polling place review plan for the 2026-2027 election cycle and for continued use in future election cycles.

Moved by Commissioner Riepl. Seconded by Commissioner Bostelmann.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

I. Discussion of Voter Felon Audit

Deputy Administrator Robert Kehoe presented the agenda item.

Discussion.

J. Discussion and Possible Action Pertaining to 2026 Administrative Rulemaking[1]

Attorney Sharpe provided an overview of the suggested administrative rulemaking projects.

Discussion.

MOTION: The Wisconsin Elections Commission ("the Commission") directs staff to begin the process of promulgating the proposed rules listed herein:

- Rule #1 – Revised and Standardized Complaint Procedure for 5.05, 5.06, and 5.061 ("HAVA") Complaints
- Rule #2 – Finish Revisions to EL Chapter 2 – Treatment and Sufficiency of and Challenges to Election Petitions (Recalls and Referenda)
- Rule #3 – Revisions to EL Chapter 3 – Maintaining Electronic Registration Records, Removing Special Registration Deputy Rules, and Revisiting Voter Registration Drives
- Rule #4 – Updates and Expansion Within EL Chapter 9
- Rule #5 – New Rule – Procedures for What it Means to "Publicly Canvass the Returns"
- Rule #6 – New Rule – Post-Election Audit Authorization
- Rule #7 – New Rule – Election Day Registration ("EDR") Undeliverable Postcard Guidance
- Rules #9, 10, and 11 – Unpromulgated Rules Required by Statute

Staff is further directed to begin the process of promulgating Rule #1 first.

Staff will return to a future Commission meeting with draft scope statements for these proposed rules, so the Commission may consider and approve them for submission to the Wisconsin Department of Administration and Office of the Governor.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Millis.

Discussion.

[1] The Commission took up this item after Item O.

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Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

K. Discussion and Action on Internal Controls Plan[2]

Chief Administrative Officer Sharrie Hauge presented the agenda item.

Discussion.

MOTION: Approve WEC 2026 Internal Control Plan and authorize staff to submit the Plan to the Chief Clerks of the Senate and Assembly for distribution to the appropriate standing committees and to the State Controller's Office.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Bostelmann.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

L. Consideration and Possible Action on Wis. Stat. § 5.06 Complaints[3]

a. Karen Christoffersen v. Paulina Gutierrez (EL 25-21)

Attorney Sharpe presented the complaint memo.

MOTION: The Commission has reviewed the proposed draft decision letter in Appendix 1 and summarily decides this matter pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06(6) by adopting the proposed decision letter in full. The Commission directs staff to immediately transmit a copy of this order to the parties.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Millis.

Commissioner Spindell provided comments regarding the City of Milwaukee's conduct of the 2024 General Election.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

b. Becca Uminowicz v. DaNean Naeger (EL 25-29)

[2] The Commission took up this item after Item I.
[3] The Commission took up this item after Item J.

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Staff Attorney Brandon Hunzicker presented the complaint memo.

Discussion.

Chair Jacobs suggested that staff send the Village of Arena clerk a link to the statutory deadline calendar on the Commission's website.

MOTION: The Commission has reviewed the proposed draft decision letter in Appendix 2 and summarily decides this matter pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06(6) by adopting the proposed decision letter in full. The Commission directs staff to immediately transmit a copy of this order to the parties. The Commission further directs staff to send the Village of Arena clerk a link to the statutory deadline calendar on the Commission's website.

Moved by Commissioner Millis. Seconded by Commissioner Spindell.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

Discussion.

c. Jeffrey Wolf v. Patty Swaffield (EL 25-77)

Attorney Witecha presented the agenda item.

MOTION: The Commission has reviewed the proposed draft decision letter in Appendix 3 and summarily decides this matter pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06(6) by adopting the proposed decision letter in full. The Commission directs staff to immediately transmit a copy of this order to the parties.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Millis.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

M. Discussion and Possible Action on Withdrawal of Candidacy Form[4]

Elections Supervisor Riley Willman presented the agenda item.

Discussion.

[4] The Commission took up this item after Item K.

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MOTION: The Commission hereby prescribes the Candidate Withdrawal Form in Appendix 1 with any alterations agreed upon during the meeting. Commission staff shall update the dates on the form as needed for succeeding General Elections.

Moved by Commissioner Riepl. Seconded by Commissioner Bostelmann.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

N. Staff Updates to the Commission

Administrator Wolfe provided an overview of the staff updates document to the Commission. She fielded questions from Commissioner Spindell.

O. Closed Session

a. Litigation Update and Consideration of Potential Litigation
b. Approval of Previous Meeting Minutes
c. Wis. Stat. § 5.05 Complaints
d. Voter Felon Audit

MOTION: Move into closed session pursuant to Wis. Stats. §§ 19.81(1)(g), 19.851, and 19.85(1)(f).

Moved by Commissioner Spindell. Seconded by Commissioner Riepl.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

The Commission moved into closed session at 12:02 p.m. and returned to open session at 1:50 p.m.

P. Adjourn

MOTION: To adjourn.

Moved by Commissioner Bostelmann. Seconded by Commissioner Thomsen.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

The Commission adjourned at 2:31 p.m.

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March 25, 2026, Wisconsin Election Commission meeting minutes prepared by:

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Anna Langdon, Elections Specialist May 7, 2026

March 25, 2026, Wisconsin Election Commission meeting minutes certified by:

_____

Marge Bostelmann, Commission Secretary May 7, 2026

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Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

Wisconsin Elections Commission
Special Teleconference Meeting
201 W. Washington Avenue, Second Floor
Madison, Wisconsin
8:30 a.m. April 6, 2026

Open Session Minutes

Present: Commissioner Marge Bostelmann, Commissioner Ann Jacobs, Commissioner Don M. Millis, Commissioner Carrie Riepl, Commissioner Robert Spindell Jr., and Commissioner Mark Thomsen, all by teleconference.

Staff present: Ahna Barreau, Joel DeSpain, Sharrie Hauge, Brandon Hunzicker, Robert Kehoe, Anna Langdon, Emilee Miklas, Angela Sharpe, John Smalley, Riley Willman, and Meagan Wolfe, all by teleconference.

A. Call to Order

Commission Chair Jacobs called the meeting to order at 8:30 a.m. and called the roll. All Commissioners were present.

B. Administrator's Report of Appropriate Meeting Notice

Administrator Meagan Wolfe informed the Commission that the meeting was noticed in accordance with Wisconsin's open meetings laws.

C. Discussion and Potential Action Relating to Prescribing New Template Forms Pursuant to 2025 Wisconsin Act 126

Elections Supervisor Riley Willman presented the agenda item. He noted that staff sought approval of updated templates for nomination and recall petitions and outreach memos to candidates, political parties, and clerks.

Discussion.

Chair Jacobs recommended the following edits to the materials:

- Clarify the new requirement in the materials: circulators now must be a Wisconsin resident for 28 days or longer with no present intent to move
- List the qualifications to be an elector in the State of Wisconsin in the outreach memos
- Either standardize usage of "qualified" and "eligible" to one or the other, or add a footnote clarifying that the two terms mean the same thing

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Commissioner Millis recommended that staff list the qualifications to be an elector in the instructions on the back of the petition templates.

Chair Jacobs recommended bringing the instructions on the back of the recall petition template in line with what is on the back of the nomination paper templates. She noted that these updates were less urgent than the updates for the nomination paper templates.

Commissioner Thomsen suggested that Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Millis review the implemented edits before the materials are released.

MOTION: Adopt the proposed memo and forms consistent with today's discussion.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Spindell.

Discussion.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

D. Consideration and Approval of Ballot Proofs for the August and November, 2026 Elections

Elections Supervisor Riley Willman presented the agenda item.

MOTION: The Commission approves the ballot design presented by staff and directs staff to utilize the ballot design for the 2026 Partisan Primary and General Election.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Riepl.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

Discussion.

E. Adjourn

MOTION: To adjourn.

Moved by Commissioner Riepl. Seconded by Commissioner Bostelmann.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye

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Millis: Aye Thomsen: Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

The Commission adjourned at 8:47 a.m.

DRAFT

April 6, 2026, Wisconsin Election Commission meeting minutes prepared by:

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Anna Langdon, Elections Specialist May 7, 2026

April 6, 2026, Wisconsin Election Commission meeting minutes certified by:

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Marge Bostelmann, Commission Secretary May 7, 2026

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Wisconsin Elections Commission
Special Teleconference Meeting
201 W. Washington Avenue, Second Floor
Madison, Wisconsin
8:30 a.m. April 22, 2026

Open Session Minutes

Present: Commissioner Marge Bostelmann, Commissioner Ann Jacobs, Commissioner Don M. Millis, Commissioner Carrie Riepl, Commissioner Robert Spindell Jr., and Commissioner Mark Thomsen, all by teleconference.

Staff present: Ahna Barreau, Joel DeSpain, Sharrie Hauge, Marcus Howard, Brandon Hunzicker, Robert Kehoe, Anna Langdon, Emilee Miklas, Angela Sharpe, Riley Willman, and Meagan Wolfe, all by teleconference.

A. Call to Order

Commission Chair Jacobs called the meeting to order at 8:30 a.m. and called the roll. All Commissioners were present.

B. Administrator's Report of Appropriate Meeting Notice

Administrator Meagan Wolfe informed the Commission that the meeting was noticed in accordance with Wisconsin's open meetings laws.

C. Discussion and Potential Action Relating to Attorney General Advisory Opinion Request

Staff Attorney Brandon Hunzicker presented the draft request for an advisory opinion to the Commission.

Chair Jacobs suggested rephrasing the question to the Attorney General: "Which level of government retains ballots when federal, state, county, municipal, and school district races are consolidated on the same ballot? As part of your response, please address which level of government must provide ballots in response to public records requests, and which level of government is responsible for records destruction once the retention period expires?"

Chair Jacobs noted two typos:

- Clarify the sentence, "Consolidated ballots and their retention also complicate public records requests and identifying the proper authority under Subchapter 2 of Chapter 19."

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- Add either a semicolon or a comma and "and" to the sentence, "Within Subchapter II of Chapter 7, concerning canvassing, there are only a handful of directions regarding ballot retention, they appear to presume separate ballots as provided in subchapter II of Chapter 5. Chapter 7 does not contain a direct reference to consolidated ballots or to Wis. Stat. § 5.655."

Commissioner Millis noted that "Subchapter 2" should be "Subchapter II."

None of the Commissioners objected to the above changes.

MOTION: The Wisconsin Elections Commission approves the draft in Attachment A, subject to any revisions or edits that received consensus during the discussion. Staff are directed to transmit the final request to Attorney General Josh Kaul pursuant to Wis. Stats. §§ 165.015(1) and 19.39.

Moved by Commissioner Millis. Seconded by Commissioner Bostelmann.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

D. Discussion and Potential Action on Manual Revisions Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 7.08(3)(c)

Staff Attorney Angela Sharpe provided an overview of the Commission's materials regarding manual revisions. She acknowledged receipt of feedback from Commissioner Riepl.

Attorney Sharpe solicited answers to the questions starting on page D4 of the Commission's manuals materials:

Question 1 – Chapter 14.6 – Election Day Registration: There is a companion EDR statute that seems to predate photo ID and a host of other later statues. Wis. Stat. § 6.55(2)(d). It says that if a voter has changed their name, but lives at the same address, they can let inspectors know of the change and still be permitted to vote without reregistering. Staff recommend that poll workers treat all name changes as needing to reregister, despite Wis. Stat. § 6.55(2)(cs), because it seems clear that this statute was not updated when the photo ID law went into effect.

- Question: Does the Commission agree with staff's interpretation?

None of the Commissioners objected to staff's interpretation.

Question 2 – Chapter 14.24 – Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC): Do appointed clerks need to be residents or qualified electors of the municipality to serve on the MBOC? On one hand, the MBOC statute says it shall be composed of the municipal clerk and "2 other qualified electors of the municipality." Wis. Stat. § 7.53(2)(a)1. (Emphasis added). On the other hand, municipal law statutes give clerks the authority "to perform any duties prescribed by law relative to elections." See Wis. Stat. § 61.25(1). Many jurisdictions are led by municipal clerks who are appointed. Staff believe it would be an odd result to say that an appointed municipal clerk can perform all other election duties, but cannot serve on the MBOC.

- Question: Does the Commission agree with staff's interpretation?

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Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Millis suggested adding language to the sentence under "Sec. 14.24.3: Who serves on the MBOC?" that clarifies that an appointed clerk who is not a resident of the municipality may serve as a member of the Municipal Board of Canvassers.

Question 3 – Chapter 15.1 – Organization and Routing of Election Materials: We can eventually update this section to be consistent with the result of the AG opinion (if there is one), but for now, staff believe the manual should advise that municipal clerks and county clerks think about their arrangement for the transfer and storage of election materials (such as ballots) and try to reach some understandings about how those materials will be stored and accessed in the future.

- Question: Does the Commission agree with staff's approach?

None of the Commissioners objected to staff's interpretation.

Question 4 – Chapter 15.6 – County Board of Canvassers (CBOC): The county canvass statute has a provision that if the returns are informal or defective, the CBOC is to "dispatch a messenger" back to the MBOC. This is clearly an antiquated statute, and staff believe it should be more liberally interpreted so that contact by phone or email is acceptable in lieu of sending a physical person on a journey across the county.

- Question: Does the Commission agree with staff's interpretation?

Chair Jacobs suggested clarifying that the CBOC may start with a phone call or email to contact the MBOC, but they should dispatch a physical person if they do not receive a response.

Chair Jacobs flagged the language "This is not necessarily problematic if the discrepancy is not large" on page D50 for clarification. She suggested that staff reword it to explain that the board of canvassers should be making efforts to figure out why there is a discrepancy, such as ensuring no ballots jammed in the tabulator, checking the auxiliary bin of the tabulator, and confirming whether any voters checked in to vote but left before casting a ballot.

Chair Jacobs noted that on page D95, references to "aggrieved candidates" and "aggrieved parties" should be standardized to one term or the other.

Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Thomsen confirmed with Attorney Sharpe that a candidate in a race falling within the recount margin could waive their status as an aggrieved candidate and allow a canvass to proceed. They suggested clarifying in the manual that a candidate may waive their status as an aggrieved candidate, and therefore their right to request a recount, by writing a letter to the Commission.

Chair Jacobs suggested the following language: "If a candidate seeks to waive their status as an aggrieved candidate, the best practice is to send the Commission a letter with the following language: 'My name is [CANDIDATE NAME]. I am a candidate for [OFFICE NAME]. I am within the margin to be considered an aggrieved party under the law. I will not be pursuing a recount, and the canvass may proceed accordingly.'"

Commissioner Millis suggested adding the language, "I irrevocably waive my right to pursue a recount" to clarify that the candidate may not change their mind after waiving their right to pursue a recount.

Chair Jacobs notified Attorney Sharpe that she would submit typo edits for the draft chapters after the meeting.

DRAFT

Commissioner Spindell sought clarification from Attorney Sharpe on items in Sec. 15.6.12 and Part 22, but did not suggest edits.

MOTION: The Wisconsin Elections Commission ("the Commission") has reviewed the recommended manual revisions presented in these materials and accepts the recommendations consistent with discussion during the meeting.

- The Commission directs staff to make revisions as discussed in their April 22 meeting.
- Staff are also directed to update any formatting, numbering, scrivener's errors, or hyperlinks necessary to finalize these chapters and forms.
- Finally, staff are directed to implement the edits consistent with the outcomes of the Questions presented in this memo, along with any revisions in response to Commissioner comments, and finalize the substance of the revised drafts with Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Millis.

Moved by Commissioner Thomsen. Seconded by Commissioner Riepl.

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

Attorney Sharpe presented three previously approved chapters of the manual for feedback on the formatting.

Commissioner Millis clarified with Attorney Sharpe that users could access a sidebar that links to each manual section when accessing the manual as a PDF.

Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Spindell suggested changing any light gray fonts to a more visible color.

Chair Jacobs suggested that the cross-cites not be in red. Attorney Sharpe noted that they would be bolded in black in the final version.

Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Millis recommended separating items in a bulleted lists with a space.

Chair Jacobs and Commissioner Millis recommended including a revision date at the bottom of each page of the manual.

Commissioner Spindell expressed agreement with the formatting comments.

E. Adjourn

MOTION: To adjourn.

Moved by Commissioner Bostelmann. Seconded by Commissioner Spindell.

DRAFT

Roll call vote:	Bostelmann:	Aye	Riepl:	Aye
	Jacobs:	Aye	Spindell:	Aye
	Millis:	Aye	Thomsen:	Aye

Motion carried 6-0.

The Commission adjourned at 9:26 a.m.

DRAFT

April 22, 2026, Wisconsin Election Commission meeting minutes prepared by:

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Anna Langdon, Elections Specialist May 7, 2026

April 22, 2026 Wisconsin Election Commission meeting minutes certified by:

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Marge Bostelmann, Commission Secretary May 7, 2026

DRAFT

Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

DATE: For the May 7, 2026 Commission Meeting

TO: Members, Wisconsin Elections Commission

FROM: WEC Staff

SUBJECT: **Dominion Voting Systems/Liberty Vote**
Petition for Approval of Electronic Voting Systems
Democracy Suite 5.20 and Democracy Suite 5.20S

Introduction

Dominion Voting Systems (DVS) is requesting approval from the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC or Commission) for the Democracy Suite 5.20 and 5.20S voting systems. This approval will allow for the sale and use of these systems in the State of Wisconsin. No electronic voting equipment may be offered for sale or utilized in Wisconsin unless first approved by the WEC based upon the certification requirements laid out in Wis Stat. § 5.91 (Appendix A). The WEC has also adopted administrative rules further clarifying the testing and approval processes in Wisconsin Administrative Code, Chapter EL 7 (Appendix B).

Liberty Vote

Midway through certification testing of these systems, Dominion Voting Systems was acquired by a new entity, Liberty Vote. DVS submitted the applications for Democracy Suite 5.20 and 5.20S prior to this change and, as such, is the applicant of record for these voting systems. For the purposes of this report, references to DVS reflect the ownership of the company at time of application, documentation review, and functional testing of the systems. The change in ownership and name does not affect WEC staff's testing procedures, evaluation of the electronic voting systems under review, or the validity of the certification process. Liberty Vote has indicated it will continue to support DVS customers and voting systems by fulfilling all obligations associated with any DVS system previously certified for sale and use in Wisconsin. Accordingly, staff does not believe this change impacts the status of prior or pending system approvals and contend that certification is tied more to a system than it is to a specific company. Correspondence from Scott Leiendecker, Founder and Owner of Liberty Vote, discussing DVS' acquisition and name change can be found as Appendix G.

Electronic Voting Systems in this Application

Democracy Suite 5.20

Democracy Suite 5.20 is a federally tested and certified paper based, optical scan voting system. It includes the following major components:

Component	Function
Election Management System (EMS)	Election management software application that provides election definition creation, ballot formatting, equipment

Wisconsin Elections Commissioners
Ann S. Jacobs, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Don M. Millis | Carrie Riepl | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen

Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

	configuration, result consolidation, adjudication, and report creation
ImageCast Central (ICC)	A high-speed, central ballot scan tabulator for use in central count locations
ImageCast Precinct 2 (ICP2)	A precinct-based optical scan ballot counter
ImageCast Evolution (ICE)*	A precinct-based optical scan ballot counter
ImageCast X (ICX) Ballot Marking Device*	This configuration is a touchscreen ballot marking device (BMD) paired with a printer. A voter will indicate their selections on the BMD, a ballot will be printed with those choices, and the voter will then deposit the ballot into a tabulator after a final review
ImageCast X (ICX) BMD and Tabulator*	The second ICX configuration features the same BMD functionality, but also includes the ability to tabulate on the same unit via a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT)
*These devices are compliant with the requirements set forth in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for accessible voting systems. Further detail on each device and its respective features will appear later in this report.	

Democracy Suite 5.20S

Democracy Suite 5.20S is a federally tested modification to the Democracy Suite 5.20 voting system. The modification provides support for modeming of unofficial election results after the polls close on Election Day from either an ImageCast Evolution tabulator or ImageCast Precinct tabulator to a Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) server through wireless telecommunications networks or analog phone lines. The modeming components of Democracy Suite 5.20S do not meet federal certification standards, but the underlying voting system (Democracy Suite 5.20) is federally certified. While this system has not received federal certification, it was presented for and passed thorough telecommunications testing at an EAC accredited Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL).

At its May 21, 2013, meeting, pursuant to authority granted in Wis. Stat. § 5.91 and Wisconsin Administrative Code, Chapter EL 7, the Government Accountability Board adopted testing procedures and standards pertaining to the modeming and communication functionality of voting systems that have not yet received EAC certification. At its September 9, 2021, meeting, the Wisconsin Elections Commission approved an updated version of these testing criteria and protocols. The procedures used by WEC staff to test the modeming capabilities of this system can be found in Appendix E of this report.

Recommendation

WEC staff is recommending approval of both Democracy Suite 5.20 and Democracy Suite 5.20S for sale and use in Wisconsin. Detailed recommendations are listed on pages 18-20 following further analysis of the functional testing performed by staff to analyze the voting systems under consideration.

Application Background

On June 19, 2025, WEC staff received an Application for Approval of Electronic Voting System for both Democracy Suite 5.20 and Democracy Suite 5.20S. DVS submitted complete specifications for hardware, firmware, and software related to the voting system. Also included with the submission were technical manuals, documentation, and user manuals necessary for the operation of the components in the two electronic voting systems.

Democracy Suite 5.20 System Overview

The Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) responsible for testing Democracy Suite 5.20, Pro V&V, is based in Huntsville, Alabama and is one of two test labs currently accredited by the EAC to conduct voting system testing. Pro V&V conducted rigorous testing of this system and issued both their final test report and recommendation for EAC certification on January 16, 2025. Per Pro V&V, "The D-Suite 5.20 Voting System, as presented for testing, successfully met the requirements set forth for voting systems in the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), Version 1.0."

Following VSTL testing, the EAC issued a Certificate of Conformance and an accompanying Scope of Certification document for this voting system on February 4, 2025. These documents signify that the system has been tested in accordance with current federal certification standards for electronic voting systems and that the system has met or exceeded those standards. Democracy Suite 5.20's EAC Certification Number is DVS-DemSuite5.20.

WEC staff conducted state-level certification testing for Democracy Suite 5.20 in the WEC office October 6-10, 2025. This period included functional testing, which requires all components of the system to correctly process three mock elections, a meeting of the Wisconsin Voting Equipment Review Panel, which is a body of local election officials and third-party advocates, and a public demonstration of the system.

Hardware and Software Components

This section provides additional information on the hardware and software components of this voting system that are most likely to be used in either a polling place or a central count location. A full list of hardware and software components may be found in Appendix C.

ImageCast Evolution



The ImageCast Evolution (ICE) is a digital scan paper ballot tabulator designed for use at the polling place. After the voter marks a paper ballot, either by hand or by using the ImageCast X ballot marking device, the ballot is inserted into the ICE for processing. The tabulator uses a high-resolution scanner to simultaneously image the front and back of the ballot. The resulting ballot images are then processed by proprietary mark recognition software, which identifies and evaluates marks made by the voter. The system then tabulates any votes cast on each ballot before depositing the ballot into an integrated secure storage bin.

When a ballot is inserted into an ICE unit, the unit will interpret voter marks on the ballot and a variety of feedback screens will be displayed to the voter. These range from confirmation that the ballot was accepted to a warning that

any ballots containing crossover votes or overvoted contests may lead to the voter's choices not being counted. In these instances, the voter will have the opportunity to have the ballot returned to them for further review or may choose to cast the ballot as they originally marked it. A sample of these voter information screens has been included with this report and can be found in Appendix D.

Ballot images and election results generated by the ICE are stored on two separate removable compact flash memory devices. These compact flash drives operate in unison to maintain a detailed audit log of the tabulation events on election day. The cards maintain all ballot images and ballot manifests, a record of the disposition of each ballot, i.e., how the ICE interpreted and counted each vote on a given ballot. The compact flash memory cards may be taken to the municipal clerk's office or county clerk's office where the election results may be uploaded into an election results management program or transferred to another memory device to facilitate storage. The ICE includes an internal thermal printer for the printing of the zero reports, log reports, and polling place totals upon the official closing of the polls. As part of Democracy Suite 5.20S, ICE tabulators also include external wireless and analog modems for the transmission of unofficial election results via a secure wireless network or a standard telephone line.

The ICE also serves as an ADA-compliant ballot marking device, designed for accessible use by voters who have visual, auditory, or physical limitations or disabilities. Depending upon the configuration, voting either occurs on the primary tabulator screen or on an external monitor, both of which require using an assistive input device to make ballot selections. If the primary tabulator monitor is used for accessible voting, other ballot processing must be temporarily suspended until the accessible session has ended. When utilizing the external monitor, ballot processing on the tabulator can continue during the accessible voting session.

An election inspector is required to begin the accessible voting session. Instructions that guide the voter through the process appear on the screen or can be accessed via the audio ballot function. Voters use an integrated tactile keypad, sip and puff device, or paddle selectors to navigate the ballot and make contest selections. Each button on the tactile keypad has both Braille and printed text labels designed to indicate function and a related shape to help the voter determine its use. In addition, voters may use headphones to access the audio ballot function that provides a recording of the ballot instructions and lists candidates and options for each contest.

A blank ballot is inserted into the tabulator ballot slot prior to making selections when the primary screen is used. For locations with an external monitor, voters make ballot selections and place the blank ballot in the tabulator ballot slot at the end of the accessible voting session. In either method, the ballot is marked according to the voter's selections and automatically returned for review. Once the voter has reviewed their ballot, it is reinserted into the tabulator for processing.

ImageCast Precinct 2



The ImageCast Precinct 2 (ICP2) is a digital scan paper ballot tabulator designed for use in a polling place. After the voter marks a paper ballot, either by hand or by using the ImageCast X ballot marking device, the ballot is inserted into the ICP2 for processing. The tabulator uses a high-resolution scanner to simultaneously image the front and back of the ballot. The resulting ballot images are then processed by proprietary mark recognition software, which identifies and evaluates marks made by the voter. The system then interprets any votes cast on each ballot before depositing the ballot into an integrated secured storage bin. As with the ICE, the ICP2 will display a variety of informational screens to the voter when a ballot is inserted.

The ballot images and election results are stored on two separate removable secure digital (SD) memory devices. These SD drives operate in unison to maintain a detailed audit log of the tabulation events on election day. Following the election, the cards may be taken to the municipal or county clerk's office to be uploaded into an election results management program or transferred to another media device to facilitate secure storage. The ICP2 includes many of the same functionalities as the ICE, including generation of ballot images and ballot manifests, a thermal printer for generation of zero tapes, log reports, and results tapes, and, for ICP2 units as part of Democracy Suite 5.20S, the ability to transmit unofficial election results securely via either a wireless or analog modem. On its own, The ICP2 does not include any accessible voting functionality and would need to be paired with another ADA-compliant component from the system to meet accessible voting requirements for use in a polling place.

Both the ICE and ICP2 may be programmed to automatically reject all ballots with overvotes or crossover votes without the option for override, which requires the voter to correct any error by spoiling their first ballot and marking a new one. This ensures that voters do not mistakenly process a ballot on which a vote for one candidate or all candidates will not count. In jurisdictions that enable this function, absentee ballots must be remade by election inspectors to preserve voter intent as closely as possible. For example, in the case of a ballot with a single overvoted contest, the entire ballot would be remade to preserve all the voter's marks apart from the marks in the overvoted contest.

The ICE and ICP2 are also capable of producing a results report showing all candidates with write-in votes. This report captures an image of what is written on the write-in vote line, but only if the oval next to the write-in field under a contest was filled by the voter. Election inspectors cannot rely on this report as a means of counting write-in votes after the polls close. Instead, inspectors must review all ballots cast in a jurisdiction by hand to ensure voter intent is being captured. This particularly applies to instances in which a voter writes in a candidate for a specific contest but does not fill in the oval for the write-in field.

ImageCast Central



The ImageCast Central (ICC) is a high-speed, digital scan ballot tabulator designed for use by election officials at a central count site. The ICC is capable of scanning ballots of various sizes and utilizes a commercial off the shelf (COTS) printer to process the front and back of each ballot, evaluate the result, and maintain continuous scanning and tabulating. The scanner is paired with a workstation on which an election worker can monitor the scan speed and track the progress of each batch of ballots being processed.



ImageCast X

The ImageCast X (ICX) is an ADA-compliant accessible touchscreen device available in two separate hardware configurations. The first configuration, which is paired with a standalone printer, is a ballot marking device. This configuration does not have any tabulation functionality, but the ballots that are generated and printed by the device are virtually indistinguishable from hand-marked ballots and may be inserted into the ICE, ICP2, or ICC for tabulation. The second configuration, which includes a printer attached to the unit itself, is a direct recording electronic (DRE) device that tabulates votes and records each ballot on a voter verifiable paper audit

trail. Both configurations utilize COTS components, e.g., touchscreen displays and desktop printers, which are paired with DVS software to form a voting device.

For each configuration, an activation card is necessary to begin a voting session. Additionally, poll worker activation cards are used by election officials to perform maintenance to the device or access the administrative menu to open or close polls. Activation cards used by voters may be configured for each ballot style in use at a polling place to ensure a voter is voting the correct ballot. These cards can be configured to require reprogramming after each use and a time limit may be set for each card. If a voter card is not used prior to the set time limit, it will no longer function with the equipment and will require reactivation before it may be used again.

Once the correct ballot style has been selected, either by an election inspector or by the voter using a pre-programmed voter activation card, the voter is left to navigate the ballot and cast their votes privately. Voters have the option to use the touchscreen, a sip and puff device, paddle selectors, or a tactile keypad to navigate the ballot and make their selections. Instructions that guide the voter through the process appear on the screen or can be accessed via the audio ballot function. Voters have the option to adjust the text display contrast and text size to suit their preferences. Each button on the tactile keypad has both Braille and printed text labels designed to indicate function and a related shape to help the voter determine its use. Voters may also use headphones to access the audio ballot function that provides a recording of the ballot instructions and lists candidates and options for each contest. The volume of the audio can be adjusted by voters.

In both the BMD and VVPAT configurations, the ICX provides a ballot summary screen on which voters review their selections before the ballot is printed. On the VVPAT configuration, the voter will have a final chance to review their choices on the tape before the ballot is cast. The VVPAT printer features an opaque window that illuminates the voter's choices on the paper roll in this final step. If the voter wishes to spoil their ballot and mark a new one, this is the final opportunity to do so. When the voter casts their ballot, the roll advances, the viewing window darkens, and the ICX is ready for the next voting session. On the BMD configuration, the voter will have a final chance to review their choices on the marked ballot produced by the printer prior to inserting the ballot into one of the supported tabulators in this system.



Neither configuration allows a voter to overvote any contest or, in partisan primary elections, vote a crossover ballot in which they vote in multiple party primaries. For elections that feature a party preference, e.g., partisan primaries, the voter is presented with the party options at the start of the voting session. When a voter chooses a party, the ICX will only display the candidates within that respective party's primary. The ballot summary screen that appears before the voter casts their ballot will also advise of any contest in which the voter has undervoted, at which point they will be able to return to the contest in question and mark their selection should they choose to do so.


Functional Testing

As required by Wisconsin Administrative Code, Chapter EL 7, WEC staff conducted three mock elections with each component of Democracy Suite 5.20 and 5.20S to ensure the voting systems conform to all Wisconsin-specific requirements. Consistent with past certifications, these mock elections included a partisan primary with a special nonpartisan school board election, a general election with both a presidential and special gubernatorial contest, and a presidential preference vote combined with nonpartisan offices and a special partisan contest.

Staff prepared a series of test decks using various configurations of votes, e.g., valid votes, overvotes, crossover votes, etc., across all three mock elections to verify the accuracy and functional capabilities of the two systems. Using blank ballot stock provided by DVS, WEC staff hand marked 300 ballots for each of the mock elections. For each election, an additional 50 ballots were marked using the ICE's accessible voting feature and another 50 were marked using the ICX BMD, bringing the total for each test deck to 400 ballots. Additionally, three separate test decks of 200 ballots each were marked on the ICX VVPAT and reconciled separately.

To ensure that the equipment in this voting system was compatible with Wisconsin election law and able to process a variety of marks, the test ballots for each mock election included several ballots purposefully marked in ways not typically recommended by the vendor. In all cases where ballots were intentionally marked with overvotes, all tabulation equipment in this system was able to consistently identify those issues and displayed the requisite warning. The same was true for crossover votes, which require a voter to vote in multiple primaries/cross party lines and are only possible in the mock partisan primary and presidential preference elections. Additionally, each mock election has two separate ballot styles, one of which includes a special contest or referendum question and one that does not. Including two separate styles assesses the ability to program multiple election definitions on each piece of equipment and to produce accurate results. In all instances, the equipment accurately tabulated votes between the separate ballot styles.

Test decks were also marked to determine exactly what constitutes a readable mark by each piece of tabulation equipment in this voting system. A subset of ballots for each mock election included irregular marks, shown here:



The first column shows a "typical" mark, i.e., a completed oval and the most common way a voter will mark a ballot. The following columns show a selection of marginal or ambiguous marks, which include less-common ways a voter may complete an oval to indicate their choices. Each piece of tabulation equipment in this voting system was able to identify the ambiguous marks as valid choices in all three mock elections.

Every voting equipment vendor recommends a specific type of marking device that should be used to complete a ballot. For all tabulation components in this system, DVS has two recommended tools they advise should be used when marking ballots. Each is listed below with the vendor's rationale for the recommendation:

- **Sharpie Fine Point Black**
  A pure black, quick-drying, alcohol-based ink. It dries the fastest with the lowest smudge risk.

- **Paper Mate Flair M Medium Point Black**
  A pure black, water-based ink. It has minimal to no bleed through.

DVS also states that "the recommended ballot marking pens have been tested and verified for use in combination with approved paper stock used for ballot production. Although many pens are readily available, and advertised as quick drying and/or low bleed through, they should be sufficiently tested in a voting application scenario…" Following a vendor's recommendation as to which marking tool works best with their system is ultimately up to the purchasing jurisdiction. To that end, and while WEC staff marked most test ballots with either a Sharpie or Paper Mate Flair pen, several other ballots were marked in different types of black pen, as well as red, green, and blue ink. Test decks also contain ballots marked in pencil, with and without erasures to test the ability of the system to differentiate a valid overvote from an erasure mark. All tabulation components were able to correctly tabulate ballots marked in all ink colors tested by staff.

Staff also included several ballots with folds and tears. In some cases, a torn ballot may jam the tabulator or not be read correctly by tabulation equipment. However, this happens much more commonly in instances where the tear goes through the timing marks that surround the outside of the ballot. If a ballot is torn severely enough that the tabulator cannot process it, it will be returned to either the voter or election inspector for review and will not be tabulated. Folded ballots are included to replicate (as closely as possible) an absentee ballot that will be processed either at the polling place or a central count location. Vendors recommend that all absentee ballots be scored in specific places on the ballot to avoid the potential of a particularly heavy crease reading as a "false positive" vote if the crease goes directly through an oval. Staff folded several test ballots to purposefully place the creases through ovals and no such false positive votes or overvotes were read by the tabulation equipment. If election inspectors encounter ballots that are torn or contain heavy creases outside of the scoring marks, it is advisable to follow the procedures for remaking the ballots in question to ensure the voter's choices are being accurately counted.

Testing Anomalies

WEC staff did not observe any anomalies during functional testing that would indicate an issue with the performance or reliability of the voting system. Across all test decks and in all three mock elections, the system accurately tabulated votes in accordance with expected results. Staff did identify a single instance in which a ballot in the partisan primary test deck was tabulated twice. After the expected results did not match, staff isolated this ballot (ballot 349 in the test deck) by reviewing ballot images and comparing them to the predetermined marking script. After this ballot was identified, the full test deck was tabulated again and all results were confirmed to be accurate. This was an isolated occurrence that is attributable to human error in the test process and is not indicative of a larger issue with the electronic voting system itself.

Democracy Suite 5.20S System Overview

For certification purposes, Democracy Suite 5.20S is a separate system from the base Democracy Suite 5.20 system. This system includes the hardware and software components featured in the base Democracy Suite 5.20 system with the added capability to transmit unofficial results from a polling place or central count location via a secure modem. These unofficial results are transmitted from either an ICE or ICP2 to a Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) using the ImageCast Listener server software located in the office of the county clerk. Transmissions are sent through a secured and encrypted wireless communications network or analog phone

network. All modifications of the base system present in Democracy Suite 5.20S were tested by Pro V&V to the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) protocols.

Modeming functions on the ICE and ICP2 may only be used after an election inspector has closed the polls, utilized a multi-factor authentication token, and entered a password to access the poll worker menu. Following the printing of the results tape, election inspectors connect the external modem and select the option to transmit results to the county on the poll worker menu of the tabulator. After this option is selected, the tabulator screen provides informational prompts to the election inspectors related to where in the transmission process the machine is at any given time. The encrypted data packet comprised of the unofficial election results is received in the county office by the ImageCast Listener server and EMS server software.

In the county clerk's office, a firewall provides a buffer between the network segment, where the election server is located, and other internal networks which utilize separate servers. The data that is transmitted is encrypted and it is digitally signed. The network is configured to only allow valid connections with the correct encryption key to connect to the SFTP server. The firewall further restricts the flow and connectivity of traffic. Only after the system determines that an incoming data packet has been correctly signed and encrypted by a state with an approved key, the information is passed through the SFTP server and on to the EMS workstation. The EMS contains matching decryption keys for each encryption key approved for the election. If it does not have a decryption key that matches that of the incoming transmission, or if some aspect of the hardware sending the transmission cannot be authenticated by the server and EMS workstation software, the transmission is rejected.

The EMS is required to be deployed on a hardened and air gapped system pursuant to the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, meaning that all software not essential to the proper functioning of the EMS is removed from the computer where the EMS is installed. This procedure is designed to increase the security of the system through the elimination of applications that may provide "back door" access to the system. Access to the internet is also restricted and the EMS provides an audit log of all system actions and connection attempts that can be used to verify unauthorized access to the system while unofficial election results are being transmitted after the close of polls.

At its May 21, 2013, meeting, pursuant to authority granted in Wis. Stat. § 5.91 and Wisconsin Administrative Code, Chapter 7, the Government Accountability Board (GAB) adopted testing procedures and standards pertaining to the modeming and communication functionality of voting systems that have not received EAC certification. The standards were based upon the analysis and findings outlined in a staff memorandum and detailed in the *Voting Systems Standards, Testing Protocols and Procedures Pertaining to the Use of Communication Devices in Wisconsin*. At its September 9, 2021, meeting, the Wisconsin Elections Commission approved an updated version of these testing criteria and protocols, which are attached as Appendix E. These rules apply to non-EAC certified voting systems, where the underlying voting system received EAC certification to either the 2002 Voting System Standards (VSS) or 2005 VVSG, but any additional modeming component does not meet the 2005 VVSG.

Modem/Telecommunication Testing

WEC staff conducted telecommunication testing of Democracy Suite 5.20S in Washington County, Walworth County, and the WEC office between October 13 and 15, 2025. DVS representatives worked with counties that currently use the vendor's equipment to identify three municipal test sites in each county. For the two rounds of testing that took place in county offices, DVS provided a portable secure EMS environment, which was configured to emulate how an EMS would normally be implemented in a county office. This includes an SFTP client, firewall, etc. This portable environment functioned to receive test transmissions from the three respective municipal test sites in each county.

A four-person team of WEC staff conducted this testing with technical support from a team of DVS representatives. Due to the number of possible configurations introduced in this voting system, WEC staff adjusted their testing methodology to capture as much information as possible without unnecessary redundancies. In past certification testing, a typical round of telecommunications testing assesses the ability of one to four separate configurations to successfully transmit results to the county office. For Democracy Suite 5.20S, there were 20 possible configurations to test:

Tabulator	Modem Type	Modem Make/Model	Server Type
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	Express
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	Standard
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	Express
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	Standard
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	Express
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	Standard
ImageCast Evolution	Analog	MultiTech MT9234MU-CDC-XR 56K	Express
ImageCast Evolution	Analog	MultiTech MT9234MU-CDC-XR 56K	Standard
ImageCast Evolution	Analog	StarTech USB56KEMH2	Express
ImageCast Evolution	Analog	StarTech USB56KEMH2	Standard
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	Express
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	Standard
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	Express
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	Standard
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	Express
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	Standard
ImageCast Precinct	Analog	MultiTech MT9234MU-CDC-XR 56K	Express
ImageCast Precinct	Analog	MultiTech MT9234MU-CDC-XR 56K	Standard
ImageCast Precinct	Analog	StarTech USB56KEMH2	Express
ImageCast Precinct	Analog	StarTech USB56KEMH2	Standard

For context, both precinct-level tabulators in this system are capable of transmitting unofficial results from the polling place. Each of those tabulators can utilize either an analog or cellular modem, of which there are two of the former and three of the latter under consideration in Democracy Suite 5.20S. Finally, there are two possible server configurations customers may choose to run at the county office, each of which was tested.

These server configurations are specific to the EMS and vary based on the overall footprint of the setup and the needs of the end user. The Standard configuration is a setup in which EMS components are distributed across multiple PCs or laptop computers. In this configuration, one or more client computers are used for user-facing applications, while a dedicated server hosts back-end services such as a database, file storage, and application services. This allows for greater scalability and supports larger jurisdictions with more complex operational needs. Conversely, the Express configuration sees all EMS software components deployed on a single PC or laptop. In the most practical terms, the Express configuration is ideal for smaller jurisdictions, while the Standard configuration might better meet the needs of larger jurisdictions with more polling places, users, etc.

In prior testing of other modem-capable systems, WEC staff would coordinate to send 10 results packets from each tabulator/modem configuration in each of three municipalities. After all 30 results packets were received, all three municipalities were instructed to send as many results packets as they could for 15 minutes. This second test was previously referred to in certification memos as “load testing.” However, due to improvements

in technology, this test does not constitute a traditional load test. Instead, staff now refer to this part of the test as "simultaneous transmission testing." Instead of simulating a situation in which the county office is overwhelmed by too many results packets, as a proper load test would do, this approach assesses the ability of the county office to receive a manageable number of transmissions simultaneously from multiple sites. This is a much more realistic means by which to evaluate the system and its capabilities. Additionally, and by combining the initial results packet transmission test and the simultaneous transmission test, the process becomes more efficient and respectful of hosting clerks' time.

A second testing adjustment is how staff assessed the abilities of the analog modems submitted for possible certification with this system. Unlike wireless modems, analog modems use traditional phone lines to transmit results via a dial-up connection. WEC staff worked with DVS representatives to set up a phone line simulator in the WEC office to conduct this testing in lieu of the traditional method of testing in three municipalities. A phone line simulator is a device that emulates the setup and conditions of a standard telephone network without requiring access to existing telephonic infrastructure.

For testing purposes, this device allowed staff to simulate a controlled environment in which the modem can establish a dial-up connection, transmit results, and complete communication handshakes with the results server. Using this simulated setup allows staff to control for issues that might otherwise interfere with testing in a real-world environment, e.g., poor line quality, unreliable connections, etc. This provides consistent and repeatable testing using identical conditions in each attempt, which allows staff to focus more clearly on the equipment itself instead of variability in telephone network conditions at the various testing sites. As this setup directly reproduces the conditions necessary for analog results transmissions, a successful test using a phone line simulator demonstrates that the equipment will perform as expected when municipal clerks transmit unofficial results on election night.

Additionally, the total number of test transmissions is lower for analog configurations. Analog modems require a dedicated connection over a single phone line, which can only support one active call/transmission at a time. Due to this constraint, simulating a scenario in which simultaneous transmissions are sent to the county office at the same time is not practical or informative. If a polling place attempts to transmit their unofficial results via an analog modem while another polling place is actively connected to the county phone line and already transmitting, they will encounter a busy signal and have to try again later.

For each test, WEC staff inserted a pre-marked test deck into the ICE and ICP2 tabulators, closed the polls, and proceeded to test the results transmission function for each tabulator, modem, and server configuration. One WEC staff member remained in the county office to monitor the incoming transmissions and coordinate the testing efforts. The results of this testing appear in the following tables.

Table 1.
Washington County Wireless Test Results (T. Trenton, C. West Bend, V. Richfield)

Tabulator	Modem Type	Server Configuration	Modem Make/Model	Transmissions
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Standard	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	30 of 30
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Express	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	30 of 30
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Standard	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	30 of 30
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Express	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	30 of 30
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Standard	MultiTech	30 of 30

			MTCM-LNA3-B03	
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Express	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	30 of 30
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Standard	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	30 of 30
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Express	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	30 of 30
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Standard	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	8 of 30*
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Express	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	9 of 30*
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Standard	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	23 of 30*
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Express	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	19 of 30*

Table 2.
Walworth County Wireless Test Results (C. Lake Geneva, T. Troy, V. Bloomfield)

Tabulator	Modem Type	Server Configuration	Modem Make/Model	Transmissions
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Standard	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	30 of 30
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Express	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	30 of 30
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Standard	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	30 of 30
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Express	PanTech UML295-4G LTE	30 of 30
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Standard	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	30 of 30
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Express	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	30 of 30
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Standard	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	30 of 30
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Express	MultiTech MTCM-LNA3-B03	30 of 30
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Standard	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	2 of 30*
ImageCast Evolution	Wireless	Express	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	8 of 30*
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Standard	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	15 of 30*
ImageCast Precinct	Wireless	Express	MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03	0 of 30*

Table 3. WEC Analog Test Results

Tabulator	Modem Type	Server Configuration	Modem Make/Model	Transmissions
ImageCast Evolution	Analog	Standard	MultiTech MT9234MU-CDC-XR 56K	10 of 10
ImageCast Evolution	Analog	Express	MultiTech MT9234MU-CDC-XR 56K	10 of 10

ImageCast Precinct	Analog	Standard	MultiTech MT9234MU-CDC-XR 56K	10 of 10
ImageCast Precinct	Analog	Express	MultiTech MT9234MU-CDC-XR 56K	10 of 10
ImageCast Evolution	Analog	Standard	StarTech USB56KEMH2	10 of 10
ImageCast Evolution	Analog	Express	StarTech USB56KEMH2	10 of 10
ImageCast Precinct	Analog	Standard	StarTech USB56KEMH2	10 of 10
ImageCast Precinct	Analog	Express	StarTech USB56KEMH2	10 of 10

*Staff experienced consistent issues with the MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03 wireless modem. After further discussion with DVS representatives, the decision was made to postpone testing of that component until the issues could be investigated and resolved. DVS ultimately withdrew this component from consideration for certification and no additional testing occurred. Staff recommendations reflect this withdrawal and, pending additional testing at a future date and Commission approval of the remaining components of the Democracy Suite 5.20S voting system, this specific model of modem would not be available for sale or use in Wisconsin. The formal request to withdraw this component from consideration can be found as Appendix H of this report.

Despite the issues with the MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03, testing of all other possible configurations in this system was ultimately successful.

Wisconsin Elections Commission Voting Equipment Review Panel

To solicit valuable feedback from local election officials and community advocates, the WEC formed the Voting Equipment Review Panel. In accordance with Wisconsin Administrative Code, Chapter EL 7, this panel includes municipal and county clerks, representatives of the disability community, and other advocates for the interest of the voting public.

The meeting took place at the WEC office in Madison on October 9, 2025, from 2:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. DVS representatives provided a demonstration of both voting systems and attendees were encouraged to test the equipment themselves by marking ballots and interacting with all the hardware components under consideration. Comments and feedback from the Voting Equipment Review Panel are included as Appendix F.

Public Demonstration

Following the Voting Equipment Review Panel, a public demonstration was held on October 9, 2025, from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. The public demonstration was appropriately noticed as a public meeting and was held in person in the WEC offices with DVS representatives available to answer questions and guide attendees through the functionality of the equipment. There were no attendees.

Statutory Compliance

Wis. Stat. § 5.91 provides the following requirements voting systems must meet to be approved for use in Wisconsin. Please see the text below of each requirement and staff's analysis of each system's compliance with the standards.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(1)
The voting system enables an elector to vote in secret.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement by allowing a voter to vote a paper ballot in the privacy of a voting booth or at the accessible voting station without assistance.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(3)
The voting system enables the elector, for all elections, except primary elections, to vote for a ticket selected in part from the nominees of one party, and in part from nominees from other parties and write-in candidates
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems allow voter to split their ballot among as many parties as they wish during any election that is not a partisan primary.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(4)
The voting system enables an elector to vote for a ticket of his or her own selection for any person for any office for whom he or she may desire to vote whenever write-in votes are permitted.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems allow write-ins where permitted.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(5)
The voting systems accommodate all referenda to be submitted to electors in the form provided by law.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement. Referenda included as part of testing were accurately tabulated by all components.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(6)
The voting system permits an elector in a primary election to vote for the candidates of the recognized political party of his or her choice, and the system rejects any ballot on which votes are cast in the primary of more than one recognized political party, except where a party designation is made or where an elector casts write-in votes for candidates of more than one party on a ballot that is distributed to the elector.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems can be configured to always reject crossover votes without providing an opportunity for the voter to override. The system can also be programmed to provide a warning screen to the voter that identifies any crossover voted contest. Either one of these programming options allows these systems to meet this requirement. The warning screen provides options where the voter can choose to have their ballot returned to them or they can cast the ballot without correcting the crossover vote. The use of the override function was previously prohibited by statute, but Wis. Stats. §5.85(2)(b) expressly allows for the optional use of the override

function in event of an overvote and the WEC has applied the same standard to the use of the override function in the event of crossover vote.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(7)
The voting system enables the elector to vote at an election for all persons and offices for whom and for which the elector is lawfully entitled to vote; to vote for as many persons for an office as the elector is entitled to vote for; to vote for or against any question upon which the elector is entitled to vote; and it rejects all choices recorded on a ballot for an office or a measure if the number of choices exceeds the number which an elector is entitled to vote for on such office or on such measure, except where an elector casts excess write-in votes upon a ballot that is distributed to the elector.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems can be configured to always reject overvotes without providing an opportunity for the voter to override. The system can also be programmed to provide a warning screen to the voter that identifies any overvoted contest. Either one of these programming options allows these systems to meet this requirement. The warning screen provides options where the voter can choose to have their ballot returned to them or they can cast the ballot without correcting the overvote. The use of the override function was previously prohibited by statute, but Wis. Stats. §5.85(2)(b) expressly allows for the optional use of the override function in event of an overvote.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(8)
The voting system permits an elector at a General Election by one action to vote for the candidates of a party for President and Vice President or for Governor and Lieutenant Governor.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(9)
The voting system prevents an elector from voting for the same person more than once, except for excess write-in votes upon a ballot that is distributed to the elector.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(10)
The voting system is suitably designed for the purpose used, of durable construction, and is usable safely, securely, efficiently, and accurately in the conduct of elections and counting of ballots.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(11)

The voting system records and counts accurately every vote and maintains a cumulative tally of the total votes cast that is retrievable in the event of a power outage, evacuation or malfunction so that the records of votes cast prior to the time that the problem occurs is preserved.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(12)
The voting system minimizes the possibility of disenfranchisement of electors as the result of failure to understand the method of operation or utilization or malfunction of the ballot, voting system, or other related equipment or materials.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems can be programmed to provide warning screens to the voter that identifies any problem with their ballot. The warning screens provide an explanation of the problem and allow the voter to have their ballot returned to them to review and correct the error. The systems can be configured to always reject overvotes and crossover votes without providing an opportunity for the voter to override.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(13)
The automatic tabulating equipment authorized for use in connection with the system includes a mechanism which makes the operator aware of whether the equipment is malfunctioning in such a way that an inaccurate tabulation of the votes could be obtained.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(14)
The voting system does not use any mechanism by which a ballot is punched or punctured to record the votes cast by an elector.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems do not use any such mechanism to record votes.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(15)
The voting system permits an elector to privately verify the votes selected by the elector before casting his or her ballot.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement through the use of hand-marked paper ballots and accessible voting equipment that provides both an electronic ballot review screen or a marked paper ballot that can be reviewed before tabulation.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(16)
The voting system provides an elector the opportunity to change his or her votes and to correct any error or to obtain a replacement for a spoiled ballot prior to casting his or her ballot.

Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(17)
Unless the ballot is counted at a central counting location, the voting system includes a mechanism for notifying an elector who attempts to cast an excess number of votes for a single office the ballot will not be counted and provides the elector with an opportunity to correct his or her ballot or to receive a replacement ballot.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems can be programmed to provide warning screens to the voter that identifies any problem with their ballot. The warning screens provide an explanation of the problem and allow the voter to have their ballot returned to them to review and correct the error. The systems can be configured to always reject overvotes and crossover votes without providing an opportunity for the voter to override.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91(18)
If the voting system consists of an electronic voting machine, the voting system generates a complete, permanent paper record showing all votes cast by the elector, that is verifiable by the elector, by either visual or nonvisual means as appropriate, before the elector leaves the voting area, and that enables a manual count or recount of each vote cast by the elector.
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting systems meet this requirement by utilizing either traditional paper ballot stock or a voter-verified paper audit trail that serves as a record of all votes cast.

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) also provides the following applicable requirements that voting systems must meet:

HAVA § 301(a)(1)(A)
The voting system shall: (i) permit the voter to verify (in a private an independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted; (ii) provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and (iii)if the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office – (I) notify the voter than the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot; (II) notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple votes for the office; and, (III) provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted

HAVA § 301(a)(1)(C)
The voting system shall ensure than any notification required under this paragraph preserves the privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot.
HAVA § 301(a)(3)(A)
The voting system shall— (A) be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as other voters
Staff Analysis
The DVS voting system components meet these requirements through the inclusion of options for ADA-compliant voting machines municipalities can choose to employ.

Recommendations

Staff has reviewed the application materials, including the technical data package and testing lab report, and examined the results from the functional and modeming test campaigns to determine if these systems are compliant with both state and federal certification laws. Democracy Suite 5.20 and Democracy Suite 5.20S comply with all applicable state and federal requirements. The components of these voting systems met all standards over three mock elections and staff determined they can successfully run a transparent, fair, and secure election in compliance with Wisconsin Statutes. The systems also allow access to the electoral process for individuals with disabilities with the inclusion of the accessible features present on the ICE and ICX hardware components.

1. WEC staff recommends approval of Dominion Voting Systems' Democracy Suite 5.20 and Democracy Suite 5.20S and the components of these systems, set forth in Appendix C, with the exception of a specific model of modem (detailed further below). These voting systems accurately completed the three mock elections and were able to accommodate the voting requirements of the Wisconsin election process. This recommendation is based on the EAC certification/documentation, the VSTL test reports provided by Pro V&V and on the Democracy Suite 5.20S system successfully completing Wisconsin functional testing as dictated by the *Voting Systems Standards, Testing Protocols and Procedures Pertaining to the Use of Communication Devices in Wisconsin*.

2. WEC staff recommends that as a continuing condition of the WEC's approval, Dominion Voting Systems may not impose customer deadlines contrary to requirements provided in Wisconsin Statutes, as determined by the WEC. In order to enforce this provision, local jurisdictions purchasing Dominion Voting Systems equipment shall also include such a provision in their respective purchase contract or amend their contract if such a provision does not currently exist.

3. WEC staff recommends that as a continuing condition of the WEC's approval, that voting systems purchased and installed as part of Democracy Suite 5.20 and Democracy Suite 5.20S be configured in the same manner in which they were tested, subject to verification by the Commission or its designee. Once installed, the configuration must remain the same and may not be altered by Dominion Voting Systems nor by state, county, or municipal officials except as approved by the Commission.

4. WEC staff recommends that election inspectors continue to check both the write-in bin, where applicable, and main ballot bin for validly cast write-in votes after the close of polls in each election, and not rely upon any optional write-in report.

5. WEC staff recommends that any absentee ballot returned by the tabulation equipment with an overvote or crossover vote notification must be reviewed by election inspectors prior to being overridden or remade. If necessary, ballots must be remade pursuant to approved procedures listed in the Election Day and Election Administration manuals.

6. WEC staff recommends that any absentee ballot returned which has been marked with non-black ink be remade by election inspectors prior to any attempt at processing on the tabulation equipment.

7. WEC staff recommends that ballots marked with the ImageCast Evolution ballot marking device or the ImageCast X ballot marking device be included as part of the pre-election public test in jurisdictions where those hardware components are used.

8. WEC staff recommends clerks and election inspectors ensure that external modems are secured prior to, during, and after every election, with proper chain of custody documentation utilized.

9. WEC staff recommends that, as a result of the vendor's request to withdraw the component from certification and the inability of staff to meaningfully test the component, the MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03 wireless modem not be certified for sale and use in Wisconsin at this time. Should the vendor wish to certify this component in the future, additional testing must be completed before the component would be presented to the Commission for their consideration.

10. WEC staff recommends that as a continuing condition of the WEC's approval, that this system must always be configured to include the following options:

    a. Automatic rejection of crossover and overvoted ballots with or without the option to override.
    b. Automatic rejection of all improper ballots except blank ballots.
    c. Digital ballot images shall be captured for all ballots tabulated by the system.
    d. Automatically return marked ballots to the voter for physical review prior to casting when marked using the ICE tabulator BMD function.
    e. Provide visual warning messages, utilizing Commission approved language, to voters when overvotes and crossover votes are detected.
    f. Voter ballot activation cards used as part of the ICX BMD or VVPAT be reprogrammed after each use and set to expire after a maximum of one hour.

11. As part of US EAC certificate: DVS-DemSuite5.20, only equipment included in this certificate can be used together to conduct an election in Wisconsin. Previous versions that were approved for use by the former Elections Board and the G.A.B. are not compatible with the new Dominion Voting Systems voting system and are not to be used together with the equipment seeking approval by the WEC, as this would void the US EAC certificate. If a jurisdiction upgrades to Democracy Suite 5.20, it needs to upgrade each and every component of the voting system to the requirements of what is approved herein. Likewise, if a jurisdiction upgrades to Democracy Suite 5.20S, it needs to upgrade each and every component of the voting system to the requirements of what is approved herein.

12. WEC staff recommends that as a condition of approval, Dominion Voting Systems shall abide by applicable Wisconsin public records laws. If, pursuant to a proper public records request, the customer receives a request for matters that might be proprietary or confidential, customer will notify Dominion Voting Systems, providing the same with the opportunity to either provide customer with the record that is requested for release to the requestor, or shall advise customer that Dominion Voting Systems objects to the release of the information, and provide the legal and factual basis of the objection. If for any reason, the

customer concludes that customer is obligated to provide such records, Dominion Voting Systems shall provide such records immediately upon customer's request. Dominion Voting Systems shall negotiate and specify retention and public records production costs in writing with customers prior to charging said fees. In absence of meeting such conditions of approval, Dominion Voting Systems shall not charge customer for work performed pursuant to a proper public records request, except for the "actual, necessary, and direct" charge of responding to the records request, as that is defined and interpreted in Wisconsin law, plus shipping, handling, and chain of custody.

13. The Wisconsin application for approval contains a condition that requires the vendor to reimburse the WEC for all costs associated with the testing campaign and certification process. Dominion Voting Systems agreed to this requirement on the applications submitted to WEC on June 19, 2025, requesting the approval of Democracy Suite 5.20 and Democracy Suite 5.20S.

Proposed Motion

MOTION: The Wisconsin Elections Commission adopts the staff's recommendations for approval of the Dominion Voting Systems Application for Approval of Democracy Suite 5.20 in compliance with US EAC certificate DVS-DemSuite5.20 including the conditions described above, and the Dominion Voting Systems Application for Approval of Democracy Suite 5.20S including the conditions described above.

Appendices

- Appendix A: Wisconsin Statutes § 5.91
- Appendix B: Wisconsin Administrative Code Ch. EL 7
- Appendix C: US-EAC Certificate of Conformance / Scope of Certification
- Appendix D: Sample Voter Information Screens
- Appendix E: Voting Systems Standards, Testing Protocols and Procedures Pertaining to the Use of Communication Devices in Wisconsin
- Appendix F: Wisconsin Voting Equipment Review Panel Feedback
- Appendix G: Liberty Vote Correspondence re: Change of Ownership
- Appendix H: Withdrawal of MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03 from Consideration for Certification

Appendix A: Wisconsin Statutes § 5.91

5.91 Requisites for approval of ballots, devices and equipment. No ballot, voting device, automatic tabulating equipment, or related equipment and materials to be used in an electronic voting system may be utilized in this state unless it is certified by the commission. The commission may revoke its certification of any ballot, device, equipment, or materials at any time for cause. The commission may certify any such voting device, automatic tabulating equipment, or related equipment or materials regardless of whether any such item is approved by the federal election assistance commission, but the commission may not certify any ballot, device, equipment, or material to be used in an electronic voting system unless it fulfills the following requirements:

(1) It enables an elector to vote in secrecy and to select the party for which an elector will vote in secrecy at a partisan primary election.

(3) Except in primary elections, it enables an elector to vote for a ticket selected in part from the nominees of one party, and in part from the nominees of other parties, and in part from independent candidates and in part of candidates whose names are written in by the elector.

(4) It enables an elector to vote for a ticket of his or her own selection for any person for any office for whom he or she may desire to vote whenever write-in votes are permitted.

(5) It accommodates all referenda to be submitted to the electors in the form provided by law.

(6) The voting device or machine permits an elector in a primary election to vote for the candidates of the recognized political party of his or her choice, and the automatic tabulating equipment or machine rejects any ballot on which votes are cast in the primary of more than one recognized political party, except where a party designation is made or where an elector casts write-in votes for candidates of more than one party on a ballot that is distributed to the elector.

(7) It permits an elector to vote at an election for all persons and offices for whom and for which the elector is lawfully entitled to vote; to vote for as many persons for an office as the elector is entitled to vote for; to vote for or against any question upon which the elector is entitled to vote; and it rejects all choices recorded on a ballot for an office or a measure if the number of choices exceeds the number which an elector is entitled to vote for on such office or on such measure, except where an elector casts excess write-in votes upon a ballot that is distributed to the elector.

(8) It permits an elector, at a presidential or gubernatorial election, by one action to vote for the candidates of a party for president and vice president or for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively.

(9) It prevents an elector from voting for the same person more than once for the same office, except where an elector casts excess write-in votes upon a ballot that is distributed to the elector.

(10) It is suitably designed for the purpose used, of durable construction, and is usable safely, securely, efficiently and accurately in the conduct of elections and counting of ballots.

(11) It records correctly and counts accurately every vote properly cast and maintains a cumulative tally of the total votes cast that is retrievable in the event of a power outage, evacuation or malfunction so that the records of votes cast prior to the time that the problem occurs is preserved.

(12) It minimizes the possibility of disenfranchisement of electors as the result of failure to understand the method of operation or utilization or malfunction of the ballot, voting device, automatic tabulating equipment or related equipment or materials.

(13) The automatic tabulating equipment authorized for use in connection with the system includes a mechanism which makes the operator aware of whether the equipment is malfunctioning in such a way that an inaccurate tabulation of the votes could be obtained.

(14) It does not employ any mechanism by which a ballot is punched or punctured to record the votes cast by an elector.

(15) It permits an elector to privately verify the votes selected by the elector before casting his or her ballot.

(16) It provides an elector with the opportunity to change his or her votes and to correct any error or to obtain a replacement for a spoiled ballot prior to casting his or her ballot.

(17) Unless the ballot is counted at a central counting location, it includes a mechanism for notifying an elector who attempts to cast an excess number of votes for a single office that his or her votes for that office will not be counted, and provides the elector with an opportunity to correct his or her ballot or to receive and cast a replacement ballot.

(18) If the device consists of an electronic voting machine, it generates a complete, permanent paper record showing all votes cast by each elector, that is verifiable by the elector, by either visual or nonvisual means as appropriate, before the elector leaves the voting area, and that enables a manual count or recount of each vote cast by the elector.

Appendix B: Wisconsin Administrative Code, Chapter EL 7

APPROVAL OF ELECTRONIC VOTING EQUIPMENT

EL 7.01 Application for approval of electronic voting system.
EL 7.02 Agency testing of electronic voting system.
EL 7.03 Continuing approval of electronic voting system.

Note: Chapter ElBd 7 was renumbered chapter GAB 7 under s. 13.92 (4) (b) 1., Stats., and corrections made under s. 13.92 (4) (b) 7., Stats., Register April 2008 No. 628. **Chapter GAB 7 was renumbered Chapter EL 7 under s. 13.92 (4) (b) 1., Stats., Register June 2016 No. 726.**

EL 7.01 Application for approval of electronic voting system.

(1) An application for approval of an electronic voting system shall be accompanied by all of the following:

(a) A signed agreement that the vendor shall pay all costs, related to approval of the system, incurred by the elections commission, its designees and the vendor.

(b) Complete specifications for all hardware, firmware and software.

(c) All technical manuals and documentation related to the system.

(d) Complete instruction materials necessary for the operation of the equipment and a description of training available to users and purchasers.

(e) Reports from an independent testing authority accredited by the national association of state election directors (NASED) demonstrating that the voting system conforms to all the standards recommended by the federal elections commission.

(f) A signed agreement requiring that the vendor shall immediately notify the elections commission of any modification to the voting system and requiring that the vendor will not offer, for use, sale or lease, any modified voting system, if the elections commission notifies the vendor that the modifications require that the system be approved again.

(g) A list showing all the states and municipalities in which the system has been approved for use and the length of time that the equipment has been in use in those jurisdictions.

(2) The commission shall determine if the application is complete and, if it is, shall so notify the vendor in writing. If it is not complete, the elections commission shall so notify the vendor and shall detail any insufficiencies.

(3) If the application is complete, the vendor shall prepare the voting system for three mock elections, using offices, referenda questions and candidates provided by the elections commission.

History: Cr. Register, June, 2000, No. 534, eff. 7−1−00; **correction in (1) (a), (f), (2), (3) made under s. 13.92 (4) (b) 6., Stats., Register June 2016 No. 726.**

EL 7.02 Agency testing of electronic voting system.

(1) The elections commission shall conduct a test of a voting system, submitted for approval under s. EL 7.01, to ensure that it meets the criteria set out in s. 5.91, Stats. The test shall be conducted using a mock election for the partisan primary, a mock general election with both a presidential and gubernatorial vote, and a mock nonpartisan election combined with a presidential preference vote.
(2) The elections commission may use a panel of local election officials and electors to assist in its review of the voting system.
(3) The elections commission may require that the voting system be used in an actual election as a condition of approval.
History: Cr. Register, June, 2000, No. 534, eff. 7−1−00; **correction in (1) to (3) made under s. 13.92 (4) (b) 6., Stats., and correction in (1) made under s. 13.92 (4) (b) 7., Stats., Register June 2016 No. 726.**

EL 7.03 Continuing approval of electronic voting system.

(1) The elections commission may revoke the approval of any existing electronic voting system if it does not comply with the provisions of this chapter. As a condition of maintaining the elections commission's approval for the use of the voting system, the vendor shall inform the elections commission of all changes in the hardware, firmware and software and all jurisdictions using the voting system.
(2) The vendor shall, at its own expense, furnish, to an agent approved by the elections commission, for placement in escrow, a copy of the programs, documentation and source code used for any election in the state.
(3) The electronic voting system must be capable of transferring the data contained in the system to an electronic recording medium, pursuant to the provisions of s. 7.23, Stats.
(4) The vendor shall ensure that election results can be exported on election night into a statewide database developed by the elections commission.
(5) For good cause shown, the elections commission may exempt any electronic voting system from strict compliance with this chapter.

History: Cr. Register, June, 2000, No. 534, eff. 7−1−00; **correction in (1), (4), (5) made under s. 13.92 (4) (b) 6., Stats. and corrections in (5) made under s. 13.92 (4) (b) 7., Stats., and s. 35.20, Stats., Register June 2016 No. 726.**

Appendix C: US-EAC Certificate of Conformance / Scope of Certification

United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Conformance

Dominion Voting Systems & Democracy Suite 5.20

The voting system identified on this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Version 1.0 (VVSG 1.0)* . Components evaluated for this certification are detailed in the attached Scope of Certification document. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been verified by the EAC in accordance with the provisions of the EAC *Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual 3.0* and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.

Product Name: Democracy Suite

Model or Version: 5.20

Name of VSTL: Pro V&V

EAC Certification Number: DVS-DemSuite5.20

Date Issued: February 4, 2025

Executive Director

Scope of Certification Attached

Manufacturer:	*Dominion Voting Systems (DVS)*	**Laboratory:**	*Pro V&V*
System Name:	*Democracy Suite 5.20*	**Standard:**	*VVSG 1.0 (2005)*
Certificate:	*DVS-DemSuite5.20*	**Date:**	*2/4/2025*

Scope of Certification

This document describes the scope of the validation and certification of the system defined above. Any use, configuration changes, revision changes, additions or subtractions from the described system are not included in this evaluation.

Significance of EAC Certification

An EAC certification is an official recognition that a voting system (in a specific configuration or configurations) has been tested to and has met an identified set of Federal voting system standards. An EAC certification is **not**:

- An endorsement of a Manufacturer, voting system, or any of the system's components.
- A Federal warranty of the voting system or any of its components.
- A determination that a voting system, when fielded, will be operated in a manner that meets all HAVA requirements.
- A substitute for State or local certification and testing.
- A determination that the system is ready for use in an election.
- A determination that any particular component of a certified system is itself certified for use outside the certified configuration.

Representation of EAC Certification

Manufacturers may not represent or imply that a voting system is certified unless it has received a Certificate of Conformance for that system. Statements regarding EAC certification in brochures, on Web sites, on displays, and in advertising/sales literature must be made solely in reference to specific systems. Any action by a Manufacturer to suggest EAC endorsement of its product or organization is strictly prohibited and may result in a Manufacturer's suspension or other action pursuant to Federal civil and criminal law.

System Overview:

The D-Suite 5.20 Voting System is a paper-based optical scan voting consisting of the following major components: The Election Management System (EMS), the ImageCast Central (ICC), the ImageCast Precinct (ICP and ICP2), the ImageCast Evolution (ICE), the ImageCast X ballot marking device (BMD), and ImageCast X VVPAT BMD. The D-Suite 5.20 Voting System configuration is a modification from the EAC approved D-Suite 5.17 system configuration.

System Modifications:

The list below includes changes between this Democracy Suite 5.20 system and the baseline of the Democracy Suite 5.17 Voting System:

GENERAL SYSTEM CHANGES

- System and security updates to Democracy Suite:
  - Upgrade to Windows 11, Windows Server 2022 and SQL Server 2022
  - Updated system components to OpenSSL 3.0
  - Added support for CardLogix Smart Cards
- Added support for Rank Choice Voting.
- ICX USB Whitelist is now maintained as part of a configuration file.
- Added an option to ensure short write-in entries (3 characters or less) can register when scanned.
- Added an option to add Batch ID's to Precinct Batch Cards
- Added ability to specify color for paper ballot and screen ballot headers based on Ballot Group.

EMS

- Adjudication Databases now included in system back-ups.
- Election Event Designer: Added ability to sort and group results by Ballot Groups in the Ballot Types Report
- Election Event Designer: Added support for New Hampshire Ballot Style
- Results Tally & Reporting: The following reports are now WCAG compliant (for accessibility):
  - Precinct Canvass
  - District Canvass
  - District Total Canvass
  - Summary Report (2 column)
- Results Tally & Reporting: Reporting Improvements:
  - Added option to filter Machine Report by Tabulator Type
  - District Total Canvass - Added voter privacy threshold.
  - Added an option to include or exclude unincorporated areas in the SOVC Report
  - Added ability to export and import Reporting Profiles for all reports in the Results Reporting Module
  - Prevented a blank write-in value from appearing in all contests on canvass reports where write-ins do not exist
  - Updated sort order on District Canvass and District Total Canvass reports to follow global order
- Results Tally & Reporting: The Automatic Results loading screen now has an option to allow users to set the results to 'Skip Adjudication'.
- Results Tally & Reporting: All Adjudication reports are now generated in RTR.
- Results Tally & Reporting: Added new Election Readiness Dashboard.

ADJ

- Updated User Interface for the Adjudication application.
- User Management is now based within the application and can be specific to the election, rather than workstation/ workgroup based.
- Ballot processing can now be done in two different ways:
  - Assign entire batch to single user(s).
  - Next available ballot goes to next available workstation.
- Outstack criteria can now be defined by tabulator type or tabulator and counting group, allowing users to adjudicate central count/mail ballots for one set of criteria and ballots tabulated within polling places and vote centers using another set of criteria.
- Added new Adjudication Statistics Report.

ICP

- Ensure that the Total Result File contains information that the poll is closed.
- Removed ability to print Zero report after ballots have been cast.

ICC

- Updated User Interface for the central scanning application.
- Loading and configuration of election files has been enhanced, users are now only required to browse to the appropriate set of election files.
- Batches can be spoiled through the application now.
- New Status Report introduced, that allows users to view the list of batches and total ballots within batches that have been scanned on any tabulator, without viewing results.

ICE

- Added support for multi-page TIFF images.

ICP2

- Added support for multi-page TIFF images.

ICX


- Added ability to perform a Hardware Sound Test from the Poll Administration and Technician Menus.
- Updated option to print line between contests on VVPAT tape to print a dashed line instead of a full line when switched on.
- Allow a voter making a straight party selection to split the ticket without having to deselect their party choice.

Language capability:

This section provides information describing the languages supported by the various components of the system.

Language	ICE	ICP	ICP2	ICX
Alaska Native	No	Yes, if using Latin alphabet	No	No
Arabic	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Apache	No	Audio only	No	No
Bengali	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Burmese	No	No	Yes	No
Cantonese	Audio only	No	No	No
Chinese	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
English	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Inuit	No	Yes, if using Latin alphabet	No	No
Filipino	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
French	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gujarati	Yes	No	Yes	No
Haitian Creole	Yes	No	Yes	No
Hindi	Yes	Audio only	Yes	Yes
Hmong	Yes	No	Yes	No
Ilocano	Yes	No	Yes	No
Indonesian	No	No	Yes	No
Japanese	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Jicarilla	No	Audio only	No	No
Keres	No	Audio only	No	No
Khmer	Yes	Audio only	Yes	No
Korean	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Laotian	Yes	No	Yes	No
Mien	No	No	Yes	No
Mongolian	No	No	Yes	No
Nepali	Yes	No	Yes	No
Navajo	No	Audio only	No	No
Mandarin	Audio only	No	No	No
Polish	Yes	No	Yes	No
Punjabi	Yes	No	Yes	No
Russian	Yes	No	Yes	No
Seminole	No	Audio only	No	No
Spanish	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tagalog	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Tamil	Yes	No	Yes	No
Telugu	Yes	No	Yes	No
Thai	Yes	Audio only	Yes	Yes
Tolowa	No	No	Yes	No
Towa	No	Audio only	No	No
Ute	No	Audio only	No	No
Ukrainian	Yes	No	Yes	No
Urdu	Yes	No	Yes	No
Vietnamese	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yuman	No	Audio only	No	No
Yurok	No	No	Yes	No

Democracy Suite 5.20 System Diagram



Components Included:

This section provides information describing the components and revision level of the primary components included in this Certification.

Voting System Software Components:

System Component	Software or Firmware Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
EMS Election Event Designer (EED)	5.20.2.6	Windows 11 Pro	EMS
EMS Results Tally and Reporting (RTR)	5.20.2.6	Windows 11 Pro	EMS
EMS Application Server	5.20.2.6	Windows Server 22 Windows 11 Pro	EMS
EMS File System Service (FSS)	5.20.2.6	Windows 11 Pro	EMS
EMS Audio Studio (AS)	5.20.2.6	Windows 11 Pro	EMS
EMS Data Center Manager (DCM)	5.20.2.6	Windows Server 22 Windows 11 Pro	EMS
EMS Election Data Translator (EDT)	5.20.2.6	Windows 11 Pro	EMS
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	5.20.2.6	Windows 11 Pro	EMS
EMS Adjudication (ADJ)	5.20.2.4	Windows 11 Pro	EMS
File System Server	5.20.2.6	Windows Server 22 Windows 11 Pro	EMS
Database Server	5.20.2.6	Windows Server 22 Windows 11 Pro	EMS
EMS Logger	5.20.2.6	Windows Server 22 Windows 11 Pro	EMS
NAS Server	5.20.2.6	Windows Server 22 Windows 11 Pro	EMS
Smart Card Helper Service (SCHS)	5.20.2.6	Windows 11 Pro	EMS
ICP Application	5.20.2.3	uClinux	ICP
ICP2 Application	5.20.2.2	Linux	ICP2
ICE Application	5.20.2.3	Ubuntu Linux	ICE
ImageCast Central Application	5.20.2.6	Windows 11 Pro	ICC
ICX with BMD Application	5.20.2.7	Android 8.1.0-2.5.2	ICX
ICX VVPAT BMD Application	5.20.2.7	Android 8.1.0-2.5.2	ICX

Voting System Platform:

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
Microsoft Windows Server	2022	Unmodified COTS	EMS Server SW Component
Microsoft Windows	11 Professional	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
.NET Framework	3.5	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
.NET Framework	4.8	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015 Redistributable	2015	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 Redistributable	2013	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
Microsoft SQL Server 2022 Standard	2022 Standard	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Cepstral Voices	6.2.3	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Arial Narrow Fonts	2.37a	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Dallas 1-Wire Device Driver	4.05	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Adobe Reader DC	AcrobatDC	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Microsoft Access Database Engine	2010	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Open XML SDK 2.0 for Microsoft Office	2.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server SW Component
Infragistics NetAdvantage Win Forms	2011.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Infragistics NetAdvantage Win Ultimate	2013.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Infragistics NetAdvantage WPF	2012 Vol. 1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
TX Text Control Library for .NET	16.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
SOX	14.3.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
NLog	1.0.0.505	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
iTextSharp	5.0.5	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
ICSharpCode SharpZipLib	0.86.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
ISONewspaper	30.4	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
SQLite	1.0.116.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Lame	3.99.4	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Speex	1.0.4	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
MS Prism	4.0.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
MS Prism Unity Extensions	4.0.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Enterprise Library	5.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Entity Framework	6.1.3	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
newtonsoft.ison	13.0.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Ogg Vorbis decoder - oggdec	1.10.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Ogg Vorbis encoder - oggenc2	2.88	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Prism.Mvvm	1.1.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
SQLSysClrTypes.msi	Microsoft System CLR Types for SQL	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
SSH.Net	2014.4.6.Beta2	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
System Windows.Interactivity. WPF	2.0.20525	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
TX Text Control 16.0.NET	16.0	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Visual Studio 2022 Professional	2022 Professional	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Wix	4.0.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Wix toolset Visual Studio Extension	4.0.1	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Spreadsheetlight	3.4.3	Unmodified COTS	EMS SW Platform
Open SSL	1.0.2K	Unmodified COTS	ICP
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module	2.0.14	Unmodified COTS	ICP
Colilo	200400221	Unmodified COTS	ICP
uClinux tools	20040603	Unmodified COTS	ICP
uClinux dist	20070130 s	Modified COTS	ICP

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
Kernel (Linux)	2.6.30.9-dvs-37	Modified COTS	ICE
U-Boot	1.3.4	Modified COTS	ICE
BusyBox	1.20.2	Unmodified COTS	ICE
e2fsprogs	1.42.4	Unmodified COTS	ICE
Expat XML Parser	2.1.0	Unmodified COTS	ICE
Fontconfig	2.9.0	Unmodified COTS	ICE
Freetype	2.4.9	Unmodified COTS	ICE
I²C Tools for Linux	3.1.0	Unmodified COTS	ICE
JPEG library	8d	Unmodified COTS	ICE
libogg	1.3.0	Unmodified COTS	ICE
libPNG	1.5.10	Unmodified COTS	ICE
libusb	1.0.8	Unmodified COTS	ICE
libusb-compat	0.1.3	Unmodified COTS	ICE
log4cplus	1.0.4.1	Unmodified COTS	ICE
OpenSSL	3.0.9	Unmodified COTS	ICE
PPP	2.4.5	Unmodified COTS	ICE
quazip	0.7.6	Unmodified COTS	ICE
Qt Everywhere Linux	4.7.3	Unmodified COTS	ICE
skell	1.19	Unmodified COTS	ICE
SoundTouch	1.6.0	Unmodified COTS	ICE
speex	1.2rc1	Unmodified COTS	ICE
SQLite	3.7.13	Unmodified COTS	ICE
Sysfs Utilities	2.1.0	Unmodified COTS	ICE
TIFF library	4.0.1	Unmodified COTS	ICE
timezone	2012b	Unmodified COTS	ICE
USB ModeSwitch	1.2.4	Unmodified COTS	ICE
zlib	1.2.7	Unmodified COTS	ICE
Kernel	4.9.11	Modified COTS	ICP2
U-Boot	2017.03	Modified COTS	ICP2
OpenSSL	1.0.2j	Unmodified COTS	ICP2
OpenSSL	3.0.9	Unmodified COTS	ICP2
Logback	1.1.1-12	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
Speex	1.2rc1	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
GreenDAO	2.2.1	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
GSON	2.8.4	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
Zxing Core	3.4.0	Modified COTS	ICX SW
SoundTouch	1.9.2	Modified COTS	ICX SW
Android	8.1	Modified COTS	ICX SW
OGG	1.3.2	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
SLF4J	1.7.29	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
USB Serial	3.2	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
OpenSSL	3.0.9	Unmodified COTS	ICX SW
OpenSSL	3.0.9	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW
Canon DR-G1130 TWAIN Driver	1.3.6458	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW
Canon DR-G2140 TWAIN Driver	1.2.7601	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW
Interscan HiPro 821dd	2.0.2.0	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW
Visual C++ 2015 Redistributable (x86)	2015	Unmodified COTS	ICC SW

Hardware Components:

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
ImageCast Precinct (ICP)	PCOS-320A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast Precinct (ICP)	PCOS-320C	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast Precinct (ICP)	PCOS-321C	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast Precinct 2 (ICP2)	PCOS-330A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ImageCast Evolution (ICE)	PCOS-410A	Proprietary	Precinct Scanner
ICP Ballot Box	BOX-330A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP Ballot Box	ElectionSource IM-COLLAPSIBLE	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	BOX-350A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICP2 Ballot Box	ElectionSource IM-COLLAPSIBLE	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICE Ballot Box	BOX-410A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICE Ballot Box	BOX-420A	Proprietary	Ballot Box
ICX Tablet (Classic)	aValue 15" Tablet (SID-15V-Z37)	COTS	Ballot Marking Device
ICX Tablet (Classic)	aValue 21" Tablet (SID-21V-Z37)	COTS	Ballot Marking Device
ICX Tablet (Prime)	aValue 21" Tablet (HID-21V-BTX) (Steel or Aluminum chassis)	COTS	Ballot Marking Device or Direct Recording Electronic
ICX UPS Inline EMI Filter	1.0	Proprietary	EMI Filter
Thermal Printer (VVPAT)	KFI 702-75250014A (V1)	COTS	Voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT)
Thermal Printer (VVPAT)	KFI 702-75250014C (V1-C)	COTS	Voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT)
Server	Dell PowerEdge R630	COTS	Standard Server
Server	Dell PowerEdge R640	COTS	Standard Server
Server	Dell PowerEdge R660	COTS	Standard Server
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 3050 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 5270 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 7440 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9010 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9020 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell OptiPlex 9030 All in One	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell Precision 3440 XE	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell Precision 3450 XE	COTS	
ICC Workstation HW	Dell Precision 3460 XE	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-G1130	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-M160 II	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-M260	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Canon imageFormula DR-G2140	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	InoTec HiPro 821	COTS	Central Count Scanner
ICC Scanner	Dell Optiplex 7050	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Dell Optiplex 7060	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Dell Optiplex 7070	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Dell Optiplex XE3	COTS	
ICC Scanner	Dell Optiplex XE4	COTS	
ICC Scanner Monitor	Lenovo 10QXPAR1US	COTS	
ICC Scanner Monitor	Lenovo 11GCPAR1US	COTS	
ICC Scanner Monitor	Dell 2418HT Monitor	COTS	
ICC Scanner Monitor	Dell 2422H Monitor	COTS	
ICC Scanner Monitor	Dell 2424HT Monitor	COTS	
ICC Scanner Monitor	Planar PCT2235	COTS	

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision 3430	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision 3431	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision 3440 XE	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision 3450 XE	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision 3460 XE	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision T1700	COTS	
Client Workstation HW and Express Server	Dell Precision T3420	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude 3340	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude 3420	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude 3410 (SSD)	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude 3410 (HDD)	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude 3400	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude 3490	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude e3470	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude e3480	COTS	
ImageCast Voter Activation (ICVA)	Dell Latitude e7450	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Pro Printer M402dn	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Pro Printer M402dne	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Printer M404dn	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Printer M501dn	COTS	
ICX Printer	HP LaserJet Printer 4001dn	COTS	
ICX Printer	Avision Ap3061	COTS	
ICE Dual Monitor	AOC e1649FWU	COTS	

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
ICE Dual Monitor	Display Logic LM15.6-USB-DV.B	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Monitor P2417H	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Monitor P2419H	COTS	
Monitor	Dell Monitor P2422H	COTS	
iButton Reader/Writer	Maxim iButton Programmer DS9490R#	COTS	
iButton to 1-Wire USB Adapter	Maxim iButton Programmer DS1402-RP8+	COTS	
iButton	Dallas Maxim DS1963S-F5+	COTS	
Black Key Ring Mount	DS9093A+	COTS	
Yellow Key Ring Mount	DS9093AY+	COTS	
Blue Key Ring Mount	DS9093AB+	COTS	
UPS	Tripp Lite SMART1500RMXL2U	COTS	
UPS	APC SMT1500 Smart-UPS	COTS	
UPS	APC SMT1500C Smart-UPS	COTS	
UPS	CyberPower PR1500LCD	COTS	
UPS	CyberPower PR1500LCD-VTVM	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell X1008	COTS	
Network Switch	Dell X1026	COTS	
Network Switch	Cisco 8-port Switch (CBS350-8T-E-2G)	COTS	
Network Switch	Cisco 24-port Switch (CBS350-24T-4G)	COTS	
Headphones	Cyber Acoustics ACM-70 and 70B	COTS	
Sip and Puff	Enabling Devices #972	COTS	
Sip and Puff straws	#970K	COTS	
Rocker (Paddle) Switch	Enabling Device #971	COTS	
Rocker (Paddle) Switch	AbleNet 10033400 (2x)	COTS	
Rocker (Paddle) Switch Cable	Hosa Technology YMM-261 (for use with AbleNet switches)	COTS	
CF Card Dual-Slot Reader	Lexar Professional USB 3.0	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Hoodman Steel USB3	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Kingston USB 3.0 High-Speed Media Reader	COTS	
CF Card Reader	Delkin Devices DDREADER-44	COTS	
CF Card Reader	IOGEAR GFR381	COTS	
CF Card	Centon C4-CM-CF-16.4	COTS	
CF Card	RiTek RDCF8G-233XMCB2-i	COTS	
CF Card	SanDisk SDCFHS-004G	COTS	
CF Card	SanDisk SDCFHS-008G	COTS	
SDHC Memory Card	Centon C4-ET-SDU-16.1	COTS	
SDHC Memory Card	Centon S4-ET-SDU3-8.1	COTS	
SDHC Memory Card	Centon S4-CM-SDHU1-8G-002	COTS	
SDHC Memory Card	Centon C4-CM-SDU1-8.2	COTS	
SDHC Memory Card	Apacer AJ3.148FSA.00105	COTS	
ACS PC-Linked Smart Card Reader	ACR38U	COTS	
A CS PC-Linked Smart Card Reader	ACR39U	COTS	
Smart Card Reader	HID Global Omnikey 3121	COTS	
USB Memory Device	Apricorn AEGIS Secure Key 3NX PN: ASK3-NX-128GB	COTS	

System Component	Hardware Version	Proprietary or COTS	Comments
USB Memory Device	Apricorn AEGIS Secure Key 3NX PN: ASK3-NX-32GB	COTS	
USB Memory Device	Centon (BiCS4) PN: C4-CT-U3P2-16.3	COTS	
USB Memory Device	Centon S4-CM-U3P2-16.1	COTS	
USB Memory Device (8 GB)	Apacer EH353-M APHA016GAG0CG-3TM	COTS	
USB Memory Device (16 GB)	Apacer EH353-M APHA016GAG0CG-3TM	COTS	
USB Memory Device	Centon (BiCS4) PN: C4-CT-U3P2-8.3	COTS	
USB Memory Device	Centon S4-CM-U3P2-8.1	COTS	
USB Memory Device	Verbatim 97087	COTS	
Smart Cards	ACS ACOS-6-64 v3090	COTS	
Smart Cards	ACOS-6-64 v3100	COTS	
Smart Cards	CardLogix C7	COTS	
Mini-Server Rack	StarTech RK1236BKF	COTS	
Rack Power Distribution Unit	APC AP9562	COTS	

System Limitations

This table depicts the limits the system has been tested and certified to meet.

Limit (Maximum Number)	Value (by configuration)		Limiting Component
	Express	Standard	
Ballot Positions	462**/292*	462**/292*	22-inch Ballot
Precincts in Election	250	1000	Memory
Contests in Election	250	1000	Memory
Candidates/Counters in Election	2500	10000	Memory
Candidates/Counters in Precinct	462**/240*	462**/240*	22-inch Ballot
Candidates/Counters in Tabulator	2500	10000	Memory
Ballot Styles in Election	750	3000	Memory
Ballot IDs in a tabulator	200	200	Memory
Contests in a Ballot Style	153**/38*	153**/38*	22-inch Ballot* 14-inch QR Ballot**
Candidates in a Contests	231**/240*	231**/240*	22-inch Ballot
Ballot Styles in a Precinct	5	5	Memory
Number of Parties	30	30	Memory
Vote For in Contest	30**/24*	30**/24*	22-inch Ballot
Supported Languages per Election	5	5	Memory
Number of Write-ins	462**/24*	462**/24*	22-inch Ballot

* Reflects the system limit for a ballot printed in landscape.

** Reflects the system limit for a ballot printed in portrait.

Functionality

2005 VVSG Supported Functionality Declaration

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails		
VVPAT	YES	
Accessibility		
Forward Approach	YES	
Parallel (Side) Approach	YES	
Closed Primary		
Primary: Closed	YES	
Open Primary		
Primary: Open supported	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan:		
Partisan & Non-Partisan: Vote for 1 of N race	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan: Multi-member ("vote for N of M") board races	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan: "vote for 1" race with a single candidate and write-in voting	YES	
Partisan & Non-Partisan "vote for 1" race with no declared candidates and write-in voting	YES	
Write-In Voting:		
Write-in Voting: System default is a voting position identified for write-ins.	YES	
Write-in Voting: Without selecting a write in position.	No	
Write-in: With No Declared Candidates	YES	
Write-in: Identification of write-ins for resolution at central count	YES	
Primary Presidential Delegation Nominations & Slates:		
Primary Presidential Delegation Nominations: Displayed delegate slates for each presidential party	YES	
Slate & Group Voting: one selection votes the slate.	YES	
Ballot Rotation:		
Rotation of Names within an Office; define all supported rotation methods for location on the ballot and vote tabulation/reporting	YES	
Straight Party Voting:		
Straight Party: A single selection for partisan races in a general election	YES	
Straight Party: Vote for each candidate individually	YES	
Straight Party: Modify straight party selections with crossover votes	YES	
Straight Party: A race without a candidate for one party	YES	
Straight Party: "N of M race (where "N">1)	YES	
Straight Party: Excludes a partisan contest from the straight party selection	YES	
Cross-Party Endorsement:		

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Cross party endorsements, multiple parties endorse one candidate.	YES	
Split Precincts:		
Split Precincts: Multiple ballot styles	YES	
Split Precincts: P & M system support splits with correct contests and ballot identification of each split	YES	
Split Precincts: DRE matches voter to all applicable races.	YES	
Split Precincts: Reporting of voter counts (# of voters) to the precinct split level; Reporting of vote totals is to the precinct level	YES	
Vote N of M:		
Vote for N of M: Counts each selected candidate, if the maximum is not exceeded.	YES	
Vote for N of M: Invalidates all candidates in an overvote (paper)	YES	
Recall Issues, with options:		
Recall Issues with Options: Simple Yes/No with separate race/election. (Vote Yes or No Question)	YES	
Recall Issues with Options: Retain is the first option, Replacement candidate for the second or more options (Vote 1 of M)	NO	
Recall Issues with Options: Two contests with access to a second contest conditional upon a specific vote in contest one. (Must vote Yes to vote in 2nd contest.)	NO	
Recall Issues with Options: Two contests with access to a second contest conditional upon any vote in contest one. (Must vote Yes to vote in 2nd contest.)	NO	
Cumulative Voting		
Cumulative Voting: Voters are permitted to cast, as many votes as there are seats to be filled for one or more candidates. Voters are not limited to giving only one vote to a candidate. Instead, they can put multiple votes on one or more candidate.	NO	
Ranked Order Voting		
Ranked Order Voting: Voters can write in a ranked vote.	YES	
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot stops being counting when all ranked choices have been eliminated	YES	
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot with a skipped rank counts the vote for the next rank.	YES	

Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Ranked Order Voting: Voters rank candidates in a contest in order of choice. A candidate receiving a majority of the first-choice votes wins. If no candidate receives a majority of first choice votes, the last place candidate is deleted, each ballot cast for the deleted candidate counts for the second-choice candidate listed on the ballot. The process of eliminating the last place candidate and recounting the ballots continues until one candidate receives a majority of the vote	YES	
Ranked Order Voting: A ballot with two choices ranked the same, stops being counted at the point of two similarly ranked choices.	YES	
Ranked Order Voting: The total number of votes for two or more candidates with the least votes is less than the votes of the candidate with the next highest number of votes, the candidates with the least votes are eliminated simultaneously and their votes transferred to the next-ranked continuing candidate.	YES	
Provisional or Challenged Ballots		
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: A voted provisional ballots is identified but not included in the tabulation but can be added in the central count.	YES	
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: A voted provisional ballots is included in the tabulation, but is identified and can be subtracted in the central count	NO	
Provisional/Challenged Ballots: Provisional ballots maintain the secrecy of the ballot.	YES	
Overvotes		
Overvotes: Overvote invalidates the vote.	YES	
Overvotes – DRE / BMD: Prevented from or requires correction of overvoting.	YES	
Overvotes: If a system does not prevent overvotes, define how overvotes are counted.	YES	If allowed via voter override, overvotes are tallied separately.
Undervotes		
Undervotes: System counts undervotes cast for accounting purposes	YES	
Blank Ballots		
Totally Blank Ballots: Any blank ballot causes an alert.	YES	Precinct voters receive a warning; both precinct and central scanners will warn on blank ballots.


Feature/Characteristic	Yes/No	Comment
Totally Blank Ballots: If blank ballots are not immediately processed, there must be a provision to recognize and accept them	YES	Blank ballots are flagged. These ballots can be manually examined and then be scanned and accepted as blank; or precinct voter can override and accept.
Totally Blank Ballots: If operators can access a blank ballot, there must be a provision for resolution.	YES	Operators can examine a blank ballot, re-mark if needed and allowed, and then re-scan it.
Networking		
Wide Area Network – Use of Modems	NO	
Wide Area Network – Use of Wireless	NO	
Local Area Network – Use of TCP/IP	YES	Client/server only
Local Area Network – Use of Infrared	NO	
Local Area Network – Use of Wireless	NO	
Used as (if applicable):		
Precinct counting device	YES	ImageCast Precinct ImageCast Precinct 2 ImageCast Evolution ImageCast X VVPAT BMD
Central counting device	YES	ImageCast Central

Baseline Certification Engineering Change Orders (ECO)


ECO #	Description
100918	Added Dell OptiPlex XE4
100921	Added DELL Latitude 3340 ICVA Workstation
100924	Updated documentation to correct version of the SCAP Security Checklist as well as updated installation documents
100936	Updated user manual with optional instructions to update the firmware.
100942	Added Delkin CF / SD Memory Card Reader/Writer
100961	Added Dell PowerEdge R660
100974	Added Apacer SDHC Memory Card
100975	Added Apacer micro–SD Memory Card
100982	Added Dell P2424HT touch monitor for Canon and HiPro central scanner workstations
101007	Added IOGEAR GFR381 USB 3.0 Multi-Card Reader (CF and SD)

Appendix D: Sample Voter Information Screens

Overvote Notification: If the ballot contains an overvote, i.e., the voter has selected more choices than they are eligible to make in a particular contest, teach tabulator will identify the overvoted contest and advise the number of choices a voter is eligible to make. The voter will have the option to either have the ballot returned or override the overvote notification. If the ballot is returned, the voter has the opportunity to spoil their first ballot and vote a new one. If the overvote warning is overridden and the voter chooses to cast the ballot as marked, they are warned that their choices in any overvoted contest will not count. This language reflects the requirements as stipulated by the WEC.



Crossover Vote Notification: if a ballot is inserted on which a voter has made choices in more than one party's primary, a warning message will appear advising the voter of such and identifying the contests with crossover votes. As with the overvote warning, the voter has the option of either having their ballot returned or casting it with the crossover votes as marked. If the voter chooses to cast their ballot as-is, any choices in contests with crossover votes will not count. This verbiage also reflects the requirements as stipulated by the WEC.



Blank Ballot: if a voter inserts a ballot on which they have made no choices, this warning will appear. The voter has the option of having the ballot returned or casting it as-is.



Appendix E: **Voting Systems Standards, Testing Protocols and Procedures Pertaining to the Use of Communication Devices in Wisconsin**

PART I: TESTING AND DOCUMENTATION REVIEW STANDARDS

Applicable VVSG Standard

The modem component of the voting system or equipment must be tested to the requirements contained in the most recent version or versions of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) currently accepted for testing and certification by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Compliance with the applicable VVSG may be substantiated through federal certification by the EAC, through certification by another state that requires compliance with the applicable VVSG, or through testing conducted by a federally certified voting system test laboratory (VSTL) to the standards contained in the applicable VVSG. Meeting the requirements contained in the VVSG may substantiate compliance with the voting system requirements contained in Section 301 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).

In the event that a system version containing telecommunications components does not receive EAC certification or is not submitted for EAC certification by the vendor, a detailed explanation shall be provided to WEC staff at the time of application listing any deficiencies that would limit the system in question from meeting the certification requirements as stated in the currently accepted VVSG testing standards in both technical and simplified language. If any of the documentation submitted to WEC is proprietary in nature, or contains protected trade secrets, the vendor shall provide an additional redacted copy of all materials. The aforementioned documentation shall be accompanied by the report from an EAC accredited VSTL listing the types of testing conducted on the system in question, the VVSG testing standard utilized, and the results of all said tests. WEC reserves the right to contact the VSTL directly to further inquire about testing of the system and ask for any clarification that may be deemed necessary as part of the documentation review prior to conducting Wisconsin state certification testing. While Wis. Stat. § 5.91 specifies that EAC certification is not required for Wisconsin state certification to be issued to a voting system, WEC staff must be provided with the most detailed information possible during the application process, including but not limited to EAC and/or VSTL report(s), technical system schematics, telecommunications specifications (including network diagrams), system security protocol, and any other documentation as required by Wis. Admin. Code EL 7.01.

Access to Election Data

Provisions shall be made for authorized access to election results after closing of the polls and prior to the publication of the official canvass of the vote. Therefore, all systems must be capable of generating an export file to communicate results from the election jurisdiction to the Central processing location on election night after all results have been accumulated. The system may be designed so that results may be transferred to an alternate database or device. Access to the alternate file shall in no way affect the control, processing, and integrity of the primary file or allow the primary file to be affected in any way.

Security

All voting system functions shall prevent unauthorized access to them and preclude the execution of authorized functions in an improper sequence. System functions shall be executable only in the intended manner and order of events and under the intended conditions. Preconditions to a system function shall be logically related to the function so as to preclude its execution if the preconditions have not been met.

Accuracy

A voting system must be capable of accurately recording and reporting votes cast. Accuracy provisions shall be evidenced by the inclusion of control logic and data processing methods, which incorporate error detection and correction methods.

Data Integrity

A voting system shall contain provisions for maintaining the integrity of voting and audit data during an election and for a period of at least 22 months thereafter. These provisions shall include protection against:

1. the interruption of electrical power
2. generated or induced electromagnetic radiation
3. ambient temperature and humidity
4. the failure of any data input or storage device
5. any attempt at an improper data entry or retrieval procedure

Reliability

Successful Completion of the Logic and Accuracy test shall be determined by two criteria

1. The number of failures in transmission
2. Accuracy of vote counting

The failure or connectivity rate will be determined by observing the number of relevant failures that occur during equipment operation. During testing, WEC staff shall maintain logs of all connection attempts. Attempts that are both successful and unsuccessful shall be noted in the logs with this information used to compile the connectivity rate. Similar logs shall be kept for calculating the rate of successful data transmissions. The accuracy is to be measured by verifying the completeness of the totals received. All test results received in the county office, whether transmitted via wired or wireless connection, shall be compared to the pre-determined results set by WEC staff to ensure that transmitted results match anticipated results.

PART II: TEST PROCEDURES AND PROTOCOLS

Overview of Telecommunication Test

The telecommunication test focuses on system hardware and software function and performance for the transmission of data that is used to operate the system and report election results. This test applies to the requirements for Volume I, Section 6 of the EAC 2005 VVSG. This testing is intended to complement the network security requirements found in Volume I, Section 7 of the EAC 2005 VVSG, which include requirements for voter and administrator access, availability of network service, data confidentiality, and data integrity. Most importantly, security services must restrict access to local election system components from public resources, and these services must also restrict access to

voting system data while it is in transit through public networks. Compliance with Section 7, EAC 2005 VVSG shall be evidenced by a VSTL report submitted with the vendor's application for approval of a voting system.

Prior to conducting any system test, WEC staff shall thoroughly review all submitted documentation including but not limited to EAC and/or VSTL report(s), technical system schematics, telecommunications specifications (including network diagrams), system security protocols, and any other documents submitted as required pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code EL 7.01.

In an effort to achieve these standards and to verify the proper functionality of the units under test, the following methods will be used to test each component of the voting system:

Wired Modem/Analog Connection Capability Test Plan

Test Objective: To transfer the results from the tabulator to the Election Management System via a wired network correctly.

Test Plan:

1. Power up tabulators and generate zero tape
2. Insert test ballots into tabulator. Once completed, close polls and generate results tape
3. Attempt to transmit results prior to the closing of the polls and printing of results tape
4. Set up a telephone line simulator that contains as many as eight phone lines
5. Perform communication suite for election night reporting using a bank with as many as seven analog modems:
    a. Connect the central site election management system to the telephone line simulator and connect the modems to the remaining telephone line ports
    b. Setup the phone line numbers in the telephone line simulator
    c. Use the simulated election to upload the election results
        i. Use at least eight tabulators in different reporting units
        ii. Use as many as two tabulators within the same reporting units
    d. Simulate the following transmission anomalies
        i. Attempt to upload results from a tabulating device to a computer which is not part of the voting system
        ii. Attempt to upload results from a non-tabulating device to the central site connected to the modem bank
        iii. Attempt to load stress by simulating a denial of service (DOS) attack or attempt to upload more than one polling location results
6. Document results on appropriate telecommunications testing data sheet
7. Following the conclusion of testing, staff must confirm the accuracy of the transmitted data by ensuring that the transmitted results match the expected results
8. Following the conclusion of testing, WEC staff shall obtain all transmission logs, ballot images, cast vote records, and results tapes for all testing locations

Wireless Capability Test Plan

Test Objective: To transfer the results from the tabulator to EMS via a wireless network correctly.

Test Plan:

1. Power up tabulators and generate zero tape
2. Insert test ballots into tabulator. Once completed, close polls and generate results tape

3. Attempt to transmit results prior to the closing of the polls and printing of results tape.
4. Perform wireless communication suite for election night reporting:
    a. Use the simulated election to upload the election results using wireless transfer to the secure FTP server (SFTP)
    b. Use at least eight tabulators in different reporting units
    c. Use as many as two tabulators within the same reporting unit
5. Simulate the following transmission anomalies
    a. Attempt to upload results from a tabulating device to a computer which is not part of the voting system
    b. Attempt to upload results from a non-tabulating device to the SFTP server
    c. Attempt to load stress by simulating a denial of service (DOS) attack or attempt to upload more than one polling location results
    d. If possible, simulate a weak signal
    e. If possible, simulate an intrusion
    f. If possible, attempt to intercept transmission signals
6. Document testing results on appropriate telecommunications testing data sheet
7. Following the conclusion of testing, staff must confirm the accuracy of the transmitted data by ensuring that the transmitted results match the expected results
8. Following the conclusion of testing, WEC staff shall obtain all transmission logs, ballot images, and cast vote records for all testing locations

Test Conclusions for Wired and Wireless Transmission

1. System must be capable of transferring 100% of the contents of results test packs without error for each successful transmission.
2. Furthermore, system must demonstrate secure rate of transmission consistent with security requirements.
3. System must demonstrate the proper functionality to ensure ease of use for clerks on election night.
4. System must provide notification of transmission failure to election inspectors
5. System must be free of any and all remote access software
6. System must be configured such that the modem component remains inoperable until after the official closing of the polls and printing of one (1) copy of the results tape**.**
7. System modems located in polling place tabulating equipment shall not be capable of receiving wireless transmissions, only of sending results packets to the central site as described above.

PART III: PROPOSED SECURITY PROCEDURES

Staff recommends that as a condition of purchase, any municipality or county which purchases this equipment and uses modem functionality must also agree to the following conditions of approval.

1. Devices which may be incorporated in or attached to components of the system for the purpose of transmitting tabulation data to another data processing system, printing system, or display device shall not be used for the preparation or printing of an official canvass of the vote unless they conform to a data interchange and interface structure and protocol which incorporates some form of error checking.
2. Any jurisdiction using a modeming solution to transfer results from the polling place to the central count location may not activate the modem functionality until after the polling place closes.

3. Both vendor and county must ensure that there is no voting system internet connectivity at the central site aside from that which is required to conduct pre-election testing and election night results transmission. At all other times, the voting system server must remain disconnected from the internet or any devices connected directly or indirectly to the internet.
4. Any municipality using modeming technology must have one set of results printed before it attempts to modem any data.
5. Any municipality purchasing and using modem technology to transfer results from the polling location to the central site are encouraged to conduct an audit of the voting equipment after the conclusion of the canvass process.
6. Default passwords provided by the vendor to county/municipality must be changed upon receipt of equipment.
7. Counties must change their passwords after every election.
   Counties must take precautions to prevent unauthorized physical access to servers.

PART IV: CONDITIONS FOR APPROVAL

Additionally, staff recommends that, as a condition/continuing condition of approval, the vendor shall:

1. Reimburse actual costs incurred by WEC in examining the system *(including travel and lodging)* pursuant to state processes.
2. Configure modem component to remain inoperative (incapable of sending transmissions) prior to the closing of the polls and the printing of tabulated results.
3. Vendor must notify WEC promptly should any security vulnerability be discovered.
4. Both vendor and county must ensure that there is no voting system internet connectivity at the central county site aside from that which is required to conduct pre-election testing and election night results transmission. At all other times, the voting system server must remain in a non-connected, air gapped state.

Part V: Conditions for continued approval

1. WEC reserves the right to schedule site visits to ensure that system was installed per certification standards to include review of:
   a. Internal and external modems
   b. Chain of custody documentation
   c. Hash validation checks
   d. Hardware and software configuration
2. WEC reserves the right to request election night transmission logs from a random selection of counties

Appendix F: Wisconsin Voting Equipment Review Panel Feedback

1. How would you rate the functionality of the equipment?

ImageCast Central
Average rating 3.5/5

- This piece of equipment has sorting features that would be beneficial for some election officials to be able to easily identify certain features of ballots, such as write-ins. This could assist with end-of-night reconciliation.
- It can also be useful for processing absentee ballots as it can more quickly feed and read a stack of ballots.
- Central count machine seems like a good way to sort ballots in modest sized municipalities.

ImageCast Precinct 2
Average rating: 4/5

- This seemed to work fine. It does not have the same issues as the ICE as it is not a dual tabulator and accessible voting equipment.
- The screen prioritizes voters and poll workers at standing height, the angle requires standing over the machine and looking down.
- The fully flushed out error messages are a substantial improvement.
- 11 seconds is a long time to scan the ballot and cast it before a voter can step away or a poll worker can insert the next ballot.
- A 19 pound tabular is astoundingly light and I can see major appeal.
- Prompting for date and time at start up is a great improvement.

ImageCast Evolution
Average rating: 2.5/5

- This machine seems to work fine as a tabulator but does not cut it as accessible equipment.
- People with disabilities should not need to vote on a tabulator.

ImageCast X BMD
Average rating: 4/5

- This system is much preferred to the ICE accessible equipment. It has an updated and more user-friendly interface.
- Has too many screens/options/keys/cards [to initiate voting session] for poll workers to remember how to use them.
- Features seem secure and allows voter to know if there is an issue with their ballot.

ImageCast X VVPAT
Average rating: 3.5/5

- Has too many screens/options/keys/cards [to initiate voting session] for poll workers to remember how to use them.
- There is a concern that with the receipt tape and poll list with voter numbers, which are available public records, someone could request both and use them to determine how voters in a ward or community voted.
- Voters have the right to privacy and this system would not be able to guarantee that right.
- I would not recommend certifying this piece of equipment at this time.

2. How would you rate the accessible features?

ImageCast Evolution
Average rating: 1.5/5

- The interface of the accessible voting session is clunky and difficult to navigate, even for those who are used to navigating with assistive technology.
- It was a painfully cumbersome process to work through the ballot. There is a high level of repetition with each contest, which slows down the voting process significantly. It took me 15 minutes to vote my ballot. Even as someone who is very adept at using tactile equipment and managing a screen reader, and who figured out how to skip the third re-reading of ballot selections, it took a long time. I was very fatigued after marking the ballot. I can't imagine someone who may not feel as self-assured as a person with vision loss or with dealing with technology having the patience and persistence to get through that process.
- Even with the auxiliary screen, completing a ballot requires poll worker to interrupt line of people returning their own ballots.
- Voting had to pause two times, once for the poll worker to begin the accessible voting session and another time for the poll worker to initiate printing on the ballot.
- I found using the aux screen to be a truly awful process and am deeply concerned that the very people who would benefit from accessible equipment will not use it because of how cumbersome and unusable it was.
- It was telling in the presentation by the equipment representatives that they chose to turn certain elements on and/or off to speed up the voting process in the demo. The system takes a long time to navigate and would take even an experienced voter in excess of 15 minutes to complete marking their ballot using this technology.
- The fully flushed out error messages are a substantial improvement.
- Prompting for date and time at start up is a great improvement.
- The accessible voting screen when viewing the ballot is more user friendly and easier to read.
- Ballot is way quieter than instructions.
- Right arrow braille is in a weird spot.
- Volume not well differentiated or labeled in braille.
- Controller could be bigger 20% would allow for more space for braille labels for buttons.
- You use controllers by setting them on a table not handheld, more table/stand space is needed.
- Help button is confusing with 3 indentations.
- Braille on printer unnecessary.

<u>Privacy and Independence</u>

- The system lacks the ability for the voter to cast their ballot privately and independently. While the transition from tabulator to sending the ballot to the auxiliary screen is short (30 seconds), it requires a poll worker to make the transition. It is obvious to others in the polling place that the voter is getting some sort of assistance as they walk to the tabulator with the poll worker and then walk over to the aux screen. After voting the ballot, the voter must call a poll worker over to the aux screen to transfer the ballot back to the tabulator, calling attention to themselves once again. The poll worker and the voter then travel back to the tabulator where the voter prints their ballot from the ADA marking system. The ballot comes out of the tabulator and then has to be reinserted to tabulate. Again, during this process, tabulation of ballots from other voters needs to halt.

- Voters with disabilities are not able to vote privately and independently.

Screen

- The size of the aux screen was very small and hard to see. When I enlarged the font to a readable size for me, I could only see a tiny portion of the ballot and had to scroll to access it all. For many people with vision loss, tracking is very difficult and is compounded by having the scroll. It's easy to lose our place and I'm concerned that this could lead to ballot marking errors and overall fatigue.

ImageCast X BMD
Average rating: 4/5

Process

- If I mismarked my ballot, it was easy to correct it either right after voting the contest or when reviewing the completed ballot before printing.
- It took a little bit for me to wrap my head around inserting a plastic card to bring up the accessible voting session, but this made sense after I did it for the first time. Potentially when training voters to use the equipment, offering some language about how to insert the card, making parallels to inserting a credit card, could be helpful.
- I like the ICX BMD the most, best features for people with disabilities.
- Interestingly, I sequenced my testing with doing the [ICE with the] aux screen first and then the new touch screen. It was a night and day contrast. Where it took me at least 15 minutes to vote my ballot on the aux screen, it took me half of that time to vote on the equipment that was brought for certification.
- Requires two poll worker interactions.
- Voters can interact with the ballot WHILE it is printing. A tug can change timing marks.
- Ballot has to be initialed by poll workers after the ballot is voted. It would be easy for a ballot to slip through the crack and not get initialed by poll workers.
- Voters know how to work commercially available printers and may try checking the paper try or pushing the power button. If the pubic a reach it they will touch it.
- Voters may be deeply skeptical about the card system. If implemented I would expect the local clerk would hear a lot about it.
- A commercial printer may be cheaper or more modular but comes at the cost of having significantly more points of error.

Privacy and Independence

- If given the card when checking in, the voting process can be done privately and independently throughout, which is key!
- I loved that it printed a ballot that is equivalent to a ballot marked by a pen. This preserve ballot anonymity.
- It varies the markings on the ballot to more closely mirror how people mark their ballots. Adds an additional layer of privacy for voters using this equipment to mark their ballot.
- Consideration of placement of the screen in the voting area will be very important, since it is so large.
- The system also separates the ballot marking features and tabulation of ballots, so it does not have the same issues that the ICE equipment has.

- There was discussion from presenter that things are easier with a "helper" for someone with a disability. Voting should be made to be independent/accessible.
- I am very comfortable recommending this equipment for certification. If certified, I would highly recommend that counties using ICE equipment add this marking device as soon as possible to ensure the voter has a truly private and independent voting experience.

Screen

- As someone with a bit of functional vision, I found the screen to be accessible because of my ability to adjust font size and contrast. The screen did not seem to pick up a lot of glare. It was at a good angle for interacting.
- When I switched modes to the audio/visual, which didn't require the ballot marking device, but required using the touch screen, I found this easy to use as well. I could see voters liking this option if they aren't comfortable using a tactile device but would rather use the touch screen. They would still have the benefit of the audio as support with the visual.

Audio

- The speech was clearly understood.
- When using the audio interface, the instructions on how to use the device were very clear. I also liked that I could jump to the instructions easily if I needed to review.

Keypad

- The handheld ballot marking device [keypad] was intuitive, but also clearly marked with tactile features and braille. The bright color coding was also helpful. Because the buttons were large, they would be easy to find with less sensitivity in one's fingers. The shape of the device made for ease in holding it, especially when voting a long ballot.

ImageCast X VVPAT
Average rating: 2.5/5

- This system functions similarly to the ICX BMD so the accessibility features to make your selections are quite good.
- However, the system does not print a regular ballot, instead it prints a teeny tiny receipt like record of the person's votes.
- The font is so small it would be very difficult for someone to read and review their selections.
- The audio voting feature was quiet and too fast. At regular speed it takes forever.

3. Rate your overall impression of the system.

ImageCast Central: Average rating 3.5/5

ImageCast Precinct: Average rating: 4/5

ImageCast Evolution: Average rating: 2/5

ImageCast X BMD: Average rating: 4/5

ImageCast X VVPAT: Average rating: 3/5

Appendix G: Liberty Vote Correspondence re: Change of Ownership

LIBERTY VOTE

October 24, 2025

Sent via electronic transmission

Attn: Meagan Wolfe
Administrator
Wisconsin Election Commission
212 East Washington, 3rd Floor
Madison, WI 53703
meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov

Re: Pending Application for Voting System Certification

Dear Ms. Wolfe,

The purpose of this letter is to provide an update regarding Dominion Voting Systems, Inc.'s application to the Wisconsin Elections Commission on 6/19/2025 for certification of the Democracy Suite voting system version 5.20, certified by the Election Assistance Commission, and Democracy Suite voting system version 5.20S.

Liberty Vote Corp. recently purchased Dominion Voting Systems. Following this change of ownership, Dominion Voting Systems, Inc.'s name has been changed to Liberty Vote USA Inc. For the purposes of pending product certifications, there has been no change to the Democracy Suite 5.20 or 5.20S voting systems, including the hardware, software, and documentation originally submitted for approval.

Liberty Vote USA Inc. is committed to providing outstanding products and services in the State of Wisconsin and seeks certification of the submitted Democracy Suite 5.20 and 5.20S voting systems. Please let us know if you need any additional information to evaluate the pending certification applications.

Yours truly,

Scott Leiendecker, Founder and Owner
Liberty Vote USA Inc.

Appendix H: Withdrawal of MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03 from Consideration for Certification

LIBERTY VOTE

February 12, 2026

Attn: Meagan Wolfe
Administrator
Wisconsin Election Commission
212 East Washington, 3rd Floor
Madison, WI 53703
meagan.wolfe@wisconsin.gov

sent via electronic transmission

RE: DEMOCRACY SUITE 5.20 AND 5.20S APPLICATION COMPONENT LIST UPDATE

Dear Ms. Wolfe:

Liberty Vote USA hereby requests the removal of the MultiTech MTCM-L4N1D-B03 cellular modem from the Democracy Suite 5.20 and 5.20S ImageCast Evolution (ICE) component list.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Robert F. Giles
VP, Certification and Compliance
Liberty Vote USA

Wisconsin Elections Commission

212 East Washington Avenue | Third Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

DATE: May 7, 2026

TO: Members, Wisconsin Elections Commission

FROM: Commission Staff

SUBJECT: Website Application Improvements for Usability, Accessibility, and Security

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide an update on Commission-wide efforts to align digital content and services with Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1 Level AA standards in advance of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Title II compliance deadlines. This update reflects a coordinated, agency-wide approach to accessibility that includes ongoing review, usability testing, remediation, and long-term compliance planning across all public-facing and internal systems.

2. Background.

Commission staff routinely review agency systems, websites, and public-facing materials. During odd-numbered election years, fewer elections provide for more time for in-depth review. This allows staff to step back from peak operations and focus on usability, content organization, and the overall effectiveness of digital services. The 2025–2027 cycle provided an opportunity to take a more comprehensive and deliberate approach to reviewing existing platforms, identifying areas for improvement, and planning longer-term updates.

As part of this broader review effort, the introduction of new federal accessibility requirements provided a more defined and structured framework to guide this work. The Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), establish internationally recognized standards to ensure digital content is accessible to individuals with disabilities, including those who rely on assistive technologies such as screen readers, keyboard navigation, and voice input tools. These guidelines are based on four core principles: content must be perceivable, operable, understandable, and robust.

In April 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a final rule under Title II of the ADA requiring public entities to comply with WCAG 2.1 Level AA standards. The original compliance deadlines were April 24, 2026, for larger public entities and April 24, 2027, for smaller public entities. On April 20, 2026, the DOJ announced a one-year extension of these deadlines. Despite the extension, staff recognize the importance of providing accessible services to all users and will continue efforts to bring all external sites into compliance by the end of summer 2026. This timeline supports a transition to ongoing compliance maintenance and continued development of WisVote CRM Migration project (WisVote 2.0).

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This federal guidance aligned with the Commission's existing review cycle and allowed staff to move from a general, exploratory evaluation of systems into a more targeted and standards-driven approach. Accessibility requirements helped prioritize work, define measurable outcomes, and ensure that improvements made during this review period would result in more consistent, usable, and inclusive digital services across all platforms.

In May 2025, the Department of Administration (DOA) convened a Digital Accessibility Compliance workgroup to coordinate statewide efforts. This work includes remediation of digital content and systems, development of guidance and policies, evaluation of accessibility tools, and implementation of training and tracking mechanisms.

3. WCAG Compliance Planning.

To support compliance with Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1 Level AA standards, the Commission established an internal cross-functional workgroup composed of staff from multiple teams. This workgroup was responsible for leading the planning phase of the WCAG compliance project, including evaluating agency web platforms, identifying accessibility needs, and developing a structured approach to remediation across systems.

The scope of the planning effort included several major systems and websites, including Badger Voters, MyVote, Elections.Wi.Gov, ElectEd, WisVote, and the Canvass Reporting Site. Given the size and complexity of these platforms, staff prioritized establishing a clear and consistent framework early in the process to guide accessibility work in a coordinated and manageable way.

A. Planning Approach

Initial planning efforts focused on defining how accessibility compliance work would be assessed, prioritized, and implemented across systems. Key activities included:

- Conducting accessibility assessments across agency systems to identify baseline issues and determine where remediation efforts should begin
- Evaluating available accessibility tools to support scanning, reporting, and issue tracking
- Selecting and implementing the Acquia Web Governance tool through an existing vendor contract
- Configuring the tool across key platforms, including Elections.Wi.Gov, ElectEd, and MyVote
- Working with vendor-provided accessibility experts to review scan results, interpret findings, and define remediation responsibilities

These efforts established a consistent process for identifying, tracking, and managing accessibility issues across multiple systems.

At the same time, staff worked to build a stronger internal understanding of WCAG 2.1 principles and what compliance means in practice. This included not only reviewing websites but also understanding how to create accessible documents and determining how existing online materials should be prioritized.

B. Prioritization Strategy

Due to the volume of systems and content involved, staff determined that prioritization was necessary to ensure efficient use of resources. Systems were prioritized based on public impact, with the most heavily used, public-facing platforms addressed first. This approach ensured that accessibility improvements would benefit the largest number of users, including voters, clerks, and other stakeholders.

As part of this strategy, staff selected the Acquia Web Governance tool for use across Elections.Wi.Gov, ElectEd, and MyVote. Using a single tool across these platforms supports consistency in evaluation, reporting, and remediation planning.

C. Initial Document & Site Review

A major part of this effort has involved reviewing posted documentation, especially PDFs and other files available on the website. Staff determined that this review was critical to the success of the project. In many cases, documents posted online were outdated and could potentially be archived or removed, which would reduce the volume of materials requiring remediation. At the same time, staff recognized that many documents are still heavily relied upon by the public and by stakeholders, making it important to identify which documents are most important and most frequently used so those could be made accessible first.

As part of the initial review work, staff identified several common accessibility gaps across systems, including:

- Missing alternative text for images
- Keyboard navigation issues
- Insufficient color contrast in certain areas
- Missing, inconsistent, or unclear heading structures

These findings helped establish a baseline for remediation work and gave staff a clearer understanding of where the most immediate and significant issues existed.

D. Accessibility Statements

Accessibility statements for elections.wi.gov and MyVote are currently being finalized and prepared for publication. These statements will communicate the agency's ongoing accessibility efforts and provide users with a clear way to report issues or request assistance.

To support transparency and provide a clear avenue for feedback, the Commission has published the following accessibility statement on key public-facing websites:

"Wisconsin Elections Commission is committed to providing accessible digital services for all users, including people with disabilities. We are actively working to improve the accessibility of our websites and aim to meet the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1 Level AA.

If you experience difficulty accessing any content on this website or need assistance, complete an accessibility report form and include the web page address (URL) and a description of the issue. You can also contact us directly at elections@wi.gov.

We welcome your feedback and are continually working to improve the accessibility of our online services."

E. Training Efforts

Staff identified the need for broader, accessibility training for agency staff, particularly related to document creation and public-facing communications. In order to support long-term compliance and reduce the need for rework, efforts have focused on building internal knowledge and providing practical tools staff can use in their day-to-day work.

Key efforts included:

- Developing WCAG-compliant training materials to guide staff on accessibility standards and expectations
- Creating accessibility checklists to support consistent, compliant publishing of web and document content
- Ensuring recorded webinars and virtual content include appropriate captioning and meet accessibility requirements
- Participating in a Plain Language Workshop facilitated by the DOA Bureau of Training and Development to improve clarity and usability of communications

These efforts have helped improve both the clarity and accessibility of Commission communications, particularly across high-traffic platforms such as MyVote and Elections.Wi.Gov, while also laying the groundwork for more consistent practices across the agency moving forward.

4. Site Specific Efforts.

A. Elections.Wi.Gov (Main Website)

Accessibility work on the Commission's main website has focused on addressing issues identified through initial Web Governance scans and establishing a sustainable process for ongoing compliance. High-and medium-priority issues identified through these scans have largely been addressed by developers, with remaining items continuing to be worked through by staff. Substantial progress has been made toward compliance, and ongoing manual review is expected to identify any remaining gaps.

Following implementation of the Acquia Web Governance tool, staff worked closely with the vendor to conduct initial scans and receive training on interpreting results and guiding remediation. Because the vendor works directly with the development team supporting the main website, their accessibility expert was able to provide a detailed review of scan results and recommend practical approaches for beginning compliance work. This support helped staff better understand the types of issues being identified and how to address them effectively.

In addition to automated scanning, staff are conducting manual testing, including the use of screen readers and other assistive tools, to evaluate user experience and ensure compliance beyond what automated tools can detect. This work is more time-intensive but is necessary to identify issues not captured through automated scans. The next phase of work will include page-by-page manual review of the main website to further identify and resolve outstanding issues. To date, staff have identified and completed remediation on a significant number of accessibility issues across multiple platforms.

A significant component of the work on Elections.Wi.Gov has also involved content management. Staff are working with developers to implement an archive system that will allow outdated content to be retained for recordkeeping while reducing the need to revise old documentation. This system will include the ability to apply expiration dates to content, display warnings when information is outdated, and redirect users to the most current and relevant information. In parallel, staff are developing processes for reviewing and archiving existing documents, particularly PDFs, to reduce the volume of materials requiring remediation.

B. MyVote Website


MyVote Wisconsin (MyVote.wi.gov) is the Commission's primary voter-facing website and a critical source of official election information. Since its redesign in 2016, the site has supported key voter functions, including registration, absentee ballot requests, ballot tracking, and access to Election Day information. Ensuring the site remains accessible and user-friendly has been a central focus of this initiative.

Work on MyVote has combined accessibility compliance efforts with a structured, multi-phase usability initiative. Beginning in early 2025, staff evaluated site workflows, navigation, and content clarity. During the summer of 2025, staff conducted online usability testing in which participants were asked to complete four core voter tasks: registering to vote, requesting an absentee ballot, tracking an absentee ballot, and locating in-person absentee voting options. Participants provided real-time feedback on what elements felt intuitive, where they encountered confusion, and what information or features were unclear.

Findings from this phase directly informed the development of a paper prototype that incorporated recommended improvements such as language and workflow updates. Staff then conducted in-person usability sessions across the state with community members, community organizations, and local government representatives. These sessions allowed staff to further refine improvements related to usability, plain language, and accessibility considerations before implementation.

During these in-person sessions, participants were presented with two versions of the MyVote site: the current version and a version incorporating recommended updates. Participants were asked to complete a series of tasks using screenshots and describe how they would navigate each process. Following the tasks, participants responded to a set of standardized questions about their experience using the site. To ensure unbiased feedback, participants were not informed which version they were reviewing.

Image 1: Usability Testing Screen



Results from these sessions indicate that the updated version of MyVote was generally received more favorably, though differences between the two versions were modest.

Overall, staff received positive feedback on the MyVote site; however, usability testing identified several recurring issues affecting clarity, navigation, and user confidence:

- **Inconsistent Design Cues:** Grey buttons and inconsistent color usage created uncertainty about actions and completion
- **Navigation Challenges:** Redundant options and limited step guidance made task flow less intuitive
- **Limited User Feedback:** Users lacked clear confirmation when steps were completed
- **Content Clarity:** Text-heavy pages were often overwhelming and frequently skimmed
- **Voter Registration:** Confusion around required information (e.g., prior addresses, name formats) and uncertainty about completion
- **Absentee by Mail:** Misunderstanding of the process (e.g., belief voting was online), unclear messaging when no elections were available, and unclear ID upload functionality
- **In-person Absentee Voting (IPAV):** Preference for simplified options, clearer terminology (e.g., “early voting”), and more intuitive access to information

At the same time, accessibility compliance work was underway. In early 2026, staff conducted a comprehensive accessibility scan of the MyVote website using the Acquia Web Governance tool. This review identified several issues requiring remediation. Because the 2016 redesign incorporated

foundational accessibility features, portions of the site already met WCAG 2.1 standards, allowing staff to focus on targeted improvements.

Table 1: *Summary of Accessibility Review Progress as of 04.20.2026*

Number of Potential Issues Identified	*43*
Number of Potential Issues Left to Review	*19*
Number of Fixes Under Development	*24*
Number of Fixes Ready to Deploy	*10*

The usability testing and accessibility review efforts were intentionally aligned, creating a unified roadmap for updates that address both technical compliance and user experience. Initial updates have focused on high-impact accessibility improvements, including:

- Enhancing color contrast to meet WCAG 2.1 standards
- Improving alternative text for images
- Adding an accessibility statement
- Improving screen reader compatibility
- Ensuring all interactive elements function with both keyboard and mouse input
- Removing or replacing non-accessible PDF content
- Improving language by incorporating plain language in Step 1 of the voter registration process

In addition to these updates, staff identified more complex workflow challenges related to how permanently overseas and military voters receive their absentee ballots electronically through MyVote. The current process relies on PDF-based ballots that do not meet WCAG 2.1 requirements and have also been identified through usability testing as confusing for some users.

Addressing these issues within the existing system would require significant redevelopment, additional usability testing, and coordination within a compressed timeline, particularly as staff are actively engaged in the WisVote 2.0. Given these constraints, staff will implement a temporary modification to the MyVote electronic ballot process. The option to receive absentee ballots electronically through MyVote will be removed, and affected voters will instead receive their absentee ballots directly from their municipal clerks by email or fax.

This approach will:

- Standardize electronic ballot delivery within municipalities
- Reduce confusion for voters and poll workers
- Ensure all voters receive accessible ballot materials
- Allow staff to focus on developing a fully compliant solution within WisVote 2.0

This change will be implemented in advance of the August 2026 Partisan Primary UOCAVA deadlines and is expected to affect approximately 170 voters statewide. All impacted voters will be notified of the change to their ballot delivery method.

Commission staff recognize that the transition from the current WisVote system to WisVote 2.0 requires careful coordination with the existing MyVote site. Staff are working to understand how underlying system changes will interact with current MyVote functionality and how data and processes will continue to support the voter-facing experience. This includes:

- Reviewing existing WisVote functionality and supporting processes
- Identifying workflows that may be impacted by system changes
- Ensuring that updates align with WCAG 2.1 accessibility requirements at launch

Throughout this process, staff are working to ensure that changes associated with WisVote 2.0 are implemented in a way that minimizes disruption to MyVote, reduces potential confusion for voters, and maintains a consistent look and feel. Where possible, existing functionality and user workflows will be preserved, with updates focused on improving clarity, accessibility, and overall usability.

By addressing these considerations early, staff aim to support a smooth transition to WisVote 2.0 while continuing to provide a stable and familiar experience for MyVote users.

In addition, staff have identified turnover and continuity of usability expertise as an ongoing consideration. To support long-term success, staff will complete usability testing training in the summer of 2026. This training will strengthen internal capacity and help ensure that future updates, including those planned for 2027, are supported by consistent and effective usability testing practices.

Although the federal compliance deadline has been extended, work is continuing with a timeline to implement key improvements by the end of summer 2026. These updates, along with interim process adjustments, are intended to enhance clarity, accessibility, and overall user experience. As development of WisVote 2.0 moves forward, accessibility and usability considerations will remain central to design and implementation, supported by ongoing training and continued testing.

C. Badger Voters Website

Accessibility work on the Badger Voters platform is underway, with staff identifying issues and beginning remediation efforts. This work is progressing alongside MyVote, with a focus on addressing high-impact issues first and incorporating both automated findings and manual review.

5. Next Steps.

As work on the Commission's external-facing websites has progressed and significant remediation efforts are near completion, staff are beginning to shift focus to internal systems.

While these applications are not public facing in the same way, they remain an important part of overall accessibility efforts. Review and planning for these systems are now underway, with work beginning on platforms such as ElectEd and WisVote.

ElectEd: Accessibility review and remediation efforts are scheduled to begin in May 2026. This work will be completed in coordination with vendor partners and accessibility experts to ensure a thorough and informed approach.

WisVote: Due to the planned sunset of the current system following the 2028 election, remediation efforts for the existing system are limited. Instead, staff are focusing efforts on ensuring accessibility is built into the design and development of WisVote 2.0. This includes incorporating WCAG standards from the outset and planning for accessibility testing prior to deployment to avoid retroactive fixes later.

Staff recognize that digital accessibility is an ongoing effort that extends beyond initial compliance. While substantial progress has been made, continued work is necessary to both achieve and maintain compliance over time. To support this, staff will continue to:

- Advance remediation efforts across all platforms
- Expand accessibility monitoring and reporting capabilities
- Maintain the archiving system to reduce outdated and non-compliant content
- Integrate accessibility requirements into future system development and procurement processes
- Continue staff training and awareness efforts

Wisconsin Elections Commission

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DATE: May 7, 2026

TO: Members, Wisconsin Elections Commission

FROM: Commission Staff

SUBJECT: Proposal for 2026 Election Security Subgrant for Municipalities

1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this agenda item is to obtain the Commission's decision regarding the acceptance and allocation of 2026 Help America Vote Act ("HAVA") funds.

2. BACKGROUND.

On March 13, 2026, the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission ("EAC") sent an email to the Wisconsin Elections Commission ("WEC") announcing Wisconsin's HAVA grant award of $819,000 with a 20% state match. This grant award is an extension of the HAVA Election Security grants previously awarded to the agency and the same terms apply. The purpose of the grant is to improve the security of federal elections. The 20% state match requires $163,800 of our agency's state funds to be used for the same purpose and is already in our agency's existing GPR state budget.

The next step is to submit a Wis. Stat. § 16.54 request to the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA) asking for permission to accept the funds. If approved by DOA, WEC will submit an award application to the EAC that includes a budget worksheet and a budget narrative which, at a high level, outlines our state plans to use the new HAVA funds. The budget plans may be amended and resubmitted as necessary throughout the grant.

In the past, staff have designed subgrants to address the highest needs reported by our municipal and county clerks that we serve. Of all federal funds that have been awarded in the past, the majority have been provided to municipalities and counties, the elections frontline in Wisconsin, to help meet their federal election security needs. Staff provided a comprehensive breakdown of all previously awarded HAVA Election Security subgrant funding at the May 14, 2024, Commission Meeting.

As of October 2025, Microsoft ended support for Windows 10, requiring all devices to update to Windows 11 to receive necessary support and security updates. As of April 1, 2026, some clerk computers were still operating on Windows 10. At the same time, Windows 11 has stricter system requirements, meaning not all existing devices can be upgraded. Typical laptop lifespans range from

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three to five years, while desktops may last five to seven years, depending on use and maintenance. Given these factors, reopening the ES Subgrant program to all municipalities, including prior recipients, is a practical and necessary step to support continued election security.

In addition to the newly appropriated funds, staff have reviewed leftover funds from prior municipal ES Subgrant programs and determined that with those remaining funds staff could award a higher amount of funds for each municipality. With costs rising, especially for technology, this higher amount would greatly benefit jurisdictions, going further than the prior funding awarded.

Staff reviewed remaining funds from the last Election Security grants. Below is a breakdown of the leftover funds:

Subgrant Title	Funds Approved by Commission	Total Amount Distributed	Total Remaining Funds
2019 ES Municipal Subgrant	$1,100,000	$824,179	$275,821
2020 ES Municipal Subgrant	$1,206,000	$35,979	$1,170,021
2022 ES Municipal Subgrant	$1,000,000	$429,216	$570,784
TOTALS	**$3,306,000**	**$1,289,374**	**$2,016,626**

When combined with the new $819,000 HAVA award, the total available funding to support municipalities in election security efforts is approximately $2.8 million. This level of funding provides WEC the ability to determine higher allocation strategies for a 2026 Election Security Subgrant program.

3. PROPOSAL.

Commission staff recommend utilizing $2.4M of the election security funds (both a portion of remaining and new funds) to establish a 2026 Election Security Subgrant (“ES Subgrant”) program for municipalities, building on the structure and lessons learned from the 2019, 2020, and 2022 programs.

These earlier programs were designed to support municipalities in implementing essential cyber and physical security improvements, particularly for jurisdictions with limited technical capacity.

Under previous programs, jurisdictions were awarded funds to either meet baseline security standards or, for those already meeting baseline requirements, to invest in a defined set of additional security enhancements. The baseline requirements included completing required security training, maintaining compliant hardware and software, and having access to IT support for managed devices.

Participation in prior subgrant rounds was highest among smaller municipalities with limited budgets and minimal or no dedicated IT support. Since the conclusion of those programs, staff have continued to receive feedback from local election officials indicating that the funding was critical to maintaining secure systems. As hardware, software, and service subscriptions age, many municipalities have expressed ongoing need for support to maintain baseline cybersecurity protections. Reestablishing the ES Subgrant program would provide a structured mechanism to address these needs and support continued compliance with evolving security expectations.

Program Administration. Municipalities applying for funding will be required to execute a memorandum of understanding (MOU) certifying that they either meet baseline security requirements or will use grant funds to achieve compliance. The MOU will be submitted through the AccessGov system.

Baseline Subgrant Compliance Standards. Jurisdictions accepting ES Subgrant funds must agree to meet the following baseline standards prior to expending funds on other allowable activities:

1. Certification of a current Election Security Contingency Plan
2. Complete WEC election security training requirements
3. Maintain compliant (up-to-date) computer hardware and software
4. Maintain either in-house or contracted IT support

Detailed compliance standards have been updated and are included in Appendix B.

Authorized Use of Funds. Consistent with prior subgrant programs, funds may be used only for the following allowable purposes:

1. Baseline compliant computer hardware and software (including future software subscriptions)
2. Baseline professional IT support (including for Badger Books, if baseline met)
3. Limited physical security improvements for election equipment
4. Security training (cyber or physical)

Funding. ES Subgrant funds will be distributed to municipalities in standardized amounts of $2,000 per municipality, not to exceed a total allocation of funds to $2.4M. Applicants will identify baseline and/or advanced security needs as part of the application process. Funding will be allocated to municipalities based on identified needs as follows:

1. Baseline compliant computer and software and/or managed IT support, up to $2,000

2. After baseline compliance, additionally allowable election security expenses, $0-$2,000

This structure is intended to ensure consistency in awards while prioritizing achievement of baseline security standards.

Disbursement Process and Timeline. Municipalities will request funding through an application form available on the WEC AccessGov portal. Below is a breakdown of proposed timelines:

- Application window opens: June 22, 2026
- Application window closes: December 1, 2026
- Disbursement of Payments: To begin no earlier than December 1, 2026
- Compliance documentation due: January 15, 2027

Given the timing of the program within a high-volume election year and concurrent state and federal fiscal year closeout periods, staff propose initiating disbursements after the application window closes. The goal is to complete all disbursements by January 15, 2027.

4. REMAINING FUNDS.

At this time, staff are assessing potential uses for the remaining unspent HAVA Grant funds, including opportunities to improve WisVote system security and to support the WisVote CRM migration project (WisVote 2.0).

5. RECOMMENDED MOTION.

The Commission directs WEC staff to renew the administration of the Election Security subgrant to municipalities at the rate of up to $2,000 per eligible municipality, not to exceed a total cost of $2,400,000.

Wisconsin Elections Commission

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DATE: [Publish Date]

TO: Wisconsin Municipal Clerks
City of Milwaukee Election Commission

FROM: Wisconsin Elections Commission

SUBJECT: 2026 Election Security Subgrant Program for Municipalities

1. Summary.

On May 7, 2026, the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) approved the creation of a 2026 Election Security Subgrant for Municipalities. The WEC will disburse up to $2.4 million of federal funds through the program. All municipalities are eligible for the subgrant, even if they previously received funds from 2019, 2020, or 2022 Election Security Subgrants. Each municipality may receive up to $2,000 under this subgrant, until allocated funds are depleted.

2. Background.

Under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2026, the WEC was offered funds to "improve the administration of elections for Federal office, including to enhance election technology and make election security improvements." These newly appropriated funds will be combined with left-over funds from earlier iterations of the program (2019, 2020, 2022) in order to provide 2026 subgrants. As with earlier grant programs, these funds are provided for fundamental cyber-security improvements including upgraded hardware and software, managed IT support, minimal physical security, and security training.

3. Authorized Uses.

Municipalities must use the funds for one or more of the following expenses:

1. Baseline compliant computer hardware and software
2. Baseline professional IT support (including for Badger Books, if baseline met)
3. Minimal physical security improvements for election equipment
4. Security training (cyber or physical)

4. How do Jurisdictions Apply?

An authorized representative of each jurisdiction must complete and submit a 2026 Election Security Subgrant Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) form via AccessGov by December 1, 2026. The link

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to access that form is XXXXX.gov. All subgrant information including a sample of the MOU and Appendices will be available on the WEC website here. This subgrant is only available to municipalities; counties are not eligible to apply. A webinar to review grant guidelines, compliance, applications, and common questions will be announced and held in summer 2026.

5. Questions?

Please direct any questions to our Help Desk at elections@wi.gov or 608-261-2028.

Wisconsin Elections Commission

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2026 ELECTION SECURITY SUBGRANT PROGRAM FOR MUNICIPALITIES

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

THE WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

AND

(NAME OF MUNICIPALITY, COUNTY)

1. FEDERAL GRANT

Funding for this 2026 Election Security Subgrant for Municipalities comes exclusively from the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA) Election Security Grant from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to the Wisconsin Elections Commission: WEC UEI F1JRNREURZA5; CFDA Number 90.404; FAIN EAC-ELSEC18WI; Federal Project Period 3/23/2018-Until funds are expended; Federal Budget Period 3/23/2018-9/30/2099; Purpose: "As authorized under Section 101 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-252) (HAVA) and provided for in the Consolidated Appropriations Acts of 2018 (Public Law 115-141), 2020 (Public Law 116-93), 2022 (Public Law 117-103), 2023 (Public Law 117-328), 2024 (Public Law 118-47), 2025 (Public Law 119-4), and 2026 (Public Law 119-75). The purpose of this award is to 'improve the administration of elections for Federal office, including to enhance election technology and make election security improvements' to the systems, equipment and processes used in federal elections."; Grant Administration: "Award recipients and sub-recipients must adhere to all applicable federal requirements including requirements under the Federal Financial Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance: Title 2 CFR Subtitle A, Chapter II, §200-Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (2 CFR § 200)."

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is for a Wisconsin municipality (city, village, or township) to request federal Election Security subgrant funds from the Wisconsin Elections Commission ("WEC" or the "Commission") by agreeing to all the below terms of this Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU" or "agreement"). Importantly, the receiving municipality will spend these federal funds as allowable below and in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 2 and the WEC's documentation retention and reporting requirements and will

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return the **required follow-up Appendix C Compliance Form with supporting documentation by January 15, 2027**.

The purpose of this municipal Election Security subgrant is to help improve the election security of federal elections statewide. Federal Election Security subgrant funds are being provided to Wisconsin cities, villages, and towns to implement baseline security measures and, where baseline security requirements have already been met, advance additional election security measures.

3. BASELINE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS SELF-ASSESSMENT

Assess the election security needs of the receiving municipality and certify that it has or will meet the baseline security requirements outlined below.

✓ **Election Security Contingency Plan.** The receiving municipality certifies they have a current Election Security Contingency Plan that meets the below specified requirements. (Please see *Appendix A How-to Guides* for details and sample plans.) *This contingency plan certification is a requirement for requesting these subgrant funds but holds no dollar value for this subgrant.*

1. **Scenario-specific response procedures:** The plan covers common contingencies including, but not limited to, evacuating a polling place, moving to a secondary polling place, and responding to physical threats
2. **Individuals responsible for key actions:** The plan names specific individuals that have responsibility for key actions
3. **Roles and responsibilities known:** Individuals named in the plan have been notified of their responsibilities
4. **Communication protocols:** The plan includes specific working contact information for all relevant parties, including but not limited to the local election official, law enforcement, building maintenance, and the principal contact at the secondary polling place
5. **Annual Review:** The plan has been reviewed by the local election official in this calendar year

_____ Yes, our municipality has a current election security Contingency Plan that meets all five specified requirements. *This is a requirement for requesting these subgrant funds.*

Please review compliance statements below and select appropriate response in each category.

✓ **WEC Election Security Training.** The receiving municipality has completed approved WEC supported Election Security Training.

_____ Already Compliant: Our municipality <u>has already completed</u> an approved WEC supported Election Security training. ($0)

Or

_____ Not yet achieved baseline: Our municipality still needs to complete an approved WEC supported Election Security Training. ($0)

✓ **Hardware and Software Baseline Compliant.** The computer used in the receiving municipality for election-related business is owned by the municipality and meets or exceeds the Baseline Hardware and Software Standards as described in *Appendix B Compliance Standards*.

_____ Already Compliant: Our municipality is already compliant. We do not need subgrant funds for a computer.

Or

_____ Requests funds to achieve baseline: Our municipality requests subgrant funds to purchase a compliant computer.

✓ **IT Support Baseline Compliant.** The receiving municipality has competent in-house, shared or contracted Information Technology (IT) support capable of maintaining minimum security standards as described in *Appendix A How-to* and *Appendix B Compliance Standards*.

_____ Already Compliant: Our municipality is already compliant. We do not need subgrant funds for IT support.

Or

_____ Requests funds to achieve baseline: Our municipality requests subgrant funds to obtain or maintain IT support.

✓ **If baseline is already achieved, you may request up to $2,000 for Additional Election Security Expenses**

If above baseline computer/software and IT support security requirements have already been met, municipalities may use subgrant funds up to the maximum subgrant award amount of $2,000 for additional eligible election security expenses. They include:

1. Professional IT support for Badger Books
2. Security training (cyber or physical)
3. *Limited* physical security improvements for election equipment (see *Appendix A How-to*)

4. SUBGRANT REQUEST AMOUNT

Subgrant Request Breakdown	**Maximum $2,000**	**Amount requested**
Baseline Hardware/Software & Managed IT	Up to $2,000	
Additional Election Security Expenses *(if baselines met)*	$0-$2,000	

Total request	***Not to exceed $2,000:***	

5. SUBGRANT PROGRAM DEADLINES

June 22, 2026 – December 1, 2026: **Subgrant Budget/Project/Spend Period:** All costs must be incurred, including goods or services received or invoices received for future services, during this project period. Invoices may contain future contractual or IT services. Bids, proposals, or purchase orders are not adequate for this subgrant.

December 1, 2026: MOU (Application) Deadline: Deadline for municipalities to return this completed MOU to the WEC which includes the self-assessment of security needs and certification that the municipality will expend subgrant funds to meet the terms of the subgrant program. Funds will not be disbursed until a completed MOU is submitted and approved.

December 1 - December 31, 2026: Awarding: No subgrant funds will be distributed earlier than December 1, 2026. Commission staff will award subgrants based on the receiving municipality's above security self-assessment and the municipality's certification that subgrant funds will be expended in accordance with the terms of this agreement and until $2,400,000 allocated funds are expended and/or the submission term has ended. Subgrant funding decisions based on a municipality's need, including the amount allocated, are within the sole discretion of the Commission staff administering the subgrant program. Subgrant funds will be disbursed by electronic transfer to a municipality's shared revenues account (if available), or via a physical check sent to a municipality's treasurer's address. For questions related to the processing of subgrant awards, contact the Commission's financial team via the WEC Help Desk at (608) 261-2028 or elections.finance@wi.gov.

January 15, 2027: Training Completion and Subgrant Compliance Form Deadline - Subgrant Closing: Deadline for municipalities to:

1. Complete an approved WEC supported Election Security Training.
2. Submit their completed Election Security Subgrant *Compliance Form Appendix C* with receipts and/or invoices documenting all subgrant expenditures, showing date and amount for all expended funds
3. Return to the WEC any and all unspent or undocumented subgrant award funds

Date To Be Determined: Documentation Retention Period: The receiving municipality must maintain documentation of all purchases made using subgrant funds for a period of three years from the closing of WEC's federal HAVA Election Security grant. The WEC will notify all municipalities when we expend and close the HAVA Election Security federal grant which will begin the mandatory three years records retention period. Please **maintain all documentation until the WEC authorizes destruction of said records**. Please consult the EAC cost documentation guidance at https://www.eac.gov/grants/cost-documentation-guidance.
For equipment costing $10,000 or more per unit: "Equipment" is defined as an asset with a useful life of more than one year and a per-unit acquisition cost of $10,000 or greater (2 CFR § 200.33) and requires additional documentation. A very specific inventory list of all Equipment

purchased in whole or in part using subgrant funds must be created and maintained by the municipality for purposes of any state or federal audit, follow requirements at 2 CFR § 200.313(d). **If these federal funds are spent in whole or in part on "equipment," this inventory list must be provided to the WEC** and again provided whenever the list changes. At least once every two years, a physical inventory of the property must be taken, and the results reconciled with the inventory list. Please consult 2 CFR § 200.313 for additional federal requirements and conditions pertaining to Equipment.

Ongoing Audit: All subgrant funds received are subject to audit by the Commission and/or the federal government to ensure funds have been spent appropriately and in accordance with all applicable state and federal laws. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(11), if the federal government objects to the use of any funds provided to a county or municipality under the subgrant, the county or municipality shall repay the amount of the subgrant to the Commission. 2 CFR 200.332(c)-(i)

6. SIGNATURES

By signing and dating this agreement, the receiving municipality agrees to the terms of this MOU, certifies that the information provided in this MOU is true and correct, will follow all state and federal laws, including adherence to all applicable federal requirements including Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance: Title 2 C.F.R. Subtitle A, Chapter II, Part 200-Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (2 C.F.R. §200) found here: (https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-2/subtitle-A/chapter-II/part-200?toc=1)

Receiving Municipality

Signature _____ **Date**: _____
(Authorized Representative of Municipality)

Printed Name _____
(Authorized Representative of Municipality)

Municipality Name: _____

County: _____

Municipality Clerk's Name: _____

Municipality Treasurer's Name: _____

Municipality Treasurer's Address: _____

_____

Municipality Contact Phone Number: _____

Municipality Contact E-mail Address: _____

Wisconsin Elections Commission

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2026 Election Security Subgrant
Appendix A
How-to Guides

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Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

2026 Election Security Subgrant

1. Updated Contingency Plan

To complete the contingency plan certification requirement that is mandatory to receive funds, the clerk or authorized designee needs to certify on the Election Security Subgrant Memorandum of Understanding that their updated election security contingency plan minimally contains five required elements. An updated contingency plan is a regularly reviewed and revised operational document that details response protocols, assigned responsibilities, and communication strategies to address potential disruptions to Election Day operations, ensuring secure, accessible, and continuous voting processes.

Contingency Plan Requirements:

1. **Scenario-specific response procedures**
   The plan covers common contingencies including, but not limited to, evacuating a polling place, moving to a secondary polling place, and responding to physical threats. Step-by-step actions for issues like equipment failure, power outages, severe weather, or staffing shortages, should be updated to reflect recent experiences. Plans for backup equipment, paper ballots, and alternative locations, with current inventory and logistics detail should be detailed. Procedures to maintain access to voting, such as provisional ballots or redirecting voters, consistent with current laws and policies.
2. **Individuals responsible for key actions**
   The plan names specific individuals that have responsibility for key actions. Clear contact lists and escalation paths between polling places, election offices, IT support, and external partners, along with guidance for informing voters.
3. **Roles and responsibilities known**
   Individuals named in the plan have been notified of their responsibilities. Also, all defined duties for poll workers, supervisors, and support staff are aligned with current staffing and training, including contingency training.
4. **Communication protocols**
   The plan includes specific working contact information for all relevant parties and escalation paths between polling places, election offices, IT support, and external partners, including but not limited to all local election officials, law enforcement, building maintenance, and the principal contact at the secondary polling place. The plan should contain clear guidance for informing voters.
5. **Annual Review**
   The plan has been reviewed by the local election official in this calendar year.

If the municipality does not have an updated contingency/emergency response plan, they must complete one prior to requesting funds. A sample template (Election Day Emergency Response Plan Template) is available on ElectEd at the following link: https://electiontraining.wi.gov/emergency

An ElectEd login is required to access the materials. If an ElectEd login is needed:

1) Email a completed and signed copy of the Request to Add Authorized Users to ElectEd (EL-365) form to the Elections Help Desk (elections@wi.gov). The form is available on the WEC website here. When completing the form, indicate “Not Applicable” under the Requested WisVote

Access Level field (unless the user also requires access to WisVote, then identify the appropriate access level).

2) Upon receipt of the completed Request to Add Authorized Users in ElectEd form, the Elections Help Desk will create and issue a login and password for the user.

2. How to Purchase Compliant Hardware and Software

I. **Background**. If a jurisdiction decides to purchase a new computer, this document is designed to help decision makers with *what to buy* and *where to buy it*.

II. **Where to Buy**. Jurisdictions may purchase hardware from any vendor or retail store they choose. This includes vendors with discounts available through state contracts or independent retailers.

III. **What to Buy**. There is an incredible variety of choices available in the computer market. We recommend that any system meet the baseline standards listed below. While more powerful systems are available, the minimum criteria below will allow clerks to perform routine election work securely and with ease.

a. Minimum Recommended Configuration:
   i. Form Factor: Computers now come as tablets, laptops, desktops, and all-in-one machines. Any form factor will work; however, clerks may find tablets and some laptops too small for comfortable work.
   ii. Operating System: Windows 11 or similarly supported OS systems
   iii. Processor or CPU: 1 gigahertz (GHz) or faster processor. Processors from Intel or AMD are most common. Good choices include Pentium, Core i3, Core i5, Athlon or Ryzen.
   iv. RAM (memory): 4 gigabytes (GB) or more. Note devices with fewer than 8 GB of RAM may be frustrating to use.
   v. Hard Disk Space (storage): 128 gigabytes (GB) or greater.
   vi. Graphics Card: Integrated graphics supporting DirectX 9 or later.
   vii. Screen Size: 14 inches or larger (recommended).
   viii. Ports: Consider the number of USB ports for any printers, devices, or scanners you will connect to your device.
   ix. All-New: Devices must not be refurbished to qualify for the grant.
   x. TPM: Windows 11 requires the presence of a Trusted Platform Module version 2.0. Any newly purchased Windows devices should meet this requirement.

3. How to Obtain IT Support

I. **Background**

a. It is important to ensure that all hardware and software are updated regularly to ensure security of IT equipment used for election-related functions. For jurisdictions without their own IT staff, engaging in managed IT services is an efficient way to stay up to date on technology, have access to advanced IT skills, and address issues related to cost, quality of service and risk. The proactive managed services model is superior to the reactive "call-when-something-breaks" model. Once you have a problem, the damage is already done.

b. Definitions:

i. Compliant Device: a device that meets baseline standards outlined in section 2.
ii. Managed Device: a device that is receiving managed IT service.
iii. Managed IT Service: ongoing IT support meeting the requirements outlined in section B. below.
iv. Managed Service Provider: a company offering managed service to customers; usually for a monthly fee.

II. **Managed Service Providers**. Municipalities may choose any managed service provider able to meet the required functions listed below in Section III. Municipalities can confer with other jurisdictions to get recommendations regarding these types of vendors. In addition, the State has many established contracts with hardware and software vendors. Those contracts and additional information are available at vendornet.wi.gov.

III. **Selecting a Managed Service Provider**.

a. Required Functions

i. Software Support and Maintenance. A provider must ensure the jurisdiction maintains current:

1. Patches / Firmware (no later than 30 days of release by vendor).
2. Antivirus software.
3. Anti-spam/anti-spyware software.
4. Web filtering software to protect against malicious websites
5. Operating Systems.

b. Communication. A Managed Service Provider must agree to send and receive timely communications as described below:

i. Notifying the WEC. Immediately notify the WEC in the event of any actual or suspected cyber security breaches affecting the clerk's office or election systems. Contact the Wisconsin Elections Commission Help Desk at elections@wi.gov or secureelections@wi.gov or call 608-261-2028.

c. Recommended Functions

i. Daily Data Backup and Recovery. Establishing a back-up rotation scheme and recovery testing for the jurisdiction.
ii. Authentication. The ability to manage digital certificates and set-up multifactor authentication.
iii. Network Monitoring and Security. Implementing best practices to prevent and monitor unauthorized access, misuse, modification, or denial of a computer network and network-accessible resources. Retention of login records is also recommended.

IV. Subgrant Funds paying for IT Support:
a. Municipalities may use $0-$2,000 of their subgrant funds on IT Support.

4. How to Check Your Windows Operating System

I. **Background**. As of **October 14, 2025**, Microsoft no longer provides security updates and support for the Windows 10 operating system. If you are still using Windows 10 after that time it will be at serious risk. Although Windows 10 device will continue to function, security vulnerabilities affecting the operating system will not be remedied, leaving affected computers susceptible to compromise.

II. **Identifying current operating system**. If you don't know what version of Windows you are using, an easy way to check would be checking the system information. Below are step-by-step instructions for Windows and Mac devices:

On Windows

1. Click the **Start** button.
2. Type **About your PC**.
3. Click **About your PC**.
4. Look for **Windows specifications**.
5. Your operating system will say something like **Windows 10** or **Windows 11**.

III. **Next Steps**. If you have a supported system, you don't need to do anything. If your computer is still running Windows 10, or any older version of Windows, you must act soon. There are several options available:

a. Purchase a New Computer. Recommended. Purchasing a new computer ensures you will have a capable Windows 11 system.

b. Upgrade the Old Computer to Windows 11. Recommended with reservations. Older computers may have difficulty running or installing an updated operating system.

IV. **Questions**. Contact the Help Desk at 608-261-2028 or e-mail elections@wi.gov.

5. Upgrading an Operating System

I. **Background**. Upgrading an Operating System (OS) is a task best left to advanced users or IT professionals. The inexperienced user could at best face a lengthy and frustrating process and at worst end up with an inoperable computer. Consider your skill level carefully before deciding to do it yourself.

II. **General Information**. Most clerks use a version of Microsoft Windows, so this section addresses only Windows upgrades. Those using any other OS should consult with a subject matter expert.

a. Preparing for Upgrade. Preparing for a new upgrade requires several steps.
    i. Research your software compatibility. Some older software may not work on Windows 11. For commercial software, you may need to pay for a replacement or upgrade. For line of business software, work with the organization that provides the software to ensure compatibility.
    ii. Verify current computer meets minimum requirements for new OS. If your computer does not meet all minimum requirements, you will not be able to install the new OS. If your computer only meets the minimum requirements, the performance of the new OS will likely not meet expectations.
    iii. Obtain the new OS.
    iv. Backup your computer. When you are installing a new operating system, there is a risk you will lose all the files on the computer unless you back them up. Always make sure that any important files are copied to a backup location before starting the installation process.

b. Making the Upgrade. Making the upgrade is a time-consuming process that takes patience. You will be required to first install a Setup program and then type in a long product key. The set-up program may reformat your hard drive, so don’t skip the backup step above.

c. After the Upgrade. Upon completion you will have to enter log in credentials and may be required to re-install software. You can also expect to spend some time downloading the latest updates to the OS you just installed. Finally, you may need to download and install new drivers for various devices.

III. **Conclusions**. Upgrading to a new OS can be a challenging experience even for advanced users. Therefore, the WEC strongly recommends obtaining the services of an IT professional to assist. Any computer technician, including technicians at businesses that sell computers, should be able to complete the upgrade.

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2026 Election Security Subgrant Compliance Standards

Appendix B

1. Background

A. Securing state information systems is critical. Wisconsin residents rely on the state, counties, and municipalities to deliver services reliably and safely. Cyber-attacks are a continuous threat to the delivery of those services. The state needs your help to protect state systems and residents' information.

B. Cyber threats commonly focus on the weakest link within systems, primarily the people using those systems. This document provides basic guidelines to reduce risks and ensure fundamental cybersecurity standards.

C. Terms Defined.

1. Compliant Device: a device that meets minimum security standards outlined in section II.A. below.

2. Managed Device: a device that is receiving managed IT service. Someone else (usually a private computer company) is managing the device security.

3. Managed IT Service: ongoing IT support meeting the requirements outlined in section II.B. below.

4. Managed Service Provider: a company offering managed service to customers; usually for a monthly fee.

2. Completion of a Contingency Plan

A.The WEC recommends that every municipality maintain an updated contingency plan in the event of an election security crisis, and the certification of a complete plan containing the below elements is a requirement for the subgrant program.

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1. The plan covers common contingencies including, but not limited to, evacuating a polling place, moving to a secondary polling place, and responding to physical threats
2. The plan names specific individuals that have responsibility for key actions
3. Individuals named in the plan have been notified of their responsibilities
4. The plan includes specific working contact information for all relevant parties, including but not limited to the local election official, law enforcement, building maintenance, and the principal contact at the secondary polling place
5. The plan has been reviewed by the local election official in this calendar year

B.To assist with this process, information about preparing a sample contingency plan can be found in Appendix A.

Baseline Security Standards for Access to and Use of State Elections Systems

3. Compliant Computer Hardware and Software that Meets the WisVote Policy Requirements.

A. Municipalities must use grant funds to meet this requirement before spending funds on any other need. The 2026 Election Security subgrant will allocate up to $2,000 maximum subgrant for the purchase of one device by the municipality. Compliant hardware and software must meet the following standards:

1. Computers using a currently supported operating system (OS).

a) Windows 11

b) MacOS 10.15 Catalina (or newer)

c) Consult with an IT professional or call the Elections Help Desk if you run another operating system (Linux, Chrome OS, etc.).

d) See Appendix A for information on how to check your Operating System.

2. Computers with current:

a) Patches / Firmware (no later than 30 days of release by vendor). Ensuring your operating system is up-to-date will generally take care of this requirement. For smaller municipalities, automatic updates will fulfill this requirement so long as they are not delayed or disabled.

b) Antivirus software.

c) Anti-spam and anti-spyware software.

d) Web filtering software to protect against malicious websites.

e)Merely possessing anti-malware software is not enough. You must download updates regularly to ensure your system is protected from the latest threats.

3. Computers owned or controlled by the municipality. While the WEC respects and permits remote work and work-from-home arrangements, municipalities must have **at least one device** that is under the municipality's legal control to meet this baseline standard. This allows a municipality to remain compliant in the event of staff turnover.

4. The WEC installs endpoint verification testing in WisVote to verify compliance upon login.

B. How to Achieve Compliance:

1. Purchase a Compliant Hardware Device. If a municipality does not have compliant hardware or software/operating system it must use the 2026 Election Security Subgrant funds to achieve compliance. Local municipality may use their funds to purchase a compliant hardware device from vendors on the state contract or from any other vendor or local retail store they choose. More information regarding the purchase of compliant devices is included in Appendix A.

2. Update Your Operating System to Windows 11. One option is to update the operating system on the computer currently used to access WisVote. For example, if the municipality is currently using the Windows 10 operating system, and the computer and software are otherwise compliant, subgrant funds may be requested to upgrade the operating system, including utilizing IT support to complete it. Additional information regarding updates to operating systems is included in Appendix A.

4. IT Support Capable of Maintaining Minimum Standards

A. Municipalities must certify that they are able to maintain their hardware and software in accordance with the policies above through 2028. This means that each municipality must either possess professional, full-time IT staff, or obtain managed support through a managed support provider. The IT support must agree to maintain current patches, firmware, anti-virus software, and web filtering software. IT support must also notify the WEC of any cybersecurity incidents involving the municipality's clerk or election systems. More information on these requirements is provided in Appendix A. The 2026 ES subgrant will allocate up to $2,000 maximum subgrant towards managed support costs that meet baseline standards. Municipalities must certify compliance by completing the WEC Security Subgrant Compliance Form (Appendix C), however the WEC will monitor the patch level of devices used to access WisVote. If a device is not in compliance with patching requirements, the WEC will follow up with the municipality to help achieve compliance. While the municipality is awaiting a patch, the user may be denied access to WisVote until the patch is complete.

B. *How to Achieve Compliance:*

1. Obtain a Managed Service Provider. A municipality may also use their 2026 ES subgrant funds to contract with a managed IT support provider to maintain minimum standards. The local election municipality will then need to certify that it has compliant IT support and provide the documentation detailing their support with their Election Security Subgrant Compliance Form (Appendix C). More information about choosing a support provider is included in Appendix A.

2. Possess in-house, shared, or contracted IT staff that provides all the services listed in Appendix A. The local election municipality will then need to certify that it has compliant IT support and provide the documentation detailing their support with their Election Security Subgrant Compliance Form (Appendix C).

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2026 Election Security Subgrant Compliance Form

Appendix C

Municipality: _____

County: _____

The municipality listed above certifies that it meets the criteria below.

BASELINE REQUIREMENTS.

1. **Plan:** We certify that we possess a complete and updated Election Day Contingency Plan containing the below required elements:

1. **Scenario-specific response procedures:** The plan covers common contingencies including, but not limited to, evacuating a polling place, moving to a secondary polling place, and responding to physical threats
2. **Individuals responsible for key actions:** The plan names specific individuals that have responsibility for key actions
3. **Roles and responsibilities known:** Individuals named in the plan have been notified of their responsibilities
4. **Communication protocols:** The plan includes specific working contact information for all relevant parties, including but not limited to the local election official, law enforcement, building maintenance, and the principal contact at the secondary polling place
5. **Annual Review:** The plan has been reviewed by the local election official in this calendar year

2. **Training:** We certify that our municipality has completed approved WEC supported Election Security Training.

3. **Computer:** We certify that our municipality has at least one municipality-owned computer used for performing election-related activities that meets the Baseline Security Standards for Hardware and Software (*See Appendix B*). If 2026 Election Security Subgrant Funds were used to purchase a compliant device, the purchase order, invoice, and/or receipt are attached as part of this submission. If 2026 Election Security Subgrant Funds were used to contribute towards upgrading a device's software to attain compliance, a receipt and/or brief description are attached as part of this submission.

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4. **Support:** We certify that our municipality either has a professional information technology staff member, has access to an IT contractor, or has access to a managed service provider that ensures we receive timely security updates and patches to our operating system and software (*see Appendices A and B*). If 2026 Election Security Subgrant Funds were used to contribute towards or procure IT support or managed IT services, a copy of the contract or service agreement is attached.

CURRENT STATUS.

Please certify your municipality's compliance to the following two statements then indicate the amounts used:

_____ We certify that our municipality is compliant with all four requirements listed above and described in the 2026 Election Security Subgrant.

_____ We certify that our municipality has applied to the purpose of increasing the security of federal elections all 2026 Election Security Subgrant funds awarded towards meeting those requirements, and/or the additionally authorized election security needs specified in the MOU, and/or are returning funds.

Our municipality used our 2026 Election Security Subgrant funds on:

Allowable Use	**Amount used**
Baseline Hardware/Software & Managed IT (Up to $2,000)	
Additional Election Security Expenses *(after baselines were met):* *(*$0-$2,000)	
1. Professional IT support for Badger Books	
2. Additional Security training (cyber or physical)	
3. *Limited* physical security improvements for election equipment	
Unspent Subgrant Funds being returned to WEC	
Total (Not to exceed $2,000):	

*** Itemized documentation for all subgrant funds expended are attached and retained. ***

CERTIFICATION.

By signing this report, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief that the report is true, complete, and accurate, the expenditures, disbursements and cash receipts were exclusively used for the purposes and objectives set forth in the terms and conditions of the award, our jurisdiction will maintain for eight years all documentation of purchases made using subgrant funds, and that we will return all unspent subgrant funds. I am aware that any false, fictitious, or fraudulent information, or the omission of any material fact, may subject me to criminal, civil or administrative penalties for fraud, false statements, false claims or otherwise. (U.S. Code Title 18, Section 1001 and Title 31, Sections 3729–3730 and 3801–3812).

Signature _____ **Date**: _____

(Authorized Representative of Municipality)

Printed Name _____

(Authorized Representative of Municipality)

Jurisdiction Contact Phone Number: _____

Jurisdiction Contact E-Mail Address: _____

Submit completed form by January 15, 2027 to:

Wisconsin Elections Commission
201 West Washington Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 7984
Madison, WI 53707-7984
elections@wi.gov
Fax: 608-267-0500

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DATE: May 7, 2026

TO: Members, Wisconsin Elections Commission

FROM: Emilee Miklas – Public Information Officer

SUBJECT: Voter Registration Outreach Efforts Following Approved Exception to ERIC Eligible But Unregistered (EBU) Mailers

1. Summary.

This memo relates to the ongoing work of agency staff to launch a public outreach campaign this fall as an alternative to the Eligible but Unregistered (EBU) mailer required by Wisconsin's membership in the Electronic Registration Information Center, also known as ERIC.

Staff welcomes input Commissioners may have about the campaign. Any feedback provided would be shared with the vendor, Vendi, a full-service advertising firm based in La Crosse that staff worked with on a similar project in 2024. Vendi maintains an existing state contract that WEC can use to expedite the project's launch.

The ERIC membership agreement allows states to request an exemption from the EBU requirement, if they can prove that they could provide other ways to effectively encourage voter registration.

The WEC's ERIC EBU exemption allows the agency to accomplish important goals, such as using the funds to conduct more effective voter outreach and educating Wisconsin voters on opportunities to register to vote.

Commission members approved staff's request to seek an exemption, and the ERIC board approved the WEC's exemption from the EBU mailer in 2024.

Available funds through the exemption provide an $82,000 budget for the project. In 2024, the WEC spent $59,863 on the Fall EBU Public Outreach Campaign. This proposal builds on the campaign that WEC developed to fulfill the EBU requirements in 2024, by utilizing the same "evergreen" creative media products developed in 2024 and allowing WEC to instead invest in the promotion of the materials to a larger audience, rather than spending funds to develop an entirely new campaign.

2. Status of Campaign.

In recent weeks, WEC staff have had conversations with Vendi on expanding voter outreach efforts this year compared to the 2024 project. We believe an expanded media budget will help accomplish that goal by incorporating new ad formats such as video reels and social media ads. That's in addition to leveraging similar themes from the Fall EBU 2024 Public Outreach Campaign, such as programmatic display ads that allow for precise targeting of Wisconsin voters across web and apps, and radio spots.

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The project is not designed to registered voters; rather, it provides Wisconsinites with the accurate information required to navigate the registration and voting process confidently.

WEC staff have emphasized to Vendi that all messaging must be nonpartisan and fair towards individuals of all political beliefs. The purpose of the ERIC EBU mailer was to ensure that any eligible Wisconsin voter receives information about registration opportunities. In 2024, the Commission also emphasized consistency. These proposals incorporate those principals to provide official, voter registration information as broadly as possible throughout Wisconsin.

Following conversations with Vendi, we have two proposals to choose from. Proposal 1 primarily focuses on using Vendi's creative services to create new video reels, :15 to :30 second spots, in addition to graphics, displays, and radio spots. Proposal 2 centers on leveraging the same themes from the 2024 campaign by adding one or two new graphics and display ads, in addition to radio spots. Both proposals would use Meta geotagging, which means targeting voters 18+ on social media platforms (YouTube, Facebook and Instagram). Geotagging was not used during the 2024 campaign.

Proposal 1: Estimated agency fees are $27,500, estimated media fees are $53,000, and production expenses $500* for a total of $81,000.

Proposal 2: Estimated agency fees are $20,050, estimate media fees are $53,900, and production expenses $50* for a total of $74,000.

**Media expenses are billed at cost. Vendi does not mark up outside expenses or take a commission.*

Vendi will provide marketing and advertising strategy, creative development, and campaign execution for the WEC's marketing campaign.

3. Scope of Work.

Vendi will leverage a combination of traditional and digital media channels to reach a broad audience of varying demographics. The media mix may include a combination of the following channels:

- Programmatic ads (display and/or online video):
    - Geotarget all Wisconsin zip codes across local news sites, weather apps and content networks
    - Run banner display and/or 15-second pre-roll video
    - Programmatic allows you to reach rural Wisconsin efficiently where broadcast CPMs (cost per thousand impressions) are high and coverage is uneven.
- Social Media
    - Use carousel images and/or video formats highlighting specific voter resources
    - Geo-target statewide with demographic filters for 18+
- Radio Ads
    - Leveraging the Public Education Program through the Wisconsin Broadcasters Association
    - Includes AM and FM radio stations
    - Provides coverage to all 72 counties

- PSA's – Public Service Advertising Program
    - Leveraging the Public Services Advertising Program thought the Outdoor Advertising Association of Wisconsin

More details on each proposal are available at the end of this document.

4. Overview.

Both proposals offer related but distinct options that will be highly effective pathways for voter outreach. WEC staff are confident both are winning options, with an emphasis on how the more cost-effective alternative aims to outperform previous years' reach.

To summarize, Proposal 1 is the "gold standard" as video allows for more placement options (e.g., Meta reels, YouTube pre-roll) and it tends to get better engagement, serves up more frequently and reaches more people.

Proposal 2 is the "the high-efficiency digital alternative" that prioritizes digital platform and automated optimization over higher production costs. Digital offers the best (CPMs) cost-per-thousand-impressions and cost-per-click efficiency.

Separate from the WEC's work with Vendi, the Public Information Office staff are exploring the possibility of compiling an elections toolkit. This would provide interested members of the public, voter advocacy groups, along with other partner intuitions and their members, a toolkit containing graphics, flyers, templated social media posts, fact sheets and other resources related to the voting process. The goal would be to share these materials across their networks.

5. Recommended Motion.

The Commission approves the expenditure of the ERIC EBU funds to fulfill the membership requirements by pursuing the public education proposal as outlined.



WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

MYVOTE.WI.GOV

2026 Campaign Proposal 1

April 14, 2026

Overview
The Wisconsin Elections Commission would like to raise general awareness for the MyVote.wi.gov website as the official resource for Wisconsin voters and drive visitors (adults 18+) to the site for resources they need to participate in the upcoming November general election, including:

- Check your registration
- Register online
- Learn who your local clerk is
- Find your local polling location
- Learn what's on your ballot
- Learn how to vote absentee
- And more

Scope of work
Vendi will develop a media strategy and detailed plan to address WEC's goals and budget requirements. A few realities will shape this plan:

- Every dollar must work hard. Digital offers the best cost-per-thousand-impressions and cost-per-click efficiency and allows for real-time optimization. Traditional media adds reach and credibility that social media alone cannot provide — important for a voter information campaign.
- Wisconsin's media landscape is fragmented. With five major DMAs plus a significant rural population, no single channel covers everyone efficiently.
- November general election timing means voter interest peaks in the final 3–4 weeks before Election Day. Flighting should concentrate there while building awareness earlier (up to 6 weeks prior).
- Campaigns perform best with a clear call to action. "Visit MyVote.wi.gov" is specific and measurable — digital channels that drive direct clicks will therefore be prioritized.

Our plan will leverage a combination of traditional and digital media channels to reach a broad audience of varying demographics. The media mix may include a combination of the following channels:

- Programmatic ads (display and online video)
    - Geotarget all Wisconsin zip codes across local news sites, weather apps and content networks
    - Run both banner display and 15-second pre-roll video
    - Programmatic allows you to reach rural Wisconsin efficiently where broadcast CPMs are high and coverage is uneven
- Social media
    - Facebook remains the dominant platform for adults 35–65 in Wisconsin, and Instagram extends reach to 18–34
    - Use carousel and video formats highlighting specific voter resources

    - Geo-target Wisconsin statewide with demographic filters for 18+
- Terrestrial radio - leverage the Public Education Program through the Wisconsin Broadcasters Association
    - Available to non-profit and government clients
    - Includes AM and FM radio stations ○ Coverage in all 72 Wisconsin counties (representing a 93% reach)
- Out-of-home - leverage the Public Service Advertising Program through the Outdoor Advertising Association of Wisconsin
- Paid search - Although organic search rankings are strong for the MyVote.wi.gov website, we will monitor whether misinformation sites are running paid search ads against your key terms closer to the election. Voter information campaigns are sometimes targets for misleading paid ads, so reserving a small contingency budget for a defensive paid search campaign to protect the top ad position could be worth activating and if it is not needed, can be swiftly re-allocated to the display or social campaign (whichever is performing the strongest).

Media services
Vendi will provide the following services:

- Strategic marketing and media consulting
- Media strategy and a detailed media plan
- Negotiate, buy and place all media
- Build digital campaign(s)
- Collaborate with WEC staff to implement campaign tracking
- Ad trafficking
- Real-time dashboard with 24/7 access to campaign results
- Digital media management for the duration of the campaign (up to 6 weeks)
- Media budget tracking and invoice processing
- Campaign summary report

Agency services: $10,500

Media expenses: $53,000

Creative services

The campaign will leverage the same theme as the Fall 2024 MyVote campaign. However, with additional media budget the expanded media plan will require additional ad formats such as video (:15 pre-roll, vertical video) and social ads (carousel and reels). WEC would also like to develop another execution to minimize ad fatigue and ensure our message cuts through the clutter. Vendi will provide creative strategy and direction, copywriting, design and project management services for the development of the creative assets required to execute the plan. Deliverables include:

- Design concepts for another execution (featuring a deer or bee)
- Develop new ad creative based on approved concept
  - Social ads (single image, carousel and reels) :15 or :20 digital animated/motion ad
  - Produce all ads per platform specs and deliver final files



Agency services: $17,000

Outside production expenses: $500 (image, music and/or VO licensing)

Total budget: $81,000

This estimate includes outside expenses for the purchase of stock images/footage, music and/or talent licensing. If additional outside expenses are required, Vendi will provide an estimate and if approved, will bill the expense at cost. Vendi does not mark up outside expenses or take a media commission.



WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

MYVOTE.WI.GOV

2026 Campaign Proposal 2

April 22, 2026

Overview

The Wisconsin Elections Commission would like to raise general awareness for the MyVote.wi.gov website as the official resource for Wisconsin voters and drive visitors (adults 18+) to the site for resources they need to participate in the upcoming November general election, including:

- Check your registration
- Register online
- Learn who your local clerk is
- Find your local polling location
- Learn what's on your ballot
- Learn how to vote absentee
- And more

Scope of work

Vendi will develop a media strategy and detailed plan to address WEC's goals and budget requirements. A few realities will shape this plan:

- Every dollar must work hard. Digital offers the best cost-per-thousand-impressions and cost-per-click efficiency and allows for real-time optimization. Traditional media adds reach and credibility that social media alone cannot provide — important for a voter information campaign.
- Wisconsin's media landscape is fragmented. With five major DMAs plus a significant rural population, no single channel covers everyone efficiently.
- November general election timing means voter interest peaks in the final 3–4 weeks before Election Day. Flighting should concentrate there while building awareness earlier (up to 6 weeks prior).
- Campaigns perform best with a clear call to action. "Visit MyVote.wi.gov" is specific and measurable — digital channels that drive direct clicks will therefore be prioritized.

Our plan will leverage a combination of traditional and digital media channels to reach a broad audience of varying demographics. The media mix may include a combination of the following channels:

- Programmatic ads (display)
    - Geotarget all Wisconsin zip codes across local news sites, weather apps and content networks
    - Run banner display ads
    - Programmatic allows you to reach rural Wisconsin efficiently where broadcast CPMs are high and coverage is uneven
- Social media
    - Facebook remains the dominant platform for adults 35–65 in Wisconsin, and Instagram extends reach to 18–34

    - Use carousel and single image ad formats highlighting specific voter resources
    - Geo-target Wisconsin statewide with demographic filters for 18+
- Terrestrial radio - leverage the Public Education Program through the Wisconsin Broadcasters Association
    - Available to non-profit and government clients ○ Includes AM and FM radio stations
    - Coverage in all 72 Wisconsin counties (representing a 93% reach) ○ Pick up the existing radio spot
- Out-of-home - leverage the Public Service Advertising Program through the Outdoor Advertising Association of Wisconsin

Media services
Vendi will provide the following services:

- Strategic marketing and media consulting
- Media strategy and a detailed media plan
- Negotiate, buy and place all media
- Build digital campaign(s)
- Collaborate with WEC staff to implement campaign tracking
- Ad trafficking
- Real-time dashboard with 24/7 access to campaign results
- Digital media management for the duration of the campaign (up to 6 weeks)
- Media budget tracking and invoice processing
- Campaign summary report

Agency services: $10,500

Media expenses: $53,900

Creative services

The campaign will leverage the same theme as the Fall 2024 MyVote campaign. However, with additional media budget the expanded media plan will require additional social ads (single image and carousel). WEC would also like to develop another execution to minimize ad fatigue and ensure our message cuts through the clutter. Vendi will provide creative strategy and direction, copywriting, design and project management services for the development of the creative assets required to execute the plan. Deliverables include:

- Design concepts for another execution (featuring a deer or bee)
- Develop new ad creative based on approved concept of Social ads (single image and carousel)
- Produce all ads per platform specs and deliver final files



Agency services: $9,550

Outside production expenses: $50 (image, music and/or VO licensing)

Total budget: $74,000

This estimate includes outside expenses for the purchase of stock images. If additional outside expenses are required, Vendi will provide an estimate and if approved, will bill the expense at cost. Vendi does not mark up outside expenses or take a media commission.

Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

DATE: For the May 7, 2026, Commission Meeting

TO: Members, Wisconsin Elections Commission

FROM: WEC Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: Scope Statement Review and Initial Approval for 2026-2027 Rulemaking

ATTACHMENT: **Attachment A** – Scope Statement for EL 20 (Revised Complaint Procedures)

Attachment B – Scope Statement for EL 2.09/2.11 (Election Petition Standards)

Attachment C – Scope Statement for EL 3 (Voter Registration Topics)

Introduction

On March 25, 2025, the Wisconsin Elections Commission ("the Commission") voted to authorize new permanent rulemaking topics, with an emphasis first on a permanent rule to revise the Commission's administrative complaint procedures. Commission staff have completed that scope statement, as well as two others, for the Commission's initial consideration. If the Commission approves the scope statements in **Attachments A – C** at this meeting, staff will submit them to the Department of Administration and Governor Evers for approval. Staff will then continue on with the permanent rulemaking steps until the Commission's next approval stage.

Rulemaking Topics

The scope statements presented for the Commission's initial review and approval cover the following topics, all of which were explained at the March 25 meeting.

Attachment	Admin Code Provision	Topic
A	Chapter EL 20 (Revised)	Revised Administrative Complaint Procedures
B	EL 2.09 / 2.11 (Revised)	Treatment and Sufficiency of Election Petitions
C	Chapter EL 3 (Revised)	Various Voter Registration Topics

Discussion – Chapter EL 20 (Administrative Complaint Procedures)

Summary of Scope

The Commission decides three different types of administrative complaints: (1) 5.05 complaints that cover criminal violations of Chapter 12, (2) 5.06 complaints that cover election official actions contrary to law or in abuse of their discretion, and (3) 5.061 complaints that cover Help America Vote Act (HAVA) violations. Current administrative code only governs one of the three complaint types today—the 5.06 administrative complaint—and it has never addressed 5.061 HAVA complaints. The proposed rule will provide procedures, address issues, and answer questions common and specific to the three complaint types.

Wisconsin Elections Commissioners
Ann S. Jacobs, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Don M. Millis | Carrie Riepl | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen

Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

Additional details regarding the new policies proposed to be included in the administrative rule can be found in Section B of the scope statement included as **Attachment A**.

Rulemaking Authority

The Commission would initiate this permanent rulemaking under its general authority to promulgate rules for the purpose of implementing the laws ensuring the proper administration of the laws relating to elections. Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1). The Commission also has rulemaking authority under the general authority granted to all agencies to interpret provisions of statute that the agency administers. Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a).

Discussion – EL 2.09 / 2.11 – Treatment and Sufficiency of Election Petitions

Summary of Scope

The Commission recently repealed and recreated existing administrative code provisions covering the treatment and sufficiency of, and challenges to, nomination papers. Wis. Admin. Code §§ EL 2.05, 2.07. It also created new provisions covering the treatment and sufficiency of, and challenges to, declarations of candidacy. Wis. Admin. Code §§ EL 2.06, 2.08. There are two remaining provisions of Chapter 2 that were not covered in that rulemaking, and they cover the treatment and sufficiency of, and challenges to, election petitions. Wis. Admin. Code §§ 2.09, 2.11. The proposed rule in this scope statement would revise §§ 2.09 and 2.11 to be consistent with §§ 2.05, 2.06, 2.07, and 2.08, and would also create new provisions to the extent any are needed for questions and issues specific to election petitions.

Election petitions are governed by Wis. Stat. § 8.40, and include recall petitions, referendum petitions, petitions for political party ballot status, petitions to adopt a nonpartisan primary in towns and villages, petitions for a spring primary in cities and villages, and petitions to participate in the presidential preference vote for candidates not selected by their party's committee. Wis. Stat. §§ 9.10(2), 9.20(2), 5.62(2)(a), 8.05(3)(d), 8.11(1)(c), 8.11(1m)(c), 8.12(1)(c).

Additional details regarding the new policies proposed to be included in the administrative rule can be found in Section B of the scope statement included as **Attachment B**.

Rulemaking Authority

The Commission has specific statutory authority to prescribe rules relating to the sufficiency of, and challenges to, election petitions. Wis. Stat. § 8.40(3). In addition, the Commission would promulgate the rule under its general statutory rulemaking authority, as well as its ability to generally promulgate rules as an agency. Wis. Stat. §§ 5.05(1), 227.11(2)(a).

Discussion – Chapter EL 3 – Various Voter Residency Topics

Summary of Scope

EL 3.04 – Amend: Requiring provision of certain information by election-day voter registration applicants

There are only two circumstances under which voters may cast provisional ballots. The first is if they cannot present acceptable proof of photo identification, and the second is if they do not have (or know) their driver's license number when registering to vote at the polling place. For the latter, current § EL 3.04(2) sets a different deadline by which those types of voters can rehabilitate their provisional ballots for them to be counted—4 p.m. the day following the election. The deadline for provisional voters who didn't have acceptable photo I.D. is 4 p.m. the Friday following the election (or by noon in a presidential election). Wis. Stat. § 6.97(3)(b), as

amended by 2025 WI Act 214. The proposed rule would amend the deadline in § EL 3.04(2) to make it consistent with the statutory deadline in § 6.97(3)(b), and would provide uniformity between the two processes.

EL 3.05 – Create: Maintaining electronically entered registration records

Wis. Stat. § 6.35(2) requires the Commission to promulgate a rule to prescribe the procedure and methods by which municipal clerks and board of election commissioners maintain records for voters who complete online registrations. Electronically entered registration records are already maintained through the statewide voter registration system. The proposed rule would confirm that clerks should be using the SVRS to maintain these registration records.

EL 3.01(15), EL 3.10, EL 3.11, EL 3.12, EL 3.13, and EL 3.20(3) – Rescind: Special Registration Deputies

Special registration deputies were eliminated from Wisconsin law in 2017 by 2015 Wisconsin Act 251. This proposed administrative rule would rescind the existing provisions of administrative code that pertain to special registration deputies. Wis. Admin. Code §§ EL 3.01(15), EL 3.10, EL 3.11, EL 3.12, EL 3.13, and EL 3.20(3).

EL 3.20(1) – Amend: Voter registration drives

EL 3.20 currently permits for voter registration drives, whereby individuals or groups can hold events or gatherings to assist voters with completing voter registration paperwork. The proposed rule would amend EL 3.20(1) to add missing information about how these third parties should turn in the completed EL-131s and proof of residence to the municipal clerk. The proposed rule also would to clarify that third parties cannot verify proof of residence and can only assist the voter with the completion of EL-131.

EL 3.06: Create: Proof of residence requirements for certain transitory voters

Transitory voters—meaning voters who are unhoused, who live in mobile homes or their cars, or have similar transitory residences—often have difficulty providing sufficient proof of residence for the purpose of voter registration, even though they have lived in their jurisdictions for more than 28 days and are otherwise eligible to vote. To register to vote, a voter must produce one of the 13 different types of proof of residence that are specifically enumerated by statute. Wis. Stat. § 6.34(3)(a). The proposed rule would incorporate and codify existing case law on the topic of transitory voters, and provide more specific clarity about how these voters can satisfy the proof of residence statutory requirement.

Rulemaking Authority

For the proposed rule to create EL 3.05, the Commission has specific rulemaking authority under Wis. Stat. § 6.35(2). In addition, the Commission would promulgate the rule under its general statutory rulemaking authority, as well as its ability to generally promulgate rules as an agency. Wis. Stat. §§ 5.05(1), 227.11(2)(a).

Additional details regarding the new policies proposed to be included in the administrative rule can be found in Section B of the scope statement included as **Attachment C**.

***

Recommended Motion: The Wisconsin Elections Commission authorizes staff to submit the statements of scope, included in **Attachments A – C**, to the Department of Administration and Office of Governor Evers for approval. Staff are directed to proceed with all necessary rulemaking processes preceding the next necessary review or approval from the Commission.

STATEMENT OF SCOPE
PURSUANT TO WIS. STAT. § 227.24
WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

Rule No.: Wis. Admin. Code EL Chapter 20

Relating to: Administrative Complaint Procedures

Rule Type: Permanent Rule pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.11

RULE ANALYSIS
Pursuant to § 227.135(1):

a) A description of the objective of the proposed rule.

The Commission decides three different types of administrative complaints: (1) 5.05 complaints that cover criminal violations of Chapter 12, (2) 5.06 complaints that cover election official actions contrary to law or in abuse of their discretion, and (3) 5.061 complaints that cover Help America Vote Act (HAVA) violations. Current administrative code only governs one of the three complaint types today—the 5.06 administrative complaint—and it has never addressed 5.061 HAVA complaints. The proposed rule will provide procedures, address issues, and answer questions common and specific to the three complaint types.

b) Description of the existing policies relevant to the rule, new policies proposed to be included in the rule, and an analysis of policy alternatives.

Section 5.06 and its related administrative code, Chapter EL 20, provide procedures that parties and the Commission use to navigate 5.06 complaints. Administrative complaints are brought under Wis. Stat. § 5.06 when an elector alleges that an election official in their jurisdiction took action that was contrary to law or otherwise abused their discretion. In contrast, §§ 5.05 and 5.061 provide little guidance for their respective criminal and HAVA complaints, and no administrative code provides additional procedures for these complaint processes.

In recent years, the Commission has addressed several procedural questions surrounding all types of administrative complaints, none of which could be answered under the existing rule. This includes, but is not limited to, handling late-filed documents and whether there should be a penalty, confirming that complaint materials can be filed by email, and what presumptions should exist when a Respondent fails to respond to the allegations in full or in part. The proposed rule would reconsider and revise the current rule to govern all three complaint types. To the extent possible, the new rule would borrow procedures from the § 5.06 process for 5.05 and 5.061 complaints. The proposed rule would also address common issues and procedural questions surrounding the three types of complaint. Finally, the rule would have dedicated sections specific to each complaint type.

In addition to the general principles that would apply to all complaint types, the proposed rule would update the existing rule to remove outdated and unnecessary details and add content specific to 5.06

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complaints. This would include language about conducting investigations, including, but not limited to, removing or updating provisions of the rule that were declared unlawful by *Pellegrini II*.

For criminal complaints, there is currently no administrative process in place beyond the text of Wis. Stat. § 5.05. Chapter EL 20 used to govern 5.05 complaints, but the Legislature superseded it with Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m). In addition to the general principles that would apply to all complaint types, the proposed rule would cover some questions specific to 5.05 complaints. This would include, but is not limited to, language about whether a response—and not just the complaint—must be notarized or include an unsworn declaration, standards for what makes a complaint frivolous, procedures for imposing sanctions for frivolous complaints, and clarifying that the Commission can exercise its discretion to dismiss a matter.

Similarly, there is currently no administrative process in place for HAVA complaint procedure beyond the text of Wis. Stat. § 5.061. In the past, the Commission has borrowed § 5.06 procedures when working with HAVA complaints. In addition to the general principles that would apply to all complaint types, the proposed rule would create a dedicated, separate process for HAVA complaints that would include any procedures required by HAVA.

The alternative would be to not promulgate this rule, leaving the Commission without clear or updated procedures in place for each type of complaint for the Commission and complainant parties to rely on. The Commission would continue to navigate 5.05 and 5.061 complaints under non-governing rules, whilst navigating 5.06 complaints under the governing, but now uncomprehensive, rule.

c) Detailed explanation of statutory authority for the rule (including the statutory citation and language).

General Authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1): "General authority. The elections commission shall have the responsibility for the administration of chs. 5 to 10 and 12 and other laws relating to elections and election campaigns, other than laws relating to campaign financing. Pursuant to such responsibility, the commission may:

> - (f) Promulgate rules under ch. 227 applicable to all jurisdictions for the purpose of interpreting or implementing the laws regulating the conduct of elections or election campaigns, other than laws regulating campaign financing, or ensuring their proper administration."

Agency Rulemaking Authority pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 227.11(2)(a): "Agency rulemaking authority. Each agency may promulgate rules interpreting the provisions of any statute enforced or administered by the agency, if the agency considers it necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute, but a rule is not valid if the rule exceeds the bounds of correct interpretation."

d) An estimate of the amount of time agency employees will spend developing the proposed rule and of other resources needed to develop the rule.

WEC staff estimates that it would take approximately 100 staff hours to draft a scope statement and carry out the subsequent steps to promulgate an administrative rule.

e) A description of all of the entities that may be affected by the proposed rule.

Because it would govern complaint procedures, the proposed rule would primarily affect the Commission. Active or potential parties to complaints (including election officials) may also be affected to the extent that

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
the procedures would be updated to reflect current law, more complete, more navigable, and more predictable.

f) A summary and preliminary comparison of any existing or proposed federal regulation that addresses or is intended to address the activities to be regulated by the proposed rule.

As of April 15, 2026, there are no known existing or proposed federal regulations that address a state's HAVA complaint procedures. This question is otherwise not applicable to Wisconsin's 5.05 and 5.06 complaint procedures.

Agency Contact Person:

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Meagan Wolfe
Administrator, Wisconsin Elections Commission
May 8, 2026
Date Submitted

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STATEMENT OF SCOPE
PURSUANT TO WIS. STAT. § 227.24
WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

Rule No.: Wis. Adm. Code EL Chapter §§ 2.09; 2.11

Relating to: Treatment and Sufficiency of and Challenges to Election Petitions

Rule Type: Permanent Rule pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)

RULE ANALYSIS
Pursuant to § 227.135(1):

a) A description of the objective of the proposed rule.

The Wisconsin Elections Commission recently repealed and recreated existing administrative code provisions covering the treatment and sufficiency of, and challenges to, nomination papers. Wis. Admin. Code §§ EL 2.05, 2.07. It also created new provisions covering the treatment and sufficiency of, and challenges to, declarations of candidacy. Wis. Admin. Code §§ EL 2.06, 2.08. There are two remaining provisions of Chapter 2 that were not covered in that rulemaking, and they cover the treatment and sufficiency of, and challenges to, election petitions. Wis. Admin. Code §§ 2.09, 2.11. The proposed rule in this scope statement would revise §§ 2.09 and 2.11 to be consistent with §§ 2.05, 2.06, 2.07, and 2.08, and would also create new provisions to the extent any are needed for questions and issues specific to election petitions.

Election petitions are governed by Wis. Stat. § 8.40, and include recall petitions, referendum petitions, petitions for political party ballot status, petitions to adopt a nonpartisan primary in towns and villages, petitions for a spring primary in cities and villages, and petitions to participate in the presidential preference vote for candidates not selected by their party's committee. Wis. Stat. §§ 9.10(2), 9.20(2), 5.62(2)(a), 8.05(3)(d), 8.11(1)(c), 8.11(1m)(c), 8.12(1)(c).

b) Description of the existing policies relevant to the rule, new policies proposed to be included in the rule, and an analysis of policy alternatives.

Election petitions must follow the statutory standards of Wis. Stat. § 8.40, as well as additional standards set by the Commission by administrative rule. Recall and referenda petitions are the most common types. There are specific standards for recall petitions in the state, especially regarding timing. Wis. Stat. § 9.10. There are deadlines for the petitioner to gather enough signatures, for the official to file a challenge, for the petitioner to file a rebuttal to the challenge, and for the official to then file a reply. *Id.* There are specific standards for the filing of a direct legislation (referenda) petition as well, including an array of deadline requirements. Wis. Stat § 9.20. As of today, EL 2.09 and 2.11 govern these two types of petitions along with challenges to them. Wis. Admin. Code §§ 2.09, 2.11. These two sections cross-reference EL 2.05 and 2.07 which discuss the requirements for nomination papers and challenges to them. *Id.*

The primary purpose of the proposed rulemaking is to bring §§ 2.09 and 2.11 into full alignment with the other recently-revised provisions of Chapter EL 2. The secondary purpose is to address any considerations specific to election petitions. For example, the "header" requirements of an election petition differ from those of nomination papers, and the revisions to § 2.09 would reflect those differences. Likewise, the proposed rule can better address timing issues of when signatures can be collected, including whether Wis. Stat. § 990.001(4) applies. Finally, the timing of recall and referenda petitions is important, and § 2.11 will have challenge deadlines that align with and account for those deadlines.

The alternative would be to not promulgate this rule, leaving the Commission and local filing officers in the difficult position of using the current EL Chapter 2 to administer challenges that concern the requirements of election petitions and challenges while using the requirements of nomination papers. Election petitions require different deadlines and the decision to leave the rule as is may lead to broad confusion amongst filing officers across the state.

c) Detailed explanation of statutory authority for the rule (including the statutory citation and language).

Specific authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 8.40(3): "The commission shall, by rule, prescribe standards consistent with this chapter and s. 9.10(2) to be used by all election officials and governing bodies in determining the validity of petitions for elections and signatures thereon."

General Authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1): "General authority. The elections commission shall have the responsibility for the administration of chs. 5 to 10 and 12 and other laws relating to elections and election campaigns, other than laws relating to campaign financing. Pursuant to such responsibility, the commission may:

- (f) Promulgate rules under ch. 227 applicable to all jurisdictions for the purpose of interpreting or implementing the laws regulating the conduct of elections or election campaigns, other than laws regulating campaign financing, or ensuring their proper administration."

Agency Rulemaking Authority pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 227.11(2)(a): "Agency rulemaking authority. Each agency may promulgate rules interpreting the provisions of any statute enforced or administered by the agency, if the agency considers it necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute, but a rule is not valid if the rule exceeds the bounds of correct interpretation."

d) An estimate of the amount of time agency employees will spend developing the proposed rule and of other resources needed to develop the rule.

WEC staff estimates that it would take approximately 50 staff hours to draft a scope statement and carry out the subsequent steps to promulgate an administrative rule.

e) A description of all of the entities that may be affected by the proposed rule.

This would affect clerks, election officials who are the subject of a recall, petition circulators, individuals filing the petition, and the general public. The effect of the proposed rule, and subsequent processes, would have little to no impact on small businesses. The proposed rule should minimize the risk of confusion when deciding whether to grant a petition based on set deadlines.

f) A summary and preliminary comparison of any existing or proposed federal regulation that addresses or is intended to address the activities to be regulated by the proposed rule.

N/A

Agency Contact Person:

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Meagan Wolfe
Administrator, Wisconsin Elections Commission
May 8, 2026
Date Submitted

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STATEMENT OF SCOPE
PURSUANT TO WIS. STAT. § 227.24
WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

Rule No.: Wis. Adm. Code EL §§ 3.04, 3.05, 3.01(15), 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.20(3), 3.20(1), 3.06

Relating to: Voter registration

Rule Type: Permanent Rule pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)

RULE ANALYSIS
Pursuant to § 227.135(1):

a) A description of the objective of the proposed rule.

The proposed rulemaking would make a series of changes to EL Chapter 3, all relating to specific voter registration topics.

EL 3.04 – Amend: Requiring provision of certain information by election-day voter registration applicants

There are only two circumstances under which voters may cast provisional ballots. The first is if they cannot present acceptable proof of photo identification, and the second is if they do not have (or know) their driver's license number when registering to vote at the polling place. For the latter, current § EL 3.04(2) sets a different deadline by which those types of voters can rehabilitate their provisional ballots for them to be counted—4 p.m. the day following the election. The deadline for provisional voters who didn't have acceptable photo I.D. is 4 p.m. the Friday following the election (or by noon in a presidential election). Wis. Stat. § 6.97(3)(b), as amended by 2025 WI Act 214. The proposed rule would amend the deadline in § EL 3.04(2) to make it consistent with the statutory deadline in § 6.97(3)(b), and would provide uniformity between the two processes.

EL 3.05 – Create: Maintaining electronically entered registration records

Wis. Stat. § 6.35(2) requires the Commission to promulgate a rule to prescribe the procedure and methods by which municipal clerks and board of election commissioners maintain records for voters who complete online registrations. Electronically entered registration records are already maintained through the statewide voter registration system. The proposed rule would confirm that clerks should be using the SVRS to maintain these registration records.

EL 3.01(15), EL 3.10, EL 3.11, EL 3.12, EL 3.13, and EL 3.20(3) – Rescind: Special Registration Deputies

Special registration deputies were eliminated from Wisconsin law in 2017 by 2015 Wisconsin Act 251. This proposed administrative rule would rescind the existing provisions of administrative code that pertain to special registration deputies. Wis. Admin. Code §§ EL 3.01(15), EL 3.10, EL 3.11, EL 3.12, EL 3.13, and EL 3.20(3).

EL 3.20(1) – Amend: Voter registration drives

EL 3.20 currently permits for voter registration drives, whereby individuals or groups can hold events or gatherings to assist voters with completing voter registration paperwork. The proposed rule would amend

EL 3.20(1) to add missing information about how these third parties should turn in the completed EL-131s and proof of residence to the municipal clerk. The proposed rule also would to clarify that third parties cannot verify proof of residence and can only assist the voter with the completion of EL-131.

EL 3.06: Create: Proof of residence requirements for certain transitory voters

Transitory voters—meaning voters who are unhoused, who live in mobile homes or their cars, or have similar transitory residences—often have difficulty providing sufficient proof of residence for the purpose of voter registration, even though they have lived in their jurisdictions for more than 28 days and are otherwise eligible to vote. To register to vote, a voter must produce one of the 13 different types of proof of residence that are specifically enumerated by statute. Wis. Stat. § 6.34(3)(a). The proposed rule would incorporate and codify existing case law on the topic of transitory voters, and provide more specific clarity about how these voters can satisfy the proof of residence statutory requirement.

b) Description of the existing policies relevant to the rule, new policies proposed to be included in the rule, and an analysis of policy alternatives.

EL 3.04 – Amend: Requiring provision of certain information by election-day voter registration applicants

Section 6.97(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes states that an elector who fails to provide proof of identification bears the burden of correcting the omission no later than 4 p.m. on the Friday after the election (or by noon in a presidential year starting in 2028). EL 3.04 lays out the timeline for the correction process for failure to provide a driver's license number, but the current rule only allows the elector to cure this omission until 4 p.m. the day after the election for the provisional ballot to be counted. The proposed rule would amend EL 3.04 and make the Code match Wis. Stat. § 6.97(2) and provide uniformity that would help electors successfully cure the omission of their driver's license number and allow them to successfully have their provisional ballot counted. It would also limit the possibility of clerk error by creating one uniform timeline for the acceptance of information to count a provisional ballot. The alternative would be to not promulgate this rule, which would leave in place the issues with having two different dates to cure a ballot depending on the circumstances creating the need for a provisional ballot.

EL 3.05 – Create: Maintaining electronically entered registration records

Wis. Stat. § 6.35(2) requires the Commission to create a rule to establish procedures for the maintenance of online voter registration records. The promulgation of EL 3.05 would put the Commission into compliance with that statutory mandate as no rule currently exists. The alternative would be to not create this rule, which would not satisfy the statutory directive.

EL 3.01(15), EL 3.10, EL 3.11, EL 3.12, EL 3.13, and EL 3.20(3) – Rescind: Special Registration Deputies

2015 Wisconsin Act 261 eliminated special election deputies and that elimination was upheld in *Luft v. Evers*, by the 7th Circuit. Rescinding EL §§ 3.01(15), EL 3.10, EL 3.11, EL 3.12, EL 3.13, EL 3.20(3), would bring Chapter 3 up to date to reflect current law. The alternative would be to not rescind the sections of EL Chapter 3 that refer to special election deputies, which would continue to keep the Code out of date given the updates to the law in 2015.

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EL 3.20(1) – Amend: Voter registration drives

The policies that would be included explicitly in the update to EL 3.20(1) are already laid out in Wis. Stat. § 6.28. Updating EL 3.20(1) would help to ensure that voters who register through these drives are successfully registered to vote by making the processes for turning in EL-131 and proof or residence documents explicit in the rule. The alternative would be to not update EL 3.20(1), which would make it more confusing for third parties who wish to help voters register through these voter registration drives. This could create the potential for people who were under the presumption that they were successfully registered to vote to learn that they were not on election day and suppress voter turnout, especially for voters who need extra documents to prove their proof of residence that they may not carry with them on election day.

EL 3.06: Create: Proof of residence requirements for certain transitory voters

Luft v. Evers clarified that a letter, sent by the clerk, to an elector's residence satisfies Wis. Stat. § 6.34 that requires a voter to provide proof of residency. Section 6.34 requires an identifying document that shows that the elector resides in the district. The promulgation of EL 3.05 would ensure that municipal clerks have the guidance to properly address proof of residency issues that may appear when a transitory voter wishes to register to vote. The alternative would be to not promulgate this rule, which would leave in place some ambiguity for clerks as to what is required for proof of residence for transitory voters.

c) Detailed explanation of statutory authority for the rule (including the statutory citation and language).

Specific authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 6.35(2): "The commission shall prescribe, by rule, the procedure and methods by which municipal clerks and boards of election commissioners shall maintain records of registrations that are entered electronically under s. 6.30(5)."

General Authority pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1): "General authority. The elections commission shall have the responsibility for the administration of chs. 5 to 10 and 12 and other laws relating to elections and election campaigns, other than laws relating to campaign financing. Pursuant to such responsibility, the commission may:

- (f) Promulgate rules under ch. 227 applicable to all jurisdictions for the purpose of interpreting or implementing the laws regulating the conduct of elections or election campaigns, other than laws regulating campaign financing, or ensuring their proper administration."

Agency Rulemaking Authority pursuant to Wis. Stats. § 227.11(2)(a): "Agency rulemaking authority. Each agency may promulgate rules interpreting the provisions of any statute enforced or administered by the agency, if the agency considers it necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute, but a rule is not valid if the rule exceeds the bounds of correct interpretation."

d) An estimate of the amount of time agency employees will spend developing the proposed rule and of other resources needed to develop the rule.

WEC staff estimates that it would take approximately 100 staff hours to draft a scope statement and carry out the subsequent steps to promulgate and rescind, where appropriate, the administrative rules.

e) A description of all of the entities that may be affected by the proposed rule.

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EL 3.04 – Amend: Requiring provision of certain information by election-day voter registration applicants

Updating EL 3.04 would affect clerks, election officials, and individuals who are involved in the process of correcting an omission and having a provisional ballot counted. The proposed rule would do so by updating the code to match the two timelines relating to provisional ballots and would require minimal compliance outreach and training because of their familiarity with the timeline for providing proof of ID to cure a provisional ballot. The effect of the proposed rule, and subsequent processes, would have little to no impact on small businesses. The proposed updates would minimize the potential for confusion on when an omission needs to be cured by matching the Code's timeline for providing a driver's license number with the Wisconsin Statutes' timeline for providing photo ID.

EL 3.05 – Create: Maintaining electronically entered registration records

Creating EL 3.05 would have almost no impact on clerks or voters because it is simply promulgating a practice that is already in place—maintaining records in the SVRS for voters who register to vote online. The effect of the proposed rule, and subsequent processes, would have little to no impact on small businesses. The proposed rule should minimize the risk that these records are improperly maintained by providing a process for their maintenance to be followed.

EL 3.01(15), EL 3.10, EL 3.11, EL 3.12, EL 3.13, and EL 3.20(3) – Rescind: Special Registration Deputies

Rescinding EL 3.01(15), EL 3.10, EL 3.11, EL 3.12, EL 3.13, and EL 3.20(3) would not affect any entities because special deputies have been removed by law since 2015. The effect of these rescissions would be to ensure that the Election Code is as up to date as possible and an accurate reflection of Wisconsin law.

EL 3.20(1) – Amend: Voter registration drives

Amending EL 3.20(1) would affect clerks, election officials, electors, and individuals who are involved in the organization and administration of these third-party voter registration drives. The proposed rule would affect these entities by providing additional clarity regarding how they submit the registration forms and supporting documentation to the municipal clerk.

EL 3.06: Create: Proof of residence requirements for certain transitory voters

Creating EL 3.06 would affect clerks, election officials, and transitory individuals who wish to register to vote, and is likely to provide necessary clarity to ensure that transitory electors are provided their constitutional right to vote. The proposed rule would do so by addressing guidance on how transitory electors can show proof of residence and providing specific instructions on how to provide proof or residence. The effect of the proposed rule, and subsequent processes, would have little to no impact on small businesses.

f) A summary and preliminary comparison of any existing or proposed federal regulation that addresses or is intended to address the activities to be regulated by the proposed rule.

N/A

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Meagan Wolfe
Administrator, Wisconsin Elections Commission
May 8, 2026
Date Submitted

DRAFT

Wisconsin Elections Commission

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DATE: May 7, 2026

TO: Commissioners, Wisconsin Elections Commission

FROM: Meagan Wolfe, Administrator
Wisconsin Elections Commission
Prepared by Elections Commission Staff

SUBJECT: Commission Staff Update

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GENERAL OPERATIONS

1. Elections

WEC staff are currently working with elections officials across the state to prepare the canvass and certification of the April 7, 2026, Spring Election. At the time of publication, WEC staff will have

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Ann S. Jacobs, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Don M. Millis | Carrie Riepl | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen

finished supporting clerks and voters with the Spring Election and will be shifting attention to post-election processes, such as reconciliation, canvassing, and ultimately certification of the Spring Election.

After work related to the Spring Election has been completed, staff will focus on projects ahead of the 2026 fall election cycle. This involves reviewing and updating existing training materials and development of elections-specific items, such as candidate checklists and clerk forms. Staff plan on bringing updates to the Commission throughout the year as projects are developed.

2. Voters

At the time this memorandum was drafted, MyVote was in the midst of an expected usage decrease following the April 7, 2026, Spring Election. MyVote traffic had been increasing since the February 17, 2026, Spring Primary, and peaked during the 7:00-8:00 a.m. hour on Election Day.

The overall voter contacts from the MyVote site during the Spring Election cycle was approximately 20% lower than the same period in 2025. The 2026 period also included an additional 6 days before Election Day. Aside from the typical questions about registration and absentee application, we have continued to see an increase in questions from voters about the status of requested absentee ballots and local in-person absentee voting options in the run-up to each election. While absentee ballot requests for the 2026 Spring Election were lower overall than the previous year's Spring Election, they were still above pre-2020 numbers for a Spring Election.

Commission Staff also noticed a decrease in comment volume associated with third-party text message campaigns which tend to provide links directly to the MyVote site or redirect voters to MyVote from their own site. We cannot say if this is due to a reduction in these types of contacts, the contacts becoming clearer in who is sending them, or voters becoming more accustomed to them.

3. Data Quality & Reporting

Data quality queries are run every day in the months leading up to an election, allowing Commission staff to monitor potential data entry errors or missing information in WisVote. If errors or missing information are discovered, staff then contact and work with clerks to resolve the errors within records. This work is ongoing.

The Voter Felon Audit ran on April 13, 2026 for those municipalities that had a 2026 Spring Primary election. No matches were identified.

Commission staff work with individual clerks to ensure all reasonable efforts are applied to ensure the accuracy of their data. The Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) regularly publishes voting statistics (formerly EL-190 reports) that summarize the data submitted by municipal clerks. These reports are available on the WEC website at elections.wi.gov/statistics-data. Reminders for past elections that are not completely reconciled are sent out to municipalities on a regular basis.

For the 2026 Spring Primary, Dane County municipalities are required to enter election data (voter participation, registration, etc.) into the statewide voter registration system no later than 30 days after the election.

2026 Spring Primary (Dane County Only) as of April 16, 2026

- 53 municipalities in Dane County reconciled their voting statistics for all reporting units.
- 6 municipalities in Dane County are outstanding to reconcile their voting statistics for all reporting units.

Election Day Registration (EDR) Postcard Statistics are required to be reported within 90 days of an election and updated by clerks as applicable. WEC staff post this data and track compliance on the WEC website at elections.wi.gov/statistics-data/voting-statistics up to a year post-election.

ERIC

Quarter 1 (Q1) 2026 Movers mailing was sent to 45,590 voters on March 30, 2026. Quarter 4 (Q4) 2025 Movers mailing was sent to 55,901 voters on December 30, 2025. Quarter 3 (Q3) 2025 Movers mailing was sent to 65,723 voters on September 30, 2025. Quarter 2 (Q2) 2025 Movers Mailing was sent on June 30, 2025, to a total of 39,881 voters. Quarter 1 (Q1) 2025 Movers mailing was sent to 39,514 voters on March 28, 2025. Data provided is current as of April 16, 2026.

Summary of Movers Mailings (2024 to Present)

Year, Quarter	Total Movers	Possible Movers[1]	Registered[2]	Inactive[3]	Requested Continuation at current address	Rate confirm current address
2026 Q1	45,590	39,612	5056	922	228	0.50%
2025 Q4	55,901	40,746	10,196	4959	540	1.00%
2025 Q3	65,723	45,856	12,691	7176	582	0.90%
2025 Q2	39,881	21,487	5093	13,301	272	0.70%
2025 Q1	39,514	13,821	14,974	10,719	405	1.00%
2024 Q4	18,183	4600	6098	7485	60	0.30%
2024 Q3	38,037	4816	24,756	8465	589	1.50%
2024 Q2	32,884	3256	22,421	7207	674	2.00%
2024 Q1	37,593	3499	25,930	8164	676	1.80%

[1] Movers postcard sent, no action taken by voter after receipt of postcard.

[2] Movers postcard sent. Voter subsequently requested continuation at their current address or updated their address. Includes voters who re-registered elsewhere in Wisconsin.

[3] Movers postcard sent. Postcards returned undeliverable, or voter registered out of state, or otherwise no longer active in Wisconsin.

Four Year Voter Maintenance

Wisconsin Statute requires the WEC to identify electors who have not voted in the last four years every June following a General Election, a process commonly referred to as Four Year Voter Maintenance. This process requires clerks to mail notices to all voters who have been registered to vote for the past four years but have not participated in any elections. The postcard serves as a request for continuation of registration when properly marked and returned to their municipal clerk's office within 30 days.

While the four-year voter maintenance process will not take place this year, the WisVote team is already preparing for future cycles by identifying potential updates to the postcard itself, reviewing statutory guidelines and prior training materials to better support clerks to carry out the process.

Badger Voters Election Data Website

The Elections Commission Badger Voters website -- https://badgervoters.wi.gov -- provides a simple and automated way for the public to request voter lists, absentee records, and candidates' nomination papers. Data can be sorted by election, office, county, municipality, ward, aldermanic district, and many more options. This allows the customer to receive only the data they are seeking. The voter list shows election activity back to 2006, when Wisconsin began using a statewide voter registration system, with the participation description of "at polls" or "absentee."

Absentee ballot data is available from 2016 to the present. Absentee data purchases provide customers with application and ballot activity and allow the customer the option to "subscribe" for future updates to data they received, as well as the ability to receive new files at the frequency they select, which can be twice per week, weekly, every other week, or monthly.

Customers can also make custom requests for existing data that is not included in a standard request format or for statistics that are not posted to our Elections Commission website. The customer is provided with an estimate of costs (developer time) to create and run the query and total number of records in the data set. If the customer chooses to purchase the file, our developer will then produce the file. Custom requests that take under a half-hour of developer time are only charged for the number of records requested.

Finally, customers can use Badger Voters to access nomination papers and declarations of candidacy for candidates who file those documents ahead of scheduled elections. This is particularly useful for customers who are considering bringing ballot access challenges due to the tight deadlines associated with that process.

Customer satisfaction is generally high with this program as there is no waiting time for accessing data needed, and the breadth of the data in standard files is very useful for many purposes. Most questions can be answered in our Frequently Asked questions (FAQ's) link on the Badger Voters website. This section also includes data element documents outlining what fields are included as well as sample files.

The Badger Voters website often has an increase in activity during the spring and fall election cycles, but activity occurs steadily throughout the year.

The Badger Voters system provides media, campaigns, researchers, and others with quality data they can use to conduct analysis, conclude extensive research and voter outreach. Prior to the updates to Badger Voters, many of the data queries had to be run manually by WEC staff. WEC has invested in the automation of this statutorily required system. This allows the public access to data without diverting staff resources and time from other projects. This means WEC staff can spend additional time working with local election officials and voters preparing for upcoming elections while still meeting the expectations of our customers and providing transparency in election data.

Badger Voters Fiscal Year Breakdowns

Fiscal Year	Total Number of Voter Data Requests	Requested Files Purchased	Percentage of Requests Purchased	Total Revenue	Total Number of Nomination Paper Requests
FY2026	639	557	87.20%	$329,705.00	215
FY2025	1,347	1,198	88.90%	$986,809.00	421
FY2024	1,067	954	85.60%	$444,901.00	1,735
FY2023	1,126	998	88.60%	$795,552.00	204
FY2022	1,049	950	90.50%	$422,970.00	1,169
FY2021	368	328	89%	$106,070.00	148
FY2020	1,291	1,134	88%	$654,557.00	402
FY2019	617	473	76.60%	$328,015.00	NA
FY2018	706	517	73.20%	$182,341.00	NA
FY2017	643	368	57%	$234,537.35	NA

Note: The state fiscal year begins on July 1 and ends on June 30. Prior to FY2020 the Net Revenue figure is for gross sales and does not account for any refunds.

4. Accessible Voting

At the Spring Primary reviewers visited 69 polling places across 55 municipalities and 14 counties. Clerks were given their reports on March 27th, ten days before the Spring Election. There were no problems identified at the following six polling places:

- Glenwood Town Hall, Town of Glenwood – St. Croix County
- Fox River Christian Church, Town of Muskego – Waukesha County
- Lake Mills City Hall, City of Lake Mills – Jefferson County
- Pleasant Prairie Recplex, Village of Pleasant Prairie – Kenosha County

- Pleasant Prairie Village Hall, Village of Pleasant Prairie – Kenosha County
- The Reserve at Kenosha Clubhouse, City of Kenosha – Kenosha County

At the Spring Election reviewers visited 72 polling places across 53 municipalities and 15 counties.

Three accessibility concerns were received since the last quarterly meeting, all related to the Spring Election.

- A voter in the City of New Berlin – Waukesha County went to their polling place on Election Day to return their absentee ballot and the ballot of their partner. The voter felt it was inappropriate for the poll worker to ask about their disability status. There was miscommunication which left the voter with the understanding that the poll worker would accept the ballots this time, but in the future, they would not be able to vote absentee. WEC staff followed up with the clerk who was already aware of the situation. Staff got permission from the voter to share their contact information with the clerk so she could reach out to the voter directly.
- A voter in the City of Madison – Dane County reported that their polling place did not have headphones for the accessible voting equipment. As a result, the voter had to vote a paper ballot with an assistant rather than independently and privately on the accessible voting equipment. The chief inspector noticed the headphones were missing when polls opened and called the clerk's office to have a pair delivered, but they had not arrived yet when the voter came a little later in the morning. The chief inspector called the clerk's office again after the voter left, and the voter called the clerk's office directly. Headphones were not delivered to the polling place until around 1 p.m. Both the voter and chief inspector have grown frustrated with the recent increase in frequency that headphones are missing. The voter knew of a different polling place that was also missing headphones.
- Another voter in City of Madison – Dane County reported that their polling place did not have headphones for the accessible voting equipment when they arrived around 5:30 p.m. The chief inspector at the location was able to get headphones while the voter was still at the polling place.

5. Security

Elections Commission IT staff put a freeze on system changes prior to the Spring Election to prevent potential disruptions, and security staff conducted heightened monitoring in conjunction with state and federal partners. The Spring Election was free of any noteworthy security events. Commission staff continues to coordinate threat information with partners, including maintaining a presence in a live chat with security partners during the election and regular coordination calls.

Agency staff has also been developing a plan which, if approved by the Commission, would offer subgrant funds to clerks for improving local IT security, modelled on past subgrants the agency has offered. More details on that plan are available elsewhere in the meeting materials.

Security training staff continue to work on new updates to the Security Awareness Training provided to clerks, including a primer on new generative AI systems and how they could impact elections.

Plans are also in development to offer tabletop exercises or roundtables over the summer, in addition to supplemental webinars.

TRAINING & EQUIPMENT

6. Clerk Training

What follows is a summary of certification and other election training conducted virtually by WEC staff and available to clerks and their election officials in ElectEd. WEC staff have also attended one in-person clerk event since the last Commission meeting.

Since January 1, 2026, clerks, clerks' staff and deputies, and chief inspectors have been completing the updated certification courses online. In an average week not near an election, around 400-500 people have been using ElectEd. The most accessed and completed trainings are Baseline Chief Inspector Training and the poll worker series, which corresponds to poll workers being the highest volume of users in ElectEd. Photo ID training is the one most accessed by all users. The recordings of webinars and training tidbits are the trainings most frequently accessed by clerks and clerk staff.

Commission staff provided specialized election training through its webinar (60 min.) and tidbit (15 min.) training series ahead of the spring primary and election:

- What's New in ElectEd
- Absentee I – By-Mail
- Absentee II – SVDs
- Judicial Privacy Act
- Absentee III – IPAV
- Spring Election Prep for Badger Book Users
- Counting Votes
- Training Poll Workers[4]
- Poll Book Watermarks
- Contingency Planning
- POR vs. POI
- Declaring the Winners
- WisVote Post-Election

WEC staff presented at the Wisconsin Municipal Clerks Association - North conference on April 16 in Eau Claire. The 90-minute session focused on poll worker appointments and training, and election day issues with poll workers and observers.

7. Badger Book Program

Badger Books are Wisconsin's electronic poll books, developed and maintained by Commission staff. They are the only electronic poll books certified for use in Wisconsin. Badger Books integrate directly with WisVote, the statewide voter registration system, ensuring voter list security and

[4] presented as a panel with two clerks as a part of the WMCA lunch-and-learn series

increased efficiency for both voters and election officials. The software was developed by the WEC and is provided to clerks free of cost. Municipalities then purchase commercial off-the-shelf hardware to deploy the system for their voters. The Badger Book program was launched in 2017 and has experienced year-over-year growth, with approximately 375 jurisdictions projected to use in 2026. Badger Books remain a voluntary option for municipalities, who must opt into the program, purchase the equipment, and submit a complete Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which outlines the roles and responsibilities of both municipal users and Commission staff.

There are currently no plans for in-person Badger Book training to be offered by staff before the 2026 General Election. Rather, the team is focusing on supporting the clerks who joined the program before the April 2026 election through updated training made available in ElectEd and two webinars with live Q&A, ahead of the spring and fall elections. As with all webinars, the recordings get posted to the catalog in ElectEd for those who miss the live events.

Per the Memorandum of Understanding the Badger Book municipalities enter into with WEC, the clerk at each new municipality is required to take the 3-hour, in-person Intro to Badger Books training from a certified trainer and complete the technology self-assessment. Two new municipalities did not meet those requirements for the April election. Clerks at municipalities already in the program are required to maintain their elections certification (6 hours training in each 2-year term or completion of MCT Core) and take any training that is deemed a requirement by Badger Book staff for maintaining readiness and understanding of the Badger Book software. There were three clerks who were out of compliance with the MOU because they did not recertify in time for the April election and/or did not complete the training for the new software update.

8. Voting Technology

The voting technology team is currently focused on finalizing certification campaigns for electronic voting systems submitted by vendors for consideration for certification in Wisconsin. The Commission approved an application from Clear Ballot Group for their ClearVote 2.5 system at their March 25, 2026 meeting. Staff are in the process of sending final approval documentation and an invoice for staff time spent on functional testing to the vendor. Clear Ballot Group has also filed six requests to review Engineering Change Orders (ECO) for this voting system. Staff will review these requests and draft a recommendation for approval or denial, which will be sent to the Administrator and Chair for their consideration.

Dominion Voting Systems, now Liberty Vote, also submitted two applications for their Democracy Suite 5.20 and 5.20S electronic voting systems. A full report on these systems, along with recommendations to certify both, appears separately in these materials.

The team is also beginning preparations for the 2026 post-election voting equipment audit. While no significant changes are being proposed to the overall structure or selection criteria, Commission staff

will prepare a full outline proposing the processes and procedures to be followed during the audit to be presented to the Commission at a later meeting.

COMMUNICATIONS

9. Outreach

The Communications Team is currently working with La Crosse based advertising firm, Vendi, on a multifaceted campaign aimed at raising general awareness of the MyVote website as the official resource for Wisconsin voters. This project is part of the Eligible But Unregistered (EBU) public media awareness campaign. One goal is to drive visitors to the website where they can find resources needed to participate in the November General Election.

It is anticipated that the ad campaign may utilize a variety of vehicles including social media and newspaper posts, radio spots, public service announcements, and outdoor advertising.

The Team continues to bolster WEC's own social media presence with new posts focused on educating voters. It is also preparing a media kit for clerks, which will be complete with templates for news releases and other communications, so those running elections can disseminate tailored information in their respective communities.

Following April's Spring Election, many media and community members continue to ask election-related questions. The Team is addressing those inquiries.

In the run-up to the Spring Election, and after polls closed, the Team pushed out news releases and updated the WEC website. It also worked with Administrator Wolfe on a news conference where the Administrator addressed questions on a wide range of local and national topics.

The election year will also bring with it the need for increased news releases and requests for interviews with WEC's subject matter experts.

10. Elections Help Desk & Customer Service

The Elections Help Desk staff support more than 2,925 active WisVote users while also answering calls and emails from the public and election officials. Staff monitor state enterprise network and data center changes and status, and process voter cancelations and voter address verification postcards. Help Desk staff have served on and assisted with various projects and development teams. Staff continue to maintain WisVote user and clerk listserv email lists and contact information and administer WEC's O365 email system. The staff continue to administer and maintain security for the WisVote Active Directory system and the Elections Learning Center, ElectEd. Help Desk staff also provide critical support to the agency's Public Records Request program and run attorney-directed searches of state electronic records.

The Help Desk staff also routinely make clerk updates when they occur to ensure accurate information in WisVote. The agency's use of Zendesk has helped improve communications to clerks and voters in a timely matter.

Calls

Reporting Period	Calls
January 2026	1,438
February 2026	1,380
March 2026	2,797
April 2026 (1 – 13)	1,899
Total for Reporting Period	**7,514**

Emails

Reporting Period	Emails
January 2026	3,646
February 2026	2,483
March 2026	3,748
April 2026 (1 – 13)	2,099
Total for Reporting Period	**11,976**

ADMINISTRATION

11. Financial Services

The WEC financial staff have performed the following financial services activities since the March 25, 2026, Staff Update to the Commission:

- On March 6, 2026, staff completed the annual review and attestation of STAR FIN staff security roles, writing a separation of duties exemption and alternate internal control where necessary.
- On March 13, 2026, staff received notification via email from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) that, under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 2026,

Wisconsin is being offered up to $819,000 in federal funds through the federal FY2026 Election Security HAVA Grant. The WEC has five years to accept those funds.

- On March 17, 2026, staff attended a U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) webinar to learn award details and submission instructions for the federal FY2026 Election Security HAVA Grant.
- On March 27, 2026, staff submitted our internal control plan (ICP) on financial services, the completed ICP questionnaire, and the signed annual report on internal controls to the State Controller's Office (SCO) audit department. This 2026 ICP was approved unanimously by the Commission at their March 25, 2026, meeting.
- On April 2, 2026, staff completed the Payment Card Industry (PCI) annual compliance training and attestation that we are following the Data Security Standards of the PCI Council and Wisconsin Statute 19.36(13).
- On April 6, 2026, staff received notification via email from the EAC of new cost documentation guidance for HAVA grantees, recently published by the EAC Office of Grants Management (OGM) on the EAC website.
- On April 7, 2026, staff requested that the SCO load our agency's FY2027 operating budget controls with zero-dollar amounts.
- On April 10, 2026, staff submitted to our State Budget Office our pay plan supplement for FY2026 requesting no supplemental salary or fringe.

In addition, staff have performed the following monthly:

- Staff continued to perform and submit to the SCO scheduled month-end close queries, inquiries, and reports. Staff conducted the necessary adjusting entries to resolve any discrepancies.
- Staff continued to review, audit, code, and approve our monthly General Services Billing (GSB) from our Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA).
- Staff continued to review and validate DOA's monthly Diverse Spend Reports.
- Staff continued to review and process our agency's bi-weekly pension obligation bond allocations.
- Staff continued to participate in monthly DOA virtual user group webinars pertaining to Project Costing, Accounts Receivable and Billing, Accounts Payable, Travel and Expenses, and Asset Management.
- Staff continued to participate in the virtual PCard Administrators Group to discuss issues pertaining to the Wisconsin Purchasing Card (PCard) and in the State Agencies Purchasing Council (SAPC) to discuss procurement topics and updates.

- Staff continued to participate in the Financial Leadership Council (FLC) meetings at SCO.
- Financial staff continue to process staff travel reimbursement requests, following the state uniform travel manual regulations.

12. Procurements

The following six Purchase Orders totaling $23,579.46 have been processed since the March 25, 2026, Staff Update to the Commission:

- A $3,313.90 Purchase Order was written to SHI International for Confluence Annual Premium.
- A $954.00 Purchase Order was written to SHI International for Jira Annual Standard.
- A $3,864.00 Purchase Order was written to Insight Public Sector for Yubico multifactor authorization keys.
- A $458.25 Purchase Order was written to SHI International for Adobe InDesign subscriptions.
- A $10,043.60 Purchase Order was written to Personnel Specialists for temporary staff.
- A $4,945.71 Purchase Order was written to Vanguard Computers for staff headsets.

All purchases accurately followed the Wisconsin State Procurement Process.

13. Meetings and Presentations

WEC staff attended the following events since the last quarterly meeting of the Wisconsin Elections Commission:

April 15-17	U.S. EAC Standards Board Annual Meeting
April 22	ERIC Board Meeting
	Enterprise IT Meeting
May 5	Wisconsin ISAC Meeting
	Meeting with USPS
May 6	State IT Director's Meeting

Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

DATE: March 25, 2026

TO: Wisconsin Municipal Clerks
City of Milwaukee Election Commission
Wisconsin County Clerks
Milwaukee County Election Commission

FROM: Wisconsin Elections Commission

SUBJECT: **DRAFT:** Timely Attention: Ballot Spoiling

Attachment A: - Checklist for Spoiling an Absentee Ballot

Many municipal clerks and other election officials in Wisconsin have been asking about the impact of a recent Court of Appeals decision on a voter's ability to spoil a previously requested ballot so that they may receive and vote a new ballot. The Wisconsin Elections Commission's guidance and updates can be found within this communication.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals for District II recently reversed the trial court's decision in *Nancy Kormanik v. Wisconsin Elections Commission*. That case originated in the Waukesha County Circuit Court. The circuit court order in *Kormanik* had enjoined the Wisconsin Election Commission (Commission) from publishing its previous guidance on ballot spoiling and from similarly interpreting certain statutes pertaining to spoiling. After the reversal of that order, the Commission met in a public meeting on March 25, 2026, and opted not to reissue its two guidance documents from August of 2022. Instead, the Commission approved the following guidance by vote of X-Y:

> ~~It is the position of the Wisconsin Elections Commission that~~ Wisconsin law allows a voter who, by accident or mistake, spoils or erroneously prepares ~~to spoil~~ a ballot ~~and~~ may receive another ballot by returning the defective ballot ~~it~~ to the municipal clerk or election inspector. ~~for the purpose of receiving and voting a new ballot.~~ The municipal clerk should verify the identity~~identify~~ of a person requesting seeking to receive a replacement ~~to spoil an~~ absentee ballot to ensure that it is the voter making the request. This voter verification process should include having the voter confirm the same information necessary to request an absentee ballot (e.g. name, full address, date of birth) ~~[OPTIONAL for Commission consideration: …,~~ and may this verification process may include the municipal clerk asking the absentee voter to produce voter identification.~~]~~ Any request must to replace a spoiled or erroneously prepared ballot may only be made during [describe time periods specified in s. 6.855(1) and (3)(c)] and voter may only receive three replacement ballots in each election.

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Wisconsin Elections Commissioners
Ann S. Jacobs, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Don M. Millis | Carrie Riepl | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen

Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

The deadlines for spoiling ballots are as follows:

- *Regular voters who spoil their ballot and request a new ballot by mail*: 5 p.m. on the 5th day immediately preceding the election.

- *Indefinitely confined absentee voters who spoil their ballot and request a new ballot by mail*: 5 p.m. on the Friday immediately preceding the election.

- *For all absentee voters who spoil their ballot and request a new ballot in person at the clerk's office or in-person absentee voting location*: 5 p.m. on the Friday immediately preceding the election for many municipalities, but may be as late as the Sunday immediately preceding the election depending on in-person absentee voting schedules.

- *In-person voters at the polling place*: In-person voters may request to spoil on election day and obtain up to three ballots.

The Commission also authorizes staff to publish the Checklist for Spoiling an Absentee Ballot that election officials may use to validate a voter's identity and create a record of the request to spoil a ballot.

Clerks and election inspectors may now resume ballot spoiling processes. Questions about this process can be directed to local counsel or the Wisconsin Elections Commission. This guidance will be reflected in the new Election Law and Administration in Wisconsin manual, which is soon to be fully adopted by the Commission. In addition, Commission staff have begun the process of promulgating an administrative rule relating to ballot spoiling. If fully approved, that rule would include more procedural detail related to spoiling processes for each voter type.

DRAFT

Wisconsin Elections Commission
201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

May 7, 2026

Paul Pustina
408 Dalogasa Dr.
Arena, WI 53503

DaNean Naeger
314 Commerce Street
Rewey, WI 53580

Sent via email to: paulpustina@gmail.com, vilarena@villageofarena.net, dnaeger69@gmail.com, tanderson@boardmanclark.com

Re: **Paul Pustina v. DaNean Naeger (EL 25-56)**

Dear Mr. Pustina and Ms. Naeger,

This letter is in response to the verified complaint submitted by Paul Pustina (The Complainant) to the Wisconsin Election Commission (Commission), which was filed in response to actions taken by Clerk DaNean Naeger of the Village of Arena (The Respondent) concerning alleged violations of Wis. Stat. §§ 5.25(4), 7.51, 7.53, and 9.01. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent failed to perform mandatory duties including (1) being unavailable on the final day to file a recount petition and thereby preventing the Complainant from exercising his statutory right to a timely recount petition, and (2) posting inadequate notice of the municipal board of canvassers meeting.

The Commission has reviewed the complaint, the response, and the reply. The Commission provides the following analysis and decision. In short, the Commission finds probable cause that a violation of law has occurred with respect to Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51, 7.53, and 9.01 and issues a corrective order. The Commission does not find probable cause that a violation of law has occurred with respect to Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4) (regarding accessible polling places) and dismisses the complaint regarding that allegation.

Commission Authority and Role in Resolving Complaints Filed Under Wis. Stat. § 5.06

Under Wis. Stats. §§ 5.05(1)(e) and 5.06(6), the Commission is provided with the inherent, general, and specific authority to consider the submissions of the parties to a complaint and to issue findings. The Commission may summarily issue a decision and provide that decision to the affected parties. This letter serves as the Commission's final decision regarding the issues raised in this complaint.

The Commission's role in resolving verified complaints filed under Wis. Stat. § 5.06, which challenge the decisions or actions of local election officials, is to determine whether a local official acted contrary to applicable election laws or abused their discretion in administering applicable election laws.

Complaints "shall set forth such facts as are within the knowledge of the Complainant to show probable cause to believe that a violation of law or abuse of discretion has occurred or will occur." Wis. Stat. § 5.06(1). Probable cause is defined in Wis. Admin. Code § EL 20.02(4) to mean "the facts and reasonable inferences that together

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Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

are sufficient to justify a reasonable, prudent person, acting with caution, to believe that the matter asserted is probably true."

Complaint Allegations

The Complainant, a candidate for Village President, alleges that the Respondent, the Village of Arena Clerk, failed to perform mandatory election duties and thereby prevented the Complainant from exercising his statutory right to file a timely recount petition for the April 1, 2025, Spring Election, and that the municipal canvass meeting was not properly noticed. The Complainant alleges that these procedural lapses denied him due process and undermined public confidence in a close election, which the Complainant trailed by 15 votes.

Regarding the municipal board of canvassers meeting notice, the Complainant alleges that there was a "nominal notice posted in Village Hall" stating that the board of canvassers would convene "'at the close of voting on Election Day.'" He alleges that the notice was not posted anywhere else in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51 and 7.53. In addition, the Complainant alleges that a news media outlet (Valley Sentinel) requested formal notice under Wis. Stat § 19.84(1)(b) but did not receive the notice.

Regarding the Respondent's availability on Friday, April 4, 2025, the deadline to file a recount petition under Wis. Stat. § 9.01, the Complainant alleges that the Respondent was completely absent from her office on that Friday. He alleges that there was no alternative arrangement provided for filing the petition and that the posted hours simply said, "hours vary, call ahead." Thus, the Complainant alleges he was left with no means to file the petition on time.

The Complainant alleges that he attempted to bring a signed recount petition the next business day, April 7, 2025, but that the Respondent refused to accept it and said she "needed it Friday." He also alleges that the Respondent attempted to discard his petition.

The Complainant argues that if the board of canvassers meeting was not properly noticed, the meeting was not properly held, the recount window never commenced, and April 1 would not have been the deadline to file a recount petition. In addition, the Complainant argues that the Respondent's lack of availability on April 4 justified an extension to the next business day to file the petition.

The Complaint also alleges a violation of Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4), regarding polling place accessibility, arguing that the Respondent's unavailability on April 4 effectively denied Complainant the legal convenience to file his petition in accordance with this statute.

The Complainant attached several documents to the Complaint including a transcript that was allegedly made from an audio recording of the interaction between the Complainant and the Respondent when he brought the recount petition to the Clerk's office on Monday, April 7, as well as the signed and notarized recount petition itself. He also attached the Spring Election Night Call-In Return Sheet and correspondence between himself and local media discussing the Respondent's lack of a response to the media's notice request.

The Complaint requests the following relief from the Commission: (1) investigate and determine the Clerk's noncompliance, (2) order acceptance of the recount petition, (3) invalidate or extend the canvass deadline, (4) disciplinary and oversight measures, and (5) any other equitable relief to safeguard the electorate's confidence.

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Response

The Respondent alleges that she posted the notice of the municipal board of canvass meeting on the Village Hall Bulletin Board and on the Village's website on March 11, 2025. In addition, the Respondent alleges that she checked that the notice was still posted on the Village website on March 28, 2025, after talking to another municipal clerk who had a question on the posting. The Respondent further alleges that the notice was still posted as of her April 23, 2025, response filing.

Regarding the email from the Taylor Scott, the managing editor of the Valley Sentinel Newspaper, the Respondent states that Mr. Scott likely would have mentioned had the notice been missing from the Village website but did not mention it. She states that in a prior complaint the Valley Sentinel had stated that they continually check the website for updates. In addition, she states that this is the first time in five years that the Valley Sentinel has requested election notices, and she believes that the Village of Arena may have been singled out by the Valley Sentinel.

Regarding the local and municipal board of canvassers meeting, the Respondent states that it was held at about 10:35 pm on April 1, meaning that the deadline to file a recount petition for an office would be April 4, 2025. The Respondent states that Mr. Scott was an observer that day but left prior to the start of the meeting.

The Respondent states that office hours vary on Fridays and that the Complainant was aware of this. In addition, the Respondent alleges that the Complainant did not call the Village office any time between that Wednesday, April 2, 2025, and that Monday, April 7, 2025, or leave a message that he planned on filing a recount petition. She also states that the Complainant did not appear at the Village Hall to verify if the Respondent was present on Friday or to see if there was a note indicating files could be left in a drop box. The Respondent states that this information is supported by the Village's security camera from the hours of 7 a.m. to 5 p.m.

She alleges that the Complainant arrived on Monday, April 7, at 3:46 p.m. to drop off the recount petition, and largely agrees with the Complainant’s description of the conversation. However, she denies attempting to throw away or discard the petition and alleges that she had scanned it and attempted to date and time stamp the petition. The Respondent states that she received another copy of the petition by email that night and sent an email to the Commission asking if she should accept the recount. The Respondent alleges that if the petition had been dated April 4, 2025, she would have accepted it, but it was notarized on April 7, 2025, instead.

The Respondent attached the email exchange between her and Commission staff in which she asks whether she should accept the recount. She also includes a copy of an email exchange with the Iowa County Clerk, concerning the need to make more ballot copies.

The Respondent concludes by saying that she is no longer the Village Clerk for the Village of Arena.

Reply

The Complainant largely refers to his arguments in the complaint regarding the posting of the Board of Canvasser's Notice. In addition, he requests the name of the Clerk, municipality, and time of the call that the Respondent mentioned as evidence of when she checked to see that the meeting notice was posted on the Village website. The Complainant states that whether this was the first time that the Valley Sentinel requested election notices is irrelevant to his allegation that the notice was not provided this time when it was requested.

In addition, the Complainant states that whether he called the village office between Wednesday, April 2, 2025, and April 7, 2025, is also irrelevant because he was not required to contact the Village Clerk ahead of time to

notify her of his intentions. The Complainant also points to the recording of the conversation in which the Respondent admits that she was not in the office on Friday, April 7, 2025.

The Complainant states that he did not appear at or call the office that Friday because he knew that the Village Office is closed on Fridays and that "I believed that since the Village Office was closed on Friday, that Monday, April 7, would be the last day for turning a petition in." In addition, he states that any contact by phone that day would have had to be through Respondent's personal phone number, which he did not have. Because of these shortcomings by the Respondent, he believed that Monday, April 7, 2025, would be the appropriate last day for turning in the recount petition.

Regarding the Respondent's statement that she was not trying to discard the document and that she was date and time stamping it, the Complainant states that the copy machine is in the hallway outside the Village Office area and Respondent had not walked in that direction, and that the Complainant does not believe that a scan was made.

Regarding her statement about no longer being the Village Clerk, the Complainant believes that this is irrelevant and should have no bearing on the Complaint. The Complainant believes that Respondent should still be investigated, as this answer appeared to be an attempt to not take responsibility.

Discussion

The Commission addresses below the merits of each alleged statutory violation.

Claim 1: Wis. Stat § 5.25(4) – Polling Place Accessibility

Wisconsin statute § 5.25(4) discusses polling place accessibility. Section (a) discusses the accessibility of polling places for people with disabilities, section (b) refers to providing voting materials in languages other than English, and section (d) concerns conducting reports on impediments faced by elderly and disabled individuals attempting to vote. Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4).

Analysis*:*

The Complainant alleges that that the Respondent violated Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4) due to her unavailability and absence on April 4, 2025, which hindered his ability to file a recount petition. This statute, however, does not relate to office hours or recall petitions. Because the statute does not apply to the allegation, the Commission does not find probable cause of a violation.

Claim 2: Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51 and 7.53 – Boards of Canvassers Meeting Notice

Wisconsin Statute §§ 7.51 and 7.53 concern the local board of canvassers and the municipal board of canvassers meetings. In this case, the local board of canvassers and the municipal board of canvassers were combined under § 7.53(1)(a), meaning that the municipal canvass took place on election night. On election night, the canvass board "shall proceed to canvass publicly all votes received at the polling place." Wis. Stat. § 7.51(1).

Analysis*:*

The Complainant alleges that the canvass board meeting was not properly noticed because the Respondent only posted a notice at the Village Hall and ignored a written request from a news outlet. He argues that these alleged failures should render the meeting invalid as it was not conducted publicly.

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The Complainant argues that the Respondent allegedly violated Wis. Stat. § 19.84, which relates to Wisconsin's laws on open meetings. While Chapter 19 is outside of the scope of the Commission's direct administrative domain, the Commission believes that the Complainant has sufficiently tied these procedures to election processes that the Commission does administer, namely the local and municipal canvasses under Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51 and 7.53. The Commission discusses Wis. Stat. § 19.84 within its Election Administration Manual and states in relevant part that:

> Wisconsin law requires that meetings of all state and local governmental bodies, including governmental subunits, shall be publicly noticed, held in places reasonably accessible to members of the public, and shall be open to all citizens at all times unless otherwise expressly provided by law. Election-related meetings such as Board of Canvassers, voting equipment testing, post-election audits, etc., fall under this requirement, and the municipal clerk must properly notice such meetings. If you have specific questions about requirements for open meetings notice, please consult with your municipal attorney.
> Wis. Stats. §§ 8.50, 8.55, 10.01, 10.02, 10.04, 10.06, 19.84, 120.06.

Additionally, a 2014 Opinion of the Attorney General concludes by saying that "the canvassing activities conducted at the local polling place level pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 7.51 constitute a 'meeting' of a "governmental body" and thus are subject to the requirements of the open meetings law."

Under Wis. Stat. § 19.84(1)(b) public notice of a meeting must be sent to "to those news media who have filed a written request for such notice" and also to the public using any of these three methods:

1. Posting a notice in at least 3 public places likely to give notice to persons affected.
2. Posting a notice in at least one public place likely to give notice to persons affected and placing a notice electronically on the governmental body's Internet site.
3. By paid publication in a news medium likely to give notice to persons affected.

The Commission finds that the Complainant has not sufficiently demonstrated that the Respondent failed to use one of the three methods for public notice. Specifically, the Respondent appears to have met the second option by posting a notice at the Village Hall and posting the notice electronically on the Village of Arena government website. The Complainant did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the Respondent had not posted the notice on the village website. The Respondent said she did so. The Complainant did not rebut that assertion in his reply other than with a question asking which clerk she was speaking to when she checked the website. Without a convincing reason to believe that the notice was not posted on the website as required, the Commission cannot find probable cause of a violation that the Respondent failed to publicly post the notice.

However, the Commission does find probable cause that the Respondent failed to send the notice to a media organization with a request on file, as required by Wis. Stat. § 19.84. The statute specifically states that "news media who have filed a written request for such notice" much receive it. In this case, the Respondent did not deny that the Valley Sentinel had an active request for public notices from the village or that the paper did not receive this notice from the Respondent. The Respondent attempts to suggest that because the outlet likely knew about her website based on past complaints, the notice did not need to be individuals sent, and that she believes the Village of Arena was the only municipality in the area that received such a request. The Complainant argued that this was irrelevant to the allegation, and the Commission agrees. The Commission therefore orders the Village of Area clerk to ensure that all local and municipal canvass board meetings under Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51 and 7.53 are properly noticed.

Claim 3: Wis. Stat. § 9.01 – Recount Filing Deadline

Wisconsin Statute § 9.01 establishes the deadlines and processes for a recount petition. For a municipal election, the deadline to file a recount petition is between the conclusion of the municipal board of canvassers meeting and "5 p.m. on the 3rd business day following the last meeting day of the municipal or county board of canvassers determining the election for that office." Wis. Stat. § 9.01(1)(a)1.

Analysis*:*

The Complainant alleges that the Respondent was not present at her office on the deadline to file a recount petition and that her lack of availability on April 4 justified an extension to the next business day to file the petition under Wis. Stat. § 9.01. Because the municipal board of canvass meeting was held on Tuesday, April 1, 2025, the deadline to file a recount petition was Friday, April 4, 2025. Wis. Stat. § 9.01(1)(a)1. It appears uncontested in the record that the Respondent was absent from her office on that Friday.[1] While the Respondent makes the case that the Complainant was not prepared to file the recount petition on that Friday, did not attempt to file it that day, and had the document notarized on Monday, April 7, the Respondent was not there on the deadline to receive a filing, and thus there was no opportunity for someone to file on that Friday.

The Commission finds probable cause that the Respondent violated Wis. Stat. § 9.01(1)(a)1. due to her absence from her office and failure to provide any reasonable mechanism for individual to submit a recount petition by the statutory deadline. Aggrieved candidates have the right under Wis. Stat. § 9.01(1)(a)1. to file a valid petition by the applicable 5:00 p.m. deadline, and a clerk who prevents that filing from taking place is frustrating a central statutory process and the exclusive remedy for a candite to contest the outcome of an election. The Commission therefore orders the Village of Arena clerk to ensure that an individual can file election-related documents in the clerk's office by the statutory deadline.

While there is probable cause that the clerk violated this provision by closing the office, the Complainant in this case also made an incorrect assumption. It appears that the Complainant was aware both of the 5 p.m. deadline on Friday and that the clerk's office was scheduled to be closed, and assumed that because the office would be closed, he would have until Monday to file the recount petition. While this assumption may be understandable, the deadline was Friday, and there is simply no evidence to show that the petition was otherwise ready to be filed but for the clerk's error. The Commission therefore could not have ordered any additional relief regarding this filing.

Commission's Findings and Order

Based upon the above review and analysis, the Commission finds probable cause to believe that a violation of law or abuse of discretion has occurred regarding Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51, 7.53, and 9.01. The Commission orders that the current Village of Arena Clerk to ensure that proper notice of any local and municipal board of canvassers meetings is provided, which includes providing the notice to media organizations requesting such notice. Further, the Commission orders that the clerk's office must remain open and staffed until the deadline whenever there is a statutory deadline allowing an individual to file an election-related document with the clerk. The Commission does not find probable cause that a violation of law has occurred with respect to Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4).

Rights to Appeal – Circuit Court

[1] Though it was not explicitly alleged by either party, the Commission also takes notice that Friday, April 4, 2025, was not Good Friday (that day was April 18, 2025).

This letter constitutes the Commission's resolution of this complaint. Wis. Stat. § 5.06(2). Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8), any aggrieved party may appeal this decision to circuit court no later than 30 days after the issuance of this decision.

If any of the parties should have questions about this letter or the Commission's decision, please feel free to contact the Commission at 608-266-8005 or elections@wi.gov.

Sincerely,

WISCONSIN ELECTION COMMISSION

DRAFT

Official Election Complaint Form

STEP 1 Complaint Type

Please select the statutory process that governs your complaint:

Note: you should choose only one statutory process per complaint; if you feel that your allegations fall under more than one statutory process, you should submit separate complaints under each process.

- ○ 5.05 (Election Law Violation)
- ● 5.06 (Violations by Election Officials or Appeals of Decisions of Election Officials)
- ○ 5.061 (Help America Vote Act Violation)

STEP 2 Complainant Contact Information

Please provide the following information about yourself.

Note: Anyone filing this complaint with you can add their information on a separate page (see page 4).

First Name	Last Name
Paul	Pustina

Residential Address: 408 Dalogasa Drive, Arena, WI 53503

Mailing Address (if different):

Telephone (optional)	Email
608-574-0589	paulpustina@gmail.com

STEP 3 Respondent

Please provide the following information about the individual or individuals whom you allege violated or improperly administered election laws:

Note: For 5.06 complaints, each respondent must be an election official. If there are multiple respondents, you can add their information on a separate page (see page 5).

Respondent Name	Respondent Title (5.06 complaints)
DaNean Naeger	Village Clerk/Chair, Board of Canvassers

Mailing Address: 345 West Street, Arena, WI 53503 / 314 Commerce Street, Rewey, WI 53580

Telephone (if available)	Email (if available)
608-753-2133	vilarena@villageofarena.net


STEP 6 Sign

Each complainant must complete ***either*** step 6a, "Unsworn Statement," or Step 6b "Sworn Statement." For either option, you may enter your digital signature by clicking the box and following the instructions, or you may print the form and sign it.

STEP 6a Unsworn Statement


I declare under penalty of false swearing under the law of Wisconsin that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed on the 8 day of April, 2025 at Middleton WI
(city or other location and state or country).

Paul Pustina
Printed Name


Signature

STEP 6b Sworn Statement (to be completed in the presence of a notary)

I, Paul D Rostiw, being first duly sworn, on oath, state that I personally read the above complaint, and that the above allegations are true based on my personal knowledge and, as to those stated on information and belief, I believe them to be true.



Complainant's Signature


Note: Each complainant listed above in section 6b must have this form sworn before a notary or other official able to swear oaths.

STATE OF WISCONSIN

County of, DANE (county of notarization)

Sworn to before me this day of, April 8, 2025.


(Signature of person authorized to administer oaths)



My commission expires on MAY 16, 2026, or is permanent.

Notary Public or [ ] (official title if not notary)

STEP 4 Applicable Statutes

Please cite each statute within Chapters 5 to 10 and 12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, as well as any other laws relating to elections, other than laws relating to campaign financing, that you allege were violated or improperly administered.

Note: The Commission cannot accept a complaint that does not cite specific provisions, including the correct subsections, of election law.

Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51, 7.53, 9.01, Wis. Stat. §5.25(4)

STEP 5 Allegations

Set forth in detail the facts that establish probable cause to believe that a violation occurred. Be as specific as possible as it relates to dates, times, individuals, and actions involved. Use as many separate pages as needed and attach copies of any supporting documentation, evidence, or affidavits.

See attached documents

RECOUNT PETITION

In Re:	The Election for Village of Arena President	Verified Petition for Recount

Petitioner Paul Pustina alleges and shows to Village Clerk DaNean Naeger:

1. That Petitioner was a candidate for the office of Village President of Arena in an election held on Tuesday, April 1st, 2025.

2. The Petitioner is an aggrieved party as defined in Wis. Stat. § 9.01(1)(a)5.

3. That Petitioner is informed and believes that a mistake and fraud has been committed in the Village of Arena in the counting and return of votes cast for the office of Village President of Arena.

4. That Petitioner is informed and believes and knows that:

   a. Chief Election Inspector Kristen Shea is a neighbor to incumbent Village Trustee Brittany Carney and personal friends with Village Trustee/Village President Kathy Stoltz, even publicly voicing support both verbally and digitally for candidate Brittany Carney and Kathy Stoltz.

   b. The municipality ran out of paper ballots and printed replacement ballots that did not register when put through the electronic voting machine. The Village Clerk, DaNean Naeger did not adequately prepare for a large voter turnout. The Clerk, keeping in mind the above average turnout for the February 18th, Primary Election, should have been prepared for a higher voter turnout as the race for Supreme Court justice and school funding referendum were also items on the ballot.

   c. The order of the General Election ballot was the same as the order of the February 18, 2025, Primary Election ballot. This brings in to question that lots were not drawn for the Tuesday, April 1st, General Election for ballot position.

   d. There was no multiple posted and published date for the meeting of the Municipal Board of Canvassers that would have provided any candidate to petition for a recount.

Wherefore: Petitioner requests a recount of the Village of Arena.

Dated this April 7 day of 2025

Paul D Pustina

Petitioner

I, Paul Pustina, being first duly sworn, on oath, state that the matters contained in the above petition are known to me to be true except for those allegations stated on information and belief, which I believe to be true.

Petitioner Paul Pustina

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7TH day of APRIL 2025

Brenda Gerardy

Notary Public (or other person authorized to administer oaths)

My Commission Expires MAY 12, 2028
(specify expiration date)

BRENDA GERARDY

BRENDA GERARDY
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF WISCONSIN

ATTEMPT TO PRESENT A RECALL PETITION FOR THE TUESDAY, APRIL 1ST GENERAL ELECTION

On Monday, April 7, 2025, at approximately 3:46, PM I entered the Village Hall of Arena, WI. with the intention of turning in a Recount Petition to indicate I wanted a recount of the April 1st, 2025 General Election results.

I announced to Village Clerk DaNean Naeger that I would be recording our conversation and then handed her the Recount Petition. The long silence is Ms. Naeger actually holding the document and reading it. After she finished reading it she set it down on the counter in front of her and the conversation went as such:

00:00 - Mr. Pustina:" I'm gonna record this."

00.46 - Clerk Naeger: "Ok"

00:49 - Mr. Pustina: "Ok. I'm on time?"

00:53- Clerk Naeger: "No. Needed it Friday"

00:57 - Mr. Pustina: "You weren't here Friday."

01:03 - Clerk Naeger: "I can't help that. I had my hours in."

01:08 - Mr. Pustina: "Could you repeat that please? A little louder? You weren't here Friday. And I can't help that? You can't help that. That you weren't here Friday, that's what you said, correct?

01:28 - Clerk Naeger: "No comment"

01:31- Mr. Pustina: "Ok. All right. Fair enough. Thank you, DaNean."

I then started to leave and I was partway out the door and turned back in and asked for the Recount Petition back. Ms. Naeger was in the process of throwing it away. She did give it back with no issue.

5.06 COMPLAINT OF PAUL PUSTINA AGAINST VILLAGE CLERK/TREASURER DANEAN NAEGER

INTRODUCTION

This Complaint is filed under Wis. Stat. § 5.06 by Complainant, Paul Pustina, alleging that the Village of Arena Clerk/Treasurer, DaNean Naeger (WCMC/CMC), failed to perform mandatory electoral duties and thereby prevented Complainant from exercising his statutory right to a timely recount petition, in violation of Chapters 5–10 of the Wisconsin Statutes. On April 4, 2025—the critical day for filing—the Clerk failed to maintain office hours or provide any means for Complainant to submit his recount petition, effectively foreclosing his narrowly defined opportunity to contest the outcome of the April 1, 2025, election for Village President.

Here, Complainant asserts that the Clerk's unavailability on the final day to file a recount petition, coupled with inadequate notice of the municipal board of canvassers' meeting, effectively nullified Complainant's statutory right to contest the outcome of the April 1, 2025, Village President election. The events giving rise to this Complaint underscore a broader pattern of procedural lapses previously identified in other 5.05 and 5.06 complaints against the same Clerk.

The present filing underscores how the continued procedural lapses, manifesting here in improper notice of the local board of canvassers meeting and the Clerk's unavailability on a key statutory deadline, has denied Complainant due process—thereby undermining public confidence in a closely decided municipal election.

Complainant seeks corrective action, including a remedy for the denied recount opportunity and any additional measures warranted by the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC).

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1. CONCERNED PERSONS/PARTIES

A. Complainant: Paul Pustina

- **Address**: 408 Dalogasa Dr, Arena, WI 53503
- **Contact**: (608) 574-0589; paulpustina@gmail.com
- **Candidate Status**: Complainant was a bona fide candidate for Village President of Arena in the April 1, 2025, election, ultimately ostensibly losing by a narrow margin of 15 votes according to the final tallies. He is also a Village resident "served by" the Clerk pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06. Given this narrow margin, Complainant possesses a clear statutory right to seek a recount under Wis. Stat. § 9.01.
- **Standing**: As a municipal candidate and elector, Complainant has a statutory right under Wis. Stat. § 9.01 to petition for a recount within the specified deadline. As a Village

elector and an aggrieved candidate, Complainant is directly "served by" Clerk Naeger under Wis. Stat. § 5.06. The Clerk's failure to maintain lawful office hours on the deadline day, as well as the improper board of canvassers notice, directly harmed Complainant by blocking his legally recognized opportunity to seek a recount. By disregarding essential protocols, the Clerk obstructed Complainant's right to petition for a recount, thereby harming him personally and undermining the integrity of local governance.

B. Respondent: Clerk/Treasurer DaNean Naeger

- **Addresses**:
  - Municipal Hall: 345 West Street, Arena, WI 53503
  - Residential: 314 Commerce Street, Rewey, WI 53580
- **Role**: As a Wisconsin Certified Municipal Clerk (WCMC/CMC), Respondent is statutorily responsible for administering all local election procedures, including accepting timely filing of recount petitions and properly noticing the municipal board of canvassers under Wis. Stats. §§ 7.51, 7.53, and 9.01. As the municipal clerk, Respondent must administer local elections in accordance with state statutes, including providing adequate notice of the municipal board of canvassers' meeting and maintaining availability for statutory filings (e.g., recount petitions) under Wis. Stat. § 9.01.
- **Prior Complaints**: Respondent is already the subject of separate 5.05 and 5.06 complaints (filed March 21, 2025 and April 7, 2025 by Becca Raven Uminowicz) alleging ballot-order mismanagement and other serious lapses as well as procedural violations on Election Day, April 1, 2025. Please incorporate the information contained in those complaints as part of this complaint. Those issues form part of the context for Complainant's allegations, demonstrating repeated administrative failings. The present matter continues that pattern of procedural and statutory neglect, culminating in a deprivation of Complainant's right to a recount.

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2. BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

1. **April 1, 2025 Election**: Complainant ran against Trustee Kathy Stoltz for the office of Village President. The results published on election night indicated Complainant lost by approximately 15 votes, 189–174. Complainant shares the concerns stated by Uminowicz's April 7, 2025, 5.06 WEC complaint that highlights the concerning voting irregularities and large discrepancies between the hand-counted ballots and the machine tabulated ballots, etc. In such close local contests, Wisconsin law provides a clear mechanism—Wis. Stat. § 9.01—for requesting a recount.
2. **Board of Canvassers Meeting**: According to a nominal notice posted in Village Hall, the local and municipal board of canvassers would convene "at the close of voting on Election Day" (April 1) to complete the canvass. Upon information and belief, the notice was not posted elsewhere and did not appear on the Village website under the regular meeting notice page. No email or formal notice was provided to news media (Valley Sentinel) who had requested it under Wis. Stat. § 19.84(1)(b). This makes the meeting

unnoticed and unlawful under Wisconsin Open Meetings Law. Complainant similarly received no individualized notice.

3. **Filing Deadline**: Under Wis. Stat. § 9.01, a candidate must submit a recount petition no later than 5 p.m. on the third business day following completion of the canvass. If the canvass was supposedly and ostensibly completed the night of April 1, the final day to file was Friday, April 4.
4. **Clerk's Unavailability**: The Clerk's posted office hours for Fridays are listed simply as "hours vary, call ahead." Respondent was completely absent from the office on Friday, April 4, providing no deputy and no alternative arrangement for her office to directly receive and process official filings that day. Consequently, Complainant had no access to the Clerk's office or the Clerk on the statutorily significant day.
5. **Attempted Submission on April 7**: Complainant then brought his signed and notarized Recount Petition to the Clerk on Monday, April 7, the first day the office was open after Friday, believing equitable tolling would apply because the Clerk was unavailable on the actual due date. Respondent refused, stating "Needed it Friday," and attempted to discard the petition. Complainant recovered the document and subsequently emailed a copy to Respondent and the WEC the same day.
   A true copy of the audio recording can be made available upon request. A true copy of the transcript is included as part of this complaint.
6. **Equitable Tolling & Invalid Canvass**: Because the municipal board of canvassers was allegedly convened on April 1 without proper notice, Complainant disputes whether the canvass (and thus the official completion date) was valid, given the insufficient notice and the questionable meeting procedure. If that meeting was invalid, the recount window never commenced (or commenced on a later date), meaning a statutory "deadline" on April 4 was illusory.
   He further contends that the Clerk's complete unavailability on April 4 necessitates tolling the filing deadline to Monday, April 7. Even if April 4 truly were the final day, the Clerk's total unavailability justifies an equitable extension to the next business day (April 7), consistent with longstanding principles preventing government officials from obstructing statutory rights by refusing to be present.

These facts, combined with Respondent's repeated procedural failures (see concurrently filed or referenced 5.06 complaints), indicate a deliberate or reckless denial of Complainant's statutory right to petition for a recount.

In sum, Complainant has adduced sufficient evidence to show that Clerk Naeger's handling of the canvass notice, office hours, and final deadline contravenes multiple statutory provisions—Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51, 7.53, 9.01, and relevant open meetings mandates.

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3. ALLEGATIONS

A. Denial of Recount Rights Under Wis. Stat. § 9.01 / Failure to Maintain Office Hours for Recount Petition Filing

Under **Wis. Stat. § 9.01**, the Clerk must accept a recount petition from an aggrieved candidate no later than 5 p.m. on the third business day following the canvass. However, the Clerk's refusal to be present or to provide an alternative means of filing on Friday, April 4—when Complainant sought to finalize his petition—effectively deprived Complainant of a statutory right.

1. **Clerk's Posted Hours**: Although the Clerk's posted schedule states "Fridays—hours vary, call ahead," she is not absolved from the duty to be available for official business on a critical statutory deadline day.
2. **No Deputy or Alternative Arrangement**: Respondent had neither a deputy clerk nor a posted method for receiving and processing official documents on April 4. Thus, Complainant was barred from timely filing despite the law's reliance on the Clerk's availability.
3. **Indication of Foreknowledge**: Respondent presumably knew the race for Village President was close (15 vote difference) and that the filing cutoff would be April 4, yet took no steps to accommodate a potential recount petition.
4. **Attempted Timely Filing**: Complainant's Monday, April 7 submission was effectively the soonest he could deliver the petition in person, given the Clerk's closure.

B. Improperly Noticed Canvass & Invalid Completion Date

Under **Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51, 7.53**, and the Open Meetings Law, the local board of canvassers must meet with proper notice and maintain a record of proceedings. Respondent posted only a nominal notice on the hall door, with no direct media email or individualized candidate notice, contravening the fundamental objectives of transparency.

1. **Minimal Notice:** A single posting inside the Village Hall, with no supplementary website update or emailed notice, failed to inform Complainant and local media about a critical meeting that concluded the canvass.
2. **No Email Notice**: Despite local press (Valley Sentinel) having requested notices of all governmental body meetings, the Clerk never sent a notice of the canvass. Even Complainant was unaware that the canvass was completed on April 1. Had the canvass not been validly completed, the recount filing deadline would extend correspondingly.
3. **Possible Nullification of April 1 Canvass**: If the board of canvassers meeting was improperly noticed or otherwise not validly convened, no official completion date could be recognized on April 1. Consequently, the third business day would not run from April 1. If the board of canvassers never validly convened, its pronouncement of final election results on April 1 is suspect. Consequently, the standard 3-day recount clock was never triggered.

C. Clerk's Refusal & Disposal Attempt on April 7

On Monday, April 7, Complainant attempted to submit the petition in person. The Clerk:

1. **Instant Refusal:** The Clerk summarily deemed Complainant's petition "late," ignoring her own unavailability on the official final day.

2. **Disputed Timeliness**: Summarily declared it was "needed Friday," disclaiming any responsibility for her unavailability.
3. **Attempted Disposal**: According to Complainant's firsthand account, the Clerk placed the petition aside and reached to dispose of it, only to relinquish it when Complainant intervened. Such an action indicates either willful disregard for statutory obligations or a fundamental misunderstanding of the Clerk's duties.
4. **Knowledge of Wrongdoing**: Respondent's abrupt handling of the petition suggests either a conscious disregard for Complainant's statutory rights or a gross misunderstanding of her official obligations.

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4. APPLICABLE STATUTES VIOLATED

1. **Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51, 7.53, 9.01** — These statutes govern the proper convening of the municipal board of canvassers, documentation of the canvass completion date, and the deadlines and processes for a recount petition. By failing to post effective notice of the canvass meeting and by closing her office on the final filing date for a recount, Clerk Naeger undermined these statutory safeguards. The Clerk's obligations to properly convene a lawful board of canvassers, document the completion date, and accept recount petitions within the statutory window were infringed by inadequate notice, closure on the final filing day, and refusal to accept the recount petition.
2. **Open Meetings (Wis. Stat. Ch. 19.81–19.98)** — The nominal notice posted only at Village Hall, with no email to local media (which had explicitly requested notice) or website posting, contravened the open meetings provisions. As a consequence, any board of canvassers' action on April 1 risks being procedurally invalid.
3. **Wis. Stat. § 5.05 references** — While the overarching statutory framework for election administration is found in Chapters 5 to 10, prior or concurrent 5.05 and 5.06 complaints highlight a broader pattern of Clerk Naeger's neglect or mishandling of mandated election procedures and a persistent disregard for statutory responsibilities in the Clerk's office, including official notice requirements and recordkeeping, and accessibility for candidate filings.
4. **Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4)** — Requires that polling places, and by extension election administration, remain accessible until the statutory deadline, ensuring all electors (including candidates filing petitions) have unobstructed access. Although primarily referencing physical access, the Clerk's unavailability effectively denied Complainant the legal convenience to file a petition. Clerk Naeger's unavailability and absence on April 4 effectively hindered statutory petition filing.

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5. LEGAL BASIS FOR COMPLAINT

Under Wis. Stat. § 5.06, a complainant who is "served by" an election official may allege that the official has failed to properly follow a statute or abused the discretion granted to them by election laws in Chapters 5–10. Complainant asserts:

1. **Wis. Stat. §§ 7.51, 7.53, 9.01** require the Clerk to properly convene the board of canvassers, record the completion date, and remain accessible for a recount petition.
2. **Wis. Stat. § 5.05** prior references: Although the main statutory focus here is on the Clerk's recount obligations, prior or concurrent complaints illustrate a broader pattern of statutory neglect.
3. **Open Meetings (Ch. 19.81–19.98)**: The incomplete or defective notice for the board of canvassers further undermined Complainant's ability to ascertain the recount-filing deadline.

As a result, Complainant was unlawfully denied the right to file a recount petition "no later than 5 p.m. on the third business day following the completion of the canvass."

Because the Clerk's behavior effectively blocked Complainant from exercising his statutory right and contravened essential procedures, relief under § 5.06 is warranted.

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6. STATEMENT OF INJURY

1. **Status as a Candidate**: Complainant was a bona fide candidate for Village President, losing by only 15 votes, in a small village race, a scenario precisely where the legislature intended recounts to serve as a pivotal check on potential error. He has an unequivocal right to demand a recount under Wis. Stat. § 9.01.
2. **Denial of Statutory Right**: By closing the office on the critical filing day (Friday, April 4), with no alternate method to accept legal filings, Respondent constructively barred Complainant from timely submission. This closure, combined with the refusal on April 7, deprived Complainant of the statutorily mandated route to contest the narrow result.
3. **Invalid Canvass Notice**: Even if the board of canvassers completed its work on April 1, that "completion" was tainted by improper notice, which arguably invalidates the timeline for counting three business days. Because the April 1 canvass meeting was not validly convened, the purported "completion date" is questionable, meaning the final recount filing date may not have occurred on April 4 at all. The Clerk's insistence on that date is thus misguided or disingenuous.
4. **Estoppel or Tolling**: Because the Clerk's unavailability blocked Complainant from meeting an official deadline, equitable remedies (tolling the deadline to April 7, or ordering the Clerk to accept the petition *nunc pro tunc*) are warranted. Under equitable principles, a statutory deadline cannot expire if government action (or inaction) renders compliance impossible. The Clerk's inaccessibility effectively guaranteed Complainant could not meet the deadline.
5. **Broader Procedural Harm**: Complainant's inability to avail himself of the recount process undermines local electoral legitimacy, especially in such a narrow race. The

public interest in a fair recount procedure is similarly compromised. Failing to accommodate a legitimate recount request in a close contest diminishes public trust in local election outcomes and denies Complainant his statutory remedy.

7. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Pursuant to **Wis. Stat. § 5.06**, Complainant respectfully requests that the Wisconsin Elections Commission:

1. **Investigate & Determine Clerk's Noncompliance**
   - Conduct a formal inquiry into whether the Clerk's failure to remain accessible on April 4, and the incomplete notice of the municipal board of canvassers, violated the recount and open meetings statutes.
   - Examine the notice posted for the municipal board of canvassers meeting to determine if the canvass truly occurred on April 1 or if the meeting was invalid under open meetings law.
2. **Order Acceptance of Recount Petition**
   - Direct Respondent to accept Complainant's recount petition *nunc pro tunc* (i.e., as though timely filed) on April 7, and otherwise declare Monday, April 7 to be the actual filing deadline in light of the Clerk's unavailability.
   - If needed, instruct the municipal board of canvassers to reconvene and permit a full and lawful recount under Wis. Stat. § 9.01, subject to oversight and transparency provisions.
3. **Invalidate or Extend the Canvass Deadline**
   - If the Commission finds that the board of canvassers meeting on April 1 was improperly noticed, issue an order declaring that the canvass completion date was invalid.
   - Instruct Respondent to re-notice and re-complete the canvass in compliance with statutory requirements, thus resetting the statutory recount window.
4. **Disciplinary and Oversight Measures**
   - If the Clerk's actions appear willful or reckless, consider referring the matter for potential prosecution under relevant statutes.
   - Alternatively, impose mandatory training or oversight on Respondent to ensure future compliance with recount procedures, open meetings, and statutory office-hour obligations.
   - Given the existing pattern of prior 5.06 complaints, the Commission may consider heightened oversight or a formal warning of potential removal from office if statutory duties continue to be flouted.
   - The Commission may require the Clerk to adopt policies ensuring candidate filing opportunities are never again thwarted by "closed office" days.
5. **Any Other Equitable Relief**

- Grant whatever further or different relief the Commission deems necessary to restore Complainant's statutory recount rights and safeguard the electorate's confidence.

8. CONCLUSION

By closing her office on the crucial filing day without establishing any alternate acceptance procedure, the Clerk contravened the plain requirements of Wisconsin's election law. The municipal board of canvassers likewise did not provide lawful notice of its purported meeting, casting doubt on the official canvass completion date. These combined failures unlawfully foreclosed Complainant's right to petition for a recount in a narrowly decided contest. Wisconsin election law prioritizes precise deadlines, but it does not permit officials to extinguish those deadlines unilaterally through non-availability and insufficient notice.

Accordingly, Complainant urges the Commission to exercise its authority under Wis. Stat. § 5.06 to remedy these procedural defects and violations by ordering the acceptance and processing of a recount petition, adjusting the recount timeline if the April 1 canvass was invalid, along with any ancillary relief or discipline warranted under the circumstances. By ensuring the recount process remains open and equitable, the Commission will affirm the integrity of local elections, particularly when margins are slim and administrative compliance is paramount. In a race separated by mere votes, these statutory protections ensure that the final outcome reflects the true will of the electorate.

Spring Election Night Call-In Return Sheet

Village of ARENA Ward 1

TOTAL # OF VOTERS 386 (Highest # on poll list)

Total # of Outstanding Provisional Ballots 0

STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION	
Brittany Kinser	160
Jill Underly	194
Adrianne Melby (write-in)	0
Scattering	2
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT	
Brad Schimel	161
Susan Crawford	219
Scattering	1
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE DISTRICT 4	
Jennifer Nashold	222
Scattering	3
Village President	
Kathy Stoltz	189
Paul Pustina	174
Scattering	4
Village Trustee	
Tara Hill	142
Brittany Carney	119
Kathy Stoltz	129
Steve Wilkinson	228
Joseph Hipsky	152
Don Helt	153
Scattering	1
River Valley School District - School Board Member - Area 3	
Jeffrey J. Maier	216
Scattering	0
River Valley School District - School Board Member - Area 6	
Emily Beck	170
Jess Hisel	115
Scattering	0
River Valley School District - School Board Member - Area 9	
John D. Bettinger	216
Scattering	1
State of Wisconsin Photographic Identification for Voting Referendum	
Yes	225
No	152
River Valley School District Exceed Revenue Limit Referendum	
Yes	156
No	215

Outlook

Fw: Municipal Board of Canvassers

From Valley Sentinel <editor@valleysentinelnews.com>
Date Sun 2025-04-06 11:57 AM
To Paul Pustina <paulpustina@gmail.com>; uminowiczbr@gmail.com <uminowiczbr@gmail.com>
Cc Gary Grass <g.grass@sbcglobal.net>

Paul, as you are an aggrieved candidate; and Becca Raven, as you have been documenting elections violations in the Village of Arena, we wanted to forward the below along for your records.

I noticed numerous other procedural violations as a media observer election night and am happy to share my observations upon request.

Best,

Taylor Scott, *Managing Editor*

Valley Sentinel
Spring Green, Wisconsin
608-588-6694
editor@valleysentinelnews.com
www.valleysentinelnews.com



Wisconsin Newspaper Association, Best in Division E (2022)

From: Valley Sentinel
Sent: Sunday, April 6, 2025 11:52 AM
To: Village Clerk/Treasurer <vilarena@villageofarena.net>
Subject: Municipal Board of Canvassers

DaNean,

We were doing research on elections and were wondering when the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers met. We were shocked today when reviewing a cursory picture I had taken of the notice board outside the village hall election night to see a small notice which indicated the board of canvassers met that night, election night.

We received no notice that the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers was meeting. I was in attendance to observe the end of election night as a media observer and no formal meeting seemingly happened, there was no formal call to order, roll call or record of the proceedings which would indicate that a meeting of the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers was meeting. And if a meeting of the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers happened, it wasn't properly noticed to us as news media that have requested notice. The clerk as chair of the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers had the duty to provide us notice.
Wisconsin's Open Meetings Law mandates that governmental bodies, including the Municipal Board of Canvassers, provide public notice of meetings and maintain records of proceedings. This ensures public access and transparency in governmental operations.

As you know, this notice to Valley Sentinel — as news media that has requested notice — is required for meetings to be considered properly noticed. When news media request notice under Wis. Stat. 19.84(1)(b) it is separate from the notice given to the public, but equally as necessary.

Our notice sent in 2020 states: "*Could you please send us all upcoming board and committee agendas/notices/meeting packets and include us indefinitely on your office's Wis. Stat.§ 19.84(1)(b). news media email list to receive those items in the future?*" We clearly and intentionally didn't limit our request to Village Board, but ALL boards and committees, etc. in the village.

Under Wisconsin's Open Meetings Law, if a news media organization has submitted a written request to a municipal clerk for notice of meetings, the organization is entitled to receive notice of all meetings of governmental bodies within that municipality, including the municipal board of canvassers. Wisconsin Statute § 19.84(1)(b) specifies that public notice of all meetings must be given to the public and to those news media who have filed a written request for such notice.

The municipal board of canvassers qualifies as a "governmental body" under the Open Meetings Law. Therefore, its meetings are subject to the same public notice requirements as other governmental bodies.

Clearly, our request to receive "all upcoming board and committee agendas/notices/meeting packets" is more than sufficiently broad to encompass meetings of the municipal board of canvassers.

We were going to come in Friday to discuss, but saw you were out of the office.

Again, can you please send us all notices for the Village — regardless of governmental body or subunit, etc. — please regard this a general request for the entire municipality like we intended in our 2020 notice.

Thank you,

Taylor Scott, *Managing Editor*

Valley Sentinel
Spring Green, Wisconsin
608-588-6694
editor@valleysentinelnews.com
www.valleysentinelnews.com

WNA 2023 BETTER NEWSPAPER CONTEST AWARD WINNER
WISCONSIN NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION

Wisconsin Newspaper Association, Best in Division E (2022)

DaNean Naeger
Village of Arena
345 West Street
Arena, WI 53503

April 23, 2025

WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION
Attn: Angelo O'Brien Sharpe
Staff Attorney
201 West Washington Avenue, Fl 2
PO Box 7984
Madison, WI 53707
angela.sharpe@wisconsin.gov
elections@wi.gov

RE: Wis. Stat. § 5.06 Complaint Filed with Wisconsin Elections Commission: Paul Pustina v. DaNean Naeger (EL 25-56)

Dear Ms. O'Brien Sharpe,

Please accept this response to the above-referenced Complaint.

Mr. Pustina alleges that I failed to post the local and municipal board of canvassers notice. This is inaccurate. The notice was posted on the Village Hall bulletin board, along with the Village's website at www.villageofarenawi.gov on March 11, 2025. I specifically remember checking to ensure the website posting was viewable on March 28, 2025, for I was talking to another municipal clerk who had a question on posting. I informed the municipal clerk that the Village's notice was posted as well as on the website and I better check it to ensure it is viewable. While I was on the phone, I checked the website, and all of the notices were viewable. I also checked the website today, April 23, 2025, and the notice is there. Taylor Scott, Valley Sentinel Managing Editor did not mention in his email on Sunday, April 6, 2025, at 11:52 a.m. that the notice was not on the website. In a previous complaint, the Valley Sentinel noted that they continually check the website for updates. This is something that Taylor would have mentioned in his email if the website did not have the notice. This is the fifth year of conducting the municipal board of canvasser notice and this is the first time the Valley Sentinel has requested election notices. He also presented an email he sent to other municipalities for the notices. I contacted a couple of the municipalities on Monday, April 7, 2025, after receiving his email, and none of them provided the notice and hadn't received an email from the Valley indicating that it should be included in the notice, just singling out the Village of Arena.

The local and municipal board of canvass was held on April 1, 2025, at approximately 10:35 p.m. giving a deadline to file a recount petition no later than Friday, April 4, 2025. Taylor Scott took a picture of the notice but failed to read it. He was present as an observer on April 1, 2025, from approximately 7:30 pm to 10:15 pm. Taylor Scott left prior to the start of the MBOC.

Office hours vary on Fridays and Pustina was well aware of this because he attends every meeting at the Village Office and passes the hours on a monthly basis. Pustina did not call the Village office any time between Wednesday, April 2, 2025, and Monday, April 7, 2025, per phone ID or leave a message indicating he planned on presenting a recount petition. I called WEC on Wednesday, April 2, 2025, to ask about the process of the recount and it was reviewed with me. Per review of the Village's security camera on Friday, April 4, 2025 (for which I have the day 7 am -5 pm downloaded on USB for your review if wanted), Paul Pustina nor Taylor Scott arrived at the Village Hall to verify if I was present or to see if there was note indicating to place any correspondence in the drop box.

Pustina arrived on Monday, April 7, 2025, at approximately 3:46 p.m. to submit the recount petition. The conversation submitted is accurate, except the last statement that states "Ms. Naeger was in the process of throwing it away." I had scanned the recount petition and was about to date/time stamp the recount petition when he asked for it back. He resent the petition via email later that evening. As soon as Pustina left my office, I sent an email to WEC asking if I needed to accept the recount. See attached response. If the recount petition was dated on April 4, 2025, I would have accepted the recount, but it was notarized on April 7, 2025. Showing that Pustina had no intention of submitting the recount petition in a timely manner of April 4, 2025.

The Recount Petition indicates that Chief Inspector Kristen Shea is a neighbor which has no relevance to completing her election duties per the oath that was taken. In smaller communities, everyone knows everyone. The Village did run out of ballots, I ordered an extra 100 ballots but that was still not enough. Per email with the Iowa County Clerk, other municipalities ran into the same issue. The process is to make copies and hand count the ballots at the end of the night. Just like if the tabulator (ICE machine) broke down, all ballots would be hand counted. MBOC was posted in a timely manner.

I am no longer the Village Clerk for the Village of Arena. There are currently two openings on the Village Board so a recount may not be needed.

Should the Commission need anything further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

DaNean Naeger

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 2025

Beth Graber

Beth Graber
Printed Name

My commission is permanent/expires 11-26-2028

NOTARY PUBLIC
BETH GRABER
STATE OF WISCONSIN

On 04/08/2025 11:04 AM CDT Erin Hoag (Support) <elections@wisconsin.gov> wrote:

Your Wisconsin Elections Commission request number (87162) is updated with the information below.

Erin Hoag (Wisconsin Elections Commission)
Apr 8, 2025, 11:04 CDT

The statute says "The petitioner shall file a verified petition or petitions with the proper clerk or body under par. (ar) not earlier than the time of completion of the canvass following canvassing of any valid provisional ballots under s. 6.97 (4) and, except as provided in this subdivision, not later than 5 p.m. on the 3rd business day following the last meeting day of the municipal or county board of canvassers determining the election for that office...".

I'm not sure what the March 11 date is referring to; the notice of the MBOC meeting? You are going to have to determine whether or not to accept it based on the timeline and how things transpired, in accordance with that statute.

Village Clerk/Treasurer
Apr 8, 2025, 10:26 CDT

**CAUTION: This email originated from outside the organization.
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Conducted April 1, 2025 at 10:35 p.m. No provisional ballots. MBOC was posted on March 11, 2025. Recount petition was dated/notarized on April 7th. My hours vary on Friday's, to call ahead. He did not call and inform me that he had any intent to file.

DaNean Naeger, CMC/WCMC
Village Clerk/Treasurer
Village of Arena
345 West St.
Arena, WI 53503

P (608) 753-2133
F (608) 753-2851
Population: 877
vilarena@villageofarena.net
www.villageofarenawi.gov

Elected Officials and Members of Village Committees: in order to comply with the Open Meetings Act requirements, please limit any reply to only the sender of this electronic communication.

E-mail correspondence to and from this address may be subject to the open records law and may be disclosed to outside parties.

Erin Hoag (Wisconsin Elections Commission)
Apr 8, 2025, 07:18 CDT

Hi DaNaen,
When did you conduct your board of canvass meeting? The deadline would be 5pm on the 3rd business day after that meeting. Also, we did hear from him that you were unavailable on Friday so it sounds like maybe he was planning to turn it in on time..?

Some clarification on those points would be helpful in determining how to proceed.

Let me know!
Erin Hoag
Elections Specialist
Wisconsin Elections Commission
201 West Washington Avenue
Madison, WI 53704
608-266-8005

Village Clerk/Treasurer
Apr 7, 2025, 16:18 CDT

CAUTION: This email originated from outside the organization.
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Received this today 4/7/25 at 3:50 p.m. I informed him that the cut off was Friday. Ok to accept anyway?

DaNean Naeger, CMC/WCMC
Village Clerk/Treasurer
Village of Arena
345 West St.
Arena, WI 53503
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Attachment(s)
2173_001.pdf

Village Clerk

From: Megan Currie <Megan.Currie@iowacounty.org>
Sent: Tuesday, April 1, 2025 9:50 PM
To: Village Clerk
Subject: RE: Counting Ballots

Received.

From: Village Clerk <vilarena@villageofarena.net>
Sent: Tuesday, April 1, 2025 9:48 PM
To: Megan Currie <Megan.Currie@iowacounty.org>
Subject: RE: Counting Ballots

DaNean Naeger, CMC/WCMC
Village Clerk/Treasurer
Village of Arena
345 West St.
Arena, WI 53503
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From: Megan Currie <Megan.Currie@iowacounty.org>
Sent: Tuesday, April 1, 2025 7:15 PM
To: Village Clerk <vilarena@villageofarena.net>
Subject: RE: Counting Ballots

I have had to print additional ballots for 8 other municipalities tonight.

From: Village Clerk <vilarena@villageofarena.net>
Sent: Tuesday, April 1, 2025 6:43 PM
To: Megan Currie <Megan.Currie@iowacounty.org>
Subject: Counting Ballots

Hi Megan,

Just wanted to give you a heads up that we will be counting ballots tonight due having to make copies. Results will be delayed…approx. 70 ballots to hand count.

DaNean Naeger, CMC/WCMC
Village Clerk/Treasurer
Village of Arena
345 West St.
Arena, WI 53503
P (608) 753-2133
F (608) 753-2851
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Monday, May 5th, 2025

Wisconsin Elections Commission

Mr. Brandon Hunzicker

Staff Attorney

201 W Washington Avenue

Madison, WI 53707-7984

Dear Mr. Hunzicker,

In this correspondence is my reply Ms. Danean Naeger's response to:

Wis. Stat. 5.06 Complaint Filed with Wisconsin Elections Commission:

Paul Pustina v. DaNean Naeger (EL 25-56)

Thank you for your time and attention on this matter.

Regards,



Paul Pustina

RESPONSE TO DANEAN NAEGER REPLY REGARDING:

Wis. Stat. 5.06 Complaint Filed with Wisconsin Elections Commission: Paul Pustina v. DaNean Naeger (EL-25-56)

1. In response to Ms. Naeger's reply regarding the posting of the local and municipal Board of Canvasser's notice, I refer to the statement regarding this in my complaint.
2. In regards to Ms. Naeger's statement that she was talking to another municipal Clerk who had a question on posting. Can Ms. Naeger provide the name of said Clerk, municipality and time of the call?
3. Ms. Naeger's statement that this was the fifth year of conducting the Municipal Board of Canvasser notice and it being the first time the Valley Sentinel requested election notices has no bearing on the complaint.
4. Regarding office hours and my not calling the Village Office between Wednesday, April 2, 2025 and Monday, April 7, 2025 has no bearing. I am not required to contact the Village Clerk ahead of time, notifying her of my intention.
5. Per the recording of the conversation on Monday, April 7th, between Ms. Naeger and myself, she states, when I said she was not in the office on Friday, "I can't help that. I had my hours in."
6. I did not stop in, or call the office on Friday as it is known that the Village Office is not open on Friday's. I also do not have Ms. Naeger's cell phone number. Which would have been her personal number as she was not in possession of a Village provided cell phone during her capacity as Village Clerk. With that knowledge, I believed that since the Village Office was closed on Friday, that Monday, April 7th, would be the last day for turning the petition in.
7. I dispute Ms. Naeger's statement that she had "scanned the recount petition and was about to date/time stamp the recount petition when he asked for it back". The copy machine/scanner is in a hallway outside the Village Office area and when I turned back, Ms. Naeger had not left the office and was leaning over in the process of throwing the petition away. If she had scanned the document as she has stated, where is it? There should be two copies of the petition in the Village's possession. That copy and the copy I provided by email later that evening. Wouldn't she have provided the scanned copy with her response?
8. Again, regarding her statement about Kristen Shea and running out of ballots, I refer to my complaint.
9. Ms. Naeger's statement, "I am no longer the Village Clerk for the Village of Arena. There are currently two openings on the Village Board so a recount may not be needed.", should have no bearing on following through with my complaint and should not absolve her of being investigated. This statement is an attempt to not take responsibility for her actions on the night of the election and thereafter.
10. Ms. Naeger also fails to address the issue in the complaint regarding the ballot order.

Regards,

Paul Pustina

WISCONSIN NOTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT

State of Wisconsin
County of DANE

This instrument was acknowledged before me on MAY 5, 2025 by PAUL PUSTINA.

(Seal) GEORGE R. YELDER
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF WISCONSIN

Signature of Notary Public
Printed Name: GEORGE R. YELDER
Title of Office: NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires: MAY 17, 2026

eSign

Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

May 7, 2026

Becca Raven Uminowicz
373 Willow Street
Arena, WI 53503

DaNean Naeger
314 Commerce Street
Rewey, WI 53580

Sent via email to: uminowiczbr@gmail.com, vilarena@villageofarena.net, clerk@villageofarenawi.gov, dnaeger69@gmail.com, tanderson@boardmanclark.com

Re: In the Matter of: Becca Uminowicz v. DaNean Naeger (EL 25-55)

Dear Ms. Uminowicz and Ms. Naeger,

Introduction

This letter is in response to the complaint submitted by Becca Uminowicz ("the Complainant") to the Wisconsin Elections Commission ("Commission"), which was filed in response to allegations of actions taken by Village of Arena Clerk DaNean Naeger ("Respondent Naeger") and the Acting Chief Election Inspector Kristen Shea ("Respondent Shea") (together "the Respondents") regarding numerous actions taken by the Respondents during the Spring 2025 elections. The Complainant alleges violations of Wis. Stat. §§ 5.25, 5.60, 5.72, 5.85, 7.15, and 7.51.

The Commission has reviewed the Complaint and Response. The Commission provides the following analysis and decision. In short, the Commission finds that the Complainant did show probable cause that a violation of law or abuse of discretion occurred when Respondent Naeger dismantled the accessible voting station and removed the vote here signs before the end of the voting period, and regarding a lack of notice provided to news media with a request on file.

The Commission finds that the Complainant did not show probable cause that a violation of law or abuse of discretion regarding the set-up of the Dominion ICE Machine, shifting the ICE machine prior to the end of voting, making copies of ballots, providing notice of the Board of Municipal Canvasser's meeting to the public, or regarding the claim that the Respondent Shea approximated rather than re-tallied when errors were made during the vote count, or regarding election observer management. Thus, the Commission dismisses these aspects of the Complaint.[1]

[1] The Complainant also alleges violations of the Help America Vote Act. The Commission has responded to the alleged violations of HAVA on April 11, 2025, noting that HAVA only applies to federal elections and that no federal offices were on the ballot during the Spring 2025 election.

Commissioners
Ann S. Jacobs, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Don M. Millis | Carrie Riepl | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen

Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

Commission Authority and Role in Resolving Complaints Filed Under Wis. Stat. § 5.06

Under Wis. Stats. §§ 5.05(1)(e) and 5.06(6), the Commission is provided with the inherent, general, and specific authority to consider the submissions of the parties to a complaint and to issue findings. The Commission may summarily issue a decision and provide that decision to the affected parties. This letter serves as the Commission's final decision regarding the issues raised in this complaint.

The Commission's role in resolving verified complaints filed under Wis. Stat. § 5.06, which challenge the decisions or actions of local election officials, is to determine whether a local official acted contrary to applicable election laws or abused their discretion in administering applicable election laws.

Complaints "shall set forth such facts as are within the knowledge of the Complainant to show probable cause to believe that a violation of law or abuse of discretion has occurred or will occur." Wis. Stat. § 5.06(1). Probable cause is defined in Wis. Admin. Code § EL 20.02(4) to mean "the facts and reasonable inferences that together are sufficient to justify a reasonable, prudent person, acting with caution, to believe that the matter asserted is probably true."

Complaint Allegations

Alleged Polling Place Accessibility Issues

The Complainant, Becca Uminowicz, Village of Arena Trustee, alleges that the Respondents, Village of Arena Clerk DaNean Naeger and Acting Chief Election Inspector and Village of Arena Trustee Kristen Shea, violated the law by failing to ensure unobstructed access and necessary accessibility accommodations, and by removing signage and dismantling the alternative paper accessibility station prior to the polling place's closure at 8 p.m.

The Complainant alleges that the voting machines were not appropriately set up to accommodate voters with disabilities, disenfranchising these voters. The Complainant states that the Village of Arena does not have standalone electronic voting machines and relies on a Dominion ImageCast Evolution (ICE) machine both to tabulate paper ballots and for accessible voting for individuals with disabilities. The Complainant asserts that there was no information posted that specifically stated that the ICE machine was an accessible voting machine, and that the machine was not used as an accessible voting machine. The Complainant states that the only way that the ICE machines can operate as accessible voting machines is if the "optional integrated ADA compliant configurations" are enabled. The Complainant alleges that an observer noted that the screen of the machine displayed "Options: none" signifying that the accessibility features were never activated. The Complainant also provided a photo showing this display on the machine. The Complainant states that "it is not known how many voters that needed accessibility were unable to vote or voted incorrectly due to a lack of accessibility." The Complainant further alleges that the Respondent Shea, could not confirm whether the voting machine had any accessibility configurations.

The Complainant also alleges that the paper accessibility set up was ineffective. The Complainant asserts that the setup was a table with privacy shields and a single chair and that there were no specialized tools available, such as large-print instructions, braille markers, or supportive adaptive tech.

The Complainant states that signage for the station was removed at 7:42 p.m. and that the station was fully dismantled by 7:45 p.m., inconsistent with the requirement that polling places remain fully functional until 8 p.m. The Complainant provides time-stamped photos allegedly of the Respondent Naeger taking down the accessible voting set up at 7:45 p.m.

Alleged Issues with Copied Ballots

The Complainant alleges that the Respondent Naeger was negligent in deciding to order an insufficient number of ballots, despite knowledge that prior elections saw near-depletion of ordered ballots. The Complainant states that this mistake and an "unusually high turnout near 66%" forced a late-day pivot to additional ballots needing to be copied onto legal-sized paper. The Complainant asserts that, when notified, the Iowa County Clerk, Megan Currie, declined to help due to the rarity of the machine and her unfamiliarity with it. County Clerk Currie allegedly stated, "I received an email from the clerk that they will be making copies of the ballots due to not having enough from the printer. I am unable to assist due to the machine having a different type of tabulating machine from the majority of the other municipalities in the county."

The Complainant alleges that the Respondent then made an unknown number of copies of the ballot to use for the duration of voting and that, once voted, the ballots were dropped directly into the ICE machine bin but later sorted out and counted with the sequestered ballots containing write-in votes. The Complainant asserts that since the County declined to assist the Village, there is no way to know if established emergency procedures were followed regarding the copied ballots. The Complainant states, upon information and belief, that the Respondent had sole custody of the copied ballots and that they were not checked for marks by election inspectors. The Complainant alleges that typically when extra ballots are needed there should be a protocol to ensure that each copied ballot is identical and properly tracked and that the County clerks often oversee or review these procedures. In this case, the Complainant alleges that since County Clerk Currie declined involvement, the Respondent operated alone and no other inspector verified the copied ballots. The Complainant asserts that "the potential for human error or interference is significantly higher in such ad hoc procedures—particularly with the [Respondent Naeger] under suspicion from earlier ballot arrangement concerns."[2]

Alleged Statistical Irregularities

Next, the Complainant alleges that there was a large swing in voter support between the hand-counted ballots and the ones tallied by the ICE Dominion machine. The Complainant claims that Candidate Paul Pustina led the hand count by a margin of 34-24 votes but was overtaken by Candidate Kathy Stoltz who won, 189-174 votes, when the machine counted votes were integrated, a swing of 21.4 percentage points. The Complainant asserts that such a shift is unusually large and atypical in elections, especially in small municipal races. The Complainant states that such a swing is exceedingly rare without a unique demographic split or other known reason, and alleges that neither exists here. The Complainant points to a previously filed 5.06 complaint in which the Respondent did not complete the second random drawing for the order of candidates on the ballot to suggest that the Respondent had a willingness to "circumvent mandated processes."

[2] The Complainant is referencing EL 25-29, also made by the Complainant against the Respondent Naeger, where the Complainant alleged that the Respondent Shea failed to conduct the required second drawing of lots to determine ballot arrangement under Wis. Stat. § 5.60(1)(b). The Commission found that the Respondent Shea violated Wis. Stat. § 5.60(1)(b)

The Complainant also asserts that Stolz received 60 less votes when she ran for Trustee than she received when she ran for Village President, and states that she believes that this "further heightens the suspicion because it is unusual voting behavior." The Complainant states that "while [this is] not direct evidence of manipulation, this reinforces the irregularity of the overall scenario."

Alleged Early Dismantling of Polling Place

Next, the Complainant alleges that she observed the Respondent take down the "vote here" signs outside the polling place around 7:50 p.m., ten minutes before the statutorily required closing time of 8 p.m. The Complainant asserts that voters who arrived after this may have assumed that voting had ended or that the polling place was not located there. The Complainant further alleges that observers saw the ICE machine being moved and part of the poll workers' area being reconfigured into "closing mode," starting at 7:56 p.m. The Complainant provided a timestamped photo allegedly showing the Respondent Naeger taking down the outdoor signs at 7:45 p.m. The Complainant states that these actions are a violation of the law and indicate a deliberate decision or reckless approach to conclude voting prior to the official deadline.

Alleged Lack of Notice of the Board of Municipal Canvassers

The Complainant alleges that there were issues regarding notice of the Municipal Board of Canvassers ("Board") meeting following the election. The Complainant states that the Board must hold an open, noticed meeting so that candidates and the public can observe the final certification. The Complainant asserts that the media was provided no direct notice and that the link to the Village website was broken. The Complainant also alleges that there was only a minimal notice posted within the Village Hall that stated that the Board would meet that same evening. As evidence, the Complainant provided an email allegedly from the Managing Editor of the Valley Sentinel, Taylor Scott, with a forwarded email from Mr. Scott to the Respondent Naeger stating that he received no notice of the meeting and that no formal meeting appeared to happen. Scott alleged, in the email, that no formal call to order, roll call, or record of the proceedings was made. Additionally, Scott alleged that he noticed numerous other procedural violations that he would be happy to share upon request. The Complainant also provided photos allegedly of the notice on the Village Hall. Finally, the Complainant provided screenshots allegedly of the Village website showing the "Latest News" section with updates from February 7, 2025 to February 28, 2025, the "Events" with a calendar containing hyperlinks on April 1st, 8th, and 17th, 2025 and the list of events on April 8, 2025, and a page allegedly of the website showing the words "HOME NOT FOUND" and "404. The page/URL requested wasn't found on this site." The Complainant asserts that this lack of notice severely hampered due process for challenging suspicious results. The Complainant alleges that this lack of notice is in violation of the laws.

Alleged Issues with the Counting and Tallying Process

Additionally, the Complainant alleges that Respondent Shea told election and media observers to sit more than eight feet away from the count and had privacy shields blocking the view of election inspectors. She states that observers had to move to be able to see the process, and that during the counting process election inspectors spoke softly and could not be heard.

The Complainant also alleges that Respondent Shea rushed the other two election inspectors during the count, which several times resulted in mistakes and miscounts. The Complainant states that more than once inspectors made errors that the Respondent resolved by approximation rather than retallying or verifying. The Complainant provides a photo allegedly of the election inspectors sorting ballots where a large amount of space is shown between the inspectors and the person taking the photo. Additionally, the privacy shield is still set up between one of the inspectors and the photographer.

Requests for Relief by the Complainant

The Complainant requests the following orders for relief from the Commission. The Complainant requests a formal, independent audit of the April 1, 2025, election, including chain-of-custody reviews, logs from the Dominion ICE machine, a verification of the hand-counted ballots, and, where appropriate, interview poll workers, observers, and other witnesses. The Complainant requests that the Commission reviews the clerical process of copying ballots and evaluate whether the accessibility features of the Dominions ICE machine were activated.

Additionally, the Complainant requests that, should the Commission find that the alleged irregularities and misadministration compromised the results, that the Commission invalidate the election results and order a special election. Further, the Complainant requests that Respondent Naeger be prohibited from overseeing further elections without additional oversight and training and that Respondent Shea be directed to recuse herself from serving as an election inspector if she remains as trustee.

The Complainant also requests that a forensic analysis be conducted of the Dominion ICE machine to determine whether unauthorized modifications occurred or if unlogged ballot entries manipulated the final tallies, and that these are cross-references with logs of the manually counted ballots.

The Complainant requests that the Village of Arena be required to implement a fully configured accessible voting system and robust signage to ensure that voters with disabilities are able to independently cast their ballot, and that it is mandated that signage remains in place until 8 p.m. The Complainant also requests that the Commission conduct random spot checks in upcoming elections to confirm ongoing compliance.

Finally, the Complainant requests that the Commission refers alleged repeated noncompliance or intentional misconduct to the District Attorney, direct mandatory remedial training for the Respondent Naeger, and issues formal guidance clarifying that local officials in active local government positions should avoid serving as election inspectors.

Response

The Commission only received a response from Respondent Naeger.

Alleged Polling Place Accessibility Issues

In her response, Respondent Naeger alleged that no voters entered the parking lot or the polling place from 7:42 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. and that the doors were unlocked and lights were on at all times. The

Respondent also asserts that the ICE machine was set up according to the manual, including having headphones and handheld devices plugged in and accessible. The Respondent states that the machine requires a key to activate the accessibility option for security measures, which means that an election inspector or the chief inspector will enable this option when requested. The Respondent asserts that there were also additional marking devices and magnifying glasses available upon request for voters who required a paper ballot to vote. The Respondent alleges that the Dominion ICE Machine is an approved ADA compliant machine from the Wisconsin Elections Commission and that the Village takes ADA accommodation seriously. The Respondent also asserts that the wheelchair accessible station meets ADA standards and that, while the sign marking the table was removed at 7:45 p.m., the table, marking devices, and privacy screen were still fully functional until 8 p.m.

Alleged Issues with the Copied Ballots

The Respondent alleges that she ordered 100 more ballots more than number for the highest local election and school district referendum but still ran out. The Respondent asserts that Dominion requires that voted copied ballots are placed in the auxiliary bin for hand counting at the end of the night. The Respondent alleges that she first made 25 copies then made 15 each additional time that the polling place ran out of ballots. The Respondent asserts that Election Inspectors were handed the copied ballots before they were handed to the voter and were required to place their initials on the ballot, indicating that it was a qualified and blank ballot. The Respondent tallied the number of copies, in total 70 copied ballots, and reported this number to the Iowa County Clerk via email. The Respondent claims that the unvoted ballots were kept separate in the poll book area at the end of the night, so as to not be mixed with the voted ballots, and that the voted ballots were removed from the auxiliary bin after the polls closed and counted for a total of 63 copied ballots. The Respondent asserts that the Complainant's allegation of a highly unusual shift in voting patterns and other anomalies is speculation. A public records request provided the email from February 25, 2025, with the request from the Complainant for "275 Regular ballots and 50 Absentee ballots" and the election results for the Village of Arena: including a tally sheet with the total votes from the paper, machine, and both ballots, and the print off from the ICE machine with the total number of machine ballots.

Alleged Early Dismantling of Polling Place

The Respondent alleges that the "Vote Here" sign that was removed was not a required voting sign. The Respondent states that the sign was removed because the light in the parking lot was not working and the signs were thus unreadable. The Respondent adds that the porch light was on and the door propped open for entry. Additionally, the Respondent asserts that the ICE machine was shifted to see the time since the Chief Election Inspector uses the time on the ICE to officially open and close the poll given that every clock/watch can vary. The Respondent states that the machine was available for use by all voters.

Alleged Lack of Notice of the Board of Municipal Canvassers

The Respondent alleges that the Board of Municipal Canvasser's meeting was held on April 1, 2025, at approximately 10:35 p.m. The Respondent asserts that the notice was posted on the Village Hall bulletin board and the Village's website. The Respondent states that she confirmed that the notice was on the

website on March 28, 2025, and on April 23, 2025, and alleges that she had received no notification that the notice could not be found on the website.

Alleged Issues with the Counting and Tallying Process

Finally, Respondent Naeger asserts that Kristen Shea is a certified Chief Election Inspector who took an oath and followed through with her duties. The Respondent alleges that the only other Chief Inspector was the spouse of a candidate on the ballot. The Respondent states that observers were able to sit or walk around the area to observe the straightening and review of the ballots for write-ins. The Respondent alleges that once the ICE machines were secured and the voting booths were removed as soon as possible. The Respondent also asserts that the election inspectors were new to the hand tally process and if ballots did not match they would start the count over once five unmatched ballots had been called out. The Respondent states that "having observers watching their every move may have made [inspectors] nervous, causing the restart of counting."

Respondent Naeger also provided additional materials about two weeks after submitting her response. The materials provided are attached to an email allegedly from Marie Currie, the Iowa County Clerk, from May 14, 2025. First, Respondent Naeger provides an email allegedly from her to the County Clerk with the names for the ballot and the number of regular and absentee ballots ordered on February 25, 2025, titled "Spring Election." Second, Respondent Naeger proves the alleged tally sheet from the April 1, 2025 election with handwritten total of the vote and a certification sheet signed by the Respondent Shea and two others. Next, Respondent Naeger provides a chart allegedly with the total number of in-person and absentee votes in the Village of Arena from the 2022 Spring Election. Finally, the Respondent Naeger provides the receipt containing the machine counted totals.

Reply

The Complainant did not file a Reply.

Discussion

The Commission will examine each of the allegations in the complaint along with the relevant statutes.

Analysis of Alleged Polling Place Accessibility Issues

Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4)(a) states in relevant part that:

> Each polling place shall be accessible to all individuals with disabilities. The commission shall ensure that the voting system used at each polling place will permit all individuals with disabilities to vote without the need for assistance and with the same degree of privacy that is accorded to nondisabled electors voting at the same polling place.

The Complainant alleges that the Respondents undermined the suitability of the polling place for individuals with disabilities by providing inadequate accessibility measures and removing the signs of the wheelchair accessible voting station early. The Respondent argues that the Dominion ICE machines are approved ADA compliant by the Wisconsin Election Commission and that the machines were set up in accordance with the manual but require a key from an election inspector to activate the accessibility option. Additionally, the Respondent asserts that the wheelchair accessible voting station was ADA compliant, and while the sign for the table was removed at 7:45 p.m., "the table, marking devices, and a privacy screen were still fully functional until 8 p.m."

The Complainant alleges that the Dominion ICE machine was not appropriately set up as an accessible voting machine unless the "'optional integrated ADA compliant configurations' are enabled." The Commission provides guidance on how to use the accessibility features of the machine on its website.[3] While a key is needed to access the accessibility functions of the machine, this is something that is done when a voter requests to use the machine. Thus, there is not enough evidence to show that voters were denied the ability to use the accessible features of the machine, and the Commission does not find probable cause that the Respondents violated the law.

Respondent Naeger did violate Wis. Stat § 5.25(4)(a) when she dismantled the accessible voting table early. The photo provided by the Complainant shows that the wheelchair accessibility station, minus the table and chair, was dismantled and put away at 7:45 p.m.—shown by both the time stamp on the photo and the clock behind the voting machine in the second photo. According to Wis. Stat § 6.78(1m), polls are required to be open until 8 p.m. and when the accessibility station was taken down prior to 8 p.m., the Respondent Naeger inhibited the accessibility of the polling place to individuals with disabilities, even if voters were not present. By taking down the station early, an individual with disabilities would not have had the same opportunity to vote independently and with the same degree of privacy as an elector without disabilities. Thus, the early dismantling of the accessible voting table is a violation of Wis. Stat § 5.25(4)(a).

Alleged Issues with the Copied Ballots

Wis. Stat § 5.72(1) states in relevant part that:

> As soon as possible after ballots are delivered to the county clerk or to the municipal clerk . . . the [clerk] shall submit one copy of each ballot to the commission for review of possible errors.

Wis. Stat § 7.15(6)(a) states that:

> The municipal clerk shall provide substitute ballots in substantially the same form of the original ballot whenever the necessary original ballots are . . . exhausted during polling hours.

[3] Dominion ImageCast Evolution | Wisconsin Elections Commission

The Complainant asserts that the Respondent violated the law when she failed to order a sufficient number of ballots and that there was no transparent oversight of the copied ballots, leading to suspicion of human error or interference by the Respondent. The Complainant also points to alleged statistical irregularities in the result to bolster this claim and asserts that there was a substantial swing in votes for the two candidates running for Village President between the copied ballots and the machine-tallied votes.

The Commission does not find a violation of law or abuse of discretion pertaining to the ordering or the copying of the ballots. Wis. Stat § 5.66(1) states that a clerk shall estimate and order a sufficient number of ballots. The Respondent claims that she ordered 100 more ballots over the highest local election/school district referendum and still ran out and needed to make 70 copied ballots. While the Respondent did not order enough ballots, the law only requires an estimate of the ballots needed, and not the exact unknown number of necessary ballots. The Complainant notes that this election contained an unusually high turnout "near 66%, surpassing the general statewide estimate of 62%." While the number of ordered ballots was insufficient, this does not amount to a violation of the law or abuse of discretion.

The Complainant also asserts that there was no way of knowing if established emergency procedures were followed regarding the copying of ballots. The Complainant alleges that because the County Clerk declined to help due to the rarity of the ICE machine and because she was unfamiliar with it, the Respondent had sole custody, and no other election inspector checked the ballots for marks. The Respondent disputes this, stating that election inspectors were handed the copied ballots and were required to "place their initials on the ballots when [they were] distributed to the voter indicating [that it was a] qualified and blank ballot." Wisconsin Statute. § 7.15(6)(a) provides that the municipal clerk shall prepare substitute ballots when the supply is running low and additional ballots are not available. Absent additional evidence to the contrary, the claim of malfeasance in following emergency procedures for additional ballots is too speculative. There is no evidence that the copied ballots were not exact copies of the originals, and there is no evidence that any voter was not able to properly vote on the copied ballots after they had been initialed by two election inspectors. Thus, there is no evidence to support a finding of probable cause.

Analysis of Early Dismantling of the Polling Place

Wis. Stat § 6.78(1m)[4] states that:

> "The polls at every election shall be open from 7 a.m. until 8 p.m."

The Commission finds that the Respondent Naeger abused her discretion when she removed the "Vote Here" signs prior to the close of the voting period. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent violated the law by removing the "Vote Here" signed around 7:50 p.m., stating that this could have led voters to believe that the polling place had closed or that there was no polling place at that location. The Respondent claims that the signs removed were not mandatory and that the parking lot light was not working making the signs impossible to read. Additionally, the Respondent claims that the porch light was turned on and that the outside door was blocked open for added lighting. While the "Voter Here" signs are not required by law, they do provide guidance to electors regarding the location of the polling place.

[4] In her Complaint, the Complainant cites Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4)(d), which pertains to accessibility of the polling place, to support her claim that the removal of signage violated the law.

This is especially helpful given that the parking lot lights were not working and voters were thus more likely to be confused about whether the polling place was open. Additionally, whatever a clerk decides is necessary for the polling place in the morning should remain in place all day so that all voters, whether they voter earlier or later in the day, have the same voting circumstances and signage. The Commission finds that the Respondent abused her discretion by removing the "Vote Here" signs prior to 8 p.m. because of the potential that voters could be mislead that voting had ended.

Conversely, the shifting of the ICE machine around 7:56 p.m. was neither against the law nor an abuse of discretion. The Respondent stated that the shifting of the machine was to allow the Chief Election Inspector to see the time since the time displayed on the machine to officially open and close the polls. The machine was still available for use by voters. The Commission does not find probable cause that the Respondent violated the law or abused her discretion by shifting the voting machine four minutes prior to 8 p.m.

Alleged Lack of Notice of the Board of Municipal Canvassers

The Complainant alleges that the Municipal Board of Canvassers' meeting following the election was improperly noticed. The Complainant asserts that notice was not available on the regular meeting notice page and that the link to the meeting notice was broken, that the local media was not provided notice, and that "a minimal notice posted within Village Hall indicated [that the Board] would meet that same evening."

This allegation is not especially well developed. The Commission provides a more thorough analysis in Paul Pustina v. DaNean Naeger (EL 25-56), which contained a more detailed allegation. However, the Complainant has cited, generally, Wis. Stat. § 7.51, concerning a one-polling place municipal canvass and Wis. Stat. § 19.84(1)(b), concerning public notice. Under Wis. Stat. § 19.84(1)(b), any public meeting, which includes a board of canvassers, must provide notice to the public, "to those news media who have filed a written request for such notice," and to the official newspaper or a news medium likely to provide notice to the relevant area. Wis. Stat. § 19.84(1)(b). The notice to the public can be accomplished by posting to three public places, posting to the governmental body's internet site, or by a paid publication in a news medium. While the Commission does not administer Chapter 19, it does administer the local and municipal canvass statutes under Chapter 7, which clearly establish a canvass board as a governmental body with its own duties and powers requiring a public notice for all meetings. Therefore, the Commission will address the allegations due to the necessary connection with Chapter 7.

The Village appears to have used one public posting and one internet posting for its notice to the public. The printed notice was posted outside of the Village Hall, which also served as the polling place, making it a public place likely to give notice to the public. While the Complainant alleges that the notice was not posted on the municipality's website, the evidence provided is too unclear to lead to a finding of probable cause. The Complainant provides screenshots of the "Latest News" section of the Arena website with items posted only in February 2025, but it is not clear if these are the truly the most recent updates on the website or if the page provided is the correct place for the notice. Additionally, the "Events" page provided only shows events on April 8 but the calendar at the top of the page appears to show that there were events on April 1, the day of the election, that are not provided. It appears, from the screenshot, that something is listed on April 1, and the Complainant does not allege that no event was listed on April 1.

Finally, the screenshot of the 404 error gives no indication of what page/URL could not be found. Thus, there is enough evidence to support the finding of probable cause that the notice was not properly posted for the public.

Regarding the notice to news media making a request for such notice, the arguments in the complaint are not well-developed, but the attachment from the Valley Sentinel does support the allegation that a news media organization had an existing request to receive notices from Arena for public meetings and did not receive this notice. The Respondent also does appear to admit that the Valley Sentinel requested notice, and while she argues that the editor separately had access to the same notice, she does not allege that any notice was sent as required. Thus, the Commission does find probable cause that the Respondent failed to send the Municipal Board of Canvassers notice to all news media making a request for it, and issues an order requiring that all notice requirements under Ch. 19 be followed for all public meetings required by an election law.

Alleged Issues with the Counting and Tallying Process

The Complainant alleges that the other Respondent, Acting Chief Election Inspector Shea rushed the tallying of the ballots, inhibited election and media observers, and resolved errors in counting by estimation contrary to law.

In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 7.51 states:

> (1) Immediately after the polls close, the inspectors . . . shall proceed to canvass publicly all votes received at the polling place.

Further, under Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2) states in relevant part that:

> The observation areas shall be not less than 3 feet from nor more than 8 feet from the table at which electors announce their name and address to be issued a voter number at the polling place, office, or alternate site and not less than 3 feet from nor more than 8 feet from the table at which a person may register to vote at the polling place, office, or alternate site. The observation areas shall be so positioned to permit any election observer to readily observe all public aspects of the voting process.

The Complainant alleges that the Respondent Shea told election and media observers to sit more than eight feet away from the tallying and that observers had to move shortly after counting began to be able to see the process. Respondent Naeger does not directly contest this allegation but states that observers were able to walk around and observe "the straightening and review of ballots for write-ins. The Complainant also alleges that election inspectors spoke softly and could not be heard during the initial counting process.

The Commission does not find probable cause of a violation of law or an abuse of discretion regarding election observation. First, the allegations appear to involve the public canvassing meeting after the polling place closed and thus after the public observation of the voting process ended.

While observers may remain to observe the public canvassing meeting, there are not any specific distance requirements, or volume requirements, applicable to that meeting. Second, even if this allegation pertained to the polling place, the Complainant does not allege that observers were required to observe more than eight feet from the tables at which voters register or state their names and addresses. Without such an allegation, the Commission cannot find that the distance requirement of the observer statute[5] was violated.

Finally, the Complainant alleges that when tallying the votes, Shea resolved errors by "approximation rather than re-tallying or verifying." Wis. Stat. § 7.51(2)(e) provides that:

> "When the number of ballots and total shown on the poll list agree . . . the inspector shall then open, count and record the number of votes."

The Commission does not find a violation of Wis. Stat. § 7.51(2)(e). The Complainant does not describe the alleged approximations in any way or provide any evidence to show what they were. In her response, Respondent Naeger stated that the canvassers would start the count over if anything did not match, which would be appropriate. Thus, there is not enough evidence to show probable cause that Respondent Shea violated Wis. Stat. § 7.51(2)(e).

Commission's Findings and Order

Based upon the above review and analysis, the Commission finds probable cause that the Respondents violated Wis. Stat. §§ 5.25(4)(a), 6.78(1m), and 7.51. The Respondents are ordered to ensure that all electors are able to use all voting implements until the polls close at 8 p.m. Respondent Naeger is further ordered to ensure that all voting signage that is set up before the polling place opens remains in place until the end of voting at 8 p.m. Finally, Respondent Naeger is ordered to provide notice of the municipal board of canvassers meeting to all news media organizations with a request on file, and to follow the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 19.84 regarding all governmental body meetings involving election processes.

The Commission does not find probable cause that a violation of law or abuse of discretion has occurred regarding the Respondents' management of the Dominion ICE Machine, estimation or copying of ballots after supplies had been depleted during voting, shifting of the ICE machine prior to voting ending, election observe practices, or the hand tallying of ballots, and hereby dismisses these aspects of the Complaint.

Right to Appeal – Circuit Court

This letter constitutes the Commission's resolution of this complaint. Wis. Stat. § 5.06(2). Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8), any aggrieved party may appeal this decision to circuit court no later than 30 days after the issuance of this decision.

[5] The Commission promulgated Wis. Admin. Code Chapter EL 4 on election observation after this complaint was filed. Under, Wis. Admin. Code § EL 4.03(6), an observer may ask an election official to repeat a name and address once, but no other information must be repeated. Thus, there would not be any violation under the observer rule either.

If any of the parties should have questions about this letter or the Commission's decision, please feel free to contact the Commission at 608-266-8005 or elections@wi.gov.

Sincerely,

WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

Official Election Complaint Form

STEP 1 Complaint Type

Please select the statutory process that governs your complaint:

Note: you should choose only one statutory process per complaint; if you feel that your allegations fall under more than one statutory process, you should submit separate complaints under each process.

- ○ 5.05 (Election Law Violation)
- ● 5.06 (Violations by Election Officials or Appeals of Decisions of Election Officials)
- ○ 5.061 (Help America Vote Act Violation)

STEP 2 Complainant Contact Information

Please provide the following information about yourself.

Note: Anyone filing this complaint with you can add their information on a separate page (see page 4).

First Name: Becca Raven

Last Name: Uminowicz

Residential Address: 373 Willow Street, Arena, WI 53503

Mailing Address (if different):

Telephone (optional): 608-753-3012

Email: uminowiczbr@gmail.com

STEP 3 Respondent

Please provide the following information about the individual or individuals whom you allege violated or improperly administered election laws:

Note: For 5.06 complaints, each respondent must be an election official. If there are multiple respondents, you can add their information on a separate page (see page 5).

Respondent Name: DaNean Naeger

Respondent Title (5.06 complaints): Village Clerk

Mailing Address: 345 West Street, Arena, WI 53503 / 314 Commerce Street, Rewey, WI 53580

Telephone (if available): 608-753-2133

Email (if available): vilarena@villageofarena.net

STEP 4 Applicable Statutes

Please cite each statute within Chapters 5 to 10 and 12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, as well as any other laws relating to elections, other than laws relating to campaign financing, that you allege were violated or improperly administered.

Note: The Commission cannot accept a complaint that does not cite specific provisions, including the correct subsections, of election law.

Wis. Stat. §5.25, Wis. Stat. §§5.60(1)(b), 5.60(5)(ar), Wis. Stat. §§5.72, 7.15, 7.51, Wis. Stat. §5.85

STEP 5 Allegations

Set forth in detail the facts that establish probable cause to believe that a violation occurred. Be as specific as possible as it relates to dates, times, individuals, and actions involved. Use as many separate pages as needed and attach copies of any supporting documentation, evidence, or affidavits.

See attached document.

STEP 6 Sign

Each complainant must complete ***either*** step 6a, "Unsworn Statement," or Step 6b "Sworn Statement." For either option, you may enter your digital signature by clicking the box and following the instructions, or you may print the form and sign it.

STEP 6a Unsworn Statement

I declare under penalty of false swearing under the law of Wisconsin that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed on the 7 day of April, 2025 at MAZOMANIE, WI
(city or other location and state or country).

Becca Raven Uminowicz
Printed Name

Becca Raven Uminowicz
Signature

STEP 6b Sworn Statement (to be completed in the presence of a notary)

I, BECCA RAVEN UMINOWICZ ~~KRISTIN L. DAREN~~ KLD, being first duly sworn, on oath, state that I personally read the above complaint, and that the above allegations are true based on my personal knowledge and, as to those stated on information and belief, I believe them to be true.

Becca Raven Uminowicz
Complainant's Signature

Note: Each complainant listed above in section 6b must have this form sworn before a notary or other official able to swear oaths.

STATE OF WISCONSIN

County of, Dane (county of notarization)

Sworn to before me this day of, April 7, 2025

Kristin L. Daren
(Signature of person authorized to administer oaths)

KRISTIN L. DAREN NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF WISCONSIN Stamp Here

My commission expires on 11/23/25, or is permanent.

Notary Public or _____ (official title if not notary)

STEP 7 Filing the Complaint

Please send this completed form to the Wisconsin Elections Commission

Email:
elections@wi.gov
Please put your name and "Complaint" in the email subject field

Mail:
Wisconsin Elections Commission
P.O. Box 7984
Madison, WI 53707-7984

Fax:
608-267-0500

Additional Complainants

First Name

Last Name

Residential Address

Mailing Address (if different)

Telephone (optional)

Email

First Name

Last Name

Residential Address

Mailing Address (if different)

Telephone (optional)

Email

First Name

Last Name

Residential Address

Mailing Address (if different)

Telephone (optional)

Email

Additional Respondents

Respondent Name	Respondent Title (5.06 complaints)
Kristen Shea	Trustee/Acting Chief Election Inspector

Mailing Address

300 Prairie Street, Arena, WI 53503

Telephone (if available)	Email (if available)
608-753-3024	k.shea@villageofarena.net

Respondent Name	Respondent Title (5.06 complaints)

Mailing Address

Telephone (if available)	Email (if available)

Respondent Name	Respondent Title (5.06 complaints)

Mailing Address

Telephone (if available)	Email (if available)

Respondent Name	Respondent Title (5.06 complaints)

Mailing Address

Telephone (if available)	Email (if available)

5.06 COMPLAINT AGAINST VILLAGE CLERK/TREASURER DANEAN NAEGER AND TRUSTEE/ACTING CHIEF ELECTION INSPECTOR KRISTEN SHEA

INTRODUCTION

This complaint is filed under Wis. Stat. § 5.06 by Complainant, Trustee and Village Resident, Becca Raven Uminowicz, alleging that the Village of Arena Clerk/Treasurer, DaNean Naeger, WCMC/CMC, and the acting Chief Election Inspector for the April 1, 2025, election, Trustee Kristen Shea, failed to properly administer or otherwise abused their discretion under the Wisconsin election laws, specifically provisions in Chapters 5 to 10. This complaint seeks corrective action by the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC), pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06.

In doing so, Complainant underscores the necessity for a thoroughly impartial election process, emphasizing how each statutory obligation must be followed to uphold public trust. Given the ongoing concerns about ballot ordering, accessibility, ballot shortages, and questionable procedures at the canvassing phase, this 5.06 complaint calls on the Commission to impose meaningful oversight and potential remedies that protect the integrity of municipal elections.

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1. CONCERNED PERSONS/PARTIES

1. **Complainant**
    1. **Name**: Becca Raven Uminowicz
    2. **Residency**: Village of Arena, Iowa County, Wisconsin
    3. **Status**: A duly elected Trustee (not up for election in 2025) and Village resident "served by" the Clerk and election officials under Wis. Stat. § 5.06.
    4. **Standing**: As both a local elector and trustee, Complainant is directly affected by the administration of elections in the Village. Misadministration or other violations harm her personal voter rights and official responsibilities on the Board, especially given that each procedural misstep has ripple effects on local governance. Consequently, the credibility of Village decisions and the public's faith in outcomes is at stake.
2. **Respondents**
    1. **Clerk/Treasurer DaNean Naeger**
        - Official address: 345 West St., Arena, WI 53503 / Home address: 314 Commerce Street, Rewey, WI 53580
        - A Wisconsin Certified Municipal Clerk (WCMC/CMC) responsible for administering elections in the Village. Currently under separate WEC

investigation (5.05 and 5.06 complaints filed March 21, 2025) for alleged ballot-order violations.
    - Oversees day-to-day election tasks, including ballot procurement, machine setup, accessibility arrangements, poll worker supervision, and canvassing coordination.
2. **Trustee/Acting Chief Election Inspector Kristen Shea**
    - Official address: 345 West St., Arena, WI 53503 / Home address: 300 Prairie St., Arena, WI 53503
    - A sitting member of the Village Board who supports the current administration's voting bloc. Served as acting chief election inspector for the Village's April 1, 2025, election, even though she herself is politically aligned with the same candidates favored by the Clerk's prior alleged misconduct.
    - By taking on the dual role of trustee and chief election inspector, Shea raises questions about neutrality, fairness, and the separation of official duties during a contested election.

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2. BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

This complaint supplements and incorporates by reference the facts and allegations in two previously filed complaints (one under 5.05 and one under 5.06) that Complainant submitted to the WEC on March 21, 2025, against Clerk Naeger for:

- Failing to conduct the legally required second random drawing after the February 18, 2025, primary, effectively renumbering the primary ballot order for the April 1 election and placing administration-backed candidates on top.
- Giving administration-supported candidates a quantifiable 1–3 percentage-point advantage (the "ballot order effect"), especially in a small, nonpartisan local race. Statistical analysis revealed a 1 in 50,400 chance the same top order repeated by random draw, raising acute suspicions of administrative favoritism.
- No records exist of any second drawing—violating Wis. Stat. § 5.60(1)(b), among other statutes, thus depriving the election process of transparent accountability. In a municipality the size of Arena, every vote and procedural guarantee matters.

While those complaints focus on the irregularities leading up to the final ballot arrangement, the April 1, 2025 election itself showcased further issues tied to the same official, Clerk Naeger, and to Trustee Shea's capacity as acting chief inspector. These cumulatively cast doubt on whether voters received a lawfully administered election free from bias or administrative missteps. The significance of these added allegations cannot be overstated—local elections often hinge on small margins, and any statutory lapses can reshape governance in ways inconsistent with the electorate's true will.

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3. ALLEGATIONS

A. Inadequate Accessible Voting Accommodations

1. **Mismanagement of Dominion ICE Machine**
    - The Village of Arena does not have standalone electronic voting machines, accessible or otherwise.
    - The Village of Arena ostensibly relies on a Dominion ImageCast Evolution (ICE) machine to fulfill two critical functions: tabulation of paper ballots and accessible voting for individuals with disabilities.
    - Upon information and belief, there was no information posted that specifically stated that the ICE machine was an accessible voting machine.
    - Upon information and belief, the ICE machine was not used as an accessible voting machine.
    - Acting Chief Election Inspector Shea apparently could not confirm whether the device had any accessible configuration, remarking she “didn’t know.” And in fact, a media observer was observed by the complainant asking chief election inspector Shea if the village had an accessible voting machine at all and Shea said she didn’t know. This underscores a broader training or oversight shortfall.
    - Upon information and belief, the ICE machines can only operate as an accessible voting machine if what Dominion Voting calls in their ICE brochure “optional integrated ADA compliant configurations” are enabled. Upon information and belief, the machine lacked the required integrated ADA-compliant features. Around 7:56 p.m., observers noted the screen displayed “Options: none,” signifying the accessible interface might never have been activated. It is not known how many voters that needed accessibility were unable to vote or voted incorrectly due to a lack of accessibility. We have to assume, upon information and belief, that voters were disenfranchised.
    - By failing to provide a truly accessible voting machine, the Village contravened both Wis. Stat. § 5.25—which mandates polling place suitability—and relevant HAVA provisions. Voters needing audio ballots, touchscreens, or other adaptive technology found no recourse and may have been discouraged from casting a ballot independently.
2. **Ineffective Paper “Accessibility” Station**
    - The Village did attempt an alternate “accessibility” setup: a table with privacy shields and a single chair. However, without specialized tools (e.g., large-print instructions, Braille markers, or any supportive adaptive tech), this station did not satisfy the core purpose of an accessible voting device or comply with HAVA.
    - Crucially, signage for this station was removed at approximately 7:42 p.m. and fully dismantled by 7:45 p.m., undermining last-minute accessibility. Potentially, if a late-arriving voter with mobility or visual issues needed that station, they would not have even found it labeled or available.
    - Such actions are inconsistent with the principle that polling places must remain fully functional up to the 8 p.m. close—especially for the disabled.

3. **Impact on Voters with Disabilities**
    - Denying a meaningful ADA-compliant machine or overshadowing it with poor signage effectively disenfranchises voters who cannot mark traditional ballots without assistance. This burdens a protected class of voters more heavily.
    - Noncompliance with HAVA or Wis. Stat. chap. 5 mandates can form the basis for a separate administrative or enforcement proceeding. Here, it demonstrates another dimension where the Clerk's administration fell short, deepening concerns about fairness and legal adequacy.
    - Issues like this regarding accessible voting have come under scrutiny lately and have garnered national attention and involvement from federal authorities, see the Towns of Thornapple and Lawrence in Rusk County, Wisconsin during the November 2024 election.
    - These exact Dominion ICE machines are notoriously weak, and have numerous documented vulnerabilities including privacy vulnerabilities, another vulnerability called a "permission to cheat" feature by researchers, as well as this machine having the ability to act as a combination machine and mark ballots without review.
    - At the very least, using the same machine to tabulate and as an accessible voting machine causes a hold up in vote casting.

B. Running Out of Official Ballots & Improvised Copies

1. **Clerk's Duty to Adequately Prepare**
    - Local clerks must estimate turnout and stock ballots accordingly. Clerk Naeger's decision to order insufficient ballots, despite knowledge that prior elections (including the Spring 2024 election) in Arena also saw near-depletion, is negligent.
    - With an unusually high turnout near 66%, surpassing the general statewide estimate of 62% (and far surpassing comparable local counties like Sauk County's 50% turnout), the Clerk's oversight forced a late-day pivot to copying additional ballots on legal-size paper. This introduced the possibility of printing or duplication errors and compromised chain-of-custody safeguards.
    - Naeger notified the Iowa County Clerk Megan Currie, who declined to help due to the rarity of the machine and her unfamiliarity with it, stating: "I received an email from the clerk that they will be making copies of the ballots due to not having enough from the printer. I am unable to assist due to the village having a different type of tabulating machine from the majority of the other municipalities in the county." Naeger then made an unknown number of copies of the ballot on legal paper on the Village copier machine, which were then used for the duration of voting. Copied ballots were then dropped directly into the ICE machine bin, but then were sorted out later and counted with the sequestered ballots containing write-in votes.
    - The fact that the Dominion ICE system is somewhat unique in the county only heightens the need for thorough pre-election planning.
2. **No Transparent Oversight of Copied Ballots**

- With the county declining to assist the Village of Arena, there's no way to know if established emergency procedures were followed regarding the copying of ballots.
- Upon information and belief, Clerk DaNean Naeger had sole custody of the copied ballots and they were not checked for marks, incidental or otherwise, by election inspectors.
- Customarily, when emergency or extra ballots are needed, there should be a protocol ensuring each copy is identical and properly tracked. County clerks often oversee or at least review these procedures.
- Here, County Clerk Currie declined involvement, citing unfamiliarity with the ICE system. Clerk Naeger operated alone, printing an unknown number of blank ballots. No other inspector verified these ballots had no pre-markings.
- Ultimately, these makeshift ballots were segregated with any ballots containing write-ins, culminating in a hand count. The potential for human error or interference is significantly higher in such ad hoc procedures—particularly with the Clerk under suspicion from earlier ballot arrangement concerns.

C. Statistical Irregularities in Election Results

1. **Machine-Tallied vs. Hand-Counted**
   - Hand-counted subsets included all write-ins plus the newly copied ballots, totaling an unspecified fraction of overall ballots, believed to be approximately 15%. Candidate Paul Pustina led that subset by a healthy margin of 34–24 (58.6% to 41.4%), approximately a 17.2 percentage-point lead.
   - Once the dominion ICE machine-tallied votes were integrated, Candidate Kathy Stoltz overtook Pustina, winning 189–174, shifting the net margin by 21.4 points from the hand-counted subset.
   - Such a swing defies typical election patterns, especially in small municipal races where uniform demographics tend to produce more consistent subsets.
2. **Highly Unusual Shift**
   - A swing of approximately 21.4 percentage points between two subsets of the same small municipal electorate is unusually large and atypical in elections.
   - In a typical election without the described contextual irregularities, a 21.4% swing between two subsets of ballots would be considered statistically highly improbable for a homogeneous voting population.
   - Given that elections typically see differences between hand-counted and machine-counted votes of around 1–3%, a shift of this magnitude (over 20%) is exceptionally unusual and statistically significant.
   - A difference exceeding 20 percentage points between two subsets is exceedingly rare without a unique demographic split or known reason. Complainant asserts that no such demographic explanation exists here.
   - In the context of questionable ballot administration, the simplest explanation might be tampering, mistakes, or misapplied procedures. The prior 5.06 complaint against the Clerk for reusing primary order suggests a willingness to circumvent mandated processes.

3. **Other Anomalies**
    - Notably, Stoltz received 60 fewer votes in the Trustee race than for Village President, a significant discrepancy suggesting unusual voting behavior or selective support that's highly unusual in such local elections, especially given the contentious context. While voters can theoretically support a candidate for one office but not another, the scale of this discrepancy is suspicious.
    - The difference of 60 votes between Stoltz's totals for president and trustee positions further heightens the suspicion because it's an unusual voting behavior pattern, indicating voters selectively supported her significantly more for the Village President role. While not direct evidence of manipulation, this reinforces the irregularity of the overall scenario.
    - The final turnout near 66% underscores how robust (or inflated) the participation was, intensifying the importance of strict statutory adherence.

D. Premature Dismantling of Polling Station & Outdoor Signage

1. **Outdoor "Vote Here" Signs Removed**
    - Complainant observed that Clerk Naeger took down the "vote here" signs outside the polling place around 7:50 p.m., ten minutes before the statutory close at 8 p.m. Latecomer voters might have assumed voting had ended or that no polling location was there.
    - With the outdoor "vote here" signs removed we have to assume, upon information and belief, that voters were disenfranchised and turned away.
    - Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4)(d) directs that voting shall continue until 8 p.m. with an unobstructed or unimpeded approach. Removing signage early violates the spirit of that law, if maybe not its letter.
2. **Shifting the ICE Machine at 7:56 p.m.**
    - Observers also saw the ICE machine being moved and part of the poll workers' area being reconfigured into "closing mode" and the process of transitioning to vote counting starting at 7:56 p.m.
    - If any voter arrived between 7:56 and 8:00 p.m., they might have been dissuaded from voting.
    - Complainant alleges these steps indicate a deliberate or reckless approach to concluding voting prior to the official deadline, further undermining trust in the thoroughness of the election.

E. Improper Notice & Conduct of Municipal Board of Canvassers

1. **Failure to Properly Notice the Municipal Board of Canvassers**
    - Typically, the municipal board of canvassers must hold an open, noticed meeting so that candidates and the public can observe the final certification. On election night, a minimal notice posted within Village Hall indicated the municipal board of canvassers would meet that same evening.
    - No email or otherwise direct notice was sent to local media who had previously requested it under Wis. Stat. § 19.84(1)(b). This directly contravenes open

meetings requirements, preventing media or candidate watchers from verifying the count.
    - The meeting notice for the Village of Arena Municipal Board of Canvassers did not appear on the regular meeting notice page of the Village of Arena website.
    - The Village website's link for that meeting notice was apparently broken (404 error). Upon information and belief, the notice is not posted elsewhere in the Village, just in a single location in the Village Hall. Notice did not appear online, so regardless it was not posted to the public correctly, in addition to the lack of media notice. The single ephemeral posted notice is insufficient for robust public awareness.
2. **Lack of Transparency**
    - A properly convened municipal board of canvassers meeting includes roll call, documented proceedings, and an opportunity for any observer to see how the final tally is certified. Here, none of that was visible.
    - Ostensibly, *if* indeed the municipal board of canvassers met the night of the election, the last business day to file for a recount was a Friday, but the Clerk was reportedly unavailable and is not usually in the office of Fridays, complicating how a candidate might file a prompt recount request if concerns were discovered. Combined with the incomplete notice, it severely hampered due process for challenging suspicious results.
    - Candidates and the public had no idea when the canvassing occurred. These issues effectively deny a candidate's right to petition for a recount. Candidate Paul Pustina has stated his intent to petition for a recount for the village president election, due to the issues described here and the issues brought forth in the two previous Wisconsin Election Commission complaints (5.05 and 5.06) filed by complainant against Naeger on March 21, 2025.

F. Acting Chief Election Inspector Shea's Role & Conduct

1. **Trustee's Alignment with Administration**
    - Because Shea actively supports or belongs to the same voting bloc that seemingly benefited from prior ballot ordering, her role as the top poll worker on Election Day is intrinsically conflicted.
    - Even if no overt misconduct occurred, the appearance of partiality is substantial. The Commission often recommends avoiding such overlapping roles (e.g., trustee and chief inspector) precisely to avert these concerns.
2. **Rushing the Count, Mistakes & Quiet Tally**
    - Election and media observers were told to sit more than eight feet away from the count, with privacy shields obstructing the view while the election inspectors sorted the ballots. Observers had to move shortly after counting started in order to be able to see the process. During the counting process election inspectors spoke softly and could not be heard, sometimes even amongst themselves.
    - Upon information and belief, Shea was rushing the two other election inspectors. This led to several times where mistakes and miscounts were made.

- On more than one occasion, inspectors made errors that Shea "resolved" by approximation rather than re-tallying or verifying. This is inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 7.51, which lays out precise recount or correction steps.
- Such a rushed or approximate approach undermines the reliability of the final totals, especially in an already tense and closely watched local race.

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4. LEGAL BASIS FOR COMPLAINT

Under Wis. Stat. § 5.06, a qualified elector or individual "served by" an election official may complain that the official has "failed to conduct an election or prepare ballots or voting machines or voting devices in the manner prescribed by law." The complaint must:

- Identify the alleged statutory breaches.
- Demonstrate how these breaches impact the complainant.
- Request a remedy or order that corrects the error.

Here, Complainant contends that both Clerk Naeger and acting chief inspector Shea failed in multiple respects—ballot procurement, machine accessibility, open meeting/canvassing notice, ensuring a complete final count, etc.—to comply with statutory duties, thus depriving Complainant and all Village voters of a proper election.

A. Statutes Potentially Violated

1. **Wis. Stat. §§ 5.25, 5.85, 7.15, 7.51, 5.60, 5.72** — re: Election Administration, Proper Ballot Handling, Machine Setup & Accessible Voting Requirements.
2. **Wis. Stat. § 5.05** references (though we focus on 5.06) — prior evidence of Clerk's wrongdoing re: ballot order and obligations.
3. **Open Meetings** (Ch. 19.81–19.98) aspects are peripheral but relevant to notice for the municipal board of canvassers, which if not properly convened, may void or hamper final certification. While open meetings are typically enforced under separate statutory channels, the pattern of noncompliance intensifies the question of election integrity.
4. **HAVA** (Help America Vote Act) compliance for accessible voting equipment, related to usage of Dominion ICE. By not enabling the device's accessible features or offering an equivalent system, the respondents hindered the statutory right of accessible voting.

B. Harm to Complainant

- As a trustee and voter, Complainant's fundamental right to a fair, transparent election was compromised. Each misstep described above—from removing signage prematurely to mismanaging accessible equipment—undermines the reliability of the outcome.
- The final village president results, arguably shaped by questionable administration, contradict the statutory imperative for a duly randomized, well-supervised election. This fosters distrust not only among losing candidates but the electorate at large.

- For disabled voters, or those requiring special accommodations, the near-complete absence of a functioning accessible station effectively locked them out of an independent voting experience. This moral and legal failing tarnishes the election's validity.

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5. APPLICABLE STATUTES VIOLATED

1. **Wis. Stat. § 5.25** — Polling place suitability, including ensuring unobstructed access and necessary accommodations, which Respondents undermined through early sign removal and inadequate accessibility measures.
2. **Wis. Stat. §§ 5.60(1)(b), 5.60(5)(ar)** — Address the ballot arrangement obligations that Complainant previously alleged were violated, reflecting a broader failure to comply with mandated election protocols.
3. **Wis. Stat. §§ 5.72, 7.15, 7.51** — Encompass the clerk's duties for securing sufficient ballots, properly configuring voting equipment, and executing the counting process with procedural fidelity.
4. **Wis. Stat. § 5.85** — Pertains to the manner in which votes shall be cast and counted, including the segregation and processing of emergency or write-in ballots.
5. **Open Meetings** (Ch. 19.81–19.98) — The defective municipal board of canvassers notice raises issues under these provisions, although enforcement typically arises via separate channels.
6. **HAVA** (Help America Vote Act) — Imposes federal requirements for accessible voting technology. By failing to provide a functional ADA interface, Respondents contravened these federal obligations as well.

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6. STATEMENT OF INJURY

1. **Status as a Village Resident and Trustee**
    - Complainant resides in the Village of Arena and is an elected Trustee not on the April 1, 2025 ballot, yet she remains directly affected by any misadministration.
    - She is entitled to receive municipal election services—including accurate ballot management, accessible voting arrangements, and transparent canvassing—from the Clerk and her deputies.
2. **Direct Impact of the Clerk's and Inspector's Duties**
    - Through ongoing irregularities in ballot ordering, accessibility provisioning, mid-election ballot copying, and final certification notice, Respondents compromised the statutory guarantees of a fair election.
    - As a trustee, Complainant's responsibilities involve working with board members who may have been advantaged by these lapses, potentially altering the board's composition or legislative stance.
3. **Public Advocacy for Opposition Candidates**

- Although not on this ballot, Complainant publicly supported candidates challenging the administration's bloc. Given the questionable processes, these opposition candidates risked being disadvantaged by the reconfiguration of ballot sequences, inadequate accessibility for their supporters, or unscrupulous counting methods.

4. **Harm to Electoral Fairness and Board Representation**
    - By under-ordering ballots and dismantling essential signage and accessible stations prematurely, Respondents likely deterred or impaired certain electors, including last-minute arrivals or disabled voters.
    - The flawed notice for canvassing further curtailed the ability for Complainant, other trustees, or the media to observe final tallies, undermining the election's transparency. Consequently, Complainant's rights to a properly constituted and lawfully elected board were abridged.

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7. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06, Complainant respectfully requests an order from the Wisconsin Elections Commission, directing the following:

1. **Investigate and Mandate Corrections**
    - Conduct a formal, independent audit of the April 1, 2025, Village of Arena election, including chain-of-custody reviews, logs from the Dominion ICE machine, and verification of the hand-counted subsets. Where appropriate, interview poll workers, observers, and other witnesses to clarify anomalies.
    - Review the clerical process of copying ballots, ensuring compliance with emergency procedures and verifying that no additional "pre-marked" or otherwise tainted ballots were introduced.
    - Evaluate whether the machine's accessible voting features were disabled or never properly activated, in violation of law. Should the Commission find a direct breach of accessibility requirements, require the municipality to adopt best-practice guidelines for future elections.
2. **Potential Invalidation and Re-run**
    - If the Commission concludes these irregularities and misadministration compromised the result in the village president contest—invalidate the April 1 election village president contest. Then order a special election or other remedy to ensure the electorate's true choice.
    - In smaller municipalities, re-running a contested race may be the fairest path to restore public confidence.
3. **Enjoin Clerk Naeger & Inspector Shea from Future Violations**
    - Prohibit Clerk Naeger from overseeing further elections absent additional oversight and training, especially regarding ballot quantity estimates, chain-of-custody for emergency ballots, and final canvassing procedures.

- Direct that trustee Shea recuse herself from serving as an election inspector or chief inspector in future elections if she remains part of a politically aligned voting bloc, thus removing conflict of interest or the appearance thereof.

4. **Forensic Analysis of Voting Equipment**
   - Secure and preserve the Dominion ICE tabulator, logs, memory devices, and related documentation. Commission or appoint an expert forensic auditor to determine whether unauthorized modifications occurred or if unlogged ballot entries manipulated the final tallies.
   - Cross-reference these logs with the manually counted subsets to confirm or refute the suspicious 20+ point swing.
5. **Ensure Proper Accessibility and Equipment Setup**
   - Require the Village to implement a fully configured accessible voting system and robust signage clarifying how voters with disabilities can independently cast a ballot.
   - Mandate signage remain in place until 8 p.m. and ensure last-minute voters (including those with disabilities) have an unobstructed approach, fulfilling Wis. Stat. § 5.25(4).
   - Conduct random WEC spot checks in upcoming elections to confirm ongoing compliance.
6. **Appropriate Disciplinary or Enforcement Actions**
   - Refer alleged repeated noncompliance or intentional misconduct to the District Attorney if probable cause emerges for willful violations.
   - Direct mandatory remedial training for Clerk Naeger on the specifics of 5.60(1)(b) second-drawing requirements, accessible voting standards, and open meeting/canvassing obligations.
   - Issue formal guidance to the Village of Arena clarifying that local officials who stand to benefit from an election's outcome (e.g., trustees endorsing certain candidates) should avoid serving as chief election inspectors.

Through these corrective measures, the WEC can restore confidence in future local contests and uphold the fundamental principles behind Wisconsin's election statutes.

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8. CONCLUSION

Respondents' conduct—individually and collectively—reflects a pattern of serious procedural failures and possible misuse of official discretion, infringing on the rights of voters and candidates. The combination of suspect ballot handling, inaccessible voting arrangements, early poll dismantling, and an improperly convened board of canvassers suggests the electoral process fell short of the statutory obligations that safeguard free and fair elections.

In a small community like Arena, where every vote carries substantial weight, even modest irregularities can reshape governance. Coupled with the prior allegations under 5.05 and 5.06, this situation implies a broader pattern wherein the Clerk's office neglected or bypassed clear

statutory mandates. Such persistent issues warrant an intensive review, possible election re-run, or disciplinary action.

The Commission is therefore urged to exercise its full authority under Wis. Stat. § 5.06 to investigate, correct, and, if necessary, invalidate and re-run compromised portions of the election. By doing so, the WEC will safeguard public trust and reaffirm that elections in Wisconsin's municipalities must strictly adhere to the letter and spirit of the law.

Outlook

Fw: Municipal Board of Canvassers

From Valley Sentinel <editor@valleysentinelnews.com>
Date Sun 2025-04-06 11:57 AM
To Paul Pustina <paulpustina@gmail.com>; uminowiczbr@gmail.com <uminowiczbr@gmail.com>
Cc Gary Grass <g.grass@sbcglobal.net>

Paul, as you are an aggrieved candidate; and Becca Raven, as you have been documenting elections violations in the Village of Arena, we wanted to forward the below along for your records.

I noticed numerous other procedural violations as a media observer election night and am happy to share my observations upon request.

Best,

Taylor Scott, *Managing Editor*

Valley Sentinel
Spring Green, Wisconsin
608-588-6694
editor@valleysentinelnews.com
www.valleysentinelnews.com



> Wisconsin Newspaper Association, Best in Division E (2022)

From: Valley Sentinel
Sent: Sunday, April 6, 2025 11:52 AM
To: Village Clerk/Treasurer <vilarena@villageofarena.net>
Subject: Municipal Board of Canvassers

DaNean,

We were doing research on elections and were wondering when the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers met. We were shocked today when reviewing a cursory picture I had taken of the notice board outside the village hall election night to see a small notice which indicated the board of canvassers met that night, election night.

We received no notice that the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers was meeting. I was in attendance to observe the end of election night as a media observer and no formal meeting seemingly happened, there was no formal call to order, roll call or record of the proceedings which would indicate that a meeting of the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers was meeting. And if a meeting of the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers happened, it wasn't properly noticed to us as news media that have requested notice. The clerk as chair of the Village of Arena municipal board of canvassers had the duty to provide us notice.
Wisconsin's Open Meetings Law mandates that governmental bodies, including the Municipal Board of Canvassers, provide public notice of meetings and maintain records of proceedings. This ensures public access and transparency in governmental operations.

As you know, this notice to Valley Sentinel — as news media that has requested notice — is required for meetings to be considered properly noticed. When news media request notice under Wis. Stat. 19.84(1)(b) it is separate from the notice given to the public, but equally as necessary.

Our notice sent in 2020 states: "*Could you please send us all upcoming board and committee agendas/notices/meeting packets and include us indefinitely on your office's Wis. Stat.§ 19.84(1)(b). news media email list to receive those items in the future?*" We clearly and intentionally didn't limit our request to Village Board, but ALL boards and committees, etc. in the village.

Under Wisconsin's Open Meetings Law, if a news media organization has submitted a written request to a municipal clerk for notice of meetings, the organization is entitled to receive notice of all meetings of governmental bodies within that municipality, including the municipal board of canvassers. Wisconsin Statute § 19.84(1)(b) specifies that public notice of all meetings must be given to the public and to those news media who have filed a written request for such notice.

The municipal board of canvassers qualifies as a "governmental body" under the Open Meetings Law. Therefore, its meetings are subject to the same public notice requirements as other governmental bodies.

Clearly, our request to receive "all upcoming board and committee agendas/notices/meeting packets" is more than sufficiently broad to encompass meetings of the municipal board of canvassers.

We were going to come in Friday to discuss, but saw you were out of the office.

Again, can you please send us all notices for the Village — regardless of governmental body or subunit, etc. — please regard this a general request for the entire municipality like we intended in our 2020 notice.


Thank you,


Taylor Scott, *Managing Editor*

Valley Sentinel
Spring Green, Wisconsin
608-588-6694
editor@valleysentinelnews.com
www.valleysentinelnews.com



> Wisconsin Newspaper Association, Best in Division E (2022)


VILLAGE OFFICE HOURS
Monday, Wednesday, Thursday:
Have you gotten your DOG LICENSE for 2025??
Notice of Spring Election and Sample Ballots
April 1, 2025
Office of the IOWA County Clerk
To the voters of IOWA County
Information to Voters
Official Ballot
Nonpartisan Office and Referendum
SAMPLE



Notice of Meeting of the Local and Municipal Board of Canvassers
At the close of voting on Election Day, pursuant to the provisions of Wis. Stat. 19.84 the Election Inspectors will convene as a joint meeting of the Local Board of Canvasser and the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the purpose of conducting the local and municipal canvasses pursuant to Wis. Stat. 7.51 and 7.53(1). This meeting will be open to the public pursuant to Wis. Stat. 19.81 89

Arena
Tuesday 7:31 PM

RAW



Accessible paper polling station on left

RAW




Layout of polling place

Arena
Tuesday 7:45 PM




Clerk DaNean Naeger taking down the accessible paper voting station at 7:45 PM

Clerk DaNean Naeger taking down the accessible paper voting station at 7:45 PM




Clerk DaNean Naeger taking down the outdoor voting/polling place signs at 7:54 PM



The ICE machine already having been moved at 7:56 PM




Arena
Tuesday 7:56 PM
RAW
2025 Iowa Spring Election
Select Language
English
System Ready
Please insert your ballot
Total Voters
00323
Location: Village of Arena
Firmware: 5.5.6.5
Options: none
Ballot Counter: 00323

RAW

Showing distance and obstuction in watching the ballots being sorted.



AGENDAS & MINUTES

UTILITY PAYMENT (FEE INCREASE) AUTO PAYMENT AVAILABLE

PERMIT/LICENSE PAYMENTS

BUILD
YOU
TROUB
VIA LIN
IT IN
'P
"INCO

Latest News

VIEW ALL NEWS

2025 SPRING ELECTION

02-28-2025

There were NO provisional ballots for the Spring Election.

Notice of Voting by Absentee Ballot

Notices - Polling Location, Testing of Voting Equipment, Provisional

Ballots, Canvass

Type B Notice
Sample Ballot

School Referendum Explanation
State Referendum Explanation

RESULTS can be found on the Iowa County website.

Fire & EMS Agreement

02-14-2025

The Village of Arena is thrilled to announce that we have officially signed a new Fire/EMS agreement. This agreement ensures that internal controls will help our emergency services thrive for many years to come and keep our community safe and protected.

A heartfelt thank you to the Arena Village Board and the Arena Township Board for their countless hours of dedication in making this agreement a reality. Your hard work and commitment to our village are truly appreciated.


Let's spread the word and show our support for our board members and our Fire/Ems volunteers. If you or someone you know would like more information on becoming a volunteer please contact our local Fire Chief or EMS Director.
Click here to view the agreement.

TECH HELP....

02-07-2025

Are you struggling with your smartphone, tablet, or laptop? Help is at hand, courtesy of the River Valley area public libraries. Every Thursday of the month, from 2 to 4 pm, individuals can drop by for

assistance with their tech-related questions—all without needing an
Whether you're grappling with setting up email accounts, navigating
troubleshooting software issues, knowledgeable volunteers or librar
a helping hand.
This invaluable resource is made possible through collaboration amo
public libraries and is part of their ongoing commitment to fostering
community.



Events

VIEW ALL EVENTS

April 2025

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
30	31	1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	1	2	3

APR
8

Personnel Committee (If Needed)

APR
8

Finance Committee

APR
8

Public Works Committee (If Needed)

APR
8

Board Meeting

Office

Monday, Wednesday, Thursday
7:30 AM - 4:00 PM
Tuesday
1:30 PM - 7:00 PM
Friday - hours vary, call ahead

Address

345 West Street Arena, WI 53503

Contact

Telephone(608)-753-2133 FAX(608)-753-2851

404. The page/URL requested wasn't found on this site.

DaNean Naeger
Village of Arena
345 West Street
Arena, WI 53503

April 30, 2025

WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION
Attn: Jim Witecha
Chief Legal Counsel
201 West Washington Avenue, Fl 2
PO Box 7984
Madison, WI 53707
james.witecha@wisconsin.gov
elections@wi.gov

RE: Wis. Stat. § 5.06 Complaint Filed with Wisconsin Elections Commission: Becca Uminowicz v. DaNean Naeger (EL 25-55)

Dear Mr. Witecha,

Please accept this response to the above-referenced Complaint.

Important note: There were no voters that entered the parking lot or the polling place from 7:42 p.m. – 8:00 p.m. Village Hall (poll location) lights were on, and doors were unlocked at all times.

Mismanagement of Dominion ICE Machine – The ICE Machine was set up according to the manual which included the headphones and handheld device were plugged in and accessible for anyone to use. The ICE Machine does require a 'key' to activate the accessibility option for security measures; therefore, anyone who requests special accommodations will be accommodated by asking an election inspector or chief inspector for assistance. The Chief Inspector also had available on the table more marking devices (pens) and magnify glass (some citizens forget their glasses) available upon asking.

Ineffective Paper "Accessibility" Station – This station is the wheelchair accessibility area which includes a table height of 28"-34" to meet ADA standards. The sign marking the table was removed at 7:45 p.m. in preparation for the end of the night counting. If a citizen needed access to the table; the table, marking devices, and a privacy screen were still fully functional until 8 p.m.

Impact on Voters with Disabilities – The Dominion ICE Machine is approved ADA compliant voting machine from Wisconsin Elections Commission. The Village takes ADA accommodation seriously. Majority of the residents bring an assistant with them due to the length of time it takes to use the ADA feature on the ICE Machine.

Clerk's Duty to Adequately Prepare/Oversight of Copied Ballots – As noted, clerk must **estimate** turnout and stock ballots accordingly. I ordered 100 more ballots over the highest local election/school district referendum and still ran out. Dominion requires making copies of an original ballot and placing voted ballots in the auxiliary bin for hand counting at the end of the night. I made copies of an original ballot in quantities of 25 first time and then 15 each time thereafter for a total of 70 ballots. Marking the count on a piece of paper and noting it to the Iowa County Clerk via email. Election Inspectors were handed the copied ballots which required them to place their initials on the ballots when distributed to the voter indicating there were a qualified and blank ballot The unvoted ballots were kept separate at the poll book area at the end of the evening so that they were not mixed with the voted ballots. The copied voted ballots were removed from the auxiliary bin after polls closed and hand sorted, reviewed for write-in's and counted with a total of 63. There are approximately six Iowa County municipalities that use the ICE Machine.

Machine-Tallied vs. Hand-Counted – I made a public records request to the Iowa County Clerk – see attached. Called April 28, 25 to see if request would be fulfilled and Megan Currie indicated the County's computers/devices were down and did not have access to the files. Shall submit when receive. Highly unusual shift and other anomalies are speculation.

Premature Dismantling of Polling Station & Outdoor Signage – Unfortunately, the parking lot light was not working properly; it was pitch dark and the signs were unable to be read. The polling location has windows that view the entire parking lot, so election inspectors and Clerk are able to see if anyone is driving into the parking area. The "Vote Here" sign was removed but it is not one of the required voting signs, just a nice to have sign. The porch light was turned on for added lighting along with the outside door was blocked open for entry. The shifting of the ICE Machine was done to see the time. Chief Election Inspector uses the time on the ICE Machine to officially open and close the polls given every clock/watch can vary. The ICE machine was available for use by all voters.

Improper Notice & Conduct of Municipal Board of Canvassers - The MBOC notice was posted on the Village Hall bulletin board, along with the Village's website at www.villageofarenawi.gov on March 11, 2025. I specifically remember checking to ensure the website posting was viewable on March 28, 2025, for I was talking to another municipal clerk who had a question on posting. I informed the municipal clerk that the Village's notice was posted as well as on the website and I had better check it to ensure it is viewable. While I was on the phone, I checked the website, and all of the notices were viewable. I also checked the website on April 23, 2025, and the notice is there. Taylor Scott, Valley Sentinel Managing Editor did not mention in his email on Sunday, April 6, 2025, at 11:52 a.m. that the notice was not on the website. In a previous complaint, the Valley Sentinel noted that they continually check the website for updates. This is something that Taylor would have mentioned in his email if the website did not have the notice. This is the fifth year of conducting the municipal board of canvasser notice and this is the first time the Valley Sentinel has requested election notices. He also presented an email he sent to other municipalities for the notices. I contacted a couple of the municipalities on Monday, April 7, 2025, after receiving his email, and none of them provided the notice and hadn't received an email from the Valley indicating that it should be included in the notice, just singling out the Village of Arena.

The local and municipal board of canvass was held on April 1, 2025, at approximately 10:35 p.m. giving a deadline to file a recount petition no later than Friday, April 4, 2025. Taylor Scott took a picture of the notice but failed to read it. He was present as an observer/media on April 1, 2025, from approximately 7:30 pm to 10:15 pm. Taylor Scott and Becca Raven Uminowicz left prior to the start of the MBOC.

Acting Chief Election Inspector (CEI) Shea's Role & Conduct – Kristen Shea is a certified CEI who took an oath and followed through with her duties. Shea's term for Village Trustee ended April 14, 2025, and more than likely did not receive this notice given it was sent to her Village vs. personnel email. The only other certified CEI was the spouse of a candidate on the ballot. The Village is required to have at least one certified chief election inspector present at the election. Observers were able to sit or walk around the area to observe the straightening and review of ballots for write-ins. Once the ICE machine was secured, the voting booths were removed as soon as possible. The election inspectors were new to the hand tally process, if they did not match (would each say five out loud when reached it) they would start the count over. Having observers watching their every move may have made them nervous causing the restart of counting.

Should the Commission need anything further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

DaNean Naeger

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of May 2025

Jessica Paulson

Jessica Paulson

Printed Name

JESSICA PAULSON NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF WISCONSIN

My commission is permanent/expires 7/5/26

Gmail

DaNean Naeger

Public Records Request

1 message

DaNean Naeger Fri, Apr 25, 2025 at 9:52 AM
To: megan.currie@iowacounty.org

Hi Megan,

I am requesting under the State of Wisconsin's Public Records Law, Wis. Stat. §§19.31-19.39 the following records in the possession of your office, in electronic format delivered via email.
1. Copy of tally sheet from the April 1, 2025 Spring Election that shows results from the Municipal Village of Arena races machine and paper totals. Along with a copy of any discrepancies that were found from your office or MBOC with the totals from the Village of Arena local races.
2. Copy of email showing how many ballots were ordered for the Spring Election, April 1, 2025 from Village Clerk DaNean Naeger dated between February 20, 2025 - March 11, 2025.
3. From the following Spring Elections: April 2023, April 2022 and April 2021 total number of voters in each of these elections for the Village of Arena. Please indicate if any of these elections contained a River Valley School District Referendum.
4. Copy of any chain-of-custody records for printing extra ballots (from initial run) for any municipality from the April 1, 2025 Spring Election.

Thank you,
DaNean Naeger

https://www.channel3000.com/news/portion-of-iowa-county-computer-network-is-offline/article_ed78d479-da7f-4623-81ef-a257c0029d4b.html

TOP STORY

Portion of Iowa County computer network is offline

Corey Moen
Apr 30, 2025



DODGEVILLE, Wis. -- A portion of Iowa County's computer network is offline due to suspected 'suspicious activity.'

The county is working with cybersecurity experts to investigate. The county reported some government services and functions may be delayed.

The Iowa County Emergency Response functions are operational, including 911 services.

"Iowa County appreciates patience as we work to assess the situation and work to resolve the issue." stated Larry Bierke, Iowa County administrator. "At this time, we do not have any ETA for resolution." "We will provide updates are more information is available."

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Corey Moen
Digital Content Producer

requests a paper ballot, or if the electronic voting equipment should malfunction.

d. If electors from more than one reporting unit use the same polling place, there should be separate ballot boxes provided for each reporting unit.

e. The ballot boxes should be clearly labeled to indicate which ballots are to be deposited.

f. There should be a suitable lock and key for each ballot box.

Wis. Stats. §§ 5.35(3), 5.40(4), 5.40(5). 5.15(6)(b).

National Flag

The American flag must be displayed on an outside pole or in the voting area during all hours the polling place is open. Wis. Stat. § 5.35(1).

Tables and Chairs

a. It is recommended that there be a separate table solely for Election Day registration away from the area where registered voters check-in to help regulate the flow of traffic.

b. You should ensure that there are enough tables and chairs for election inspectors to conduct their work.

c. Additional chairs should be available for voters and observers to use as needed.

Signs

a. Traffic in the polling place can be improved by posting "Enter," "Exit," and "Voter Registration" signs. In addition, signs marking the accessible path should be prominently posted and easy to read from the parking lot.

b. Directions that instruct voters to state their name and address, provide proof of identification and sign the poll book can make the check-in process more efficient.

A Designated Observer Area

Observers are individuals who wish to exercise their right to be present at the polling place on Election Day. Anyone, other than a candidate, has a right to be at a polling place to observe the conduct of the election. Wisconsin law does not

DaNean,

Here are the documents that you requested. There are not any forms for #4. You can view the total voters on our website here: Welcome to the Official Website of Iowa County, WI - Archived Election Results the only one that had a school referendum was 2022.

Thanks,

Megan Currie
County Clerk
Iowa County
222 N Iowa St, Suite 102
Dodgeville, WI 53533
(608) 935-0399

Megan Currie

From: Village Clerk <vilarena@villageofarena.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 25, 2025 1:39 PM
To: Megan Currie
Subject: Spring Election

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Village President – Vote for one

1. Kathy Stoltz
2. Paul Pustina

Village Trustee....Vote for three

1. Tara Hill
2. Brittany Carney
3. Kathy Stoltz
4. Steve Wilkinson
5. Joseph Hipsky
6. Don Helt

275 Regular ballots and 50 Absentee ballots

DaNean Naeger, CMC/WCMC
Village Clerk/Treasurer
Village of Arena
345 West St.
Arena, WI 53503
P (608) 753-2133
F (608) 753-2851
Population: 877
vilarena@villageofarena.net
www.villageofarenawi.gov

Elected Officials and Members of Village Committees: in order to comply with the Open Meetings Act requirements, please limit any reply to only the sender of this electronic communication.

E-mail correspondence to and from this address may be subject to the open records law and may be disclosed to outside parties.

TALLY SHEET

Showing results for the WARD 1 IN THE VILLAGE OF ARENA in the County of Iowa on the 1st day of April, 2025 as made by the election inspectors setting forth the total number of votes for each office, the names of all persons receiving votes, and the number of votes cast for each person.

GIVE NUMBER OF LAST VOTE ON POLL LIST OR HIGHEST NUMBER ON REGISTRATION LIST 386

	PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES	x	Election
	CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES		
x	STATEWIDE OFFICES		Primary
	LEGISLATIVE & DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICES		
x	JUDICIAL & SUPERINTENDENT		
	COUNTY OFFICES		
x	LOCAL OFFICES		
x	SCHOOL OFFICES		
	REFERENDA		Name of Party (Partisan Primary)

OFFICE	NAMES OF CANDIDATES (Including Write-Ins)	MACHINE	PAPER	TOTAL
STATE SUPERINTENDENT	**STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION**			
	Brittany Kinser	128	32	160
	Jill Underly	166	28	194
	Adrianne Melby (write-in)			
	Scattering	2		2
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT	**JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT**			
	Brad Schimel	131	30	161
	Susan Crawford	186	33	219
	Scattering	1		1
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE DISTRICT 4	**COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE DISTRICT 4**			262
	Jennifer Nashold	222	40	~~222~~
	Scattering	3	1	~~3~~ 4
Village President	**Village President**			
	Kathy Stoltz	165	24	189
	Paul Pustina	140	34	174
	Scattering	4		4

Village Trustee	**Village Trustee**			
	Tara Hill	126	16	142
	Brittany Carney	105	14	119
	Kathy Stoltz	114	15	129
	Steve Wilkinson	192	36	228
	Joseph Hipsky	122	30	152
	Don Helt	127	26	153
	Scattering	1	3	4
River Valley School District	**School Board Member - Area 3**			
	Jeffrey J. Maier	223	43	266
	Scattering			
	School Board Member - Area 6			
	Emily Beck	149	21	170
	Jess Hisel	94	21	115
	Scattering			
	School Board Member - Area 9			
	John D. Bettinger	226	42	268
	Scattering	1		1
State of WI Referendum	**State of Wisconsin Photographic Identification for Voting Referendum**			
	Yes	190	35	225
	No	127	25	152
River Valley School District Referendum	**River Valley School District Exceed Revenue Limit Referendum**			
	Yes	135	21	156
	No	177	38	215

TALLY of the votes given in the Village of Arena, County of Iowa

State of Wisconsin on April 1st, 2025.

X	Election
	Primary

Name of Party (Partisan Primary)

	PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
	CONGRESSIONAL OFFICES
X	STATEWIDE OFFICES
	LEGISLATIVE & DISTRICT ATTORNEY OFFICES
X	JUDICIAL & SUPERINTENDENT
	COUNTY OFFICES
X	LOCAL OFFICES
X	SCHOOL OFFICES
	REFERENDA

NOTE: THIS STATEMENT IS TO BE MADE IN DUPLICATE, ONE TO BE FILED WITH THE MUNICIPAL CLERK AND THE OTHER TO BE DELIVERED TO THE COUNTY CLERK. FOR SCHOOL DISTRICT ELECTIONS, ONE COPY IS DELIVERED TO THE MUNICIPAL CLERK, AND THE OTHER IS DELIVERED TO THE SCHOOL DISTRICT.

STATE OF WISCONSIN

County of Iowa

Received and filed this ___ day of _____, 2025

(Signature of County Clerk)

CERTIFICATION

State of Wisconsin)

) SS.

County of Iowa)

We, the undersigned, certify that we are election inspectors for the 1 ward of the Village of Arena, County of Iowa, State of Wisconsin, for the primary or election held on the 1st day of April, 2025.

We further certify that we have counted all the ballots cast in said ward or polling place, that the count was duly legally made and the results of the count shown on the within tally sheet statement is correct.

1. Kasten A. Shea

2. Rosemary Pape

3. Debbie Stafford

(Signatures of at least 3 Election Inspectors, including the chief inspector and one inspector representing each of the 2 major political parties. Any inspector or tabulator participating in the ballot count must sign the certification.)

Dated: April 1st, 2025.

2022 Spring Election					
	# Absentee Vote	In Person Vote	Total # Voted	Total # Registered	% Voted
IOWA COUNTY	**936**	**4,048**	**4,984**	**15,002**	**33.2%**
TOWN OF PULASKI	6	58	64	219	29.2%
TOWN OF RIDGEWAY	5	122	127	414	30.7%
TOWN OF WALDWICK	3	106	109	314	34.7%
TOWN OF WYOMING	9	106	115	273	42.1%
VILLAGE OF ARENA	24	134	158	529	29.9%
VILLAGE OF AVOCA	12	97	109	275	39.6%
VILLAGE OF BARNEVELD	34	191	225	823	27.3%
VILLAGE OF BLANCHARDVILLE	5	36	41	122	33.6%
VILLAGE OF COBB	16	87	103	286	36.0%
VILLAGE OF HIGHLAND	17	125	142	491	28.9%
VILLAGE OF HOLLANDALE	9	47	56	180	31.1%

Iowa County
2025 Iowa Spring Election
Tuesday, April 1, 2025

Tabulator Name
Village of Arena

Tabulator ID
3

Voting Location
Village of Arena

Voting Location ID
3

Precinct
Village of Arena, Ward 1

Total Cast	323
Total Voters	323

Ballot ID: 2106, Ballot Name: 2106

Ballots Cast	323

63 paper
386

Precinct
Village of Arena, Ward 1
Voters: 323
Ballots Cast: 323

State Superintendent (1)

Brittany Kinser	128
Jill Underly	166
Write-in	2
Total Votes	296
Number of Overvotes	0
Number of Undervotes	27

Supreme Court Justice (1)

Brad Schimel	131
Susan Crawford	186
Write-in	1
Total Votes	318
Number of Overvotes	0
Number of Undervotes	5

Court of Appeals, District 4 (1)

Jennifer Nashold	222
Write-in	3
Total Votes	225
Number of Overvotes	0
Number of Undervotes	98

Village President - V. Arena (1)

Kathy Stoltz	165
Paul Pustina	140
Write-in	4
Total Votes	309
Number of Overvotes	0
Number of Undervotes	14

Number of Undervotes	:	5

Court of Appeals, District 4 (1)

Jennifer Nashold	:	222
Write-in	:	3
Total Votes	:	225
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	98

Village President - V. Arena (1)

Kathy Stoltz	:	165
Paul Pustina	:	140
Write-in	:	4
Total Votes	:	309
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	14

Village Trustee - V. Arena (3)

Tara Hill	:	126
Brittany Carney	:	105
Kathy Stoltz	:	114
Steve Wilkinson	:	192
Joseph Hipsky	:	122
Don Helt	:	127
Write-in	:	1
Total Votes	:	787
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	182

School Board, Area 3 - River Valley (1)

Jeffrey J Maier	:	223
Write-in	:	0
Total Votes	:	223
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	100

School Board, Area 6 - River Valley (1)

Emily Beck	:	149
Jess Hisel	:	94
Write-in	:	0
Total Votes	:	243
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	80

School Board, Area 9 - River Valley (1)

John D Bettinger	:	226
Write-in	:	1
Total Votes	:	227
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	96

State Referendum Q1 - Photographic ID for voting (1)

Yes	:	190
No	:	127
Total Votes	:	317
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	6

River Valley School Referendum - Exceed Revenue Limit (1)

Yes	:	135
No	:	177
Total Votes	:	312
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	11

TOTALS for all Ballots	
Total Cast	: 323
Total Voters	: 323

State Superintendent (1)	
Brittany Kinser	: 128
Jill Underly	: 166
Write-in	: 2
Total Votes	: 296
Number of Overvotes	: 0
Number of Undervotes	: 27

Supreme Court Justice (1)	
Brad Schimel	: 131
Susan Crawford	: 186
Write-in	: 1
Total Votes	: 318
Number of Overvotes	: 0
Number of Undervotes	: 5

Court of Appeals, District 4 (1)	
Jennifer Nashold	: 222
Write-in	: 3
Total Votes	: 225
Number of Overvotes	: 0
Number of Undervotes	: 98

Village President - V. Arena (1)	
Kathy Stoltz	: 165
Paul Pustina	: 140
Write-in	: 4
Total Votes	: 309
Number of Overvotes	: 0
Number of Undervotes	: 14

Village Trustee - V. Arena (3)	
Tara Hill	: 126
Brittany Carney	: 105
Kathy Stoltz	: 114
Steve Wilkinson	: 192
Joseph Hipsky	: 122
Don Helt	: 127
Write-in	: 1
Total Votes	: 787
Number of Overvotes	: 0
Number of Undervotes	: 182

School Board, Area 3 - River Valley (1)	
Jeffrey J Maier	: 223
Write-in	: 0
Total Votes	: 223
Number of Overvotes	: 0
Number of Undervotes	: 100

School Board, Area 6 - River Valley (1)	
Emily Beck	: 149
Jess Hisel	: 94
Write-in	: 0
Total Votes	: 243
Number of Overvotes	: 0
Number of Undervotes	: 80

School Board, Area 9 - River Valley (1)	
John D Bettinger	: 226
Write-in	: 1
Total Votes	: 227
Number of Overvotes	: 0

Total Votes	:	243
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	80

School Board, Area 9 - River Valley (1)

John D Bettinger	:	226
Write-in	:	1
Total Votes	:	227
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	96

State Referendum Q1 - Photographic ID for voting (1)

Yes	:	190
No	:	127
Total Votes	:	317
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	6

River Valley School Referendum - Exceed Revenue Limit (1)

Yes	:	135
No	:	177
Total Votes	:	312
Number of Overvotes	:	0
Number of Undervotes	:	11

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Unit Model: ICE (2.3)
Unit Serial: AAFEBKR0011
Protective Counter: 3455
Software Version: 5.5.6.5

Certification

WE, THE UNDERSIGNED ELECTION OFFICIALS, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE ELECTION WAS HELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITY ELECTION ACT AND REGULATIONS OF THIS JURISDICTION.

Kristen J. Shea
Inspector Signature

Rosemarie Pope
Inspector Signature

Debbie Stafford
Inspector Signature

Inspector Signature

Poll closed.
Tuesday Apr 1 20:01:58 2025

Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

May 7, 2026

Robert Kopplin
4540 W Leon Terrace
Milwaukee, WI 53216

Paulina Gutierrez
200 E. Wells St. Room 501
Milwaukee, WI 53202

Sent via email to: bobkopplin@gmail.com, pgutie@milwaukee.gov, voterinfo@milwaukee.gov, and jschet@milwaukee.gov

Re: EL 25-64, Robert Kopplin v. Paulina Gutierrez

Dear Mr. Kopplin and Executive Director Gutierrez,

Introduction

This letter is in response to the complaint submitted by Robert Kopplin (the Complainant) to the Wisconsin Elections Commission (Commission), which was filed on April 21, 2025, alleging that the City of Milwaukee Elections Commission (MEC) Executive Director Paulina Gutierrez (the Respondent) did not allow election observers to readily observe all public aspects of the voting process. The Complainant alleges violations of Wis. Stat. §§ 7.41(2), 7.52(1)(a), and 6.88(3) at Operations Center, the board of absentee ballot canvassers meeting located at 1091 South Kinnickinnic Avenue in Milwaukee, during the April 1, 2025, Spring Election.

The Commission has reviewed the Complaint, Response, and Reply. The Commission provides the following analysis and decision. In short, the Commission finds that the Complainant did not show probable cause that the Respondent's actions constituted an abuse of discretion or violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 7.41(2), 7.52(1)(a), and 6.88(3).

Commission Authority and Role in Resolving Complaints Filed Under Wis. Stat. § 5.06

Under Wis. Stats. §§ 5.05(1)(e) and 5.06(6), the Commission is provided with the inherent, general, and specific authority to consider the submissions of the parties to a complaint and to issue findings. The Commission may summarily issue a decision and provide that decision to the affected parties. This letter serves as the Commission's final decision regarding the issues raised in this complaint.

The Commission's role in resolving verified complaints filed under Wis. Stat. § 5.06, which challenge the decisions or actions of local election officials, is to determine whether a local official acted contrary to applicable election laws or abused their discretion in administering applicable election laws.

Complaints "shall set forth such facts as are within the knowledge of the Complainant to show probable cause to believe that a violation of law or abuse of discretion has occurred or will occur." Wis. Stat. § 5.06(1). Probable

Wisconsin Elections Commissioners
Ann S. Jacobs, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Don M. Millis | Carrie Riepl | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen

Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

cause is defined in Wis. Admin. Code § EL 20.02(4) to mean "the facts and reasonable inferences that together are sufficient to justify a reasonable, prudent person, acting with caution, to believe that the matter asserted is probably true."

Complaint Allegations

The Complainant alleges he served as election observer for the 2025 Spring Election and observed practices by the Milwaukee Election Commission's board of absentee ballot canvassers that were not in compliance with Wisconsin's election laws.

The Complainant alleges that he observed the entrance of the "ballot collection room" where absentee ballots collected from drop boxes as well as walk-in absentee ballots were located. Nearby were two rooms with "Authorized Personnel Only" signs affixed to them and windows that were either obstructed by objects or blocked out with paint. The Complainant noticed that one of the restricted office rooms was connected to the garage and he questions why the restricted rooms had access to the garage.

The Complainant alleges that the windows to the "Secure Ballot Room" were obstructed, one with spray paint and the other with stacks of mail bins, making it difficult for election observers to watch the "scanning of ballot envelopes or the handling of ballots." He alleges that in previous elections, observers had been able to see into windows that are now obstructed.

The Complainant questions what is happening in the restricted rooms saying: "[w]hat is happening in these rooms that no observers are allowed to see into? What are Milwaukee election officials bringing into the office from the garage that they don't want observers to see."

The Complainant also provided photographs of the "Authorized Personnel Only" signs and the "Secure Ballot Room."

Response

The Respondent filed a written response with the Commission on May 23, 2025. The Respondent argues that the Complainant's allegation "lacks merit" and she denies any violation of Wisconsin law.

The Response admits that there were several areas at the board of absentee ballot canvassers location where the public and election observers are not allowed access to certain areas to prevent disrupting MEC's operations. The respondent argues that the restrictions are lawful, and that the Complainant has "incorrectly" asserted that the restrictions violate Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2). The Respondents argues that observers are only allowed access to "for the purpose of observing the voting process, not to areas dedicated for ministerial tasks or to areas that are unrelated to the voting process." She identifies "[t]o the best of her ability" the areas described in the complaint and in the photos as:

> Exhibit 1 – this area is private office space and additional loading bay access; Exhibit 2 – this is a picture of the area outside of the Secure Ballot Room; Exhibit 3 – this is a picture of the front room vestibule to the Operations Center, which served as the absentee ballot collection area; Exhibit 4 – this is the same room as pictures in Exhibit 3; Exhibit 5 – this area is private office space.

She argues that neither Wis. Stat. § 7.41 or § 7.52, which concerns an absentee ballot board of canvassers meeting and grants observers the same level of access, require "public access to areas that

are dedicated to ministerial tasks or to areas that are unrelated to the voting process." Rather, she states that election observers only have access to observe the voting process. She alleges that observer access to the loading bay, private office rooms, and the Secure Ballot Room was not required and that public access to "such areas would be unreasonable, disruptive, and unsafe." The Respondent does admit that observers previously had been able to see into several windows that were blocked off during the 2025 Spring Election, but argues that such access in the past went beyond what was required by law.

Reply

The Complainant filed a reply, stating that along with a violation of Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2), the Respondent also violated Wis. Stat. Wis. Stat. §§ 7.52(1)(a) and 6.88(3). He argues that observers have the right to observe "the chain of custody of absentee ballots at any and all stages of storing, transporting or any handling." The Complainant argues that election observers should have access to the full voting process, including ministerial tasks. The restriction of access to certain voting processes "puts at high risk the election results being manipulated."

He also alleges that the tasks conducted in the restricted areas include "evaluating the legal sufficiency of each ballot and controlling their chain of custody prior to tabulation." The Complainant takes issue with the Respondent's claim that allowing access to these areas would be "unreasonable, disruptive, and unsafe" and argues that observers have the right to see the processing of ballots, that any observer who did disrupt the proceedings could be removed, and that there is no explanation provided as to why such observation would be unsafe.

Discussion[1]

The Complainant alleges that the Respondent violated Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2), and added §§ 7.52(1)(a) and 6.88(3) in the reply, by not allowing election observers to observe all public aspects of the voting process, arguing that observers have the right to observe the full chain of custody of absentee ballots including "storing, transporting or any handling."

Under Wis. Stat. §§ 7.41 and 7.52(1)(a), election officials must establish designated observation areas for election observers "to observe all public aspects of the voting process." Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2). The observation areas shall be positioned "to permit any election observer to readily observe all public aspect of the voting process" and allows observation from between three and eight feet from the tables at which voters may register to vote or at which they state their names and addresses. *Id*.

Wisconsin statute § 6.88(3) concerns the processing of absentee ballots in a polling place. Because this complaint does not concern a polling place, this citation does not appear relevant, and the absentee ballots would have been processed following the very similar procedures under Wis. Stat. § 7.52.

The Complainant argues that the Respondent cannot restrict access to areas where absentee ballots are handled and processed. At an absentee ballot board of canvassers meeting, voters do not register to vote, but under Wis. Stat. § 7.52(3)(a), the names of absentee voters are required to be read by the canvassers so that observers can hear. Therefore, observers must be able to observe the proceedings from three to eight feet away from this activity.

[1] The Commission's observer rule, Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter EL 4, was not yet in effect when this complaint was filed, and therefore the Commission does not apply those standards to this decision. However, the Commission notes that its decision would not have changed under the new rules, but it would have also considered Wis. Admin. Code §§ EL 4.03(1)(b), 4.04(3), 4.05(2)(a), and 4.05(3).

Beyond that, observers have the right to observe "all public aspects of the voting process." Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2). The Commission finds that regarding an absentee ballot board of canvassers meeting, this means that observers must have an ability to see and hear all activities specified in Wis. Stat. § 7.52, though they are not guaranteed the right to observe three and eight feet away from activities that are not the reading of names on the absentee ballot envelopes.

The question for the Commission is thus whether the Complainant has shown probable cause that he was denied access to observe activities prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 7.52. As an initial matter, there does not appear to be an allegation that he was not allowed to observe the reading of absentee voter names from three to eight feet away, and thus the Commission does not find any violation of that requirement.

The Complainant alleges that he was denied access to two office rooms and one larger "Secure Ballot Room." From his description and photos, it appears that he was able to observe the area in which voters came to the location to drop off their absentee ballots and where ballots collected from drop boxes were delivered, and the complaint appears to concern the scanning and handling of ballots that were returned to the clerk prior to election day.

Regarding the two offices, the Commission does not find probable cause of a violation or an abuse of discretion. The Complainant does not clearly allege that these areas were being used for absentee ballot processing in any capacity and merely alleges that election officials appeared to have access to these areas that also had access to areas where absentee ballots were handled. Without a clear allegation that activity that is observable under Wis. Stat. § 7.52 took place in these locations, the Commission cannot find a violation.

The Complainant alleges that absentee ballots were scanned and handled in the Secure Ballot Room, and, in the reply only, alleges that ballots were "evaluated for legal sufficiency" in this room. The Respondent counters that neither Wis. Stat. § 7.41 nor 7.52 requires access to areas that are unrelated to voting or that are "dedicated to ministerial tasks" and asserts that observers had access to the absentee voting process. The minimal descriptions provided in the three filings do not give the Commission a clear idea of the function of the Secure Ballot Room. However, the responsibility is always on a Complainant to make a clear allegation supported by evidence, and in this case, it is not clear that observers were denied access to any specific procedure under Wis. Stat. § 7.52, which includes all aspects of opening and counting absentee ballots.

From the filings, it appears that the Respondent has placed two distinct processes within the same building, namely the processing and sorting of returned absentee ballots to the Executive Director or her authorized representatives in the Secure Ballot Room, and then the activities of the board of absentee ballot canvassers. The Commission does not agree that ministerial tasks of the board of absentee ballot canvassers can be restricted, and all tasks defined under Wis. Stat. § 7.52 are subject to the general rule of public observation of the voting process, though not subject to the specific distance requirement. However, the initial return of absentee ballots to the Executive Director and the processing and sorting of those ballots, which are tasks falling under Wis. Stat. §§ 6.86(5) and (6), 6.87(4)(b)1., (6), and (9), and 6.88(1) and (2), are not required to be observable.[2]
From the allegations in the complaint and the statements in the response, it appears that these Executive Director processes were being carried out in the Secure Ballot Room, and thus those activities were not observable because they did not involve the processes under Wis. Stat. § 7.52.

[2] Under Wis. Admin. Code § EL 4.05(2)(a), ballots returned to a clerk's office or alternate site are observable when returned by the USPS during the scheduled hours of in-person absentee voting. In this case, though involving an absentee ballot canvass board rather than an in-person absentee voting site, it appears that the complainant was allowed to observe the in-person return of absentee ballots by voters and from drop box collection.

While the Commission does not find that the Complainant provided arguments and evidence supporting a probable cause finding that absentee ballot board of canvassers activities were being conducted where observers could not observe them, the Commission does question the apparent practice of scanning and sorting absentee ballots in a room right next door to the canvassers meeting while not providing any form of access to that location. The Commission suggests either conducting those activities in a separate location or allowing some level of access, perhaps just through the window.

Under Wis. Stat. § 7.41, the clerk's initial processing of absentee ballots is not observable. This role includes accepting, processing, recording, and determining if a certificate envelope is deficient or requires correction. Despite this, as the Respondent acknowledged, there is nothing preventing additional access regarding these specific tasks.

For sorting that takes place immediately adjacent to the absentee ballot board of canvassers meeting, some level of observer access may be helpful in providing transparency to election conduct. However, as observation is not required, the Commission does not issue an order regarding this allegation and leaves the decision to the Respondent regarding whether any portion of absentee ballot sorting and processing may be observed when it is conducted immediately adjacent to activities that are observable.

Commission's Findings

Based upon the above review and analysis, the Commission does not find probable cause to believe that an abuse of discretion or violation of law occurred under Wis. Stat. §§ 7.41(2), 6.88(3), and 7.52(1)(a).

Right to Appeal – Circuit Court

This letter constitutes the Commission's resolution of these complaints. Wis. Stat. § 5.06(2). Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06(8), any aggrieved party may appeal this decision to circuit court no later than 30 days after the issuance of this decision.

If any of the parties should have questions about this letter or the Commission's decision, please feel free to contact the Commission at 608-266-8005 or elections@wi.gov.

Sincerely,

WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

Official Election Complaint Form

STEP 1 Complaint Type

Please select the statutory process that governs your complaint:

Note: you should choose only one statutory process per complaint; if you feel that your allegations fall under more than one statutory process, you should submit separate complaints under each process.

- 5.05 (Election Law Violation)
- ✔ 5.06 (Violations by Election Officials or Appeals of Decisions of Election Officials)
- 5.061 (Help America Vote Act Violation)

STEP 2 Complainant Contact Information

Please provide the following information about yourself.

Note: Anyone filing this complaint with you can add their information on a separate page (see page 4).

First Name	Last Name
Robert	Kopplin

Residential Address: 4540 W Leon Terrace, Milwaukee, WI 53216

Mailing Address (if different):

Telephone (optional)	Email
	Bobkopplin@gmail.com

STEP 3 Respondent

Please provide the following information about the individual or individuals whom you allege violated or improperly administered election laws:

Note: For 5.06 complaints, each respondent must be an election official. If there are multiple respondents, you can add their information on a separate page (see page 5).

Respondent Name	Respondent Title (5.06 complaints)
Paulina Gutierrez	Executive Director of Milwaukee Elections

Mailing Address: 200 E Wells St, Room 501 Milwaukee, WI 53202

Telephone (if available)	Email (if available)

STEP 4 Applicable Statutes

Please cite each statute within Chapters 5 to 10 and 12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, as well as any other laws relating to elections, other than laws relating to campaign financing, that you allege were violated or improperly administered.

Note: The Commission cannot accept a complaint that does not cite specific provisions, including the correct subsections, of election law.

7.41(2) ...alternate site and not less than 3 feet from nor more than 8 feet from the table at which a person may register to vote at the polling place, office, or alternate site. The observation areas shall be so positioned to permit any election observer to readily observe all public aspects of the voting process.

STEP 5 Allegations

Set forth in detail the facts that establish probable cause to believe that a violation occurred. Be as specific as possible as it relates to dates, times, individuals, and actions involved. Use as many separate pages as needed and attach copies of any supporting documentation, evidence, or affidavits.

I was observing in front of the ballot collection room for drop boxes and walk-in absentee ballots. This room had a clear window and its door was open so I could see inside. To my left, was a restricted office with the sign "Authorized Personnel Only" on it; this office also had a window which was almost covered by a poster. The rest of the window looked like it was painted with frosted spray paint so I could not see inside.

To my right, down a short hallway, was another restricted room with the "Authorized Personnel Only" sign it. This door leads to another office space much larger than the office to the left. I can see there is a window to this office in the drop off room. But I cannot see into the office through this window because it is also covered by what looks like frosted spray paint.

The drop off room has two access doors, one to the exterior of the building and one to the hallway where I was stationed. In the right office,when the door near me was opened, I could see another door on the far side of the room which leads to the garage. But the view to the remainder of the room was obscured by a partition wall from my view point in the hallway.

Commissioner Haag was told be Paulina he could park his vehicle in the garage. Shortly afterwards he came out of the right restricted room past my chair. He had not entered that room, so I assume this office space has a door leading to the garage.

The " Secure Ballot Room" windows are no longer clear for observers to watch the scanning of ballot envelopes or the handling of ballots. One window was obstructed with a sign and frosted spray paint. Mail bins almost fully covered the second window, limiting observation. Not even our tallest observer could see over the stack of bins. In past elections, observers have been able to see into several windows at central count that are now blocked off.

What is happening in these rooms that no observers are allowed to see into? What are Milwaukee election officials bringing into the office from the garage that they don't want observers to see?

STEP 6 Sign

Each complainant must complete ***either*** step 6a, "Unsworn Statement," or Step 6b "Sworn Statement." For either option, you may enter your digital signature by clicking the box and following the instructions, or you may print the form and sign it.

STEP 6a Unsworn Statement

I declare under penalty of false swearing under the law of Wisconsin that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed on the [ ] day of [ ], [ ] at [ ]
(city or other location and state or country).

Printed Name [ ]

Signature [ ]

STEP 6b Sworn Statement (to be completed in the presence of a notary)

I, [Robert Kopplin], being first duly sworn, on oath, state that I personally read the above complaint, and that the above allegations are true based on my personal knowledge and, as to those stated on information and belief, I believe them to be true.

Robert Kopplin
Complainant's Signature

Note: Each complainant listed above in section 6b must have this form sworn before a notary or other official able to swear oaths.

STATE OF WISCONSIN

County of, [Milwaukee] (county of notarization)

Sworn to before me this day of, [04/15/2025].


Sommer C Jordan
(Signature of person authorized to administer oaths)

Stamp
SOMMER C JORDAN
Notary Public
State of Wisconsin


My commission expires on [03/3/2026], or is permanent.

Notary Public or [ ] (official title if not notary)


ELECTION
AUTHORIZED
PERSONNEL ONLY




RING BELL FOR
SERVICE




ELECTION
Mail Ballot Processing
CENTRAL COUNT SIGN-IN
INTAKE & RECEIVING
REVIEW, NUMBERING & EXTRACTION
BALLOT RECONSTRUCTION
TABULATION
WEEKLY PLANNER

EVAN C. GOYKE
City Attorney

MARY L. SCHANNING
ROBIN A. PEDERSON
NAOMI E. SANDERS
JULIE P. WILSON
Deputy City Attorneys

CITY OF MILWAUKEE
Office of the City Attorney

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KATHRYN Z. BLOCK
THOMAS D. MILLER
PETER J. BLOCK
PATRICK J. MCCLAIN
ANDREA J. FOWLER
HANNAH R. JAHN
MEIGHAN M. ANGER
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ALEX T. MUELLER
ALEXANDER D. COSSI
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Assistant City Attorneys

May 22, 2025

VIA EMAIL ONLY: elections@wi.gov; james.witecha@wisconsin.gov

James Witecha
Chief Legal Counsel
Wisconsin Elections Commission
201 West Washington Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 7984
Madison, WI 53707-7984

RE: *Robert Kopplin v. Paulina Gutierrez*
Case No. EL 25-64

Dear Attorney Witecha:

Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06 and Wis. Admin. Code § EL 20.04(3), please consider this to be the Verified Response of Respondent Paulina Gutiérrez ("Respondent") to Complainant Robert Kopplin's ("Kopplin") April 21, 2025 complaint ("Complaint"). For reasons stated herein, Respondent asks the Wisconsin Elections Commission ("WEC") to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.

KOPPLIN'S COMPLAINT

Kopplin was an election observer at the Milwaukee Election Commission's ("MEC") "Operations Center" (located at 1091 South Kinnickinnic Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin) during the April 2025 General Election. *See* Complaint, p. 2. Kopplin alleges that, during the administration of the April 2025 General Election, MEC (by and through the Respondent) restricted access to certain rooms at the Operations Center. *Id*. To Kopplin, the lack of access to these areas of the Operations Center is a violation of Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2). However, Kopplin's vague argument lacks merit and Respondent denies that any violation of Wisconsin law has occurred.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the April 2025 General Election, MEC used its Operations Center as its central count to canvass, process, and count 50,129 ballots. *See* Gutiérrez Decl., ¶¶ 2-3. In line with Wisconsin law, members of the public were not provided access to certain rooms of the Operations Center to avoid disruptions to MEC's operations. This restriction of access applied to the areas specifically identified by the Exhibits of the Complaint[1], which included private staff office space, access to the loading bay, and MEC's Secure Ballot Room. *Id*., ¶ 4. No unauthorized election activities occurred within these areas of the Operation Center identified in the Complaint and public access was not required. *Id*.

RESPONSE TO ALLEGATION

Kopplin unfoundedly alleges that Respondent violated Wisconsin law. Specifically, Kopplin incorrectly asserts that MEC prohibiting public access to certain rooms within the Operations Center is a violation of Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2). *See* Complaint, p. 2. However, Kopplin's argument lacks merit and evidence. Wisconsin law only requires public access to areas of a central count for the purpose of observing the voting process, not to areas dedicated for ministerial tasks or to areas that are unrelated to the voting process.

Wis. Stat. § 7.41, concerning the public's right to access and observe the voting process, provides in relevant part:

> Any member of the public may be present at any polling place, in the office of any municipal clerk whose office is located in a public building on any day that absentee ballots may be cast in that office, or at any alternate site under Wis. Stat. § 6.855 on any day that absentee ballots may be cast at that site *for the purpose of observation of an election and the absentee voting process* . . . .

Wis. Stat. § 7.41(1) (emphasis added); *see also* Wis. Stat § 7.41(2) ("[t]he observation areas shall be so positioned to permit any election observer to readily observe all *public aspects of the voting process*") (emphasis added).

Similarly, Wis. Stat. § 7.52, concerning the canvassing of absentee ballots, provides that "[a]ny member of the public has the same right of access to a meeting of the municipal board of absentee ballot canvassers . . . that the individual would have under Wis. Stat. § 7.41 to observe the proceedings at a polling place." *See* Wis. Stat. § 7.52(1)(a).

[1] To the best of her ability, Respondent will attempt to identify the areas Kopplin has included pictures of:

Exhibit 1 – this area is private office space and additional loading bay access; Exhibit 2 – this is a picture of the area outside of the Secure Ballot Room; Exhibit 3 – this is a picture of the front room vestibule to the Operations Center, which served as the absentee ballot collection area; Exhibit 4 – this is the same room as pictures in Exhibit 3; Exhibit 5 – this area is private office space.

Nowhere in Wis. Stat. §§ 7.41 or 7.52 is it required to provide public access to areas that are dedicated to ministerial tasks or to areas that are unrelated to the voting process. Rather, the statutes speak to observing voting activity that occurs in a polling place or at a central count location on election day and the actual absentee *voting* process – not observing ministerial tasks that occur on election day or access to non-election-related areas.

It is within MEC's authority to prohibit public access to certain non-election-related areas of the Operations Center. Specifically, Kopplin's Complaint indicates concerns over not being able to access the loading bay and private office rooms or see into the Secure Ballot Room. *See* Complaint, p. 2 ("[w]hat is happening in these rooms that no observers are allowed to see into? What are Milwaukee election officials brining into the office from the garage that that don't want observers to see?"). Again, Wisconsin law does not require MEC to provide public access to observe ministerial tasks or to non-election-related areas of a central count. Allowing public members access to such areas would be unreasonable, disruptive, and unsafe.

Finally, Kopplin mentions that prior elections had more accessibility for election observers at MEC's central count locations. *See* Complaint, p. 2 ("[i]n past elections, observers have been able to see into several windows at central count that are now blocked off"). Briefly, Wisconsin law creates a floor of accessibility for observation, but does not necessarily create a ceiling. In other words, MEC is mandated to provide a minimum amount of public access, but is not limited to providing only that amount of access and no more. Any access provided above the minimum mandate is at the discretion of MEC and may be withdrawn at any time for any reason, provided of course that it not be for a discriminatory reason. In this case, the changes to MEC's Operations Center observed by Kopplin were within MEC's discretion and were not based on a discriminatory purpose. As such, these changes were not a violation of Wisconsin law.

CONCLUSION

Respondent denies Kopplin's allegation that a violation of Wisconsin law has occurred. For the foregoing reasons, Kopplin's Complaint should be dismissed. Please note that the electronic signature of legal counsel follows regarding all legal arguments raised herein, as does the verification by declaration of Ms. Paulina Gutiérrez regarding all factual assertions.

Dated and signed at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 22nd day of May, 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

Electronically signed by Jordan M. Schettle

Jordan M. Schettle (State Bar No. 1104571)
Attorney for Respondent
CITY OF MILWAUKEE
200 E. Wells St., Room 800
Milwaukee, WI 53202-3515
Telephone: (414) 286-2601
Facsimile: (414) 286-8550
jschet@milwaukee.gov

Attachments:

- Declaration of Paulina Gutiérrez

STATE OF WISCONSIN
BEFORE THE WISCONSIN ELECTIONS COMMISSION

ROBERT KOPPLIN

Complainant,

v. Case No. EL 25-64

PAULINA GUTIÉRREZ

Respondent.

DECLARATION OF PAULINA GUTIÉRREZ

STATE OF WISCONSIN)
)
COUNTY OF MILWAUKEE)

I, Paulina Gutiérrez, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and state as follows:

1. I am the Executive Director of the City of Milwaukee Election Commission ("MEC"). I was confirmed for this role on June 11, 2024, and serve as an election official pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.02(4e). I served as Executive Director at all times relevant for the purposes of this action. I have personal knowledge and belief as to the matters set forth below.

2. MEC has an Operations Center, located at 1901 South Kinnickinnic Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The Operations Center was used as MEC's Central Count location for the April 2025 General Election.

3. For the April 2025 General Election, MEC issued 55,116 absentee ballots. Of those, 50,129 absentee ballots were accepted and counted on Election Day.

4. At the Operations Center on Election Day, there were areas the public were prohibited from accessing. These areas included the Secure Ballot Room, private office spaces, and access to the Operations Center's loading bay. No unauthorized election activities occurred within these areas of the Operation Center during MEC's administration of the April 2025 General Election.

5. I personally read the above Verified Response and that is it true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

Per Wis. Stat. § 887.015, I declare under the penalty of false swearing under the law of Wisconsin that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated and signed at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 22nd day of May, 2025.

Electronically signed by ***Paulina Gutiérrez***

PAULINA GUTIÉRREZ
Executive Director
Milwaukee Election Commission

P.O. ADDRESS
200 East Wells Street, Room 501
Milwaukee, WI 53202
Tel: 414-286-3491

VIA EMAIL ONLY

James Witecha
Chief Legal Counsel
Wisconsin Elections Commission
201 West Washington Avenue, Second Floor
P.O. Box 7984 Madison, WI 53707

RE: Robert Kopplin v. Paulina Gutierrez

Case No. EL- 25-64

Reply to Respondent Paulina Gutierrez's Response to my Complaint

Dear Attorney Witecha:

Pursuant to Wis. Stat. s. 5.06 and Wis. Admin Code s. EL 20.04(3), please consider this to be my Reply to Respondent Pauline Gutierrez's response to my Complaint, as identified above. For the reasons stated in this reply, Complainant asks that the remedy stated below be ordered.

In reply to the Gutierrez's response, it is a misinterpretation of the Wisconsin Code, and in turn an abusive application of the Wisconsin election statutes, to prevent an observer from doing his or her job to observe the chain of custody of absentee ballots at any and all stages of storing, transporting or any handling of absentee ballots, or any ballots. Gutierrez has abused, and has indicated by her actions and communications that she intends to continue to abuse, the letter and intent of Wisconsin's election statute.

The plain meaning and obvious intent of the state statute under Wis. Stat. s. 7.41, indicates that election observers have different and special authority than the general "public". This section spells out that observers have the right to be present to meaningfully observe, within three to eight feet, what happens to those absentee ballots once, they are mailed or otherwise delivered to a vote counting entity, to ensure that a true and honest count of votes cast by qualified voters is achieved. The intent of the

Wisconsin Code, including Wis. Stat. Sections 7.41, 7.52, and other provisions of the Code, is to seek fair and accurate elections, and accordingly that is the primary purpose of allowing observers to observe all handling of ballots. It is illogical at best to otherwise have large and significant gaps in that safeguard. It goes without saying that the intent of Wisconsin's election statutes, that provide authority for observers to effectively observe, must be enforced, as with any state's election code, for the purpose of deterring mistakes or fraud; stopping it when it is detected by appropriate means, such as by informing or objecting to it to election officials by non-disruptive means, or through legal action; and if an improper practice, Constitutional violation, or crime has been completed, to be able to serve as a witness in a legal proceeding. For Gutierrez in a dismissive fashion to claim in its response that some stages of election officials handling those ballots is somehow immune from mistake, fraud or fraud detection, by claiming these stages are not a public aspect of the absentee voting process for "ministerial" handling grounds, is a vague and arbitrary interpretation of the statute.[1]

Even if the handling of absentee ballots were ministerial as respondent describes them, which is not conceded, this argument is still unconvincing. This is because the observer seeks their right to simply view this "ministerial handling" of ballots in the light of day. Such a prevention by Gutierrez, of a necessary protection of the vote is an abuse of the application of the observer laws and election fraud prevention laws of our State. Gutierrez cites no statute, nor can she, where the so-called ministerial storage or handling of the ballots that it argues should be hidden from view, that is except for the appointees of a Democratic administration who carry out those ministerial and transport duties, should

[1] An initial reply to this assertion is that the activities that have been released as to what duties the City of Milwaukee employees do in these blocked off rooms are not merely ministerial -according to MEC's own flowchart they involve evaluating the legal sufficiency of each ballot and controlling their chain of custody prior to tabulation. These functions directly relate to the "public aspects of the voting process" protected by Wis. Stat. § 7.41(2).

be without the observers from the campaigns or political parties whose candidates or on the ballot. It goes without saying that, with no observers allowed, this creates an opportunity or an unnecessary temptation for individuals to mishandle these "ministerial" duties.

This of course puts at high risk the election results being manipulated, in what would otherwise be an honest election; this can happen in a short period of time. Such an alarming interpretation cannot be the intent of the statute as it defies reasonableness, fairness, and common sense. This application of the law, that could potentially cause a devastating result, necessarily includes mandating hidden conduct during ministerial, as well as other handling, storing or transporting of absentee ballots. This on its face is an abusive application of the statute.

Gutierrez's vague and overly broad description of the interpretation of the statute is that a "public aspect" of our highly important vote counting process is necessarily limited to the spaces that a random person (or "member of the public") walking off the street can readily have access to. Even though Gutierrez may seek to attempt to put random persons on the par with election observers, so that only its employees have exclusive and unobserved handling of ballots during vital parts of the election integrity process, this self-serving interpretation is without merit.

It would be repugnant to logic and common sense for the legislature to intend that gaping holes in election observation can be imposed for election observers, who clearly are the well-known safeguards to fair elections. As shown by the powers it has granted to election observers to be positioned within three to eight feet to view the absentee ballot process, every place the absentee ballots go must necessarily be a public aspect of the voting process.

Hidden conduct with absentee ballots in back rooms, sometimes for many days, and during the transportation of ballots, is by anyone's standards intolerable. In several previous elections, many irregularities were witnessed by observers who could see into the places that Gutierrez now insists should be blocked from observer view. Guterrez's solution to such previous witnessing and reporting of what they saw is to permanently block observers from viewing these spaces - so that they can no longer be in a position to see any more of her employees' irregularities. It is hard not to

reasonably infer that, because Gutierrez supervised the frosting over of windows, the placing of other obstacles such as posters and mail bins in front of windows, and locked doors to rooms to hide her employees' conduct, she obviously knows her actions discontinue observers from being able to carry out their purpose - to be present to deter improper conduct, to report improprieties to those who can put a stop to it, or to be witnesses in legal proceedings in criminal court or in civil courts to redress Constitutional rights violations of qualified Wisconsin voters. It is hard not to draw any other credible conclusion.

Gutierrez asserts that she decided to prohibit observers from watching the proceedings in certain rooms or spaces where absentee ballots were moved or handled, which Gutierrez defined as "private staff office space", "the loading bay", and a "secure ballot room." Gutierrez explains she would not let anyone, in this case including election observers, into those places, who were not the City of Milwaukee's employees handling ballots, because to her this would be "unreasonable, disruptive, and unsafe." See Response, p. 2. Again, such a reason for prohibiting observers from being duly present in a room to merely view the handing of absentee ballots, ministerial or not, is an abuse of her applying her authority. First, these excuses are vague, patronizing, and unjustified. Gutierrez does not give any examples, even worst-case scenario hypotheticals, to justify refusing election observers to see and hear the hidden conduct which happened or what will happen in the future, in these spaces, nor could they give any.

As stated, respondent does not cite any law to justify those misleading reasons. In fact, the Wis. Stat. s. 7.41 (3) provides a language that suggests the intent of the statue rejects one of those reasons, namely the one that claims merely having observers present is "disruptive". Section. 7.41 allows a supervisor to remove a person, such as an observer, only under certain conditions, one of those being that he or she "[d]isrupts the operation of the polling place, clerk's office, or alternate [absentee ballot] site...." This clearly infers that observers are allowed to be present if and until they were in fact disruptive. Thus, this language appears to justify *removal* of an observer only if he or she is seen to be a disruptive individual because of an "overt act" of specific disruptive conduct he or she committed. See s. 7.41

(3) (a)[2] Obviously, one necessarily must be present to commit overtly disruptive acts.

Also, for Gutierrez to summarily prohibit observers from viewing what happens when her employees are supposed to be carrying out ministerial handling of ballots, because that for some unexplained reason is supposed to be "unreasonable", is unjustified. As explained above, an observer simply observing as he or she is of course authorized to do, is a normal part of his or her duty, and their purpose for being there; this observing that he or she would do in a "ministerial space" is the same type of duty he or she would do in any other so-called "vote counting" place." Carrying out that responsibility is by definition clearly not unreasonable. That authorization for observers is for the purpose of observing the handling of absentee ballots to ensure that proper and legal actions take place without any mishandling. Anything can happen, even very bad, when there is no proper observation.

Also, Gutierrez argues that observers watching the ministerial handling of absentee ballots is "unsafe." Of course, Gutierrez provides not even one example of how watching ballots is unsafe. This sounds like a left over by-gone COVID reason to stop transparency that was used to justify the sordid goings-on of the well-known and infamous election officials' conduct of the 2020 general election. What is unsafe is not having the proper safeguards in place, that would specifically allow observers from all parties to carefully watch the vote counting process at every stage in which ballots are stored, handled, and transported.

Also, because it is well established that there exists a federal Constitutional right to the integrity of the ballot, including the right to be protected from vote dilution, Gutierrez's intentional practices of non-transparency in the system as it stands fails to protect ballot integrity. The power of local officials to regulate the manner of elections obviously does not justify the abridgment of the fundamental right to vote and to have one's vote counted in a fair manner. Many courts have long recognized that

[2] It would be within the keeping of this wording of the statute for a campaign or political party to have the right to replace such a removed individual, with one who was not disruptive.

precautionary measures to achieve fair elections are in accordance with our Constitutional tradition and are effective to prevent fraudulent practices.

Respondent's response that her creating rules to disallow observers from observing the entire chain of custody of Gutierrez's possession of absentee ballots, such as during ministerial duties or when absentee ballots are transported and, in a garage, is to presumably claim that no fraud that can happen during this aspect of the voting process. However, based on common sense, court precedent, and recent past history, this assertion is at best naïve and at worst is offensive to the intelligence of observers who have recently watched votes being handled by City of Milwaukee officials appointed by Democratic office holders. There are ample specific examples of troubling partisanship witnessed by many observers, who would be glad to testify to them, certainly about election officials' conduct during the 2020, 2024 and 2025 elections, so that such partisanship has gained the reputation of being rampant.

If there was not improper conduct going on or sought to go on, experience and human nature dictate that any election official would want observers to be present in order to show that to the world.

According to Wis. Stat. s. 7.41, the only authority that a election official has to disallow observers is if there are excessive numbers from one political party in one place, and if an individual observer is being disruptive by overt acts. To commit an overtly disruptive act, an observer is required to have had the right to be present in the first place. It's an abusive application of the law to say that an observer being merely present and ready to do their jobs as described above, and without being disruptive, is an overt act that is "disruptive". Gutierrez has apparently decided on her own that any person present must be removed or, more abusively, not allowed to do their job by being present to start with. To deny observers to be present during any part of the elections process, especially where ballots are vulnerable for manipulation because no observer can see them, by merely offering phrases that only "ministerial" duties are taking place, that scanning and transporting of ballots do not require observing, or that any of this is justified because such simple observing is "unreasonable, disruptive, and unsafe", see Response p. 2, is an abusive application of the law. This would be true in any polling place, even in polling places which

have no history of problems. – however unfortunately there is ample documented and well-publicized problems at Milwaukee, Wisconsin polling places, especially at the City's absentee ballot Central Count.

Remedies Sought

Complainant seeks the following remedies: Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.06, the Wisconsin Elections Commission must:

1. Issue a formal finding that the Milwaukee Election Commission and its officers violated Wis. Stat. §§ 7.41(2), 7.52(1)(a), and 6.88(3).

2. Mandate complete transparency for all Central Count operations including for all future elections. This necessarily includes allowing observers from all parties on the ballot to be present and to be in a position to meaningfully see and hear at all times everything that goes on in every place in which there are ballots and ballot envelopes. The only instance in which an observer should be prohibited from being so present is when he or she interferes with the entrance or exiting of voters, or in the case of absentee voting, positioning themselves in a place that interferes with election official's immediate tasks of carrying out their normal duties of handling those ballots. Outside of this exception, the observation of the handling of absentee ballots should naturally include observing all conduct, including but not limited to ministerial conduct and transporting of ballots, when ballots are mailed or otherwise delivered to any applicable government entity or its agent.

3. Order mandatory training and procedural reforms for MEC personnel, including its Executive Director and all election workers, to ensure compliance with statutory transparency obligations.

4. Retain continuing jurisdiction to monitor compliance during future elections, including periodic review of MEC's observer access protocols and facility layouts.

All statements above are true and correct based upon my personal knowledge.

As a citizen and resident of the State of Wisconsin, per Wis. Sat. s 887.015, I declare under the penalty of false swearing under the law of Wisconsin that the all statements above are based upon my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

Dated and signed at the City of Milwaukee this ninth day of June, 2025.

Electronically signed by Robert Kopplin_____

Wisconsin Elections Commission

201 West Washington Avenue | Second Floor | P.O. Box 7984 | Madison, WI 53707-7984
(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

DATE: May 7, 2026

TO: Members, Wisconsin Elections Commission

FROM: Wisconsin Elections Commission Staff

SUBJECT: Consideration of Correspondence to Congressional Representatives and USPS. Regarding Timely Ballot Delivery

1. Summary.

This memorandum discusses feedback from local election officials regarding the timely delivery of absentee ballots by mail during the 2026 Spring Election. In the weeks surrounding the 2026 Spring Election, Commission staff received reports from some clerks and voters concerned that mailed absentee ballots were taking an unusually long time to reach their destination. These individual reports were concerning, but their anecdotal nature prevented a thorough analysis of the situation. Staff therefore asked Wisconsin County and Municipal clerks to share their experiences through a standardized online survey.

The survey asked for the following information:

- Observed problems with mail travel times
- Absentee ballot travel times as compared with prior elections
- Voter feedback about absentee ballot travel times
- Perceived average travel time for ballots through the mail (one-way)
- Late arriving ballots as compared with prior elections

2. Clerk Feedback

As of April 24, 2026, the survey on absentee ballot mail performance garnered 906 responses. This is an exceptionally high response rate compared to past WEC online surveys and suggests a high degree of clerk interest in the topic. This figure exceeds the response rates for all but one other statewide survey conducted by the WEC since 2021 – the noteworthy exception being a survey about funding needs.

Survey results suggest that concerns are widespread. Approximately two-thirds of clerks reported observing problems with mail travel times. Just over half of clerks reported receiving "negative" or "mixed" feedback from their voters about absentee ballot travel times. Only 3% of clerks reported positive feedback about mail performance.

Wisconsin Elections Commissioners
Ann S. Jacobs, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Don M. Millis | Carrie Riepl | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen

Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

Table 1: Observed Problems






Table 2: Voter Feedback




Despite the negative sentiments, there was no consensus that mail performance was clearly worse than in prior elections. The largest number of clerks (48%) reported that performance was "about the same," and some even reported an improvement. Nonetheless, many respondents (39%) described mail performance as "somewhat worse" or "much worse."

Table 3: Comparison to Past Elections




Likewise, most clerks indicated their belief that mail was generally delivered in 3-5 days – a timeframe that falls within USPS standards for First Class Mail. However, a substantial number of respondents indicated the perception that mailed ballots take seven or more days to reach their destination.

Table 4: By-Mail Ballot Travel Times



Approximately one-quarter of respondents felt that the number of late-arriving ballots was greater than in past elections.

Table 5: Late Arriving Ballots



In addition to the general survey responses described above, over 300 clerks took the time to submit separate written comments with their survey responses. All received comments are attached to this memorandum as Appendix A.

Common themes in the comments include:

- General satisfaction with local post office support but dissatisfaction with the larger postal system
- Increased delays with mail going to or coming from out-of-state
- A belief that sending mail to processing centers in Milwaukee or Minneapolis is causing problems
- Lack of voter confidence in the mail
- Unrealistic statutory deadlines to request a ballot
- Concerns about 'wasted' postage expenses and tight local budgets

Some clerk comments expressed a neutral perspective on mail performance.

> *The USPS does the best they can given the state of the USPS. Voters are coming to the realization that they need to plan for delivery times better.*
>
> - Clerk from St. Croix County

Mailing out and receiving ballots highly depends on destination.

- Clerk from Lincoln County

However, two-thirds of the comments expressed negative sentiments. The clerks who experienced delays often felt very strongly about their observations.

So far, I have had to mark 40 ballots returned after deadline. I don't ever recall having this many.

- Clerk in Fond du lac County

As a clerk for 23 years, this is the worst we have seen.

- Clerk in Columbia County

The worst mail delivery day of the week is Tuesday (unfortunately for elections!) and our office jokingly but sadly refers to it as "no mail Tuesday."

- Clerk in Waukesha County

Comments were received from 69 of Wisconsin's 72 counties. The greatest number of concerns came from Waukesha County and Dane County.

Collectively, the survey results and submitted comments suggest there is at least a widespread perception that by-mail absentee ballot delivery times are excessive and getting worse. Concrete data is difficult to obtain, because election officials do not always know when the voter receives their ballot or when the voter places the completed ballot back in the mail. Intelligent Mail Barcodes (IMBs) permit limited tracking of a ballot from the clerk to the voter, but no similar mechanism exists to track a completed ballot coming back to the clerk's office. Finally, even where IMBs are present, the data obtained is often incomplete. Not all clerks use the optional IMB labels and, even when they do, not all ballots are scanned and reported by USPS.

3. Draft Communication

At the direction of the Chair, Commission staff prepared a draft letter to the USPS in order to share the concerns described above. The draft letter is attached as Appendix B.

4. Optional Motion

The Commission directs staff to send the proposed communication to the Postmaster General and to Wisconsin's elected officials in Congress.

#	Comment	County
1	We only had one late arriving ballot thus far (normal for us, we're small) but it was postmarked March 30th and arrived April 8th. I believe in town or in the region, not from a significant distance. Seems unusually long.	Milwaukee County
2	There didn't seem to be a rhyme or reason to the length of time it took. I had a ballot come from Florida that only took 4 days, however, I had a ballot mailed from Rhinelander (1 mile from me) that took 5 days.	Oneida County
3	We did not receive any ballots on election day, which is not typical.	Waukesha County
4	I spoke with my St. Germain postmaster about this prior to the election. Mail sent from my post office in St. Germain if a PO Box can be directed at the post office to the PO Box. All other mail goes to Eagle River then to Green Bay to process and then returns to Eagle River which delivers the mail to addresses in St Germain. There are obviously issues with that set up and it is causing delays in mail. The WEC should work with the USPS to address the situation.	Vilas County
5	I'm concerned about the cutoff time for requesting absentee ballots before election Day. There's not enough turn around time to mail out and send back. It gives the voters false impression.	Rusk County
6	for the time it takes ballots to get to their locations, it only wanted one number. This is my perceived breakdown = local: 7-10 days, within the state: 10-14 days, out of state: 10-14 days, out of the country: 30 days	Waukesha County
7	Our mail goes to Milwaukee to then be sent back here to addresses that in some cases are less than a mile away.	Fond du Lac County
8	Around the end of 2024/beginning of 2025, those in our office who send and receive mail began noticing delays, not only in the time it takes to send and receive, but also in the time it takes for an undeliverable piece of mail to be returned to the sender. We have received a number of items returned undeliverable to our office after being sent months prior, in some cases up to four months later. It seems no longer safe to send something through the mail if that piece of mail has a deadline, as you can no longer count on it being delivered in a timely manner.	Portage County
9	Need to change date when voter can ask for an absentee ballot. Thursday prior to election is TO LATE. Need at least a 10 day timeline.	Marathon County
10	There is a problem with the amount of time a voter can request a ballot by mail to when it gets delivered. If they request it on the Thursday before the election, there are times the voter doesn't receive the ballot to be able to cast their vote by absentee ballot, let alone return it. There is an issue with the envelopes opening due to the adhesive used and possibly the way the mail machines sort, or how it's handled at the USPS to the Municipal Clerks office. That creates more work on the Clerks to figure out if the ballot was tampered with, creates distrust with the voters and a bad relationship with the USPS. This also creates the issue of voters who put their ballots in the USPS to be returned but 10 days later, look in myvote and their ballot still hasn't been received by the clerks office, so they are out of luck and can't cancel that ballot to have a vote count because that mailed ballot "Might" show up but it also "might" have been lost by the USPS or eaten by their machines. That is unfair to the voter to not have their voices heard. We should be able to spoil a ballot up until election day so the voter can have a vote count either way when we can't prove that the USPS didn't lose/misplace/accidentally get destroyed by sorting machines, someone's right to vote. There has also been a larger number of ballots being ruined by water damage in the recent years. I am not sure how but that makes for a lot of remaking ballots and sometimes it's impossible to determine voter intent.	Dane County
11	It seems that the ballots still are being sent out of our municipal post office to a distribution center, I don't understand why if there are only 10 absentee ballots they cannot be hand canceled and stay within the municipality.	Oconto County
12	Our local postmaster Michael informed us when we called Tuesday to confirm how many ballots they had for pickup (we usually pickup any that come through on election day) that he was adamant that we could not pick these up due to a policy from 2020 that prohibited such procedure. I cited that this has never been a policy implemented in the preceding years and that the post office actually delivered ballots on election day in 2024 for the presidential election. He said this would have been disallowed and a breach in protocol. I asked for him to provide the policy in writing (he didn't know where to find this to which I stated if it was a policy in effect, he could locate it in their manual) and have not heard from him since. He stated this broke chain of custody as the postage must be cancelled. I believe he was confusing the new postage rule where they are cancelled at the sorting facility. I went directly to the post office where the staff was pleasant, helpful and knowledgeable about how to cancel there by request and release these accordingly for processing. I cited Priorities USA v WEC and statute regarding chain of custody for these ballots by which they were returned via mail and delivered to the clerk (in person at the post office). He was confusing what was outdated policy (no drop boxes etc) and new procedures. Overall, he did not seem current on policy.	Waukesha County
13	With all ballots requiring to go to the main Milwaukee USPS campus prior to being delivered, ballots now seem to take upwards of 3-5 days to reach their destination, however, of the 27 ballots received after election day, 16 show postmarkings on 4/6, 6 were postmarked on 4/7, 3 were postmarked 3/24 and 1 was postmarked 3/26. One was not postmarked by the Post office at all.	Milwaukee County
14	So far, I have had to mark 40 ballots returned after deadline. I don't ever recall having this many. We also had issues with getting ballots returned from Florida for some reason.	Fond du Lac County
15	We saw a record number of absentee ballots mailed on March 14th not returned. 16% did not come back or get received by voter. We are still seeing absentees come in. It has gotten worse on delivery. Please pull it together. As a clerk for 23 years, this is the worse we have seen.	Columbia County
16	I do believe it does take longer for the absentee ballot to reach the voter and it's return to the Clerk; however, I always mail the ballot out as soon as the ballots are available and almost always, the voter never returns the ballot until the week before the election. This election I mailed a ballot on March 4 to a voter and never received it back until the day after the election. The postmark was April 6th so it took 2 days. Not sure why the voter waited so long to return it.	Juneau County
17	Not enough time to send and get back with the law as it is	Wood County
18	Multiple instances where two ballots were mailed to the same address (husband and wife) where one ballot arrived and the other either arrived two or more days later or never arrived at all. Mailed out on the same day.	Burnett County

#	Comment	County
19	With having to accept absentee requests coming in 1-2 business days before an election, I don't have high hopes that they will receive the ballot.	Grant County
20	There is no way a person requesting an absentee ballot on the Thursday before the election can receive it by mail and return it by mail by the election day. I have people walk them in but if they have to do that they might as well vote in person.	Juneau County
21	If the ballots were kept local it took 2 days, if they sent them to Milwaukee (which we asked them not to) it took 14+ days. Also, from personal experience at my home, we didn't receive any mail for 3 days (April 3, 4, 6). I contacted the post office on April 7 as to why we didn't receive any mail for 3 days, they said that Milwaukee never sent it up to them. It personally wasn't a problem for elections for myself, but that could have been a real problem for people trying to get their ballots mailed back in time. The post office did come around and collect any outgoing mail, it was the incoming that was the problem.	Calumet County
22	Most ballots arrived pretty timely according to their postmarks. We did however have one arrive 4/8 from Lake Geneva postdated 3/26 and one from in town dated 3/28. Overall, we have had about the same number arrive late.	Ozaukee County
23	City of Pewaukee has experienced gross mishandling and delivery of absentee ballots for many years. The worst mail delivery day of the week is Tuesday (unfortunately for elections!) and our office jokingly but sadly refers to it as "no mail Tuesday". We get on average two pieces of mail and one newspaper every Tuesday and that's it. Seems very suspicious that on Election Day, we'd received little or no absentee ballots in the mail. We are also constantly cancelling ballots and reissuing them because our voters never receive them. And when we attempt to contact the Post Office about it, we are consistently dismissed and believe it or not, we've actually been told by postal workers to "just be happy that they finally arrived". Ballots are extremely delayed in their delivery, and on average, it takes over TWO WEEKS for delivery to an out of state address. For local ballot delivery, we've seen it take as long as a week, if the ballot is even delivered at all. At this point, we've actually started begging our voters to not use the mail and to drop their ballots off in person if able, because the mail delivery is that bad! It is high time that the Post Office be investigated for their inept ability to deliver election related mail, and most importantly, absentee ballots!	Waukesha County
24	I called the postmaster at our local post office, questioning why I received ballots postmarked April 4 in Milwaukee in the mail on April 9. He said that the processing at the central location can vary, but that if residents would hand-deliver their ballots to the local post office, the sorting process in-house would help the post master be able to locally postmark them and deliver them in person to the polling place if received on election day.	Walworth County
25	We have had major issues for years. This spring, specifically, we had an absentee ballot go out from a MyVote request. After two weeks it came back as undeliverable. In looking at the USPS online and speaking with my local post office, we have no idea why it was undeliverable. It was a valid address.	Florence County
26	After the recent election, I believe voters are not very confident that they will receive their absentee ballot in a timely manner. They are believing I (the Clerk) did not send them their ballot. This election I had an issue with the PO, March 26th I was notified by my local PO that they were receiving multiple outgoing absentee envelopes as undeliverable. Makes me look bad as some of my voters were believing/questioning that it was me (the Clerk) that hadn't sent a ballot. Not the case, I take elections (and the rest of my duties) very seriously.	Washburn County
27	We have had more and more problems with our mail. From absentee ballots to mailings for public hearings. I do have to say, they did bring to our office any outstanding ballots that they got in which we really appreciated. They actually came twice as they found one more, so for that they were great.	Milwaukee County
28	All absentee ballots were returned on time	Shawano County
29	I think the problem is that so many are mailing at the same time. I am very concerned about the length of time some undeliverable ballots come back. I had one come back 6 months after an election. I have also had people tell me their address is correct, and yet it comes back undeliverable.	Brown County
30	I made contact with the WI Region Director of the USPS about my concern ahead of the election and then was able to speak with our mail carrier. Both agreed that our ballots would be mailed and received properly and I'm happy to say we received less than 20 ballots after the 7th. Quite a few electors who received their mailed ballots chose to come vote on the 7th.	Milwaukee County
31	The mail-in absentee process is broadly smooth voters appreciate the option. We've seen a considerable uptick in it's usage, and though it has issues with the postal process, they are not significant enough to outweigh the benefits we've seen.	Ozaukee County
32	it varies. My local post office welcomes and sorts the local ballots, however I have not seen the mailing data turn up consistently in Wisvote in either mailing direction. Returning ballots are only minimally scanned.	Green Lake County
33	Mail service is awful	Douglas County
34	The post office used to keep all Election mail in town, so that the voter would get in faster and also it would be returned to us faster. Now it goes to Minneapolis, which can take up to 3 or 4 days to get to the voter and then that long to get back to us.	Trempealeau County

#	Comment	County
35	Outgoing 3-5 days, longer for out of state 5-7 days. Incoming, some are received within the same day, others, if routed through Milwaukee, 2-3 days, out of State, 3-4 days. I'm still receiving incoming absentees, without a postal date stamp. This election about 4 without a postal date stamp. I saw it was run through a machine sorter because of the marks, but no date stamp. I had one outgoing this election that went missing in action; it was never returned undeliverable or no postage, nor did the recipient receive it up to the Friday before the election. I double checked outgoing address, and that was fine.	Winnebago County
36	Spring Elections already have a tighter turnaround. With the current MyVote request site, voters think they can request a ballot up through Thursday and get it next day. We just don't have next day mail anymore. We need to tighten the deadline to REQUEST a ballot so it is more realistic for them to get it, vote it, and get it back to us. Also, voters can't "get" their ballot and let it sit. They need more information that time is of the essence to get it returned in time to be counted.	Waukesha County
37	With future bigger elections coming up, the mail service is going to be a larger problem.	Waukesha County
38	The USPS does the best they can given the state of the USPS. Voters are coming to the realization that they need to plan for delivery times better. I am seeing less requests very near election day, and didn't receive late ballots during the spring election.	St. Croix County
39	An absentee ballot was forwarded to a voter's new/different address. I did not think ballots are to be forwarded. It really surprised us. We are having troubles with our local post office with staff, route changes, one day we didn't get mail.	Jefferson County
40	I wanted to mention that we got at least 3 or 4 ballots back where a voter had crossed off their apartment number and replaced it with a different number. That triggered me to deactivate the ballot, get in touch with the voter with re-registration info and go through that process. I don't know why the USPS is letting those get to the incorrect apartment numbers! I don't know if other communities experienced this as well. When we get them back late, it's harder to contact voters for the changes, especially when some have mobility issues and struggle to get here in person to register. I know in one case, the voter told me she wouldn't be able to vote (just due to the timing) and could I mail her the forms so she could re-register after 4/7 by mail, and I did so.	Milwaukee County
41	I received two ballots in the mail after election day (4/9/26). One of the ballots was postmarked March 27! The other ballot was postmarked April 6. As Clerks, we do our due diligence and check the mail several times on Election Day. We even checked WisVote absentee tile and it showed 3 absentee ballots were "out for delivery" on Election Day. We never received two of the three until two days after Election Day. With this, there is still one outstanding ballot that hasn't been delivered. This is concerning as these voters didn't get their votes counted when they could have been counted on Election Day if the post office would have really delivered the three ballots there were "out for delivery."	Dodge County
42	I mailed one to Florida late on 3/27 as she didn't realize she didn't have request in. Hand wrote address, no imbalance label, abd her ballot got back to me 4/6. Another ballot to student in illinois mailed with imb label never made it; i didn't hear until election day.	Green County
43	you should change your language to state to give at least 2 weeks for the clerk to receive it. our mail carrier told us out of state ballots are only traveling by truck not by air	Dane County
44	When the USPS changed to not allowing local post offices to keep local mail here, instead making it go to a hub and then come back, that is when the issues with late or lost ballots happened. If they would make an exception to election mail and allow them to stay local, it would definitely cut down on the lost or late ballots.	Sheboygan County
45	I think the mail for absentee ballots moves much faster than non-absentee ballot mail. I almost never get ballots returned after the election, people will hand deliver.	Pierce County
46	We had a lot of absentee ballots turned into us in person because the voters don't trust the USPS to get it back in time or even at all.	Waukesha County
47	when people are traveling out of state and request a ballot they do not realize the time it takes to send and return...personally i dont like that they can request a week out as it will never arrive in time and for sure not be returned in time	Adams County
48	Comments by voters who insist in returning their absentee ballots in person because they simply "do not trust the mail system." We assure them that they did, in fact, receive their ballot so the return should be the same. They still do not trust the USPS. The unused postage for those returning their ballots in person is a substantial amount. We do provide the option to participate in IPAV as well.	Monroe County
49	Mail service as a whole is much slower in our area as no mail is processed locally any more.	Langlade County
50	We have even had problems with our local water bills, a lot of our residents don't trust the mail anymore. We had the mail rush on election day and try to deliver random stuff to us three times. Some postmarked some not when they caught it because it wasn't going to get back in time. Also for the first time since I became clerk, I received a ballot after election day, which I don't remember happening before.	Wood County
51	Mail delivery has slowed and knowing this may reflect the need to update ballot request deadlines; the Thursday or Friday before doesn't work any longer.	Door County
52	Residents in general are not trusting of the USPS. While most ballots are returned by mail, those that hand deliver them to our office often say they do not trust the USPS to deliver promptly.	La Crosse County
53	I had an absentee ballot postamarked in Milwaukee on March 24 at 4pm that did not make it to the Village Mailbox until APRIL 8th. So it was late. THAT seems UNREASONABLE. Other dates that I feel should have made it before Eletion Day were April 2nd and April 3rd all postamrked from Milwaukee	Waukesha County
54	I can send 2 ballots to the same address at the same time, one arrives right away, the other takes a week to arrive. This seems to happen on a regular basis.	Walworth County

#	Comment	County
55	I had several husband and wife's contact me saying one of there votes was recorded but the other wasn't. I had only recieved one of the ballots. They have all told me they were mailed on the same day. I just yesterday had a lady that needed her ballot mailed to florida. She just received the ballot that was mailed on March 13th,yesterday April 9th.	Fond du Lac County
56	We did not have any issues with mail in ballots,	Wood County
57	Several outgoing ballots took more than 8 days to be delivered, while the majority of ballots took 3-4 days to be delivered. There is always a mailperson who delivers ballots about 7pm on Election day. They go above and beyond to get the ballots to the municipalities.	St. Croix County
58	I am getting calls from residents that ballots were severely delayed I have one example of a ballot postmarked from the clerk on 3/17 and stamped by USPS at the Green Bay facility on 4/7. Unacceptable. It doesn't seem as though USPS is prioritizing delivery of ballots like they have in the past.	Marathon County
59	Mail is getting slower & less reliable - besides more expensive. Not the other way around.	Pierce County
60	Accessible absentee voting by mail is essential to maintaining the integrity and continuity of our democratic system, ensuring fair and equal participation for all eligible voters.	Trempealeau County
61	Postal service quality has diminished over the past two years.	Fond du Lac County
62	mail as a whole is a problem.	Waushara County
63	WE PAY FOR RETURN POSTAGE BUT THE MAJORITY OF OUR BALLOTS ARE HAND DELVIVERED. WITH LIMITS ON OUR BUDGETS THIS SEEMS LIKE A WASTE OF MONEY FOR MUNICIPALITIES TO HAVE TO PAY THE RETURN POSTAGE IF THEY'RE ALLOWED TO HAND DELIVER THE BALLOTS BACK TO US	Green County
64	More people hand delivered due to not trusting how long the USPS was taking	Brown County
65	I'm concerned with how slow the postal service has been, even with regular mail (not absentee ballots).	Dodge County
66	If I go in and speak to a person in the Brodhead post office about delivering ballots in town or neighboring town they will by pass sending ballots to Miwaukee which slows the process considerably. However, if we use the Orfordville PO they are not accommodating. Anything sent from rural home boxes, which voters generally do to return ballots, goes to Milwaukee first which makes the mail much slower. Our postal system is very inefficient for local mail delivery which is not good for mail in ballot delivery.	Rock County
67	Sherwood received an absentee ballot in the mail on election day that was addressed to the Clerk in Appleton. The witness was a Sherwood resident, so it may have been mailed FROM the Sherwood post office, but it was clearly addressed to Appleton Clerk.	Calumet County
68	Because of the issues we were seeing we were traveling down daily to the post office and and requesting the "local only" service for all outgoing mail	Portage County
69	Our post office does well with the flow of ballots that stay local, they are very conscientious. If a ballot is sent out of town (student or "snow bird"), I feel like it is hit-or miss, as they are sent to Milwaukee first for processing	Marinette County
70	Voter emailed me wondering if her ballot was received. She noticed on wis-vote it didn't show received. I emailed her back and said I never received it. This is Friday and have still not received it.	Grant County
71	Indefinity confined requirements need to be looked at, also the need to place a return stamp on the envelope. Why can the voters place one instead of the municipality?	Shawano County
72	Wisvote is showing ballots out for delivery even if returned. Unreliable if voter calls to check in on status. More voters dropped off in person resulting in stamps not being used and an additional cost to town. We should not have to put stamps on, the government should deliver voting material.	Columbia County
73	Outgoing local ballots took around 5 days Outgoing ballots for out of state took around 10 days	Marathon County
74	Very disappointed with mail service. We had voters that paid additional postage to get their ballots to the municipal clerks and sadly they arrived AFTER April 7. I do NOT want to see extended deadlines, meaning mailed ballots can arrive after the Election and be counted, because I truly feel we will still see the same issues and voters that will procrastinate . We work so hard at the front end to get ballots to the voter and then to have them come back after Election Day is very frustrating. We are seeing ballots postmarked March 23-24, 2026, and now arriving after Election Day. One of my Clerks questioned their local post office about the timing and was told the "blizzard" affected service. Then why do the ballots need to be sent to a processing center. That is ridiculous. I am currently working with some of my municipalities to get a "drop box" for absentee ballots. Even local officials are seeing the situation. After having officials from USPS attend the WEC conference in Wausau and how they felt that absentee ballots were important and understanding deadlines, blah, blah - Well they sure dropped the ball. :(	Fond du Lac County
75	I had a few ballots mailed the same day, going to the same address, where one made it and the other did not.	Price County
76	I received a more ballots two days after the election then I did on election day. All were postmarked April 3rd-6th.	Waukesha County
77	I receive more comments from voters lately regarding their lack of faith in the post office versus in the past. More hand-delivered ballots than before. Postal workers not stamping ballots locally and sending them to regional facilities has resulted in late-arriving ballots in the past.	Fond du Lac County
78	Mailing out and receiving ballots highly depends on destination	Lincoln County
79	I had an upset elector due to his ballot not being returned to the town. It was unfortunately lost in the mail.	Crawford County
80	Concerned that under political pressure, the postal service will not treat mailed ballots with the care, accuracy and promptness required.	Dane County
81	I feel that the postal office is becoming more and more unreliable with mailings in general and it is a high concern for me as a clerk to send absentees through the mail.	Green County
82	Hello ~ thank you for the survey opportunity. I have a big concern about the postal service and absentees - firstly because of my residents not receiving their ballots timely and secondly - the total waste of money for our Village.	Sheboygan County

#	Comment	County
83	Locally all our mail has to travel to MSP-STP to be sorted before it comes back locally. It is widely understood that mail will take several days longer than it used to when we had a USPS sorting center in Eau Claire WIS. I work in the Hayward Wi area.	Sawyer County
84	Had an issue with 1 ballot the PO did not deliver in error, reason was no forward; however, should have just been delivered. Second ballot sent to elector, delivered to them and received back in time for election.	Door County
85	Mail does not go out until the following day in many areas. Example: Tuesday afternoon (before 4pm) a ballot is put in the mail, the mail does not get on the truck until Wednesday morning, if after 4pm it does not go out until Thursday morning. If a ballot is mailed on Saturday or Sunday, it will not leave the post office until Tuesday morning.	Grant County
86	I mail out absentee ballots and a week later I have voters calling me to ask when I will be mailing out their ballot so they obviously haven't received it in a week.	Waupaca County
87	Mailed ballots 3/5/26 applicant never received them.	Florence County
88	Please end absentee ballot requests by mail earlier - end mail requests by Thursday. The Dresser Post Office in Dresser, Wi, Polk County is exceptional to work with.	Polk County
89	At least one person was concerned about mail time and hand delivered the ballot to my mailbox since we don't have a dropbox in our rural area.	Chippewa County
90	We needed to get ballots to Post office before 3 PM in order for them to be stamped as received by the current day. Not guaranteed they went out that day	St. Croix County
91	We had a ballot that stated it was delivered, but the voter is claiming it never was delivered, and the time had passed for her to get a new ballot sent. Mail gets mixed up, and lots of time not deliverable with other items we are mailing. I am not sure of the solution or what the issue is, but I blame both the processes and lack of concern of to receive the mail, because the addresses are not excepting mail properly. People are getting so much junk mail it may get mixed in and tossed out.	Columbia County
92	Due to our "border location" as an outer ring commuter area adjacent the Twin Cities, local mail is sent to an urban MN sorting center end of day -- for processing overnight (in theory). The postmark applied by the automated sorting center is typically applied 2 days later than the ballots were actually mailed to/from the local post office. This makes it difficult to know the true overall mailing time. Also the postmark date applied by USPS at the sorting center makes it falsely appear the clerk did not meet statutory requirements for mailing out requests in a timely fashion -- or by the statutory deadline. Mail typically takes a day or two longer to return from the sorting center than previously -- not much, but it's resulting in more late returns. Previously, local voters could request a hand-cancelled postmark at the local post office in WI and enjoy direct delivery to our POB in that post office. Now members of the USPS staff have been instructed to deny that option and inform voters that they must send all mail to the MN sorting center for scanning/tracking and postmarking instead, where it is occasionally delayed or lost. If extra glue or tape is not applied to secure the corners of the envelope seal, it appears the mailed ballots are also now more likely to get caught in a machine and either damaged or delayed.	Pierce County
93	Not all Post masters seem to take all elections as seriously as they do the "Presedential" I'm sure there is an additioanl push on their end during those times however, my expectations is that they all should matter so if you're going to pull bins at 5pm on the presidential and deliver what could have been missed they should do it for all of the elections. period. Consistency is key, let's just make it a thing.	Rock County
94	We noticed no cancelations on some of the ballots we received in the mail & wondered if that was not being done to speed up the process?	Waukesha County
95	Most calls we received stated they did not trust that they would receive or return a ballot in time.	Ashland County
96	In State delivery one way 2-7 days Out of State delivery one way 7-10 days	Vilas County
97	We had feedback about neighbors receiving their ballot in the mail, but some didn't receive it for another week or two. Our mail leaves Black River Falls and goes to the Cities then back to Black River Falls. We have no idea where the ballots get separated and hung up - if in the Cities or her at the local Post Office.	Jackson County
98	We have a positive experience with our local post office getting ballots to us if they are received in the City on Election Day, even if with the late mail truck. HOWEVER, delivery times were even worse than February. We mailed some ballots the Tuesday before the election (to addresses in town) and voters received those ballots this Thursday, more than a full week after sent out. We have also just this week received back two ballots for the February election that were postmarked before the February election date.	Wood County
99	I did not watch the postmarks in relationship to arrival. I wish I had. No real complaints from anyone as I may have in past elections. The Mishicot Post Office 54228 tries really hard to help with my absentee ballots. I appreciate them very much. One comment, though, perhaps the deadline to request mailed absentee ballots should be set earlier.	Manitowoc County
100	Most ballots arrived for voters quickly. Some voters claim they never received them. A few ballots arrived in my office after election day with postmarks of March 24 and April 1.	Walworth County
101	It is the voters choice to use absentee voting. They need to factor that into their choice and plan ahead, just like paying bills on time. Spring Election Ballots (for requests on file) went out March 17. They have multiple ways of returning the ballots including paying extra for expedited services - that should not be the munis responsibility	Sheboygan County
102	So far, I've received 3 absentee return-by-mail ballots. They are postmarked in Saint Paul, MN. One ballot rec'd 4/8/26 was postmarked 4/1/26. Second ballot rec'd 4/9/26 was postmarked 3/30/26. Third ballot rec'd 4/9/26 was postmarked 4/3/26.	Dunn County
103	I believe West Bend did a great job of speeding up the process. Most people got theirs in two days. Only a few outliers in that respect.	Washington County
104	Our Mail goes to St. Paul MN and then back again. IF the local Post Office could postmark and sort it would be a faster return.	Barron County

#	Comment	County
105	In prior and current elections, we had comments come from our residents that it took a while for them to receive the ballot. Others stated that they got the ballot right away. I am concerned with our mail system. All ballots should have the same time frame especially in our own communities. It varies drastically on when things are getting processed with USPS. we received 2 ballots After the election and after looking on Wis vote we have another 10 "Out for Delivery". I thought USPS are supposed to deliver ballots to the polling locations before 8pm if they have them. This has not happened here. I am worried that with the Future of the USPS that this process is just bound to get worse and become more frustrating. Our Post Office has ongoing personnel changes and there is no consistency.	Dodge County
106	outgoing mail is the issue, residents returned their ballots in person do to distrust of the postal service.	La Crosse County
107	The Thursday before an election to request a mail ballot is too short of a turn around to get that ballot back. They have a work around to request if they choose "Calendar Year" and we are still required to mail a ballot out. Stop the "Calendar Year" the week before an election and turn it back on after the election.	Waukesha County
108	I have a voter who was emailed her ballot in Taiwan, she sent it out from there on March 28th, as of April 10th it has not been received by me in my office.	Shawano County
109	My understanding is that the cut date/time for mail-in ballot requests that came through the MyVote system was 5PM on Thursday April 2nd for an election to be held on April 7th. Even if the clerk happened to see a request arrive as late as 5PM on Thursday, law requires that the balot be mailed withing 24 hours - which means that the Clerk could be compliant by mailing the ballot on Friday. This would only provide two business days (Monday and Tuesday of the following week) for the ballot to both be recieved by the voter and sent back to the Clerk. Given my experience with 2 business days of delay each way, this is nowhere near enough time, and the cut date shold have been no later than 5PM Tuesday May 31st, 2026 to ensure adequate postal delivery times both ways. And that assumes no other delays in proecessing occur, which is also not very realistic. Thank you for considering my comment.	Green County
110	It was really hard to tell with this election, as the # of absentee requests were much lower for this election. Have not heard any complaints, some ballots were not sent back. Too early to tell if late ballots will still be received. I think it will be more noticeable come fall.	La Crosse County
111	saw more instances of delivery being 2-3 days after the anticipated delivery date in WisVote both for in and out of state voters.	Milwaukee County
112	My Post Master kept all local absentee ballots in house and hand stamped them and put them in their boxes. Not sure if this is allowed by the Post Office but they did do it here. Helped on outgoing mail. In coming is a different story. By the posting date on the envelope compared to when it was received by us is usually over 7 days.	Waushara County
113	Our post office is willing to work with me and will keep ballots for Crivitz, rather than sending them on to Green Bay, and deliver them same day or next day if I bring them into the window at the post office. If they are just put in the mail box, it can take 3 to 4 days delivery time.	Marinette County
114	I'm getting really frustrated with people returning their ballots in person (especially Ind. Conf.). I keep adding up the wasted postage, $0.78 times 10+ doesn't seem like a lot but it is when every penny counts in my budget!	Columbia County
115	My issue is with ballots that did not get to their destination at all.	Vernon County
116	The question about number of days to receive a ballot is not a fair question. it depends on where you are mailing from and where you are mailing to. Local vs. long distance. Invalid question.	Waukesha County
117	In our small community, it takes at least two days before the mail leaves our Village. Then it travels across the entire state to a sorting facility before it is sent back to my side of the state. This is a very big concern for me as a clerk, absentee voting needs to remain as a way to participate in the voting process.	Grant County
118	Absentee ballots mailed to local voters are transferred to a central sorting facility, scanned and sent back to the local post office for delivery to local voters, adding one or two days to delivery. This process is repeated when the local voters mail the absentee ballots to the Town.	Dane County
119	I have not had any problems with returning ballots from the USPS- I always check the dates stamped and I receive them either in 1-2 days after that stamped date.	Brown County
120	The cut off time for mailing an absentee ballot should be at least a week before the election--not 3 days	Kewaunee County
121	Move the deadline to request an absentee ballot to Wednesday at 5pm instead of Thursday. Our local post office is closed.	Racine County
122	I believe the postal office in your City or Village should be able to put the ballot in the postal box of the person it is addressed for. It should not have to go up to the sorting center to return to the City or Village that it is going to. That is why they are late or never arrive.	Monroe County
123	We received 6 late ballots compared to average of 1 in the past. they were postmarked the saturday or monday before the election. In the past these would have been hand cancelled by the local post office and we would have received them the next day.	Washington County
124	I would definitely like to see absentee ballots by mail be an option. There are several reasons they are necessary, and it is the only way to give voters the proper opportunity to cast their ballot.	Grant County
125	This was my first election so I do not have prior experience to reference.	Wood County
126	With the number of late arrivals in February, I encouraged our snow birds to expedite. Most used express mail, Fed Ex to ensure timely delivery. **our mail only comes in/goes out once a day at the post office. always need to plan ahead.	Vilas County
127	Absentee ballots are costing us money us towns cannot afford. They need to be limited to indefinitely confined and out of town. we only get 80% back. Very frustrating.	Dunn County

#	Comment	County
128	I am very concerned regarding the poor service we are getting from the USPS. I don't think ALL of the general public realize the service has deteriorated and know to plan accordingly. This could be a very serious issue in the future. Maybe a highlighted comment should be included with the instruction sheet enclosed with the ballot. That wouldn't help with timely requests, but could help with timely returns.	Sawyer County
129	While I did not have any known issues with absentee mailings and returns, the general performance of the post office in regards to timeliness of other mailings, and lost mailings is concerning.	Waushara County
130	Postal performance is adequate. However, timelines should be adjusted for requests to accommodate the returns. Perhaps 1 week? Now, you could also consider allowing Clerks to process the absentee ballots the day before Election Day (Monday) to take some pressure off the poll workers who have only one DS200 at the polling place.	Eau Claire County
131	The only issue we have is when the Oak Creek post office requires that the ballots first go to the downtown office to be forwarded. This provides a delay. However, without going downtown there would not be a bar code.	Milwaukee County
132	I am finding that ballots sent to other states are arriving faster than ballots I send to addresses in my municipality. I have also noted that some ballots are taking up 10 days to return to me from the postmark date. Again mailed from my municipality.	Wood County
133	We have had stretches where we don't get mail for up to 5 days, so we have made it our practice to take the mail directly to the post office if it's time sensitive/ we haven't received mail by 4:00 p.m.	La Crosse County
134	I know that locally (Wautoma--54982), postal workers go above and beyond to help clerks ensure each vote is counted. On Election Day, I have had local postal workers notice ballots in the stream of mail and hand-deliver them to us at the polling place on Election Day. I doubt this is an official requirement of their jobs. Although I hear all the time about how much worse USPS performance is, I take it with a grain of salt. I know how public perception (think: the belief in widespread election fraud) can be warped by politicians and peers, so I hesitate to condemn the postal service. I haven't personally experienced the decline in service that I hear about. At least locally, I witness dedication and above-and-beyond care and service from postal workers.	Waushara County
135	1. I think the deadline to mail ballots on the Thursday before the election is way to late. 2. I do not want any late absentee ballots counted after election day. If you need to change anything, change the deadline date to mail.	Outagamie County
136	I had 2 voters that winter in Arizona that I mailed their ballots on 3-18-26. The USPS mail system shows that they were dropped off but they NEVER received them. This couple has tracked that as being the 10th piece of mail that they never received that they could see on their dashboard was on it's way to them.	Barron County
137	When I used to take my local ballots to the local post office, they were automatically sent out to Milwaukee for postal processing, instead of just being sent out with the local carriers. That changed this year and that made life a million times better!! Sometimes when I would drop them off in the morning, the voter would have them in their mailbox that day. It not only helps the clerks look like we're doing our jobs in a timely fashion, it really reflects well on the postal service as well! THANK YOU for allowing local ballots to be sent out immediately with local carriers!!! :) It is appreciated!	Portage County
138	I'd like to discourage mailing ballots back. Return in person or mail back two weeks before election.	Fond du Lac County
139	This has been an issue with all mail. More lost than ever before, for everything including absentees. The mail that is not lost is damaged, late, delivered to the wrong address, or all of the above.	Rock County
140	Voters receive their ballots quicker if they are physically given to post office staff. When returning a ballot or regular mail, it has taken 8 days to arrive at the destination.	Oconto County
141	Seemed the same as before, no complaints	Richland County
142	No mail problems here ballots are handled locally not shipped to Twin Cities	Chippewa County
143	We received a small batch on election day from the mail, and almost double the day after.	Dane County
144	I mailed out absentee ballots on March 11. One individual's ballot was postmarked on March 11, again on March 20 and it arrived to her on April 3rd. Have no idea where it was and neither does the post office. Two ballots were mailed out on March 25 to the same addresss (husband and wife) The husband never received his. Prior years all ballots were able to be mailed from the local office and went out the next day to the voters. Now they have to go to Milwaukee. If I put it in the mail on Monday, it gets sent to Milwaukee Tuesday morning and have no idea when it will get to the post office in Mt Calvary to get delivered to the voters.	Fond du Lac County
145	We received a ballot after the election and I received her husbands well before the election. Both mailed from same place and same time	Waupaca County
146	Now days the mail system is not reliable to get things in a timely manner. I am not sure what is going on or how to fix this issue but something really does need to be done to protect voter's rights.	Monroe County
147	I had a lot more voters bring there voted ballot to me at the office instead of using the postal service. I also had a resident, out of state in Texas who's ballot was mailed by me on 1/29/26 and he received it after the February election. Just a little feedback.	Dane County
148	If I have a request for an absentee ballot on the last Thursday before the election I have them vote in my office if possible. The ballot won't get back to me before election day. Sometimes it takes up to a week to get a ballot back.	Price County
149	Multiple local voters did not receive their ballot 14 days after the were mailed and never did end up receiving the ballot.	Washington County
150	We just received a notice about another postage increase; we have pre-stamped absentee inner envelopes. Is there any consideration on waiting to go the increase after the August primary?	Waukesha County
151	I sent a ballot to a resident who spends 6-8 weeks in Florida and she never received it the ballot.	Jackson County
152	With mail delivery taking longer than in previous years, it's more likely that not all absentee ballots are received on time. I am satisfied with my local post office. I'm concerned about the general delivery process in recent years.	Vernon County
153	Your question regarding how many days it takes a ballot to get from the office to the voter cannot be answered. We have no idea when the voter received the ballot.	Sauk County

#	Comment	County
154	Message said machine could not read label and ballot was returned! Yet it was legible. Had to put on new label and stamps and resend. 2 send to same home yet wife got hers 5 days after husband and both in our same community. Getting mail back saying no receptacle even though the other items get deliveref.d.	Waukesha County
155	We had 14 ballots delivered to our address that were for different areas in Portage County, we had two that were for individuals that were delivered to us, and two for Madison (we called to let them know) it was too late to put them in the mail except that is what we had to do for Madison and the two individuals who we received by mistake.	Portage County
156	Mailing a ballot in our small town took 5 days to get returned to clerk.	Washburn County
157	We received multiple ballots returned as undeliverable by the post office on April 9th. They were mailed out on March 13th. This significant lag means that neither the voters nor our office had any ability to communicate alternative options to the voter so they still had an opportunity to vote in the April 7 election. Additionally, since our local post office has gone to one single pick-up/ drop-off time rather than two, it add an average of two days travel time for all mail pieces. When voters can still request an absentee ballot by mail the Thursday prior to the election through 5pm, and we process first thing Friday morning, depending on when the truck arrives at the post office, that ballot may not even leave the post office until Saturday. The post office delivery lag and the current statutes do not align, and it is negatively impacting voters (as well as our other operations that rely on specific statutory deadlines). In previous elections, there were very few times that we would receive a late arriving ballot. In this election, we received several.	Sauk County
158	I am quite concerned about the effects of the recent Executive Order regarding mail-in ballots. It is not the job of the postal service to determine which voters get ballots.	Barron County
159	Our small post office is only part time staffed, we get no mail.on Tuesdays, which of course is election day, so if we dont get it Monday, it's Wednesday.	Grant County
160	My local post office is wonderful to work with especially as relates to election items. They are very alert to the importance of timely processing and offer residents option of bringing absentee certificate to post office directly to place into town's PO Box as long as has postage affixed.	Green County
161	We received only one delivery on election day in the mid morning with only 20 ballots. and the received 269 the next day, and the 92 the following day, most were postmarked before election day, some as early as March, and several were not postmarked at all.	Milwaukee County
162	Consider those voters who have returned their absentee ballots, but have not been delivered to clerks on election day, the ability to vote in person	Pierce County
163	Keep up the good work!	Trempealeau County
164	We work with our local post office to hand stamp out going & tell our people to have post office hand stamp or the majority just drop them off at town office to clerk, then they know it is here to be counted.	Juneau County
165	Most absentee ballots did not show any postal data.	Green Lake County
166	Absentee ballot delivery times seem similar our other mailed items, such as utility bills and payments.	Manitowoc County
167	Our residents are well aware of the increased postal delivery times, so they were able to plan their absentee mailing times in advance. As a result, we did not have an increase in absentee ballots not returned by election day	Brown County
168	One problem was the person who requested an absentee ballot on the very last allowable day. I sent it out immediately. She returned it as soon as she could , too, but it still arrived late. Could the final request date be moved up to allow more time? I had no phone number to call her to vote in-person.	Brown County
169	TOO MANY PEOPLE THAT ARE REQUESTING AND THEN SHOWING UP AT THE POLLING PLACE TO RETURN THEM OR VOTE IN PERSON.	Marquette County
170	For the November 2025 General Election, one ballot from a couple living in TX mailed at the same time arrived about a week before the election, the other ballot arrived a few days after the election with no postmark.	Dodge County
171	I had an Absentee ballot returned due to 'no such address', but the address was correct. I had a voter send back an Absentee ballot via UPS and it never got here. There was one Absentee ballot that should have been returned by the PO because the voter moved, but it was not returned.....his wife's ballot came back though.	Sawyer County
172	The deadline to mail an absentee ballot on the Friday before an election needs to be changed. It will never get there and returned in time for ballot to count.	Oneida County
173	I received several Absentee ballots without the stamp being canceled. I could see it went through a mail machine because of the bar code at the bottom of the envelope. I received 1 Absentee ballot on April 8, 2026 with no postal marks at all. I brought these examples to the attention of the Postal workers.	Jefferson County
174	Although the majority of ballots seemed to arrive to voter and back to us quickly (2-3 days each way), we seemed to have an abnormal number of voters (~25) who contacted us that were sent their absentee on March 17th but had not yet received it by April 1st. A few even stated that their spouse had received theirs at the same address within 2-3 days of it being sent, but their absentee had never arrived. We also had a number (3-4) that were returned undeliverable, but other mail, to include letters from our office, had been recently delivered with no issue to the same address.	Eau Claire County

#	Comment	County
175	I find that most of my voters are confident enough in the mail that they will receive their ballot but they are less confident that it will get returned in time so nearly half of my absentee voters return their ballot by hand or in our dropbox. This obviously wastes the postage that we have put on the certificate envelopes . I have found that our post office will work hard to get the ballots back to us especially in those last days before the election. It's my understanding that most mail is supposed to go down to Milwaukee before it comes back but I know for a fact that I have had ballots come back to me that the post office received the same day and they have quickly hand canceled it and sometimes made a special trip to our clerk's office to drop them off even if they have already delivered the rest of our mail that day. In my opinion they go above and beyond but we are a smaller community so I can see why there might be more willingness to go above and beyond like that. I really wish that we could change the law allowing people to request a mail-in ballot up until 5:00 p.m. the Friday before the election because it's possible they won't even receive it before election day but nearly impossible for them to receive it and mail it back. I feel like that deadline should be more realistic.	Winnebago County
176	Just finished my First year and second election	Shawano County
177	I had a ballot postmarked April 1st and received it on April 8th	Sheboygan County
178	We are a small municipality and do not have a high volume of absentee ballots. The additional mailing time did not cause an issue with this election, but the time has increased.	Shawano County
179	Ballot request timelines need to be adjusted as I do not see the delivery improving. Logically there is not a way to request a ballot at 5 pm on the Thursday prior to the election, mail that ballot, and receive the ballot back by the following Tuesday...not at all possible.	Door County
180	This election had fewer absentees due to minimal number of candidates so not a good basis to judge. Majority of absentee voters were on confined list so mailed early.	Taylor County
181	The mail service is awful. I no longer trust USPS for delivery.	Marathon County
182	Many residents in our municipality are unhappy with and have low trust in the postal service.	Lafayette County
183	If sent to same zip code and from inside post office, it is quick. If outside zip code, there is no way that an absentee should be sent after Wednesday of the week before elections. If they need to send it back, it will not get to me in time. And if another person cannot return it, they can't submit their ballot. Even sending it the Wednesday before is pushing it and it may not be enough time.	Crawford County
184	Not sure the days it took to mail to voters but was told 7 days for me to receive it back from the voter. I called on one the day prior to inquiry as it wasn't back yet.	Barron County
185	five years ago, I had a ballot delivered on election night directly from the USPS by an individual. Fantastic USPS service!	Buffalo County
186	I just received an absentee ballot on April 9 that was postmarked April 1. An eight-day delivery time seems excessive. Absentee ballots should be treated with a higher priority than regular mail, as they appeared to be in the past. During this election, several voters also told me they never received their absentee ballots. We have also recently experienced broader issues with postal delivery. On average, first-class mail has been taking around 14 days, so while eight days may be an improvement, it is still concerning. Around tax time, mail addressed to our Village PO Box was returned as undeliverable. I had over 30 documented pieces of mail; however, we received many more complaints. I contacted the Milwaukee postmaster who presented at the WEC conference, and although she said she would look into the issue and follow up, I never received a response. Our local postmaster later indicated that a truck of mail was mistakenly sent to a return facility rather than the delivery facility. This created a significant burden for the Clerk's office, as residents understandably looked to us for answers. Even when the issue is outside the Clerk's control, the Clerk's office is still expected to respond, investigate, and help find a solution.	Kenosha County
187	It seems to take 3-4 days for mail to be post marked in Milwaukee and sent back to Monroe, and another 3-4 days back to Monroe. Most people ballots were fine when they are mailed out 21 days prior to the election. The ballots that were recieved past the election seem to be those that were requested and mailed out from my office with that 10-7 day prior to the election.	Green County
188	I received no late ballots. Seems the postal service delivers them in a reasonable time frame.	Grant County
189	Mail service has declined greatly in the past 2 years or more.	Jefferson County
190	Please help us get the sizes and required inserts to a single first class stamp	Brown County
191	We don't track data on absentee ballots. Town Clerk have enough duties, reports, data, etc without adding that. Maybe not have us put our county and towns on these forms...	Eau Claire County
192	I think you need to concreate on items you have more control over. In some sates they only have mail-in voting and they have had it for years. Please stop changing things just because you can. We had a very good system under the GAB	Monroe County
193	I delivered my ballots to the post office and asked that they be hand stamped.	Richland County
194	The mail time in our area is not very good. However, at our small post office, the postmaster took our absentee ballots and stamped them right in the office, rather than them having to travel to Green Bay before going to the voter. This was very helpful and made things a lot quicker. If the ballots were returned to the local post office, he did the same thing then, making for a much faster turnaround time.	Forest County
195	If voters take ballot into the local post office and ask for it to be hand postmarked I receive ballots the next day. I do that for outgoing, as well. We had one voter express concern about length of time to receive ballot - they are in Florida for the Winter, it took about a week for them to receive their ballot.	Marathon County

#	Comment	County
196	The local post office is very helpful. They will hand cancel postage and deliver ballots next day when mailing within their route areas. The issues arise when ballots have to route through the regional sorting facilities and are traveling out of the area. The process is very slow.	Winnebago County
197	The USPS does not scan every ballot sent or returned, nor do they cancel every ballot.	Adams County
198	I live in the country and have more than 1 town address to mail ballots. I try to take to post office so they stay "in town" as much as possible when mailing out ballots. However, it takes sometimes a week for ballots to get through our postal system after being mailed out from my house or the voters house.	Crawford County
199	our rural post office does not have an evening pickup, which is why our average is listed as 4 days.	Oconto County
200	It seems like it is taking longer and longer for ballots to reach the voters, this election was the worst one I have had on number of ballots not returned. I had two residents that had called wanting to know why they never received their ballot. I did verify their address and it was correct on where it was sent. Ballots that went absentee were mailed on the 12th of March and they still had not been received by 7th April. Others I did not see back until the 28th of March.	Ashland County
201	There should be a better option for voters when their ballot is lost in the mail on the way to them. I had one voter in April 2026 that requested an absentee ballot, it was sent and recorded as being processed (in MN on the way back to northern WI), and then never arrived. Her husband's ballot arrived on time. She was going out of time and was not at all happy to not be able to vote. Perhaps if nothing else, more information should be provided to absentee voters that they are taking a chance that the ballot could arrive late, their ballot could be returned to the municipality after the deadline, or they may not receive the ballot at all, and they are agreeing to take that chance. The scanning system does help, but not when it stalls out by just saying the ballot has been scanned by USPS and then never shows up.	Bayfield County
202	The average number of days really depends on the distant the ballot has to travel.	Oconto County
203	When i send absentee ballots, WisVote always says "out for delivery". The only time this changes is when I mark the ballot as returned. Shouldn't the status change to delivered so I know the voter received it? Or does the postal system not "talk" to WisVote like that?	Clark County
204	I am unsure of delivery dates. I can’t depend on a number of days to tell a voter.	Jackson County
205	Current deadlines (Thursday prior to election) to request an absentee ballot is not working anymore. We cannot control what the post office does but we take the complaints about not receiving ballots in time to vote, let alone return by election day. In our efforts to retain whatever voter trust is left, it doesn't help when these items out of our control reflect on all levels of election administration - and not positively. If there is anything we can do to speed ballot time, please do so. THANK YOU	Rock County
206	I have asked our postal office to hand stamp the absentee ballots. They have been great to do that for me, however, I still have absentee ballots not get to the voter.	Wood County
207	The Clerk-Treasurer office is currently short staffed therefore I don't have time to look into the mailing times.	Waupaca County
208	First, it's impossible to know when the voter receives their ballots after I have mailed them. Also impossible to know when I receive them when the voter mailed them back to me not knowing when they put them in the mail. I do know that when they are postmarked at Milwaukee I receive them 2 days later. Also, the postal service here in Rhinelander and my mail carrier in particular do everything in their power to make sure that the ballots are handled professionally and in a timely manner. At an election a couple of years ago the postmaster hand delivered a ballot to me before the polls closed. We are a rural town and he had to drive on his off time to do that. The voters are the problem who wait until the last minute to mail out their ballots. Also, you need to fight the suggested possibility of limiting mail-in ballots. They are absolutely needed.	Oneida County
209	Voters are concerned about mailing time when they send their ballot back to me.	Price County
210	We had one absentee voter who came to vote in person and said his ballot never arrived, even though the postal data in WisVote said "out for delivery"on March 14. We had 2 voters who said they mailed their ballots back a week prior to the election but we never received them. We have made it clear to return your ballot as soon as possible but that doesn't seem to work. Is there any way to have a postal code on the return envelope so we know when they are mailed back?	Dane County
211	all mail is taking an extremely long time - our town has 3 different postal zip codes and mail is very sparatic in the delivery time. some have taken 2 weeks to get	Marathon County
212	This is my first election as a new clerk. I used the printable mail labels that include the smart mailing labels. This is something our previous clerk did not utilize. While I'm not confident the tracking was always accurate, I do feel the mail arrived to voters and back to me quicker than most mail seems to be moving through the USPS lately.	Dodge County
213	For the indefinitely confined and voter who typically have an absentee request " on file" there is little problem. But for many folks (especially college students), by the time they know they need a ballot or are aware of an upcoming election there is hardly enough time to get a ballot sent out and returned. This is especially tough since mail from the PO only goes out once a day it can set things back even further.	Bayfield County
214	i recevied an absentee ballot on Thursday before elections. I drove it to the Pardeeville post office and requested that it bypass milwaukee. They were agreeable and the voter received the next day and was able to return it to me in time.	Columbia County
215	Our township is pretty small and for the most part we all have the same mail carrier. Our mail carrier is very good about hand stamping the ballots, so they stay in house and I generally get those the next day.	Rock County
216	For the past two elections - April and Feb - we did not get any mail on election day. We checked our mailbox multiple times throughout the day and again at poll close, nothing. The next day, we had ballots and other mail in the box. We rarely go a day without ANY mail, and it seems really suspicious that two of the no-mail days were election days.	Dane County
217	We noticed no difference in delivery times, and all absentees were returned prior to the election.	Oconto County

#	Comment	County
218	There needs to be more strict requirements for requesting and voting absentee. The extra cost alone for voters simply choosing to do it just because, is far too great, and in many cases, they do not return the ballots.	Brown County
219	My concern is more with how late someone can request an absentee ballot. This is the real issue. Why would anyone, in or out of state, think that they can request on the Thursday before an election and receive it on time with time to return it to us. We see more and more wasted postage on those who now hand deliver the ballot as they don't trust the postal service. Something needs to be revised.	Outagamie County
220	We are a small community with post service workers we know. They try their best to catch and be aware of absentee ballot mailing, especially if mailed within same town. However those that get sent to large towns to get processed see a 10 day turn around.	Burnett County
221	I had numerous ballots sent on 3/13/2026 that were never received. The Post Office blamed the snow storm on Monday. I asked if they would please take a second ballot up the street to a indefinitely confined individual. They said yes, but when I came back in the afternoon to drop off another 2nd ballot I was told they couldn't do that and would send his ballot through the traditional route. I never got the ballot back from the individual so I can only guess when he may have gotten it. We have never had issues like this during my time here.	Jefferson County
222	It seems to take as many as 7 to 8 days for ballots to deliver within the town. We had some that never arrived and voters had to come to the polls to vote.	Walworth County
223	I am less concerned about the post office as I am about the process itself. A large percentage of our mail out ballots are returned by perfectly healthy people who walk them back into the office and make comments about how convenient the process is. The amount of time and money we spend (other tax payer dollars) so that people can be convenienced when voting defeats the purpose of absentee voting. This needs to be seriously looked at.	St. Croix County
224	Local mail delivery now takes as long as the long-distance mailings we do, compared to ten or so years ago when the service was better and faster. The later in the time available to request an absentee ballot, the more we are concerned that it will not get to the voter timely enough to be voted and mailed back by election day. Some voters have even said they do not trust the mail to get it back timely, so they end hand-delivering their ballots on election day.	Juneau County
225	There was physical damage to ballots mailed to voters as well as returned to the clerk	Outagamie County
226	I received a call from the post master that stated they never received their second batch of mail from Green Bay. The postmaster was doing everything to find the missing mail. I am guessing those are the ballots received after election day. My postmaster is AMAZING and does everything she can to make sure every ballot is counted. She was even willing to drive to pick up the missing mail wherever it was.	Manitowoc County
227	Some people did not even receive their ballot from us while others mailed on March 28th and we did not receive it until April 13th	Ozaukee County
228	Many voters are concerned about the mail. We mailed 152 ballot. 55 voters physically returned their ballots to our office.	Columbia County
229	Election Day I believe there was 1 returned in our regular mail and then the Cudahy post master brought down an estimated 5 or 6 more at the time the post office closed for the day (Tuesday). Wednesday mail contained an estimated 10-15 late arriving absentees, Thursday contained an estimated 3 late arriving absentees, Friday contained an estimated 8-10 late arriving absentees. These numbers are substantially larger than even a November Election. The post office staff even asked me what we do with them since it was "their fault". I'm not sure what was meant by that statement since timing of arrival is also dependent on when the voter placed them in the mail.	Milwaukee County
230	I have concerns related to the post office performance in general. THEY STATED THAT THE VILLAGE'S MAILING ADDRESS WAS INVALID ON A NUMBER OF WATER BILLS SENT TO VILLAGE HALL DURING THE ABSENTEE VOTING TIMEFRAME. THIS IS A CONCERN AS YOU CAN IMAGINE WHEN WE WERE SUPPOSED TO RECIEVE BALLOTS.	Waukesha County
231	If the USPS stops delivering mail does that mean we won't have mail in ballots anymore or would that responsibility shift to a different service provider?	Washington County
232	The mail in ballots are taking longer in most cases and out of state ballots are usually taking much longer, sometimes up to two weeks.	Sauk County
233	I received ballots April 8 that were post marked in Milwaukee Mar 25. That should have been plenty of time to get to Slinger before Election day.	Washington County
234	I still have several Absentees that have not been returned, but I have not had a chance to finish reconciliation, so I'm not sure if those people voted on 04/07, or not, yet. Some voters felt forced to come in and vote in person as they had not received their ballot. Several voters returned their mailed absentee to me in person because they felt there was not enough time to mail it back.	Columbia County
235	I think absentee by mail should be limited to the elder, confined and or service men and women. It would lesson situations in the bigger cities and it would be more authentic! It would eliminate the news feeds on the bigger cities and schools. College students should have to vote in their municipality in which they live - where their mail is sent, car is insured, health insurance is covered. Most college students are on their parents health insurance, so they are not independent paying their own bills, such as why would they want to support a municipality for the people living in their college area. The student has no impact on their economic growth or development as they are they a short period of time. They are not tax payers! Students need to understand their vote impacts the economic daily living. Not living off their parents or grandparents checkbook. Everyone has the right to vote, vote in your municipality in which it could impact or will impact because that's where the tax dollars are coming from.	Calumet County
236	Could the cut off date be earlier seeing it takes longer for the mail to process.	Marathon County

#	Comment	County
237	My municipality normally gets mail delivery every day - this is also how our mail goes out. We did not receive mail for three days in a row April 1st - 3rd, meaning we didn't get ballots back for three days. This has NEVER happened before - we've had a day skipped here and there, but never multiple.	Winnebago County
238	We had one family that sent their absentees (3 total) back all at the same time from the same location. All ballots were issued on 3/17. One was received by the office on 3/30, the other on 4/3 and the last one just came in Saturday 4/11 mail.	Winnebago County
239	We would like to see the inside postage eliminated. It is getting way too costly	Dane County
240	Our mail travels from Town of Stockton, to Stevens Point, to Milwaukee then back to be delivered. I don't understand this process. We waste so much municipal money providing stamps on returned envelops and because people don't trust the mailing service, everyone drops them off to the clerk before the election. So much municipal money is wasted on stamps that is unnecessary and with the price of stamps increasing almost every six months. It costs our town a lot of money.	Portage County
241	A postal employee told me they did not receive mail for the lower numbered PO boxes (400 and lower) for Monday April 6 or Tuesday April 7. I then got 5 absentee ballots on Wednesday April 8. One was mailed March 24 where was that ballot all this time.	Walworth County
242	Ballots that were mailed to local residents were quicker than ballots that were sent to our of state locations.	Vilas County
243	I have mailed (3) Representatives from USPS regarding my concern.	Sheboygan County
244	I received only one late ballot, postmarked April 8, so it could have been when it was sent. No information from sender.	Door County
245	We have noticed that people do not have confidence in the postal system, so a fair number of ballots are being returned to either the drop box or in person at Village Hall. The other issue we have noticed is a ballot being mailed to a different address (snowbirds) that do not make it to that address even when the address is correct on the ballot. The other issue we have is the cost of sending an absentee ballot when voters are either returning them via a drop box or in person at Village Hall.	Dane County
246	This year, more than ever, we had several ballots get completely lost in the mail. Both on their way to voters and on their way back to us.	Outagamie County
247	The biggest concern is the number of ballots that get lost in the local mail and are never scanned in anywhere. I also see mail being returned as UTF after several weeks, and in some cases, months. While the majority of local mail is delivered in a timely manner, even relatively few missing ballots is a concern and costs us a not insignificant amount in duplicate postage.	Racine County
248	Our mail person who delivers at the village hall is pretty good. But when she has a sub working, they aren't. I always take absentee ballots to the post office myself to mail and not the outside mailbox at the village hall. There is a couple who winters in AZ and he gets the ballot; she does not. Or so they say. I ended up sending her a second ballot and the next day the first one arrived. Personally I think it's her and not the mail. But I have heard from other area clerks they experience delivery issues with each election. Thank God for drop boxes at municipal buildings!!!	Portage County
249	Our local post office is very helpful trying to get the ballots to our office since we are right across the street from the post office.	Eau Claire County
250	I mail my ballots from Portage. My ballots then travel to Milwaukee for a postmark, and then the majority of my ballots, travel back to Portage to be delivered locally. The USPS wonders why they have financial hardship, but they are overhandling the mail, shipping absentee ballots back and forth needlessly. Today I received two absentee ballots marked Return to Sender "Temporarily Away", each were postmarked March 17th in Milwaukee. Today is April 13th. Where have they been sitting all of this time?	Columbia County
251	Being able to request a ballot as late as the Thursday before an election is asinine. There is very little chance that a ballot being sent out of state will reach the requester and get returned by Tuesday. The cut off should be no later than the Tuesday before the election for mail ballots. Thursday is too late.	Burnett County
252	When voters fill out an absentee request online, they should be required to fill in a way to contact them (phone or email) in the event that it is very short on time turnaround.	Fond du Lac County
253	My understanding was that voters could bring their ballot to our local post office (Washburn) and if it was 5 or fewer days before the election the postal workers would keep it separate and not send it to Duluth/Minneapolis for "counting" but would keep it local and put it directly in the Clerk's PO box. That is what has happened in the past but this election people brought their ballots in to the post office during that window and were told by the workers that it would be sent to Duluth/Minneapolis unless the voter returned on Monday, the day before the election, and turned in the ballot then. So people left with their ballots and then had to return. I would like to know for sure what the actual rule is. Is this determined by each individual post office?	Bayfield County
254	I have actually had ballot dropped off at post office and mailed back to the clerk's office the next day instead of the voter's address on the envelope	Bayfield County
255	At least one of the absentee ballots I mailed was never received by the voter	Marinette County
256	I think we should send the ballots out earlier.	Barron County
257	This would be regarding the SAVE act and downward flow of citizen information. My understanding is that the Feds will colabrate on the "list" of qualified citizen's and then it will go to the state election official who then will hand it over to the USPS. From there the USPS will decide if a person will get that absentee ballot or not based on the database they have.....THIS IS SO WRONG, IF THIS IS THE PLAN!!!	Shawano County
258	The postal workers work very hard to get our mail delivered on time. The problem that we have is that our mail is sent to the Twin Cities and then comes back to our Village for distribution. When we mail out the absentee ballots, we ask them not to send them to the cities but to keep them local. I don't know if this is the practice for the incoming mail, but it would be nice to have them be consistent especially when it is for election ballots.	St. Croix County

#	Comment	County
259	Absentee request deadlines need to change to a week before the Election. I had 3 voters complain they never received their ballot, 2 voters from different addresses that had their ballots mailed to Florida and they came back undeliverable; even though they confirmed that it was the correct address.	Eau Claire County
260	Deadline to request ballots by mail should be moved to the Monday or Tuesday before an election. By the close of business on Thursday is too late.	Brown County
261	As a city, we have noticed the mail system significantly decline in the last 6 months or so. We are noticing a lot of things getting lost in the mail, not being delivered to intended recipients, arriving to us way later than normal. Some of this we feel is in part due to the removal of the local post offices and moving all of the postal stamps to the regional offices.	Iowa County
262	I think the mail carriers in Richland County do a fine job.	Richland County
263	Ballots that were mailed from our town ended up postmarked in MILWAUKEE. That is ridiculous. We wonder why our mail has to go there to be processed and not more locally. It is amazing that I received them in time and not after the election. Not happy with our mail delivery times.	Taylor County
264	out of state absentees were for the most part not returned for the april election - I believe voters received their ballots too late and felt that if returned they would not be received in time so did not return.	Rock County
265	Hard to really answer these questions when we are uncertain when they returned it.	Jackson County
266	Postal service was not very good this time. Ballots took 10 days or more for them to be received. This election was the worst for ballots not returned including one that was sent back priority mail and did not receive that one back.	Polk County
267	I would like to see phone number on the absentee ballot request as required. I mail out absentee ballots as soon as we receive the ballots but some people wait till its too late to return them on time.	Marquette County
268	I think the cutoff date for requesting ballots should be earlier to quarantee time to voter and back.	Manitowoc County
269	This election we had more than two dozen ballots that voters never received and have still not come back to the clerks office. We had a 30% drop in voters using the vote early option from Spring 2025 to Spring 2026 and I do believe frustration with the mail is a contributing factor.	St. Croix County
270	It sucks that it has to go on a truck to MILWAUKEE sit overnight and then the next morning to finally get processed just to get sent back to the local post office that is located right next door to the Village office.	Columbia County
271	postal service is slower than in past years, the outgoing is just as bad as some voters don't get their ballots at all sometimes now and coming back ballots are delayed also. This shouldn't be right down to the wire, it's too important. By mail ballots isn't like it used to be for many reasons, maybe this shouldn't be a thing. Maybe just absentee in the clerk's office if voters can be here on voting day?	Polk County
272	The Post Office is trying very hard to get ballots to municipalities. However, now that most of the outgoing mail is sent to a larger city for distribution rather than staying local, it takes addition time for ballots to arrive.	Door County
273	Several spouses recieved one ballot but not the other and they were all mailed out at the same time.	Marathon County
274	A previous question - response of how many days appears to be taking, local is probably 4-6 days and out of town, our snow birds, take 7-10 days - it's not ideal.	Washington County
275	If the post office cannot deliver in a timely manner (2-3 days), election laws might as well be changed. We mailed a ballot out on the Tuesday before the election, to an in city address. That ballot was not received until the Thursday after the election. Current election law has us mailing ballots until the Friday before an election. If the post office cannot deliver timely, we are throwing away time and money.	Wood County
276	Because of mail delays, many people walk their ballot back into the office. This creates many issues, including a massive waste of municipal funds @ $.78 (soon to be $ .82) a piece for return stamps that are then not used to mail back... It also creates negative thoughts/convos when everyone has to hand in their own ballot, because often times a spouse attempts to turn in ballots for both parties and they cannot.	Marinette County
277	Because mailing is 3 days on average the cut off date for requesting absentees should be changed.	Waupaca County
278	USPS is awful! They don't care when you try to talk with them.	Langlade County
279	I had a couple who are in AZ. We mailed our big batch of absentees on Friday March 13th. The wife received her ballot (according to her husband) on March 14th. He never received his 1st ballot. I cancelled and mailed a 2nd ballot on March 26th. He received it on April 2nd. He mailed it back to me priority (paying the extra postage) and I received it on Monday April 6th. This was not the only case. It also took a while for us to receive any undeliverables.	Walworth County
280	Received a ballot from voter that mailed the ballot in plenty of time to be counted on election day - postmarked March 26 - but I received it 18 days after it was mailed from the voter's location. This is more than a week after the election.	Waukesha County
281	Our ballots have to go from the Belleville Post Office to Milwaukee and back again so that the bar codes can be scanned for MyVote information to be updated (total of 4 days from ballot going to elector and elector sending back). Most people here in the "country" do not take this into consideration when returning their ballots. I sent out the bulk of my ballots on March 12, but they were not sent back soon enough. The three electors placed their ballots in the Belleville Post Office mailbox on April 4, they arrived in Milwaukee on April 6 per the cancel stamp and to the town hall on April 8. The problem is not with the post office. These three people had to drive past the town hall to get to the Belleville Post Office on Saturday - they should have just dropped them into the drop box located outside the town hall front door. People need to think about this when they request and return ballots.	Green County
282	I don't believe letting voters request an absentee ballot up until the Friday before is a valid request as that is not enough time to mail the ballot, voter to fill out the ballot and to return the ballot on time	Pierce County
283	We had trouble because of holiday schedule. Post office was closed on the Friday before election and slow on the Monday before	Washburn County

#	Comment	County
284	My local post office does an amazing job. BUT, people need to remember that we had a historic snowstorm shortly after the ballots needed to be mailed out which I'm sure added to the delivery time.	Waushara County
285	Voters have lost confidence in the postal service. Several absentee ballots were hand delivered to me.	Rusk County
286	The edgerton Wisconsin post office goes out of their way to accommodate our absentee ballots. They are truly service oriented	Jefferson County
287	Why is WEC still allowing absentee ballots to be sent without tracking information. Due to the issues with mail, tracking should not be an option. This is an issue in the township where I live. My absentee ballot address is handwritten and the inside envelope does not have a label.	Dodge County
288	The deadline to request absentee ballots by mail should be earlier. Voters may not even get their ballot by election day if they request it on the Thursday or Friday before the election.	Marathon County
289	The Thursay at 5pm deadline to request an absentee ballot via mail is completely unrealistic and needs to be changed.	Oneida County
290	It appears our post office is holding mail. We have been watching this for some time. Days 1 and 2 we receive very little mail. Day 3 there is a large amount of mail. Days 4 and 5 again we receive little, etc.	Adams County
291	We've had more ballots show up late. With curious markings and no postmarked dates. Example of how late... Postmark from Milwaukee 3/28 received in mail 4/15 at 1pm.	Dane County
292	Our municipality is right across the street from our post office and they used to make ballots a priority and hand deliver them the day before and on election day. Now, they don't even notify us that ballots are there.	Waukesha County
293	I did not receive any ballots after the election.	Waupaca County
294	In 2025, the City had 21 total ballots received from the day after the April election to the present day. In 2026, the City currently has 36 ballots received from the day after the April election to the present day. We received 7 today (April 16th) that were postmarked in Milwaukee on March 19th.	Sheboygan County
295	It depends on the post office and if they send to Milwaukee or not. It takes much longer to go and from Milwaukee, which is what the workers have been told they have to do, even if coming and going through the same location.	Marquette County
296	Local mail doesn't appear to be the issue; it's the snowbirds in Arizona and other states further away that have significant delays there and back. One voter was waiting and returned it priority mail at a cost of just shy of $12, and it still arrived 1-2 days late (after 04/07/2026).	Barron County
297	Local mail has experienced some delays, not nearly as so long as out of state. One local voter was waiting for his ballot that was mailed on March 17th; he still hadn't received it after a full 7 days. It arrived late; the postmark was 04/06, which is not ideal - however, I'd have to ask the voter what day he mailed his ballot that he was eagerly awaiting.	Barron County
298	Some of the returnes were not postmarked with date	Dodge County
299	I actually took the ballots right to the post office where they were addressed. They still took several days to get them delivered.	Barron County
300	Received ballots postmarked March 27 after April 7.	Rock County
301	The delay in northern WI is due to Rhinelander mail going to Milwaukee and then coming back to Rhinelander which is creating a longer than ever turnaround.	Oneida County
302	It depends upon whether the destination is within Madison or outside. If outside, the number of days to receive a ballot varies widely. If within, the time is minimal.	Dane County
303	I had ballots that I have sent in several prior elections go to Florida. I sent them both out on the same day. The wife never received hers and called me. A few days later, I got them both back - one voted by the husband and one marked undeliverable for the wife.	Sawyer County
304	we had a ballot go missing and based on data from USPS it was all the way in MO - not sure why local mail doesn't stay local	Walworth County
305	THERE WASN'T ANYTHING CONSISTENT WITH THE PROCESS, IT WOULD VARY. IT'S UPSETTING TO SEE SUCH PROBLEMS WITH A SYSTEM THAT HAS BECOME VERY UNRELIABLE FOR SUCH AN IMPORTANT PROCESS.	Jefferson County
306	I'm concerned about late-arriving ballots. We received 88 ballots at 8:30 on 4/8. This is an unusually high number. We also didn't receive our customary delivery of ballots after 5 pm on Election Night.	Brown County
307	Couples had concerns when one of the voters had received their ballot and the other had not. This happened more frequently this election than in the past. When looking at the tracking information, the information for the missing ballot stated that the ballot was "out for delivery" on the same day or within the next day or two of when the first ballot was delivered. On some occasions, it had been several days in the "out for delivery" status. It is just strange that the ballots were not delivered at the same time (or within the next couple of days), because often times when the ballots are returned to us by the voter we end up receiving them back on the same day.	La Crosse County
308	We received four more absentee ballots in today's mail, and it appears the post office is now trying to cover up their delays by adding a second postmark to the ballots. One of the four ballots I received today was originally postmarked March 24th, but the post office tried to put a second postmark over that date, dated April 9th. Two other ballots were originally postmarked April 6th, but the post office tried to put a second postmark over those as well, dated April 9th.	Waukesha County
309	I had a voter send their absentee ballot priority mail on March 27, 2026 from Florida. We did not receive their ballot until April 8. I think the Election Commission needs to do more about informing voters the mailing issues with absentee voting with the USPS.	Waukesha County

Wisconsin Elections Commission

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(608) 266-8005 | elections@wi.gov | elections.wi.gov

May 7, 2026

Mr. David Steiner
Postmaster General and Chief Executive Officer
United States Postal Service
475 L'Enfant Plaza SW
Washington, DC 20260

RE: Wisconsin Election Mail

Dear Postmaster General Steiner,

We write to you today to express our concern about mail delays that threaten the ability of our citizens to exercise their right to vote. While these concerns pertain to all voters, Wisconsin voters who are overseas or serving in the military are disproportionately affected by this issue.

We are a bipartisan Commission charged with administering elections in the State of Wisconsin. As part of our duties, we assist over 1,850 municipal clerks and 72 county clerks. Unlike many other states, Wisconsin has a highly decentralized elections system, and these local officials are the ones doing the hard work to issue, receive, and process absentee ballots. Following Wisconsin's Spring Election on April 7, 2026, many of these clerks contacted us to report grave concerns about the performance of the mail.

In a subsequent survey of Wisconsin local election officials, two-thirds of clerks reported problems with the mail. More than half of the clerks reported receiving complaints and concerns from their voters. And a quarter of the clerks reported receiving more late ballots than is typical for an election. While most clerks report mail arriving within 3-5 days, a concerning number reported election mail took 7-10 (or more) days to reach its destination. Finally, many of the clerks described infrequent mail deliveries when compared to past elections. One veteran clerk described the quality of service as the lowest in her 23 years of experience.

Wisconsin Elections Commissioners
Ann S. Jacobs, chair | Marge Bostelmann | Don M. Millis | Carrie Riepl | Robert Spindell | Mark L. Thomsen

Administrator
Meagan Wolfe

These concerns are not intended to diminish the incredibly difficult and overwhelmingly successful work the Postal Service does every day. Many Wisconsin clerks went out of their way to share that the support from their local Post Offices has been nothing short of exceptional. This sentiment is echoed by our state staff, who are deeply thankful for the professionalism and proactive engagement of their regional contacts. We recognize that a majority of election mail is delivered promptly. [1]

We hope you recognize that any delay in election mail can potentially deprive citizens their fundamental right to vote. We must continue to work together to ensure better results for the public. Thank you for your attention to this matter, and I look forward to your prompt response.

Sincerely,

The Wisconsin Elections Commission

Cc:
Senator Tammy Baldwin
Senator Ron Johnson
1st District Representative Bryan Steil
2nd District Representative Mark Pocan
3rd District Representative Derrick Van Orden
4th District Representative Gwen Moore
5th District Representative Scott L. Fitzgerald
6th District Representative Glenn Grothman
7th District Representative Tom Tiffany
8th District Representative Tony Wied

[1] United States Postal Service, 2024 Post-Election Analysis Report: Delivering the Nation's Election Mail Securely and Effectively (Dec. 2, 2024) (about.usps.com/newsroom/national-releases/2024/1202-usps-releases-2024post-election-analysis-report.htm).